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INTRODUCTION
This study began as an account of judicial institutions 
of labour conflict resolution in the tradition of 
comparative law and empirical socio-legal research. By 
looking at labour courts and equivalent judicial 
institutions in France, Germany, Great Britain and the 
United States, it became apparent that labour conflict 
resolution at the judicial level is linked in many respects 
to pre-judicial processes. Thus the study was expanded to 
include institutions at the company level (grievance or 
dispute procedures, arbitration and negotiation procedures) 
as well as collective bargaining institutions. However, not 
only do these non-judicial institutions differ widely 
between countries; they also operate under different 
premises in the industrial relations system than labour 
courts or other institutions which form part of the judicial 
system. A socio-legal perspective which looks at industrial 
relations procedures simply as pre-judicial procedures and 
which employs the methods of judicial research, became 
insufficient to study the functions and processes of labour 
conflict resolution within the industrial relations system.
The present analysis adopts therefore a systems 
theoretical approach which assumes strict separation and 
operational closure of both the legal system and the 
industrial relations system. The study presupposes that 
non-judicial labour conflict resolution is closely linked to 
the industrial relations system. In order to justify this 
presupposition a theory of the industrial relations system, 
in which the function of labour conflict resolution is 
determined, had to be developed.
The general theory of social systems, which encounters 
a paradigm shift from structural functionalism to a theory
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of communication circuits (1), has already been used to 
analyze the legal system as an autopoietic social system 
(2). However, autopoietic systems theory has so far not 
been applied to industrial relations. The following study 
attempts to show how the application of this theory can 
contribute to the understanding of both industrial relations 
and labour conflict resolution.
Chapter I outlines the major characteristics of an 
industrial relations system as an autopoietic social system. 
Previous attempts to apply Parsonian systems theory to 
industrial relations, in particular the attempt of John 
Dunlop, are criticized from the perspective of a Luhmannian 
concept of autopoietic social systems. The chapter
discusses Luhmann's conception of a social system in general 
in order to describe industrial relations as a social
system. Thereafter I propose a model of industrial
relations as a social system in which its essential
components are outlined.
Chapter II discusses functions of labour conflict 
resolution in an industrial relations system. Labour 
conflict resolution is described as an immune system of the 
collective bargaining system. The tripartite structure of 
many procedures of labour conflict resolution is analyzed as 
representing corporatist arrangements which characterize 
industrial relations in general.
Chapter III analyses labour conflict resolution in 
workplace industrial relations. It compares company dispute 
procedures in France, Germany, Great Britain and the United 
States.
1) The major work which represents the paradigm shift in 
the theory of social systems is Luhmann 1984a. See 
also Willke 1987.
2) See on the operational closure and the autopoietic 
nature of the legal system Teubner 1989. See also 
Luhmann 1987d: 354-363; 1986b and 1981a.
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Chapter IV analyses labour conflict resolution at the 
judicial level. It compares labour courts and equivalent 
judicial institutions in the four countries.
Chapter V contains remarks on the role of law in labour 
conflict resolution. It emphasizes the limits of legal 
regulation in labour law and its dependency on self­
regulation processes within the industrial relations system. 
The case of labour conflict resolution is used to illustrate 
the concept of reflexive labour law.
A few remarks on methodology might be added. The study 
uses qualitative rather than quantitative methods. It does 
not present new empirical data on labour courts and 
grievance procedures which is representative in a 
statistical sense (3). Nevertheless, the empirical material 
of the study attempts to increase knowledge of 
organizational reality and operations of labour conflict 
resolution.
Three sources of data have been used. Firstly, 
information was gathered through observations and interviews 
at labour courts and other labour conflict institutions. 
The research was started with an analysis of fourty cases of 
the Berlin labour court (4). The author gained further 
insights into the operations of the Berlin court while 
serving for three months as an assistant and articled clerk 
at this labour court in the beginning of 1989. During the
3) Studies which can claim to present representative 
empirical data on labour courts are Dickens et al. 1985 
for Great Britain and Falke et al. 1981 and 
Rottleuthner 1984 for West Germany.
4) This research was carried out at the 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin together with Erhard 
Blankenburg and Siegfried SchSnholz. See Blankenburg 
et al. 1978 and 1979.
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course of research five other labour courts were visited in 
Germany.
Data and material about the U.S. were gathered during a 
year of research studies at the University of Wisconsin in 
1980/81 which led to a separate report (5). This research 
was continued and updated during two further stays in autumn 
1984 and 1988. The following departments and agencies were 
visited in Washington D.C.: the Equal Rights Division of
the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 
the Department of Labor, the headquarters of the Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the AFL/CIO. Arbitration 
hearings were attended in Wisconsin and California and 
visits were made as well to the NLRB office in Milwaukee.
Data on the employment protection system in Great 
Britain were collected during four stays as visiting fellow 
of the Industrial Relations Research Unit of the University 
of Warwick between 1983 and 1988. Additional material has 
been gathered since the author started to teach employment 
law at Lancaster University in 1989. Interviews were 
conducted with 20 full-time and part-time chairmen of five 
industrial tribunals. These interviews were combined with 
visits to the respective regional industrial tribunals where 
hearings were attended. During these visits it was possible 
to arrange interviews with the Presidents of the industrial 
tribunals in England and Wales and the Scottish industrial 
tribunals. In addition, the author interviewed the 
administrative supervisor of industrial tribunals at the 
Department of Employment, and three senior ACAS officers who 
were successively in charge of individual conciliation at 
the ACAS headquarter in London. Interviews with individual 
ACAS conciliators were conducted at the ACAS regional office 
in Birmingham. Interviews with personnel managers and shop
5) Rogowski 1981.
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stewards relating to their experiences with company dispute 
procedures were conducted during a visit to the Ford motor 
plant at Canley in Coventry.
Utilization of both the national judicial statistics 
and the internal registers of the particular labour conflict 
resolution institutions provided a second source of valuable 
data. Statistics on German and French labour courts are 
published in the German Bundesarbeitsblatt and the French 
Annuaire statistioue de la justice. Statistical information 
on the British industrial tribunal system are contained in 
the Employment Gazette, the ACAS Annual Reports and the Fact 
Sheets of the Central Office of the Industrial Tribunals. In 
the U.S. some data on grievance procedures can be found in 
evaluations of collective bargaining agreements by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics prior to 1980; information on 
caseload developments are reported by the NLRB and the FMCS 
in their Annual Reports.
A third source of data for this study was the wealth of 
industrial relations research on grievance procedures and 
socio-legal studies of labour courts and employment 
protection. This material has been widely used and 
occasionally reinterpreted by applying the concepts of 
reflexive labour law and autopoietic industrial relations. 
In this respect this study can be understood as a 
contribution to the development of an alternative systems 
theoretical approach to the study of law and society, and of 
industrial sociology.
CHAPTER I
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM
Like other social research, industrial relations 
research employs various frames of reference. In general, a 
distinction can be drawn between approaches which focus on 
actors and institutions and those which concentrate on 
systemic and structural aspects. The first path is taken by 
action theory and pluralist or institutionalist theories and 
the second by Marxist or political economy approaches and 
also by systems theory (1).
The first chapter will be devoted to a discussion of 
the second strand of theorizing of industrial relations. It 
is particularly concerned with systems theory in industrial 
relations research which has been the most influential 
approach in both national and comparative accounts of 
industrial relations since the 1950s. In particular John 
Dunlop's "Industrial Relations Systems", published in 1958 
(2), had a lasting impact on national and international 
industrial relations research (3). His systems theory 
approach, which was inspired by Talcott Parsons' theory of 
structural functionalism, is the background against which an 
alternative approach to the systems theoretic 
conceptualization of industrial relations, based on Niklas 
Luhmann's work on social systems, will be developed.
1) See the classification of frames of reference in 
industrial relations research in Bean 1985: 1 ff.
2) Dunlop 1958. Dunlop still subscribed to his systems- 
theoretical approach in the 1980s. The main theoretical 
chapter "An Industrial Relations System", designed in 
1958 as an introduction to his comparative study of 
sectors of national industrial relations systems, was 
reprinted without alterations in his collection of 
articles on "dispute resolution" in Dunlop 1984 as ch. 
1.
3) See only Schienstock 1982: 32-59 and Hyman 1989, ch. 5.
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A critique of Dunlop's Systems Theory of industrial
Relations
Dunlop justifies his usage of systems theory with
direct reference to Parsonian structural functionalism. He 
considers Parsons' systems theory in general, and the 
analysis of the economic system as social system in 
particular, to be "suggestive for organizing insights and 
observations about the industrial-relations aspects of 
behavior in industrial society" (4) . He praises Parsons' 
systems theory in particular because its application helps 
"to provide analytical meaning to the idea of an industrial 
relations system" (5). Systems theory can advance beyond 
previous approaches in industrial relations research, which 
Dunlop disqualifies as "classifications in the spectrum of 
labor peace and warfare".
Dunlop is inspired by Parsonian theory after its 
complete systems-theoretical turn, as outlined in Parsons' 
and Smelser's "Economy and Society" of 1956. Parsons' 
theory developed in three phases: from the study of the
structure of social action as voluntaristic, non- 
deterministic action (6) to an analysis of the structure of 
social interaction as the basis of society as a social
system (7) and then into a deductive application of so- 
called pattern variables and generalized media of 
communication in order to describe social systems (8).
Initially, Parsons' analysis of the structure of society was 
characterized by a tension between action theory and systems 
theory, a tension which was resolved after the publication 
of "The Social System" (1951), and in particular after
4) See Dunlop 1958: 5.
5) Dunlop 1958: 3.
6) Parsons 1937.
7) Parsons 1951.
8) Parsons 1955, Parsons and Smelser 1956, and most of the
"late work" of Parsons.
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"Economy and Society" (1956 with N. Smelser), in favour of 
systems theory (9). The emphasis shifted from developing a 
systems theory based on conditions of social interaction to 
constructing social systems according to functional 
imperatives derived from a general scheme of pattern 
variables.
Social action is conceived after Parsons' systems- 
theoretical turn as the result of a combination of 
structural forces of the social system. Social action is 
constructed through a combination of four "pattern 
variables" which describe functional imperatives: 
adaptation, goal-attainment, integration and latent-pattern 
maintenance.
These pattern variables, known as the AGIL scheme, 
represent not only the conditions for social action but also 
describe both the functions of the main social subsystems 
and the functions of the surrounding systems. Thus, the 
four main social subsystems of society are each 
characterized by one of the four functions: the economy by 
adaptation, the polity by goal-attainment, law and other 
mechanisms of social control by integration and "the locus 
of cultural and motivational commitments", e.g., family and 
cultural institutions, by latent-pattern maintenance (10) . 
Furthermore, the surrounding systems are also characterized 
by these functions. Whereas the social system is 
characterized by integration, the cultural system is
9) An insightful and informative discussion of Parsons 
"systems-theoretical turn" can be found in Habermas 
1981, Vol. II, pp. 297-443. Habermas criticizes Parsons 
for his deficit in "action theory", which Habermas 
alleges to result in neglecting the analysis of the 
lifeworld context of social systems. However, Habermas' 
criticism is made "in defense of the subject" in the 
analysis of society. Thus, despite his integrative 
theory building, it is in fact Habermas who limits the 
theorizing of society and excludes theories which are 
not centered around subjects and their "communicative 
actions".
10) Parsons and Smelser 1956: 46-53.
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characterized by latency, the personality system by goal- 
attainment, and the behavioural organism by adaptation.
Parsons' theory of society includes both an analysis of
the structure of society, based on the AGIL scheme, and a
theory of social evolution. The theory of evolution is 
based on a concept of societal modernization which is 
characterized as a process of functional differentiation of 
the social system into subsystems. The social system
differentiates subsystems which are specialized to fulfill 
functions for the system at large. Social systems also 
create integrative mechanisms which link the functionally 
differentiated subsystems (11). Primitive societies are
characterized according to Parsons by a low degree of 
differentiation into social subsystems whereas modern 
societies are characterized by structural differentiation of 
the economic, the political, and finally the cultural 
system, respectively achieved by the Industrial Revolution, 
the Democratic Revolution, and the Educational Revolution 
(12) .
Dunlop's starting point is to call the industrial 
relations system "an analytical subsystem of an industrial 
society on the same logical plane as an economic system" 
(13). This, however, deviates from a Parsonian view in 
which the economic system is one "functional" subsystem of 
the overarching social system when it is decomposed 
according to the four functional imperatives. For Parsons, 
the industrial relations system can only be a subsystem of a 
subsystem, most likely a subsystem of the economy. Thus, 
the industrial relations system cannot be on the "same 
logical plane" as the economic system.
11) Parsons 1975: 43-45.
12) See Parsons 1971 on the theory of the three revolutions 
separating early from late modernization.
13) Dunlop 1958: 5.
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In line with Parsons' theory of social evolution 
Dunlop's theory of industrial relations focuses on 
differentiation and modernization processes both in society 
and in industrial relations. Dunlop calls industrial 
societies "modern" when relations of managers and workers 
are formally arranged outside the family, when these 
relations are distinct from political institutions, and when 
the industrial relations system has an existence separate 
from the economic system.
In a "note" added to his outline of basic features of 
an industrial relations system Dunlop offers the following 
application of Parsons' differentiation concept and his four 
functional imperatives to the study of industrial relations. 
A quotation from this note demonstrates Dunlop's use of 
systems theory. In addition it introduces the main system 
components of Dunlop's own conception of an industrial 
relations system:
"The functional differentiation of an industrial relations 
system and the corresponding specialized structures or 
processes may be defined as follows: (1) Adaptive - The
regulatory processes or rule-making in which the specialized 
output is a complex of rules relating the actors to the 
technological and market environment and the frequent 
changes which pose problems of adaptation to the actors. 
(2) Goal Gratification - The polity or political functions 
in the subsystem are specialized toward the contribution of 
survival or stability of the industrial relations system and 
to survival and stability of the hierarchies of the separate 
actors which is requisite for the attainment of goals by the 
actors. (3) Integration - The function of maintaining 
solidarity among the actors in the system is contributed by 
the shared understandings and common ideology of the system 
relating individual roles to the hierarchies and hierarchies 
to each other in turn. (4) Latent-pattern Maintenance and 
Tension Management - The function of preserving the values 
of the system against cultural and motivational pressures is 
provided by the role of the expert or professional in all 
three groups of actors in the system" (14).
Dunlop uses Parsons' "pattern variables" as a 
classification scheme for the presentation of system
14) Dunlop 1958: 30.
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components ("rules", "hierarchies", "ideologies", and 
"experts") which he considers relevant to his comparison of 
national industrial relations systems. However, Dunlop 
subscribes only formally to Parsons' ideas. In fact, he 
does little more than present his own understanding of 
industrial relations in the Parsonian language of the AGIL 
scheme. Neither in the theoretical outline nor in the 
comparative study do Parsons' insights in the four 
functional imperatives guide Dunlop's conception of an 
industrial relations system.
Dunlop's conception is centered around four "elements" 
which appear in various constellations in the above 
quotation: actors, contexts, ideologies, and rules. The
separate existence or "autonomy" of industrial relations 
systems is shaped by these four "elements". Dunlop 
discusses them separately in his theoretical outline, in 
which he characterizes the "elements" as follows: the three 
main actors are management, workers and government agencies, 
contexts consist of technology, market constraints, and the 
power distribution in society, and the ideologies of the 
actors must be compatible in order to permit a common set of 
ideas which allocate acceptable roles to the actors. The 
last, and most crucial "element" in Dunlop's theory of 
autonomous industrial relations, is the concept of rules 
governing the relations of industrial actors. This body of 
rules, which includes rules on procedures for the 
establishment and administration of substantive rules, 
constitutes "the center of attention in an industrial- 
relations system" (15). In Dunlop's view, the specific 
character of industrial relations systems derives from rule- 
making independent of decision-making in the economic 
system.
Dunlop's "elements" have been widely discussed in 
industrial relations theory. Shalev, for example,
15) Dunlop 1958: 13.
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criticizes Dunlop for a meaningless use of the ideological 
factor: "... his materialistic theoretical bias, explicitly 
seeking in 'technological and market forces' rather than 
'political and ideological considerations' the key to 
national diversity in industrial relations, precluded 
meaningful utilization of ideology as an important 
variable." (16) Other authors argue that the element 
"actors" needs further differentiation. Employees should be 
divided into organized and non-organised employees and 
employers into employer associations and single members 
(17). However, these authors misunderstand Dunlop's
abstract notion of the tripartite structure of actors. As 
part of the tripartite relationship, each actor is conceived 
in Dunlop's model as a complex and hierarchically ordered 
entity whereby their respective hierarchies influence - and 
are influenced by - rule-making and the substance of the 
rules of the industrial relations system (18).
Nevertheless, Dunlop's elements must be criticized for 
a lack of theoretical deduction. There is no definition of 
"element" in his theory, and it is probably impossible to 
find a unifying characteristic of those heterogeneous 
factors which Dunlop calls elements. Dunlop reveals a lack 
of rigour in this respect in his theoretical discussion.
The theoretical and practical limits of Dunlop's 
systems-theoretical endeavour to analyze the industrial 
relations system can be demonstrated with respect to his 
analysis of the unity of the industrial relations system. 
In the last section of his theoretical chapter Dunlop tries 
to show how differentiation within the AGIL pattern of 
Parsons' functional imperatives contributes to establishing 
the "unity" of an industrial relations system:
16) Shalev 1981: 251.
17) For references see Schienstock 1982: 40-46.
18) See also Schienstock 1982: 40.
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"It can be seen how each of these functional 
differentiations contribute to each other and to the unity 
of an industrial-relations system. (A-G) The rule-making 
contributes to the attainment of stability and survival, and 
stability in turn requires a grid of rules. (A-L) The 
technical problems involved in rule-making contribute to 
enhance the role of the professional or expert, and his role 
in turn produces a reduction of tension (a literal drawing 
of the "heat") among the actors and is the repository and 
defender of the values of the system. (G—I) The attainment 
of stability and survival requires shared understandings 
relating the actors to each other, and an effective 
integration contributes to the achievement of stability and 
survival. (L-I) The reduction in tensions and the 
preservation of values contributed by the professionals is a 
force for integration, and the shared understandings 
contribute toward enhancing and maintaining the role of the 
professional or expert. The functional differentiations of 
the system reinforce each other and unify the industrial- 
relations system." (19)
Dunlop, like Parsons, discusses the problem of unity as 
a problem of structure. Unity is conceived in this forced 
application of the four pattern variables as a product of 
rather static links among the system components which are 
supposed to reinforce each other and thus to contribute to 
system maintenance ("stability", "survival", "integration"). 
However, achieving unity does not seem to be a problem for 
the system. The links among the system components 
miraculously unify the system.
In fact, unity in this discussion is merely the 
construct of an external observer. It is not analyzed as a 
vital concern for the industrial relations system itself. 
Dunlop's analysis conveys the impression that the problems 
of the system derive from external rather than internal 
sources. It is beyond Dunlop's sociological imagination 
that threats to the unity and, indeed, to the existence of 
the industrial relations system itself could derive from the 
internal processes and links among the system components.
Dunlop conceptualizes the industrial relations system 
both as a subsystem of society at the national level, as a
19) Dunlop 1958: 30-31.
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system of industry-wide collective bargaining, and as a 
system of work relations in a single enterprise. Although 
this seems to correspond with common understanding in 
industrial relations research, it is unclear how this is 
related to his systems theory approach. Dunlop pays little 
attention to the relation of these three levels of the 
industrial relations system. He can therefore be criticized 
for having acknowledged the scope and the different levels 
of the industrial relations system only with respect to its 
external relations but not with respect to the internal 
structure and processes of the industrial relations system.
Dunlop's approach is an input-output analysis which 
places high emphasis on contextual factors that influence 
the structure of the system. Dunlop shows in detail how the 
content or substance of rules reflects the various contexts 
of the industrial relations system. The contextual 
influence varies inversely with the structural complexity of 
the industrial relations system: "The smaller the unit to
which the term (industrial relations system, R.R.) is 
applied, the larger the context, and in general the larger 
the influence of givens outside the system" (20). The idea 
is that workplace rules in a single enterprise are more 
influenced by technical and market constraints or the 
distribution of power in society than rules that apply to an 
industry or a national industrial relations system. The 
question remains, however, of what constitutes the "core" of 
an industrial relations system which is not determined by 
external forces and which integrates both large and small 
units.
«
Dunlop's approach to the study of the industrial 
relations system remains classificatory. He uses various,
not always coherent, approaches to discuss or to classify 
rules and procedures. His main scheme of rules reflects his 
distinction of "elements" and operates with five "ideal
20) Dunlop 1958: 24.
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types" of industrial relations rules and procedures, all 
linked to the three "actors" and their relationships (21). 
Rules and procedures are determined for Dunlop by (a) 
managerial hierarchy; (b) specialized governmental agencies;
(c) worker hierarchy; (d) joint management and worker 
hierarchy; and (e) tripartite rule-making of management, 
workers and state agencies. In addition he sometimes uses 
distinctions which are close to legal classifications when 
he separates administrative regulations, collective 
agreements and customs and traditions in the work place. In 
a more descriptive fashion he also distinguishes between 
compensation rules, disciplinary rules, and job aspiration 
rules.
Dunlop's analysis of rules and rule-making can be 
criticized on a number of points. In trying to advance 
beyond descriptions in his analysis of rules, he merely 
mentions different sources of rule-making. He does not, 
however, discriminate between those sources which are 
internal and those which are external to the industrial 
relations system. Dunlop can be criticized in general for 
economic reductionism which is expressed in a tendency to 
over-generalize that "economic development" is ultimately 
responsible for rules and rule-making (22) .
My main criticism is related to Dunlop's lack of 
analysis of the actual process of rule-making. Although it 
is emphasized throughout his study that rule-making creates 
the centre of the theory of industrial relations, he is 
ultimately unable to analyze how these rules are created by 
the system within the limits of his methodology. 
Schienstock rightly criticizes Dunlop for neglecting 
decision-making processes and for conceiving actors only as 
structural entities (23). Dunlop makes no effort to study
21) Dunlop 1958? 13-16; 34-58; 76-77; 92-93; 127; 342-379.
22) "Industrialization proliferates rules". See Dunlop 1958: 
343.
23) Schienstock 1982: 40-46 and 55-59.
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the actual processes which generate the stable "grid of 
rules" at the various levels of national industrial 
relations systems.
It is both astonishing and revealing that Dunlop's 
theory of industrial relations systematically neglects not 
only the contribution of collective bargaining and grievance 
procedures to rule-making but the analysis of collective 
bargaining as such. There is no separate analysis of the 
process and structure of collective bargaining and 
arbitration procedures in his analytical study of industrial 
relations systems. Grievance procedures are only briefly 
discussed at a late stage of the analysis where they are 
conceived solely as mechanisms for the settlement of 
disputes but not as mechanisms in generating rules (24).
Furthermore, his approach to procedures is half­
hearted. Procedures are not important as an independent 
object of Dunlop's theoretical and comparative study but 
only insofar as "procedures are themselves rules" (25). 
Dunlop is preoccupied with the substantive content of rules, 
which supposedly reveal a higher degree of uniformity in a 
cross-national comparison of industries than do procedural 
rules. Unfortunately, he makes no use of his observation 
that institutional forms of rule application or procedures 
"particularly well reflect the characteristics of a national 
industrial relations system" (26). The assumption that "a 
diversity of procedures may still result in similar
24) Dunlop 1958: 367.
2 5) Dunlop 1958: 13.
26) Dunlop 1958: 367. In his later studies he showed some
interest in the study of collective disputes procedures 
and dispute-resolution mechanisms for emergency 
situations in the U.S.. There he found, for example, 
that state-imposed dispute procedures, and not only 
rules, can express in their design and structure 
authoritarian political and legal principles which 
restrict and govern the autonomy of collective 
industrial relations. See Dunlop 1984, Part III.
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substantive rules" (27) seems to justify an almost complete 
neglect of the study of procedures in his comparison.
In summary it can be stated that Dunlop's systems 
theory remains at a classificatory level. This is probably 
related to the lack of understanding of the theory of 
structural functionalism which he himself admitted (28). 
Indeed, his systems-theoretical understanding has hardly 
exhausted the potential of Parsons' system theory to 
conceptualize industrial relations systems. Nevertheless, 
his classificatory approach, which enabled him to present 
information on foreign industrial relations systems that 
otherwise might have been suppressed by adopting a strict 
deductive approach, should probably also be considered a 
phenomenological virtue without, however, reducing the 
criticism on his conceptual weaknesses.
Thus it seems hardly acceptable that central areas of 
industrial relations like collective bargaining, 
arbitration, grievance handling, negotiations between worker 
representatives and management, and political exchanges at 
national level are either neglected or poorly treated in the 
study. Although rule-making in industrial relations is 
central in Dunlop's discussion his study reveals a lack of 
interest in considering the real processes of the creation 
and application of rules through procedures.
It seems due to Dunlop's rather mechanical 
understanding of systems theory, which tends to 
conceptualize industrial relations as a trivial machine, 
that he underestimates problems related to the internal 
complexity of the system. More than thirty years after the 
publication of his study the reader is astonished at the
27) Dunlop 1958: 26.
28) Dunlop thought of his own application of Parsons' system 
theory that it "may not be acceptable to Professor 
Parsons, and it may reflect a lack of understanding of 
his theoretical system". See Dunlop 1958: 30, Footnote 
30.
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lack of sensitivity to the threats to the system which 
derive from internal processes. Internal complexity creates 
problems both for the structure and for the elements of the 
system. The need to reduce internal complexity is an 
important reason, for example, for the formalization of 
interactions between collective actors or between individual 
and collective actors. However, only recently have we begun 
to analyze these interactions as communication processes in 
which the system reproduces itself.
Since the 1950s the theory of social systems has 
evolved from a closed systems approach to an open systems 
approach and has most recently been developed into a theory 
of operationally closed but cognitively open systems. 
Dunlop applied the former research paradigm to the study of 
industrial relations. A discussion of the recent "paradigm 
shift” in systems theory from concerns with structures and 
functions of social systems to an analysis of the 
communication processes which are constitutive of the self­
reproduction or autopoiesis of the system (29) can help us 
to advance beyond the Dunlopian approach to a systems theory 
of industrial relations.
The Theory of Autopoietic social Systems
The theory of autopoietic social systems has been 
developed by Niklas Luhmann and his followers during the 
last two decades. It is widely perceived as an attempt to 
revolutionize the basic conceptions not only in systems 
theory of society but in sociology in general. Indeed, 
Luhmann himself claims to present a new universal 
sociological theory, a "fachuniversale Theorie" of sociology 
(30). Thus the autopoietic theory constitutes a challenge
29) Luhmann 1984a: 15-29.
30) Luhmann 1984a: 7-12.
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not only to general sociology but to all special sociologies 
as well, including industrial sociology and the sociological 
study of industrial relations.
Luhmann, who studied with Talcott Parsons at Harvard 
University in the early 1960s, initially helped to introduce 
Parsons' systems theory in West Germany. However, from the 
outset Luhmann criticized Parsons' structural functionalism 
for falsely assuming causal relationships between the 
structure and the function of social systems and analyzing 
structure and function one-dimensionally with respect to 
aspects of system maintenance (31).
Luhmann's critique of structural functionalism became 
more radical when he adopted ideas of autopoietic or self- 
reproductive systems from general systems theory. Luhmann 
respecified the theory of autopoietic systems for the study 
of social systems (32). His theoretical focus shifted from 
concerns with functions and structure to an analysis of 
self-reproduction of elements. Since his "autopoietic turn" 
Luhmann has conceived social systems, contrary to Parsons 
and Dunlop, as operationally closed and cognitively open 
systems. The structure and the unity of any system, 
including developed social systems, is seen as directly 
dependent on the operationally closed self-reproductive 
processes.
In the following an attempt is made both to briefly
outline and to apply autopoietic systems theory to an
analysis of industrial relations (33). The general outline
31) Luhmann 1962.
32) See in particular Luhmann 1984a. The following
presentation of the concept of autopoietic social 
systems will mainly refer to his study of "Soziale 
Systeme".
33) Luhmann has not applied his theory to industrial
relations. Systems theory in general has been 
criticized by sociologists of neglecting the study of 
intermediary economic institutions. See Wiswede, Kutsch; 
Eifller 1987: 6-11, who contrast system theory and
utilitarian behaviourism in the sociological study of
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of the theory of autopoietic systems proceeds in four steps. 
First, the concepts of function, differentiation and 
evolution of society are introduced. Second, the internal 
complexity and the main system components of a social 
system, i.e., elements and structures, are discussed. 
Third, the specific characteristics of a Luhmannian concept 
of social systems, i.e., communication, self-reference and 
autopoiesis, are presented. And fourth, the relationships of 
social systems are reviewed under the headings of 
interpenetration, structural coupling and interference. In 
the last section of the chapter the Luhmannian theory will 
then be applied to analyze the social system of industrial 
relations.
Functions, Differentiation, and the Evolution of Socisty
In his analysis of autopoietic systems Luhmann 
distinguishes between three "levels of analysis": general
systems theory, the theory of social systems (as opposed to 
psychic systems, organisms and machines) and the level of 
concrete analysis of social systems (34). With respect to 
the general theory of social systems two types of analysis 
can be distinguished in studying self-reproduction:
analysis in terms of differentiation and analysis in terms 
of complexity. The first is concerned with the
decomposition of social systems into other social systems or 
subsystems whereas the second is concerned with the 
decomposition of the system into elements and relations 
(35) . Luhmann combines the two types in his theory of
economics and who prefer the latter. However, there are 
a number of studies on intermediary associations which 
explicitly use a systems-theoretical perspective. See 
Weitbrecht 1969; Teubner 1978; and Prigge 1987a.
34) Luhmann 1990d: 2-3.
35) Luhmann uses the following metaphor to describe the
difference between differentiation and complexity
analysis: "Im einen Fa lie geht es um die Zimmer des
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social systems. His evolutionary theory of social systems 
refers mainly to differentiation, whereas his explanation of 
autopoiesis refers mainly to complexity.
Similar to Parsons, Luhmann considers the development 
of social systems as a process of differentiation. In his 
analysis of the development of the social system "society" 
he deviates only slightly from Parsons' evolutionary levels 
of primitive, intermediate and modern societies (36) in 
describing the fact that societies develop from segmentation 
to stratification to functional differentiation. However, 
in Luhmann's concept of modern society as primarily a 
functionally differentiated society, the Parsonian ordering 
of society with just four primary subsystems is replaced by 
a polycentric view of society. In Luhmann's theory of 
modern society there exists neither a fixed number of 
functionally differentiated social systems nor a firm 
ranking of functions (37).
"Das impliziert einen Verzicht auf feste Rangordnungen, weil 
man nicht ein für allemal festlegen kann, daß Politik immer 
wichtiger ist als Wirtschaft, Wirtschaft immer wichtiger als 
Recht, Recht immer wichtiger als Wissenschaft, Wissenschaft 
immer wichtiger als Erziehung, Erziehung immer wichtiger als 
Gesundheit (und dann vielleicht zirkulär: Gesundheit immer 
wichtiger als Politik?). An die Stelle einer solchen 
Rangordnung ... tritt die Regel, daß jedes Funktionssystem 
der eigenen Funktion den Primat gibt und von diesem 
Standpunkt aus andere Funktionssysteme, also die 
Gesellschaft im übrigen, als Umwelt behandelt."
For analytical purposes Luhmann distinguishes between 
society and functionally differentiated social systems. He 
considers society as a first order social system, whereas 
the economic and the legal system are viewed as second order 
social systems or societal subsystems. Society as a first 
order social system differs from second order social systems
Hauses, im anderen Falle um die Steine, Balken, Nägel 
usw.." (Luhmann 1984a: 41).
36) Parsons 1975.
37) See Luhmann 1987c: 34-35,
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insofar as it has no other social system as an environment; 
society's environment consists only of natural and psychic 
systems.
Differentiation leads not only to several functionally 
differentiated societal subsystems but continues inside each 
societal subsystem in the creation of further subsystems. 
As the system develops through this process of internal 
differentiation, it itself becomes the environment for its 
subsystems (38).
The transformation from vertical stratification to 
horizontal functional differentiation is called the 
”catastrophe” of modern times (39). However, only society, 
i.e. the first order social system, is described by Luhmann 
as losing its centre and becoming polycentral when 
functional differentiation is adopted as the primary mode of 
social organization. Luhmann maintains that centralization 
and stratification remain as structuring principles inside 
second order social systems where they are used as 
mechanisms of internal ordering along with decentralization 
(40). However, this observation of centralization in 
function systems is not meant by Luhmann as a normative 
statement but rather as a cynical matter-of-fact statement, 
which characterizes many of his generally refreshing and 
illuminating descriptions of societal processes. Indeed, it 
is not plausible that decentralization should not also be 
adopted in functional subsystems. Such a general decrease 
of hierarchy not only in society but also in functional 
subsystems is described by Willke as a tendency of modern 
societies (41).
It is made explicit that in an autopoietic systems 
theory functions are ultimately defined by the social
38) Luhmann 1984a: 258 ff..
39) Luhmann 1987b: 19.
40) Luhmann 1990a: 202-203.
41) Willke 1989: 44-54.
22
systems themselves. Functions are not derived from 
universally given pattern variables. Each societal
subsystem decides itself in self-referential processes which 
function it fulfills in society.
Functions of the functionally differentiated societal 
subsystems are expressed in binary codes which are specific 
to each functional subsystem of society. Functional social 
subsystems are guided by these binary codes. Binary codes 
are achievements of evolution (42). They are necessary 
requirements to define the boundary of a function system and 
to select its elements. In applying the binary code the 
functional subsystems can distinguish between societal 
communications that belong to the system or the environment 
of the system. According to Luhmann, examples of binary 
codes are true/false in case of the science system, 
right/wrong in case of the legal system and payment/non­
payment in case of the economic system (43). However, these 
codes do not guide the behaviour of the participants 
directly. They need programs which translate them into 
behavioural directives (44).
The definition of function is crucial to the theory of 
a functionally differentiated society. From the outset of 
his theory construction Luhmann has criticized the use of 
the concept of function in systems theory (45). Functions 
are not derived from the system's environment. Luhmann 
insists that a translation of functions into structures is 
controlled by the system and not by the environment. This 
approach avoids the assumption of given functions and 
structures which limit the study of functions to the aspect 
of maintenance of structures. It argues instead that the
42) Luhmann 1990d: 233.
43) See on binary codes for the science system Luhmann 
1990c, ch. 4, for the legal system Luhmann 1987a and for 
the economic system Luhmann 1988a: 187-210.
44) Luhmann 1987b: 15.
45) See only Luhmann 1962.
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functional method aims at uncovering "functional 
equivalents" to existing structures.
Luhmann's approach, which was originally labelled 
"functional structuralism", replaces causal relationships 
between the system and its environment by the concept of 
function as goal-orientation ("Zweckorientierung") of the 
system. However, goals indicate permanent problems of the 
system, in particular reduction of environmental complexity 
and stabilization of system boundaries. Thus, the functions 
as goal-orientations offer no "causal" solutions for the 
problems of the system. However, this concept of function 
leads to the insight that functional equivalents to 
structural solutions (46) usually exist.
The conception of functional equivalence assumes that 
the system selects structures among functional alternatives. 
So far, this functional method is mainly used scientifically 
in analyzing the contingency of system structures. 
Nevertheless, Luhmann predicts that the functional method 
will be used increasingly in self-descriptions of the social 
systems as well. Luhmann also predicts that the realization 
of previous functional equivalents will cause strain on 
social systems. The use of the functional method, which 
thematizes functional equivalents, enables the criticism of 
previous self-descriptions of the system as simplifications 
of complex choipes between a number of functional 
equivalents (47).
An "unavoidable consequence of functional 
differentiation" (48) is that society becomes global. 
Through the exclusion of fulfilling other functions, the 
functional subsystems, like science or economy, become able 
to include all communicative behaviour, unlimited by 
territorial boundaries. Traditional subsystems which are
46) Luhmann 1968: 260-266.
47) Luhmann 1984a: 83-91.
48) Luhmann 1990d: 178.
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constituted by specific communications can spread over the 
globe. Society as a whole can no longer integrate its 
subsystems by common territorial frontiers, except for the 
political system which continues to use frontiers. Indeed, 
a modern, functionally differentiated society is a world 
society (49).
Nevertheless, Luhmann distinguishes system integration 
and social integration. A decrease in territorial system 
integration is not automatically accompanied by a similar 
tendency in social integration.
"I carefully avoided any reference to social integration. 
The concept (of world society, R.R.) does not presuppose any 
kind of pooled identity or pooled self-esteem (like the 
nation-state). Modern society in particular is compatible 
with any degree of inequality of living conditions, as long 
as this does not interrupt communication." (50)
Unlike Habermas, however, Luhmann sees no solution for 
systemic problems of modern societies which can be gained 
from new forms of social integration. Instead, he predicts 
a decrease in the ability of social integration to integrate 
systems. Because system integration is less dependent on 
interaction mechanisms in order to synchronize 
communications, due to new telecommunications techniques, 
social integration can independently develop new forms of 
intimacy than provide solutions for the integration of the 
world society (51).
49) See the essay on "World Society as a Social System” in 
Luhmann 1990d: 175-190.
50) Luhmann I990d: 178-179.
51) Luhmann 1990e: 121-123.
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complexity, Elements and Structure
In addition to the theory of differentiation, the 
analysis of complexity is the key approach to Luhmann's 
theoretical construction of social systems . Social systems 
are conceived as operating in an environment which is 
necessarily more complex than the system. Luhmann's theory 
of social differentiation emphasizes that complexity 
increases not only in the relations between social systems 
but also within social systems as a result of their 
operating in a complex environment. Thus complexity is a 
property of both the system and its environment (52).
The only way in which autopoietic systems can respond 
to increases in the complexity of their environment is 
through the creation of internal structures leading to an 
increase in internal complexity, which then often leads to 
demands to reduce internal complexity. However, an increase 
in internal complexity does not mean adaptation to the 
environment in the sense of Parsons and Dunlop (53).
"Selbstreferentielle autopoietische Systeme sind endogen 
unruhig und reproduktionsbereit. Sie entwickeln zur 
Fortsetzung ihrer Autopoiesis eigene Strukturen. Dabei 
bleibt die Umwelt als Bedingung der Möglichkeit und als 
Beschränkung vorausgesetzt. Das System wird durch seine 
Umwelt gehalten und gestört, nicht aber zur Anpassung 
gezwungen und nicht nur bei bestmöglicher Anpassung zur 
Reproduktion zugelassen."
The function of structures is not to translate 
environmental needs into the system. The function of 
structure is to secure the autonomy of the system's self- 
reproduction, which is conceived as an operationally closed 
process. Although the environment remains both a necessary 
condition and a constant constraint and irritating factor
52) Luhmann 1984a: 261-262.
53) Luhmann 1990a: 36.
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for the system, it cannot force the system to adapt its 
reproduction.
Luhmann develops a definition of system complexity at 
the level of elements and their relations. In the abstract, 
system complexity is defined as the relationship between the 
set of all possible relations between elements (contingency) 
and the selectivity achieved by the self-constituted 
structure of a system (54). This definition combines the 
problems of the selectivity, contingency and self­
constitution of the system through specific selections (55).
Systems of higher order can determine the number and 
the unity of elements for themselves. The social systems of 
higher order can have less internal complexity than systems 
of lower order. Elements are the units which are non- 
decomposable for the system. Elements are related to each 
other; without relation there exists no element (56). 
Elements are highly complex and are constituted by the 
social system. Furthermore, the unity of an element is 
constituted by the system through ascription ("Zurechnung") 
(57). Thus elements do not exist as such but only for the 
system and through the system.
Luhmann offers in this respect an alternative to 
Dunlop's classificatory approach to the definition of the 
elements of a system. Dunlop was unable to find a unifying 
characteristic of his elements because he avoided analyzing 
elements as defined by the industrial relations system 
itself. In Dunlop's input-output approach elements are 
created by adoption processes to its contexts. In Luhmann's 
approach elements are constituted by the system itself and 
they derive their meaning from the industrial relations 
system and not from the environment of the system.
54) See Luhmann 1984a: 46-50.
55) See also willke 1987: 17.
56) Luhmann 1984a: 41.
57) Luhmann 1984a: 44.
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An increase in the number of internally complex 
elements reaches a threshold for Luhmann beyond which it is 
no longer possible to combine all elements with each other. 
As the system cannot further decompose the elements, certain 
relations of elements must be selected to create a system. 
Thus a system reduces complexity by selecting certain 
relationships and not by selecting certain elements. 
However, the selection of certain relationships of elements 
also increases complexity within the system as well. Thus 
the social system is confronted with the paradoxical 
situation that reduction of complexity leads to an increase 
in complexity.
Structures of the system emerge both from self- 
reproduction of the elements and from selection of 
relationships. In Parsons' and Dunlop's systems theory 
approach the social system as a whole is conceived as an 
aggregation of its parts. Luhmann replaces this
hierarchical view by a circular view. The system acquires 
properties ("emergente Eigenschaften") in the evolutionary 
process which cannot be explained by the properties of its 
elements (58). The system uses the self-reproduction of the 
elements for its own self-reproduction, upon which in turn 
the self-reproduction of the elements becomes dependent. 
The structure of the system evolves in this process as a 
product of both the self-reproduction of the elements and 
the system itself.
Autopoietic systems theory develops a new understanding 
of structure. Luhmann insists that it is not sufficient to 
define structure as relations of elements. In the general 
autopoietic conception of systems, structures result from 
the fact that only certain relations of elements are 
selected and held constant over time. Structure is thus
58) See also Willke 1987: 100.
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defined as limitation of possible combinations of elements 
within the system (59).
Structures of social systems are not formed by action 
or institutions. Instead, they are derived from
expectations of behaviour. Expectations both limit possible 
combinations of elements and create new possibilities for 
combinations. There exists no other mechanism of creation 
of structures for social systems than that of generalization 
of expectations and of forming reflexive expectations, i.e. 
expectations of expectations (60).
Expectations are defined as "symbolic generalizations 
of meaning" (61). Meaning, for Luhmann, is the over-arching 
category which characterizes both psychic and social 
systems. Meaning is "described" by him with reference to 
three dimensions: temporal, material, and social. In all 
three dimensions expectations can be generalized: In the
social dimension the process of generalization of 
expectations leads to institutionalization. However, to 
stabilize expectations beyond factual situations it is 
necessary to establish contrafactual expectations. Thus in 
the time dimension, expectations are generalized through 
norms which enforce certain expectations in case of their 
rejection in concrete situations. Norms are thus 
characterized as counterfactual and "disappointment-proof" 
(62) . And in the material dimension expectations are 
generalized or bundled as persons, roles, programs and 
values (63). Luhmann's social theory of law is based on the 
conception of côngruence of generalization and stabilization 
of counterfactual, normative behavioural expectations in the 
temporal, material and social dimension (64).
59) Luhmann 1984a: 73-74; 382-87.
60) Luhmann 1984a: 139-140 and 411-421.
61) Luhmann 1984a: 139.
62) Luhmann 1985a: 73
63) Luhmann 1984a: 421-456.
64) Luhmann 1985a: 73-83.
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Luhmann postulates that operation of meaning is the 
only form of operation for psychic and social systems to 
"digest" complexity and self-reference. Unfortunately he 
fails to define meaning, and resorts instead to a 
"phenomenological description" of meaning (65). Of course, 
the distinction of the three dimensions of meaning is highly 
suggestive and useful, but the vagueness and the unresolved 
linguistic and philosophical connotations of the concept of 
meaning can still be criticized, as Habermas did prior to 
Luhmann's autopoietic turn (66). Luhmann's concept of 
meaning and, indeed, his theoretical background in general, 
comprise and are influenced by rather heterogeneous 
philosophical traditions, among others Husserl's 
phenomenology, Gvlnther's and Spencer Brown's logics, post- 
Kantian cognitive sciences, Whitehead's cosmology and 
epistemology and, of course, Maturana's and Varela's 
autopoietic theory and von Foerster's systems theory (67) . 
It might be questioned whether these traditions are 
compatible or whether they remain eclectic points of 
reference, only reflecting Luhmann's personal philosophical 
tastes. However, this shall only be stated as an irritating 
factor which might or might not have an influence on the 
theory construction (68). This cannot be discussed within 
the limits of the present study.
65) "Was Sinn ist ..., läßt sich am besten in der Form einer 
phänomenologischen Beschreibung vorführen." Luhmann 
1984a: 93.
66) Habermas in: Habermas and Luhmann 1971: 171-202.
67) See, for example, Luhmann 1984a, ch. 2 on the 
phenomenology of meaning, pp. 377-382 and 394-396 on 
structuralism and on Whitehead's cosmology, and ch. 12 
on post-Kantian epistemology. See also Luhmann I990d: 
21-85.
68) See also Habermas 1985a: 426-445.
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Communication, Self-Ref«rence and Autopoiesis
Probably the roost radical departure from the Parsonian 
theory of the social system and, indeed, from conventional 
sociology, is Luhmann's assumption that the ultimate, non- 
decomposable elements of an autopoietic social system are 
communications and not human beings. Human beings belong to 
the environment of the social system; their individuality 
and their consciousness are treated as highly complex 
psychic systems (69). Accordingly, if industrial relations 
are analyzed based on Luhmann's theory of social systems, 
its "elements" have to be defined as communications.
Communication consists of three components in Luhmann's 
account: information, utterance and understanding. Each
component is described as a selection, and communication is 
characterized as the coordination of three selections (70). 
Each communication is embedded in a recursive process of 
communications. Thus without linkage to other
communications no communication can happen.
Communications cannot be observed. This is tragic for 
a social system because its survival depends on its ability 
to observe and describe itself which are preconditions for 
self-reference and autopoiesis. Thus a communication system 
has to ascribe itself as an action system to become 
observable both for external observers and for self­
observation (71) .
Luhmann defines action in the tradition of systems 
theory as a selection ascribed to systems ("Handlung ist auf 
Systeme zugerechnete Selektion" (72)). He derives his 
theory of action as selection from Parsons' theory of double
69) See only Luhmann 1984a, ch. 7.
70) Luhmann 1984a: 195-196.
71) Luhmann 1984a: 226.
72) Luhmann 1984a: 160.
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contingency. The concept of action was based on a concept 
of interaction in Parsons' "The Social System". Social 
interaction in this second phase of Parsons' theory building 
was described as a situation of double contingency in which 
two actors choose voluntarily between sets of alternatives 
under conditions of "evaluative orientation". Social action 
is seen as a product of interaction because actors' choices 
are guided by "patterns of value orientation" which 
structure the interaction situation (73).
Luhmann reinterprets Parsons' concept of double 
contingency. To analyze action systems it is not necessary, 
according to Luhmann, to refer to the motivations of the 
actors which orientate their behaviour towards cultural 
patterns and symbolic values. He emphasizes instead that 
the formal characteristics of double contingency lead to 
structures in the interaction situation. Structure reduces 
uncertainty and creates trust relations (74). In a doubly 
contingent situation each participant assumes uncertainty 
similar to his own uncertainty about the behaviour of the 
other participant. Thus his behaviour is orientated both 
towards his own and towards the projected uncertainty of the 
other participant. In addition, he perceives that the 
uncertainty of the other participant is dependent on his 
own uncertainty (75). In this sense the mutuality of 
expectations creates the structure of the interaction 
system. The interaction system binds the two actors through 
double contingency and thus becomes a self-referential 
circle. Luhmann merges the theory of self-reference and 
double contingency and thus arrives at a concept of action 
without subject (76).
Luhmann reverses the common sociological view of social 
systems as constituted by action. Instead, the autopoietic
73) Parsons 1951: 37.
74) Luhmann 1984a: 179-182.
75) Luhmann 1984a: 166.
76) Luhmann 1984a: 164.
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system, based on self-reference, selects and ascribes 
certain communications as actions. Behaviour becomes action 
only if it is constituted as an element of a social system. 
However, to become able to ascribe communications as 
actions, the interaction must have advanced beyond
elementary self-reference. The elementary form of self­
reference, i.e., referring to ego by referring to alter, is 
not sufficient to define action as an element of the system. 
In fact, the system of interaction must have been
established in a second self-referential circle to become
able to define action as an element of the system (77).
Thus the situation of double contingency of two actors 
implies two self-referential circles: Action realizes its
own operation, i.e., creation of meaning, and its
realization automatically becomes a demonstration of its
existence within the social situation of alter and ego and 
thus initiates social self-reference (78).
Interaction systems which are structured by the
proposition: "I do what you want if you do what I want" are 
unstable. Such a self-referential circle can cease to exist 
from one moment to the next; to survive, it needs the system 
which treats the self-referential circle as a basic element 
of its self-reproduction (79). Self-reference of the system 
means, in this respect, that the system produces and
delimits the operative unity of its elements through the 
operation of its elements. It is precisely this process 
that Luhmann calls the autopoietic process, which lends its 
own unity to the system (80).
Self-reference is an operation which involves applying 
a distinction to indicate something to which the operation 
of reference itself belongs. Luhmann distinguishes between
77) Luhmann 1984a: 184.
78) Luhmann 1984a: 183.
79) Luhmann 1984a: 183.
80) Luhmann 1985: 281-282; see also Luhmann 1984a: 57-65.
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three forms of seIf-reference (81); (1) Basic self­
reference: an element relates to itself by means of the
distinction between element and relation without being 
system-reference. (2) Process-oriented self-reference or 
reflexivity: when elements are arranged into processes, as
is usually the case with communications, self-reference 
means relation of processes through the application of the 
distinction between before and after. (3) Self-reference as 
system-reference or reflexion: the system refers to itself;
self-reference of systems means that not only the elements 
or the processes but also the system as such refers to 
itself.
A self-reproductive communication system can never be 
autarkical or self-sufficient. It needs energy and 
information from its environment. In addition its
communication of meaning relates directly or indirectly to 
the environment. A communication system is only autonomous 
in the sense that it controls the synthesis of 
communications (82). Otherwise it is open to the 
environment and in particular to societal communications. 
With respect to the legal system, Luhmann has demonstrated 
this openness as cognitive openness which is paradoxically 
linked to the normative closure of the legal operations 
(83).
Pre-autopoietic systems theory defined systems as open 
systems which are characterized by their exchange relations 
with the environment. Autopoietic systems theory conceives 
systems instead as closed systems which reproduce themselves 
not by variation of structure but by constant recombination 
of their elements. Recursive closedness of the system, with 
respect to its elements, guarantees self-reproduction or 
autopoiesis. Luhmann constructs a theory of an
operationally closed social system which is not dependent on
81) Luhmann 1984a: 599-602.
82) Luhmann 1984a: 200.
83) Luhmann 1990d: 229-234 and Luhmann 1985a: 31-40.
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other social systems or its environment for its core 
activity, i.e. autopoiesis. Only if autopoiesis is
guaranteed, can the system be open and relate to the 
innumerable events and conditions of its environment.
Interpenetration, structural Coupling and Interference
A particular pertinent problem for a theory of 
autopoietic social systems that remains is the precise 
conceptualization of the relationship of the system to its 
environment. If self-reproduction is the ultimate concern, 
the vital operations must occur within the system and can 
neither be located in the environment nor in the exchange 
relations between the system and the environment. 
Autopoietic operations cannot directly link with processes 
in the environment. Systems only observe each other but do 
not regulate each other. External regulation of self­
reproduction can only be successful if it corresponds with 
self-regulation. The "disenchanted" state is limited in 
this conception to societal steering which realizes self­
regulation as the prevalent mode of regulation (84).
A social system can logically develop three kinds of 
relationships. It can relate to society, it can relate to 
another social system or societal subsystem, and it can 
relate to itself. Luhmann has proposed calling the 
relationship to society function. to another social 
subsystem performance (Leistung), and to itself, as was 
already mentioned in the discussion of the self-referential 
nature of social systems, reflexion (85).
In an autopoietic system all external references are 
guided by internal processes. External references become
84) willke: 1983a.
85) See, for example, Luhmann 1990c: 635-648.
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meaningful for the system only by internal operations. The 
legal system, for example, internally attaches meaning to 
external references by distinguishing norms and facts, and 
this distinction and the subsequent combination of norms and 
facts are guided by internal legal criteria (86). This 
constitutes the basis of operational closure of the legal 
system.
The forms of relationships of the system, based on this 
operational closure, are called the openness of the system. 
Relationships can occur on the level of elements and on the 
level of structure. On the level of elements, the system can 
relate to any form of societal communication and can 
incorporate it by applying the binary code of the system. 
Because Luhmann distinguishes between structure based on 
communication and structure based on action (87), the 
relations of system structures become complex. Luhmann 
himself has advanced the theory of intersystemic relations 
mainly on the level of structures based on action. A number 
of competing approaches which conceptualize relations of 
action systems are discussed in systems theory . Three 
concepts in analyzing intersystemic relationships can be 
distinguished: interpenetration, structural coupling and
interference.
(a) Interpenetration
There are several attempts in the theory of social 
systems to analyze intersystemic relations by applying the 
concept of interpenetration, originally introduced by 
Talcott Parsons. He developed the concept of
interpenetration in the vein of his systems theoretical turn 
to the AGIL scheme.
86) Teubner 1989: 97-98.
87) Luhmann 1984a: 382.
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Parsons' concept of interpenetration aims at the 
overlapping of systems in general. His main interest lies 
in studying the effects of intersystemic relations on action 
systems (88). He describes interpenetration as the process 
of incorporation of cultural values in social subsystems. 
Interpenetration is the abstract term which represents the 
three processes of institutionalization, internalization, 
and learning. The process of interpenetration is a process 
of embedding the cultural value patterns into action or 
interaction systems (89). Interpenetration replaces the 
role concept in analyzing internalization of cultural 
values.
Some authors have used the Parsonian concept of 
interpenetration for a general theory of intersystemic 
relations (90). Richard Münch, for example, proposes 
generalizing the concept of interpenetration to encompass 
those interactions between society and environment in which 
"these two transform each other at the margin, without 
mutually changing their central cores" (91). 
Interpenetration of interaction of society and environment 
generates societal subsystems which then interpenetrate each 
other. In Münch's conception, differentiation occurs as a 
result of interpenetration (92). It becomes the key concept 
in "understanding modernity" (93). However, Münch's 
approach is too diffuse and too simplistic to be useful 
(94) . From the perspective of autopoietic systems theory, 
the crucial question of operational closure and its impact 
on interpenetration is missing in Münch's analysis.
88) Parsons 1971: 5-6.
89) See the discussion of Parsons' concept of
interpenetration in Jensen 1978, Luhmann 1978b and 
Luhmann 1981c: 152.
90) See Jensen 1978, Münch 1987 and Münch 1988.
91) Münch 1987: 67.
92) Münch 1988: 224.
93) Münch 1988: 222-250.
94) See also Teubner 1989: 110.
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Luhmann offers in this respect a more convincing 
interpretation of the interpenetration conception. He 
restricts the concept of interpenetration to relations of 
human beings and social systems. With reference to Parsons' 
late work (95), Luhmann reinterprets interpenetration. It is 
translated (96) into a conception for an analysis of the 
relation of social systems and human beings or psychic 
system, i.e., consciousness. Luhmann describes
interpenetration as process of mutual contribution to the 
selective constitution of elements of the social and the 
psychic system. The two systems interpenetrate each other 
through adoption of complexity and boundaries (97). Thus, 
the key feature of the concept of interpenetration is the 
transmission or use of complexity between the psychic and 
the social system for the creation of internal orders and 
structures.
However, the exchange of complexity is not restricted 
to the relation of psychic and social systems. It might be 
useful for further discussion of the autopoietic social 
theory to reserve the concept of interpenetration for the 
description of general processes of exchange of complexity 
between systems. Nevertheless, for our purposes of a theory 
of autopoietic industrial relations we shall follow Luhmann 
and restrict the concept of interpenetration to the 
relationships of the psychic and the social systems*
(b) Structural Coupling
The external relations of social systems are analyzed 
by Luhmann mainly by applying the concept of structural 
coupling of social systems. Luhmann has adopted this 
concept from general systems theory. However, the concept 
of structural coupling was originally invented in biology to
95) Parsons 1978.
96) See Luhmann 1978b: 300.
97) Luhmann 1984a, ch. 6.
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explain the link of cells and metacellular living systems to 
their environment and to other living systems.
Maturana and Varela applied the conception of 
structural coupling to analyze the ontogenesis of 
autopoietic living systems in their biological theory of 
cognition (98). They argue that the recursive coupling of 
the structures of different autopoietic units leads to a
history of reciprocal structural changes as responses to 
mutual perturbations. Structural coupling of cells, for 
example, leads to metacellular units which develop into
second order units and then become autopoietic systems 
themselves (99).
Maturana and Varela apply the concept of structural 
coupling to the analysis of human cognition. The structural 
coupling of autopoietic units can solve the problem of human 
knowledge and perception of the biological and cultural 
mechanisms of social life. Human life develops cognitive 
"blind spots" which disguise the mechanisms of its creation. 
Human knowledge limits itself: "We do not see what we do
not see, and what we do not see does not exist" (100). The 
understanding of structural coupling of autopoietic units is 
the solution to the problem that there exists no independent
position for the observation and description of the
development of human life and the world at large. 
Structural coupling can be understood as the source of 
irritations of the systems. Only in exceptional
circumstances are the systems irritated by new factors which 
occur in these established structural relations. However, 
these irritations lead to new knowledge according to 
Maturana and Varela and, indeed, to the evolution of 
mankind.
98) Maturana and Varela 1987: 85-89.
99) Maturana and Varela 1987: 98-100.
100) Maturana and Varela 1987: 260; see also Maturana and
Varela 1980: 38-40.
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Nevertheless, perturbations cannot cause changes in an 
autopoietic system. They can only irritate the system and 
thus initiate internally controlled operations in 
operationally closed systems. Thus, structural coupling of 
the system and the environment does not contribute 
operations or any other components to the reproduction of 
the systems. It is simply the specific form in which the 
system presupposes specific states or changes in its 
environment and relies on them.
Structural coupling of autopoietic systems should not 
be confused with causal relations. The exchange of 
information between autopoietic systems cannot be described 
in terms of input and output. In fact the theory of 
autopoietic systems replaces the input-output model with the 
concept of structural coupling. Causality is conceived only 
as a construct of an observer who is interested in causal 
attributions. Intersystemic relations are highly selective 
connections between systems and their environments. Events 
in the environment of the system can only influence the 
chances of structural variation of systems but cannot 
determine structural changes.
Willke has put forward an interesting combination of 
the concepts of structural coupling autopoiesis and 
autonomy. Whereas the concept of autopoiesis is restricted 
to the internal horizon of systems, the concept of autonomy 
encompasses both the internal and the external horizons of 
the systems. The analysis of the autonomy of systems 
includes both the self-reference and the external reference 
of the system (101).
In Luhmann's theory of a modern society as a 
combination of autopoietic social systems without centre, 
structural coupling becomes the concept to describe the 
combination. In accordance with Maturana and Varela,
101) Willke 1989: 48.
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structural coupling for Luhmann means reciprocal irritation 
or perturbation of the structures of the coupled systems. 
Structural responses are limited by reproductive processes 
of the elements of the system. Thus each system can respond 
to the irritation only with internal means which are 
dependent on the autopoiesis of the system. Luhmann compares 
the perturbation relation of social systems to that of 
colliding billiard balls which continue to move in different 
directions after the collision (102).
Structural coupling means a relation of social systems 
which is compatible with functional differentiation of 
autopoietic social systems. Structural coupling can neither 
overcome the identity and autonomy of the coupled systems 
nor rank functional sub-systems in an asymmetrical 
hierarchical fashion. Structural coupling allows only 
selective exchanges between the systems. Structural 
coupling produces irritations inside the system which are 
implemented by the system through its network of operations 
into further operations (103).
The concept of structural coupling tries to explain, 
for example, how the political system uses law to solve 
problems of self-reference and, vice versa, how the legal 
system uses politics to solve its problems with self­
reference. The concept of structural coupling argues that 
this instrumentalization is only possible because systems do 
not overlap. The separation of functional subsystems is a 
precondition for selective structural coupling.
The conception of structural coupling has been further 
developed by Luhmann in his recent studies of the legal, the 
economic and the science systems (104). Luhmann discusses 
the semantic concepts of constitution, contract and property 
as mechanisms of structural coupling between social systems.
102) Luhmann 1990b: 204..
103) Luhmann 1990e: 103.
104) Luhmann 1988a, 1989, 1990b and 1990c.
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The constitution couples the political and the legal system, 
contract and property couple the economic and the legal 
system.
Luhmann has demonstrated the process of separation and 
recombination of social systems with respect to the function 
of the constitution in the legal and in the political system 
in some detail. The semantic concept of the constitution 
which was developed in the eighteenth century recombines the 
functionally differentiated political and legal system. 
According to Luhmann the main reason for constitutions were 
not independence from colonial domination, as in the case of 
the U.S., nor the formation of political sovereignty in a 
revolutionary situation, as in the French case, but the 
occurrence of problems of self-reference, paradoxes and 
asymmetries in the legal and in the political systems of the 
respective countries.
The two main problems of the functionally 
differentiated systems are then that the law had to realize 
that law is whatever the law arranges to be legal or illegal 
and that the political system had to solve the problem of 
sovereign power which was bound by itself. The concept of 
the constitution offers the solution for both systems 
because it separates the political and the legal systems and 
provides for their structural coupling. The paradoxes of 
both systems can be unfolded, on the one side, by reference 
of the legal system to the political system, e.g. the 
political will of the people giving itself a constitution, 
and on the other side, by reference of the political system 
to the positive law and by "super-coding" the legal system 
with the distinction between constitutional and 
unconstitutional legality.
Luhmann has adopted another biological metaphor, in 
addition to structural coupling, to conceptualize relations 
of society and social systems. Luhmann uses the idea of 
medium or materiality continuum. Society is the materiality
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continuum of functional systems; societal structures, in 
particular language, are mediated into the legal system 
through this materiality continuum (105).
(c) Interference
Teubner has criticized Luhmann's approach to 
intersystemic relations which uses the materiality continuum 
as contradictory and as inconsistent with his general theory 
of society. Teubner criticizes that this concept of 
structural coupling in a materiality continuum cannot 
adequately explain the ’'mediation" of societal structures 
and functional sub-systems (106). It confuses societal and 
extra-societal links of the social system. The links of 
social systems between each other need different concepts 
from the links of the social systems to their material 
environment.
For Teubner, direct contact of social systems is 
possible within society. He proposes to conceptualize the 
relation of social systems as interference (107). Whereas 
Luhmann uses the biological metaphors of structural coupling 
and materiality continuum, Teubner resorts to physics, or, 
to be precise, to optics, in proposing interference as the 
concept to describe intersystemic links. Interference is 
thus suggested as a concept to describe the direct contacts 
between social systems and their societal environment.
Interference is possible because of the special nature 
of the element of a functional social system. This element 
is communication, which is always at the same time general 
societal and special communication in the functional system. 
The elements of functional systems consist of the same 
substance as in society at large. Indeed, the same 
communication is linked to the communication process or
105) Luhmann 1988c.
106) Teubner 1989: 105-109.
107) Teubner 1989: 106.
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circle of society and of the functional system. Teubner 
calls this societal context of communication the "life world 
context". Thus interference and structural coupling or 
materiality continuum differ insofar as the elements of 
social subsystems or of functional subsystems are derived 
from societal communication and thus are not closed towards
each other. Teubner sees social systems linked not only at
the structural level but also with respect to elements.
It might be questioned if Teubner's critique of Luhmann 
still applies to Luhmann's recent attempts to make use of 
the concepts of structural coupling and materiality 
continuum. In these writings Luhmann separates the concept 
of structural coupling and the discussion of the materiality 
continuum (108). Nevertheless, Teubner's conceptual
distinction between intersystemic relations of social
systems and of relations of social systems and their 
physical and psychic environments is convincing.
Teubner's concept of interference can serve as a 
heuristic guideline for our discussion of the industrial 
relations system, the political system and the legal system. 
He distinguishes three types of interference: interference
of events, interference of structures, interference of 
roles.
Interference of events means the simultaneous presence 
of events in different systems. Communications are 
events which have the potential to be recognized in 
different system contexts at the same time . They 
allow punctual links between systems.
Interference of structures is related to expectations. 
General societal expectations and expectations related 
to a partial functional subsystem can overlap. General
108) Luhmann 1990a: 41 on coupling and resonance and
especially 1990c, ch. 1 on consciousness and
communication.
44
social constructions of reality can be used in 
functional subsystems for their construction of 
reality.
Interference of roles is related to overlapping 
membership in different systems. Double membership is 
a mechanism for solving intersystemic conflicts (109).
Hutter has used the theory of interference of social 
systems in his case study on the "Production of Law". He has 
further developed the concept of interference by introducing 
the idea of conversation circles in which social systems can 
interfere. Interference is responsible for new "utterances" 
(Mitteilungen) in conversations which lead to change in the 
social system (110).
Hutter (111) and Luhmann (112) have both proposed using 
a general theory of therapy to analyze intersystemic 
relations. A system influences another system through 
involvement in a conversation which allows transfer of 
knowledge without destroying the autonomy of the recipient 
of knowledge. The recipient of therapeutic suggestions 
remains free to choose according to his own autopoietic 
needs.
The remark on a general conception of therapy leads to 
a final observation in our description of the autopoietic 
conception of social systems. The autopoietic theory has 
far-reaching epistemological consequences for external 
observation and scientific analysis. Self-observation and 
external observation are both self-referentially structured. 
All observations and descriptions are thus "system 
relative". Explanations refer to reasons; these reasons, 
however, can only be justified by reference to other reasons 
and reasoning is thus a self-referential process. If
109) Teubner 1989: 111.
110) Hutter 1989: 43.
111) Hutter 1989: 129.
112) Luhmann 1990c: 648-653.
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"ultimate reasons" ("Letztbegriindung") are sought, they can 
only be found in self-referential theories of self- 
referential systems (113). External explanation cannot 
claim to be outside systems; it is always linked to its own 
system, in this case the scientific system, and is thus 
"system-relative".
The Social System of Industrial Relations
In the following, the Luhmannian concept of a social 
system is applied to industrial relations in two steps. 
First, five types of social systems, which can be derived 
from Luhmann's approach, are discussed as possible 
candidates to characterize the industrial relations system 
as a social system. Second, a proposal to define industrial 
relations as a social system is presented on the basis of 
the previous descriptions of the Luhmannian concept of a 
social system.
Five Types of Social Systems
Luhmann's general theory of social systems 
distinguishes three levels of analysis of social systems: 
interaction, organization and society (114). Accordingly, 
we can derive three types of social systems: interaction
systems, organization systems, and function systems of 
society. Two additional types can be found in Luhmann's 
analysis of social systems which are characterized by 
operating with contradicting communication relations either
113) See Luhmann 1984a: 654-661. A self-referential theory 
of law is discussed in Teubner 1990b.
114) Luhmann 1984a: 15-18.
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to another social system or to the society at large. These 
are called conflict system and immune system accordingly.
Thus Luhmann's theory offers five types of social 
systems as possible candidates to characterize industrial 
relations as a social system. On the basis of the 
distinction of the five types of social systems, I shall 
discuss in the following how industrial relations can be 
described (a) as a set of interaction systems, (b) as a 
hypercyclically constituted network of organizations, (c) as 
a conflict system, (d) as an immune system of society, and
(e) as a functionally differentiated societal subsystem.
(a) Industrial relations as a set of interaction systems
Luhmann describes interaction systems as "simple" 
social systems which are formally characterized as 
communication between participants who are present (115). 
The presence of the participants is established through 
their mutual perception. Communication among present 
participants consists of both verbal and non-verbal 
communication. The perception of non-verbal commanication 
among present actors is always reflexive perception because 
ego's perception can be perceived by alter and vice versa 
(116). However, verbal communication is superior to non­
verbal communication in "simple" social systems because it 
can be guided by topics. Topics represent rudimentary
structures of the system. The structure of interaction 
systems is created through the autopoietic requirement of 
continuous communication. Mechanisms of the creation of 
structure are: sequential order of relevant events;
communication is structured by topics; and participants are 
not allowed to talk all at once, but only one after the
other (117).
115) Luhmann 1975: 21-38.
116) Luhmann 1975: 23-24.
117) Luhmann 1984a: 564.
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Structures of interaction systems are not very stable 
because topics, for example, can be changed easily. 
Structurally interaction systems show a low degree of 
autonomy. Interactions are episodes with a strong tendency 
to disappear when the communication among present actors 
ends. To become interaction systems, episodes must be 
combined (118). In addition, interactions must be able to 
reproduce themselves through self-constituting self­
reference.
Luhmann insists that interaction systems and society 
are dependent on each other by definition, but that society 
as a social system cannot be reduced to interaction systems 
(119). However, many questions remain open as to which way 
interaction systems are linked both to each other and to 
society. Their relationship with organizations is even less 
adequately clarified in Luhmann's theory.
Nevertheless, the application of the analysis of 
interaction systems to industrial relations is obvious. 
Negotiations are systems in which actors are present. The 
communication in collective bargaining negotiations, for 
example, is structured by an agenda, by topics and by a 
procedure which prescribes formal rules of participation in 
communications. These negotiations are episodes which are 
linked through their results, i.e. collective bargaining 
agreements, which are supposed to be renegotiated after a 
certain period of time.
Interaction systems of the industrial relations system 
have generally achieved a high degree of structural 
autonomy. Collective bargaining and grievance procedures 
both define which claim or grievance they can process in 
procedures which are established by the systems themselves. 
These negotiation systems define their communicative
118) Luhmann 1984a: 553.
119) Luhmann 1984a, ch. 10.
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elements through self-reference and are therefore 
autopoietic systems.
The industrial relations literature provides many 
descriptions of the autonomous character of collective 
bargaining which allude to self-reproductive concerns of the 
industrial relations system. Wolfgang-Ulrich Prigge, for 
example, defines collective bargaining as a negotiation 
system of interorganizational self-governance which is able 
to determine topics of discussion, processes or phases of 
negotiations and the roles of the negotiators (120).
Industrial relations communications are not only the 
result of interactions but they also describe themselves as 
industrial relations negotiations. Furthermore, collective 
bargaining negotiations can link together because they can 
recognize each other as similar interaction systems. They 
form a set of independent interaction systems.
If industrial relations are viewed as a set or 
combination of interaction systems, it might be asked if the 
set itself has evolved into a new kind of system through the 
combination of interaction systems. The set might have 
achieved the capacity to define the various interaction 
systems as its elements. In this case negotiations in 
industrial relations interaction systems are no longer 
randomly related communicative episodes. These interaction 
systems might be linked through their communications. 
Several other system components of interaction systems might 
be related according to a higher, or second, order which has 
evolved at the level of industrial relations at large. In 
this case it would be insufficient to describe industrial 
relations only in terms of a set of loosely related 
interaction systems.
120) Prigge 1987 33-5. Prigge's approach is an open systems 
approach. The analysis of institutional structures 
dominates over the analysis of communicative processes 
in this input-output analysis.
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(b) Industrial relations as a hypercyclically constituted
network of organizations
Organization theory is a candidate in analyzing the set 
of interaction systems as a second order system. The 
organizational account of industrial relations usually 
focuses on the special characteristics of interactions in 
industrial relations which are often carried out by 
organizations of employers and employees. However,
organization theory can be applied at two levels: at the
level of participants of industrial relations interactions 
and at the level of the industrial relations system at 
large.
Industrial relations interactions are special insofar 
as they are not based on communications between individuals 
but between collective actors. Collective bargaining on a 
meso-level of industry or region and on a micro-level in the 
company or the plant is carried out by unions or worker 
representatives and employer associations or employer 
representatives. These collective actors are either 
organizations or groups of representatives.
The topics of industrial relations communications are 
the result of organizational processes. Claims in 
collective bargaining are agreed upon in internal processes 
of unions or employer associations. Grievances are shaped 
in communications between the grievant and the union 
representative, the works council or the shop steward. The 
initial proposals in industrial relations negotiations are 
often controlled and confined by organizations which are 
only indirectly present in the negotiations. Collective 
bargaining proposals are products of intra-organizational 
consensus.
However, it cannot be overlooked that these intra- 
organizational processes are not autonomous but linked to 
the negotiation processes between their organization and
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other organizations and thus are dependent on extra- 
organizational processes. An interesting research question 
in this respect is the study of the extent to which the 
intra-organizational processes reflect the conditions of 
negotiations in the particular collective bargaining system 
of the company, the region, or the country. There seems to 
be evidence that the independence of the collective actors 
from the collective bargaining system decreases with the 
development of the industrial negotiation systems. Hansjorg 
Weitbrecht, who studied the generation of collective 
bargaining claims of the German metal workers union, found 
that the relation between the size of the claim and the 
outcome of bargaining remained remarkably stable (121). 
This finding can be interpreted from a system theoretic 
point of view to indicate both the separate existence and 
the links between the claims-generating organizations and 
the negotiation system. The organizations which are 
responsible for the claims recognize the separate existence 
of the negotiation system by referring to experiences with 
claims in previous negotiations. Unions and employers 
define their roles by referring to the negotiation system 
and to its conditions which thus influences the generation 
of claims.
Therefore, it becomes necessary to ask about the nature 
of the negotiation system. It could be an autopoietic 
system itself. A possible approach to study the nature of 
the negotiation system is to apply Teubner's concept of the 
gradual development of autopoietic systems to the analysis 
of the collective bargaining system.
Teubner has demonstrated the gradual concept with 
respect to the evolution of an autopoietic organization. He 
proposes to link interaction and organization as cumulation 
of self-reference. He distinguishes between interaction,
121) Weitbrecht 1969: 145. He reports that the outcome of
negotiations in the German metal industry remained at a 
level of two-third of the union claim from 1948 to 1966.
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group and organization (122). Whereas interaction is 
defined by the presence of participants, a group is formed 
when the presence of a participant is used as a criterion 
for self-description of the interaction, i.e., participants 
in interaction become members. If membership is used to 
define the boundary of the system, this allows repetition of 
the interaction despite the absence of the participants, and 
thus creates an autonomous action system. Organizations are 
characterized by hypercyclical relations of elements, 
boundary, structure and identity. Organizations become 
collective actors when self-referentially constituted system 
components, i.e. organizational norms, actors, membership, 
and identity are hypercyclically combined. The collective 
actor is constituted through a cyclical relation of
organizational decisions and organizational identity.
Organizations therefore are called second order autopoietic 
systems.
However, a certain uneasiness in viewing the industrial 
relations system simply as an organization system remains. 
Most industrial relations systems are certainly capable of 
communicating their internally achieved results to the
external world (123). They define themselves through 
membership by inclusion of certain collective actors and by 
exclusion of others. And they can isolate themselves from 
social and psychic conditions in order to follow self­
generated programs (124).
Nevertheless, there is something specific about 
industrial relations which is not captured by this
description. This is related to the fact that the main
instrument for self-regulation and the creation of internal
structures is a mutual agreement. In this respect another
theoretical suggestion of Gunther Teubner can be discussed.
122) Teubner 1987: 113-121.
123) Luhmann 1990c: 672.
124) See Luhmann 1988.
52
Teubner has recently proposed separating types of 
social systems at the intermediate level between interaction 
and society where Luhroann locates organizations. Teubner 
suggests viewing "contract" as a social institution next to 
organization, which is characterized by "formalization of 
exchange" whereas organization is seen as "formalization of 
cooperation" (125).
In applying his theory of the hypercycle Teubner 
demonstrates that contracts can evolve into autopoietic 
social systems. Through self-reference the contract becomes 
an autonomous social system which is able to define certain 
communications as "contractual acts" and which can create a 
structure of "contractual norms". In further self- 
referential processes, when contract norms and acts lead to 
contractual norm production, Teubner sees basic hypercycles 
at work (126).
Furthermore, when contract and organization are 
combined, networks "emerge". They are said to be 
autopoietic systems of a higher order "insofern sie durch 
Doppelattribution emergente Elementarakte ("Netzwerk­
kooperationen") herausbilden und diese zirkulär zu einem 
Operationssystem verknüpfen" (127). Networks are collective 
actors which act through other collective actors. They are 
systems which are formed through a combination of contract 
and organizations and which possess the major features of an 
autopoietic system.
In applying Teubner's idea of a hypercyclically 
constituted network, it can be argued that collective 
bargaining develops into an autonomous network system 
between organizations which becomes able to define both its
125) Teubner 1990.
126) Teubner 1990: 10-11.
127) Teubner 1990: 15. For Teubner, examples of legal
recognition of such networks are the legal regulation of 
company law "hybrids" such as franchising systems and 
joint ventures.
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norms and the status of its members, i.e., the participating 
collective actors. Collective bargaining creates mechanisms 
of self-observation and self-constitution. It is able to 
produce its own norms, rules and institutional structures.
Furthermore, the collective bargaining system 
hypercyclically relates its system components and thus 
creates elementary acts in the form of negotiations which 
are recursively related. The collective bargaining system 
is able to define unions as actors in collective bargaining 
and thus is a collective actor which acts through other 
collective actors. Thus interactions of unions and employer 
associations form a network which produces norms, defines a 
space and forms a unity.
The collective bargaining and other negotiation systems 
between the industrial partners form autopoietic systems 
which are of a different quality than in interaction 
systems. However, the main problem with this analysis of 
industrial relations as a network or several networks lies 
in the theoretical concept of the relation of the industrial 
relations system to other functional subsystems of society 
and to the society at large.
(c) Industrial relations as a conflict system
With respect to intersystemic links Luhmann's theory of 
social systems offers a further possibility of 
conceptualizing the industrial relations system as a social 
system, i.e., the conflict system which has developed within 
another social system (128). For Luhmann, a conflict system 
is characterized by four aspects: contradiction, conflict, 
negative double contingency, parasitic position inside 
social systems. Contradiction is defined as non-acceptance 
of a communication or, in other words, a situation in which 
expectations are not fulfilled.
128) Luhmann 1984a: 529-541.
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Social systems create contradictions through 
communication of negation. Thus contradictions form part of 
the self-reference of social systems. Contradictions are 
constituted by the social system through the unity of the 
three elements of communication: information, utterance and 
understanding.
"Erst die Einheitsvermutung der Kommunikation konstituiert 
durch die Auswahl dessen, was sie zusammenzieht, den 
Widerspruch. Der Widerspruch ensteht dadurch, daß er 
kommuniziert wird." (129)
There are two forms of contradictions according to 
Luhmann: contradiction of another communication or
contradiction of own communication, i.e. self-contradiction. 
A well known form of self-contradiction is irony, in which 
the form of presentation contradicts the content of the 
communication.
A contradiction only becomes a conflict when the 
contradiction is voiced and the refusal of expectations is 
communicated back as negation of the communication. Luhmann 
has described the possibility of a conflict system, based on 
recursively communicated negations, which becomes an 
independent social system of a particular kind (130). In 
interactional conflict systems, the situation of double 
contingency is redefined as one of "negative" double 
contingency in which ego refuses to do what alter wishes 
since ego expects alter not to do what ego wants. In 
itself, this alternative, reversed structure of expectations 
is highly integrative, allowing a wide range of actions to 
be incorporated within the basic assumption of opposition. 
Anything which can be assumed to be detrimental to the other 
party is potentially part of a conflict system. The 
destructive consequences of the new conflict system are thus 
felt in the social system in which the conflict system 
originated.
129) Luhmann 1984a: 498.
130) Luhmann 1984a: 530-532.
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For Luhmann a conflict can develop into an independent 
conflict system only within another social system. From the 
covering system's point of view the conflict system is the 
"excludedt included third" (131). Luhmann describes this 
relationship with a rather unfortunate and distasteful 
biological metaphor as a relationship between a non- 
symbiotic parasite and its host. The metaphor is borrowed 
from Michel Serres' study on "social" parasites (132). The 
conflict system is "parasitic" in the sense that it absorbs 
attention and resources of the "host" system.
Luhmann has not directly applied the idea of a 
parasitic conflict system to industrial relations. In his 
"Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft", where he discusses the 
problem of "Labour" as an example of the general problem of 
scarcity in economics, "Labour" is suddenly described as a 
"parasite" of the economic system (133). Industrial 
relations are treated as an old-fashioned semantic of 
"Capital" vs. "Labour". Although Luhmann does not contest 
that workers need organized representation of workers' 
interests (134), he criticizes unions for protecting 
interests in a mode which leads to inflexible labour 
markets. In this economic view on industrial relations, 
unions are seen as instruments in increasing the price of 
labour despite pressing unemployment (135).
Nevertheless, conflict systems are conceptualized as 
interaction systems. Conflict systems endure when the 
conflict can be interpreted to show signs of general 
societal relevance beyond the limits of the specific 
interaction. Luhmann sees law and morality as mechanisms 
which can operationalize societal relevance of conflicts in 
interaction systems. Where law and morality fail to upgrade
131) Luhmann 1988a: 212.
132) Serres 1980.
133) Luhmann 1988a: 212-223.
134) Luhmann 1988a: 171.
135) Luhmann 1988a: 223-224.
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or select Individual conflicts as "socially relevant", 
specific organizations fulfill this function. Luhmann 
proposes that trade unions can be seen as organizations 
which select particular conflicts and enhance their status 
as relevant for the society at large (136).
Luhmann's brief analysis of generalization of the 
conflict within the conflict system (137) does not consider 
repercussive effects of the generalization on the conflict 
system as such. In Luhmann's approach there is no 
possibility that the conflict system might transform into a 
different type of system. Thus in his account, a conflict 
system remains a conflict system despite a tendency towards 
generalization of conflicts.
However, an alternative scenario can be proposed, which 
assumes a transformation of the very character of a conflict 
system through generalization. It assumes that the conflict 
system can reach a level of autonomy which allows the 
transformation from negative communication to positive 
communication. During this process negative double
contingency is transformed into positive double contingency. 
An example can be the development of those industrial
relations systems that switch from conflictual 
communications to joint decision-making. These industrial
relations systems change their reproductive basis from 
negative to positive forms of communication. Thus the 
generalization of conflicts within a particular host system, 
which no longer defines the reason for conflicts as half­
heartedly included thirds but as own systems problems of 
wider societal relevance, not only helps to preserve the 
conflict system but transforms the conflict system from an 
interaction system into a different form of social system. 
The conflict system acquires a new identity during this 
transformation process and domesticizes conflict through
136) Luhmann 1984a: 536.
137) Luhmann 1984a: 535-536.
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limiting negative double contingency to situations of 
adversary negotiations and collective bargaining.
(d) Industrial relations as an immune system of society
Luhmann's theory offers a fourth possibility to 
conceptualize the industrial relations system as a social 
system which is related to the idea of an immune system of 
society. The idea is that contradictions circulate in 
society and can be activated as conflicts against societal 
structures. Society needs to protect itself from the 
destructive consequences of conflicts.
However, the idea of an immune system is not simply to 
protect society from conflicts. Its function is not to 
maintain attacked structures and to restore the status quo, 
but to protect autopoiesis. The function of social immune 
systems lies in the extension of communication by other 
means. Thus immune systems do not avoid conflicts but 
merely offer suitable forms of communication. The 
overriding aim is to avoid the use of open violence which, 
among other negative consequences, interrupts communication 
necessary for the self-reproduction of society (138).
Luhmann emphasizes the destabilizing effects of 
contradictions on the social system. However, this 
destabilization is not considered dysfunctional but rather 
supportive for the evolution of the system. Complex social 
systems need a certain amount of instability to become able 
to react towards perturbations both within the environment 
and within themselves. Examples are changing prices in the 
economic system, a legal concept in which criticism and even 
change of the law becomes a normal event and marriages which 
can be terminated by divorce. It is not possible for the 
system to assume that things remain as they are. 
Expectations have to be secured continuously. Instability
138) Luhmann 1984a: 504.
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is related to the autopoietic reproduction of the system and 
not only to unstable structures and expectations. In fact 
contradictions are not only able to demolish but are also 
able to replace structures and thus maintain the autopoietic 
reproduction of the system. Contradictions enable the
continuation of action in the absence of the certainty of 
expectations. Contradictions are the communication of "no” 
and protect the system against petrification.
Luhmann has demonstrated his idea of an immune system 
with respect to the legal system (139). The legal system 
serves as the prime immune system of society which 
guarantees communication of expectations even in case of 
contradiction. It permits societal communication to resort 
to legal forms of communication in the case of communicative 
break-down in every-day life situations.
The legal system operates as an immune system of 
society by anticipating uncertainties and instabilities 
internally before these uncertainties and instabilities 
occur in society .
Law is created in anticipation of possible conflicts. 
It secures the continuation of communication in a modified 
form in case of contradiction in normal communications. Law 
selects certain expectations and protects them in case of 
conflict, which creates the basis of normativity of 
expectations. Experiences with conflict are generalized for 
this reason in anticipation of future conflicts. In modern 
societies law invents new problem constellations which in 
fact, nobody would have thought of, if law did not exist. 
And law declares the expectations which arise from new 
problem constellations to be law. Thus law does not serve 
the function of avoiding conflicts but, in fact, increases 
the chances for conflict. It simply tries to avoid the 
violent carrying on of conflicts by providing a means of
139) Luhmann 1984a: 509-512.
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communication adequate to the conflict. "Recht dient der 
Fortsetzung der Kommunikation mit anderen Mitteln." (140) 
Law is societally adequate when it is able to generate 
enough conflicts and enough internal complexity to manage 
these problems.
We might ask whether the industrial relations system 
can be conceptualized as an immune system similar to the 
legal system.
I propose to view the industrial relations system as a 
system complementary to the legal system at the level of 
society. It serves as an immune system because of the 
limited capacity of the legal system in handling conflicts. 
Because of the restrictive entry conditions of the legal 
system, which requires conflicts to be transformed into 
individual claims, the industrial relations system can be 
seen as a second immune system of society which handles 
collective conflicts. It serves to continue communication 
in the case of collective conflicts. It provides procedural 
forms which transform violent collective conflicts into 
negotiations.
Luhmann's "social immunology" could be further advanced 
by applying the concept of immune systems to the study of 
functional subsystems of society. A good example of immune 
systems at the level of concrete social systems is the 
industrial relations system. Thus, in addition to the 
general character of the industrial relations system as an 
immune system of society, we find a system-specific immune 
system within the industrial relations system. This system 
is the grievance procedure and arbitration system which 
serves in the capacity of an immune system in the collective 
bargaining system.
140) Luhmann 1984a: 511.
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(e) Industrial relations as a functionally differentiated
societal subsystem
The four previous characterizations of industrial 
relations as a social system do not preclude the 
conceptualization of the industrial relations system as a 
functionally differentiated societal system on the same 
plane as the legal, the economic or the political system.
Teubner's application of the idea of a hypercycle, 
derived from biochemical theories on the origin of life, is 
not restricted to the emergence of organizations as 
autopoietic systems. It is equally applicable to the 
evolution of functional subsystems of society.
Teubner describes autopoiesis as resulting from a three 
step autonomisation of social systems from self-observation 
to self-description to autopoiesis of social systems. 
Autopoiesis or self-reproduction emerges from a cyclical 
relation of cyclical system components (= hypercycle).
"Gesellschaftliche Teilsysteme gewinnen steigende Autonomie, 
wenn im Subsystem die Systemkomponenten (Element, Struktur, 
Prozess, Identität, Grenze, Umwelt, Leistung, Funktion) 
selbstreferentiell definiert sind (= Selbstbeobachtung), 
wenn zusätzlich diese Selbstbeobachtungen als 
Selbstbeschreibungen im System operativ verwendet werden 
(= Selbstkonstitution) und wenn schließlich in einem 
Hyperzyklus die selbstkonstituierten Systemkomponenten als 
einander wechselseitig produzierend miteinander verkettet 
werden (= Autopoiesis)." (141)
Teubner proposes a gradual evolution of autopoietic 
systems. He assumes that self-reference is not limited to 
elements (parts) but occurs with respect to other system 
components, i.e., structure (networks), process 
(production), boundary and environment (space) and the 
system as a whole (unity). For Teubner the hypercycle, i.e. 
cyclical combination of cyclical self-description of self-
141) Teubner 1987b: 101-102.
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reference, is thus not confined to self-reference of 
elements but equally applies to the other system components.
Teubner has demonstrated the idea of a hypercycle with 
respect to the cyclical relations of the four components of 
the legal system: Legal procedure, legal action, legal
norm, and legal doctrine. In the development of the legal 
system from diffuse societal law to a state of relative 
autonomy, and then to full autopoiesis, these components 
first acquire identity by a process of self-reference and 
are connected hypercyclically in a second process to form 
the autopoietic legal system (142).
Combination of episodes (143) is a mechanism which 
equally applies to the industrial relations system. 
Interactions are episodes in the "carrying on" of society. 
Structures created in industrial relations episodes are used 
in later episodes. Independent industrial relations 
discourses with elaborate grievance procedures and 
collective bargaining styles evolve from these structures. 
In the end an industrial relations culture evolves.
It is possible to construct an autopoietic industrial 
relations system in analogy to Teubner's construction of an 
autopoietic legal system. Procedures, action, norms and a 
retained body of knowledge can be found in the industrial 
relations system as well.
Teubner distinguishes three stages in the evolution of 
a legal system: Diffuse societal law, relatively autonomous 
law, and autopoietic law. Industrial relations consist of 
diffuse societally produced system components. Workplace 
industrial relations rules which are not introduced through 
procedures but are followed repetitiously for reasons of 
tradition are examples of such a state of an industrial 
relations system.
142) Teubner 1989, graph on p. 50.
143) Teubner 1987b.
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An industrial relations system has become partly 
autonomous when one or more of its components become self- 
referential. Examples of this, by analogy to secondary 
legal rules, are norms of recognition of employee 
representatives in grievance procedures or collective
bargaining which regulate the creation of norms.
The industrial relations system is hypercyclically
structured when its components are not only engaged in self­
reference but when the relations of its components become 
recursive. In an autopoietic system the elements rely on 
references to other system components to constitute
themselves. Elements and structure become two mutually 
referential system components. Actions of the industrial 
relations system (elements) are used to define rules 
(structure) and rules are used to define industrial 
relations action (which should not be confused with 
industrial action).
Teubner's hypercycle concept is thus highly suggestive 
of a conception of an industrial relations system as a 
social system. It differs from Luhmann's concept which 
insists that autopoiesis characterizes all social systems 
and that social systems are by definition autopoietic and 
cannot be partly autopoietic and partly allopoietic (144). 
According to Luhmann social systems do not differ with 
respect to autopoiesis. They can only differ with respect 
to the degree of differentiation from their societal and 
other environments and with respect to the degree of 
internal and external complexity.
Teubner's concept has the advantage of discussing the 
crucial question of the historical origin of autopoietic 
systems. Luhmann's approach seems contradictory in this 
respect because he adheres to a theory of differentiation of 
society in which autopoietic function systems are
144) Luhmann 1987e: 318-319.
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achievements of evolutionary processes but he resists 
conceptualizing the historical origins of a particular 
social system before it has become an autopoietic social 
system.
The industrial Relations System as a Social System. 
A Proposal
I propose to view the industrial relations system as a 
functional subsystem of society on the same plane as the 
legal, the economic or the science systems. The industrial 
relations system has constituted itself as a fully-fledged 
functional social system. Although it is possible to 
characterize it as a conflict system within the economic 
system and as an immune system of society, these 
characterizations cannot grasp the entire nature of the 
industrial relations system in modern societies. Thus, in 
my view the modern industrial relations system is best 
understood as a functionally differentiated subsystem of 
society.
This proposal can be demonstrated by discussing the 
four hypotheses which Luhmann has outlined in his analysis 
of the economic system as a "catalogue" for the empirical 
testing of the existence of a social subsystem (145). In 
applying these hypotheses the industrial relations system 
can be characterized in the following way:
Form and scope of differentiation have reached a level 
in modern societies which makes an autonomous 
industrial relation system possible that is not 
dominated by other function systems.
145) Luhmann 1988a: 51.
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The industrial relations system operates with a 
specific combination of closure and openness with 
respect to its elementary operations.
The industrial relations system operates under a binary 
code which represents the exclusive function of the 
system.
- The industrial relations system has achieved a relative 
prominence in society at large in its ability to 
arrange corporatist exchange relations with other 
function systems to further its autonomy.
The following outline of the proposal for a model of 
industrial relations as a social system discusses these four 
hypotheses separately.
(a) Differentiation of an Industrial Relations System
Modern societies are functionally differentiated 
societies. Such a society has overcome the hierarchical 
mode of integration which was characteristic of 
stratificatory societies. A primary mode of integration in 
modern societies is a vertical order of mutual recognition 
of functional subsystems. Each function system is 
exclusively responsible for fulfilling its societal 
function.
It might be argued that the industrial relations system 
is not a full-blown autopoietic system. Teubner could argue 
in analogy to his idea of steps in the autonomisation of the 
legal system, that the industrial relations system consists 
of autopoietic interaction systems but lacks the hypercycle 
of recursive relations of system components and therefore, 
has not yet reached the status of a functionally 
differentiated autopoietic system on the same plane as the
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economic or the legal system (146). In my view this is 
partly a question for the theory of an autopoietic 
industrial relations system and partly an empirical question 
about the stage in the development in the industrial 
relations system. My preliminary answer is that more signs 
point in the direction of a fully-fledged autopoietic 
function system.
Self-reference of the elements of the industrial 
relations system is not only a theoretical supposition but 
an empirically observable phenomenon. Institutions and the 
structure of the industrial relations system are based on 
self-reference. However self-reference of collective 
communications is a highly improbable process.
In these modern societies industrial relations have 
developed into autopoietic function systems which are 
recognized by other function systems. Industrial relations 
have developed from a conflict system into a societal 
subsystem which defines itself with respect to fulfilling a 
function in society at large.
The function of the industrial relations system is to 
manage collective violence, which can occur in the relations 
between industrial interest groups.
Luhmann has embarked on problems of industrial 
relations in two contexts: In his analysis of the economic 
system and in his semantic studies of self-descriptions of 
modern societies. In his sociological analyses of the 
economic system he discusses the history of "Labour" only as 
the history of parasites of the economic system (147). 
"Labour" is a semantic problem related to the economic 
problem of scarcity. Although Luhmann senses that "Labour" 
indicates a different relation to the society at large which
146) Teubner 1989: 49-56.
147) Luhmann 1988a: 213-223.
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cannot be captured by the code of the economic system (148), 
he does not analyze “LabourM apart from the economic system.
Luhmann has further analyzed "Labour" in its semantic 
opposition to "Capital" as representing two classes of 
society. His discussion of class theory is meant as a 
contribution to a description of self-descriptions of the
modern society at large. Luhmann admits that the opposition 
of "Capital" vs. "Labour" as representing two classes of 
society has advanced beyond a mere scientific analysis of 
society. It has, in fact, achieved the status of a widely 
shared self-description of society. However, for Luhmann 
class society means a self-description of the modern society 
as a hierarchically ordered society. Thus, for Luhmann, the 
semantic of "Capital" and "Labour" represents an inadequate 
self-description of modern society. It is an attempt of 
society to resist recognition of its functional 
differentiation into polycentric, horizontally ordered 
function systems (149).
If Luhmann had studied the self-descriptions of the
industrial relations system, he might have detected that it 
has achieved the status of an independent function system in 
society. The opposition of labour and capital has formed a 
negotiation system which has become self-reproductive.
The industrial relations system is characterized by 
special forms of interactions between collective actors, 
which are known as strike activities. The understanding of 
these interactions has changed. These changes in the self- 
descriptions 'indicate a development of the industrial 
relations system. Whereas the modes of regulation of
148) Luhmann 1988a: 222.
149) Luhmann 1985b: 148-150 and 1988b: 168-176. Luhmann
holds the Marxist "semantic" of "Capital" and "Labour" 
responsible for diverting societal communication from 
discussing the real problems of modern societies by 
triggering and perpetuating conflicts which are 
unrelated to the overwhelming and urgent "ecological" 
dangers of our societies. See also Luhmann 1988a: 169.
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strikes are the main concerns of industrial relations in its 
pre-autopoietic phase, the nature of its elements, i.e., 
collective negotiations, as conflictual or cooperative 
becomes prevalent in autopoietic industrial relations. Thus 
the self-descriptions of the system increasingly relate to 
the self-reproduction of its basic communications. 
Industrial democracy is a form of self-description of 
industrial relations which emphasizes codetermination or 
participation between the collective actors.
These self-descriptions also reflect different forms of 
regulation of the industrial relations system, and in 
particular the transformation from external regulation to 
seIf-régulâtion. Regulation of industrial relations has 
historically evolved from regulation of industrial action, 
to regulation of arbitration and other forms of third party 
facilitation to self-regulation of negotiations by self­
created agreements. This history of industrial relations is 
reflected in the order of regulatory instruments in modern 
collective bargaining. However, it appears in this order in 
a reversed form: First negotiation, then arbitration, then
industrial action.
Industrial relations fulfill the societal function of 
managing conflicts between collective actors. From the 
society's point of view the function of the industrial 
relations is the management of collective violence. 
However, modern industrial relations have advanced beyond 
the status of a conflict system. Interaction of collective 
actors occurs in the shadow of conflicts, i.e., strikes and 
lock-outs. Negotiations both avoid and make creative use of 
these forms of collective behaviour or collective violence.
Most industrial relations systems are conflict systems 
in the beginning of their development. However, once 
industrial relations systems have developed structures of 
formalized negotiations these not only express the relevance 
of the conflict both for the host system and the society,
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but they acquire a function as institutions of conflict 
resolution for both the host system and society.
Otto Kahn-Freund has provided insightful remarks on how 
autonomous industrial relations, which manage conflict to 
achieve a number of purposes, can nevertheless revert to 
open conflict systems. He defines as the "cardinal feature 
of labour-management relations" that "it is the conflict 
itself which gives rise to the formation and consolidation 
of groups and to the establishment of the relevant social 
relations as group relations." (150)
For Kahn-Freund it is not so much the aspect of the 
conflict relation defined as "negative communication" 
between the collective actors but the conflict as form of 
interaction between unions and employers' associations which 
leads to progress in the industrial relations system. Open 
conflict is gradually reduced and transformed into an 
instrument which becomes "the sparingly used ultima ratio in 
the arsenal of the groups". However, Kahn-Freund noticed a 
danger of reversal to "primitive" forms of conflict 
behaviour in complex conflict systems which rests on 
intergroup relations:
"Eventually this may lead to a situation in which the 
element of spontaneity appears in the intragroup rather than 
the intergroup sphere: The dissatisfaction of the workers 
may be directed against the union itself on account of the 
deliberateness and moderation of its action. It may find 
expression in 'unofficial' or 'wildcat' strikes, i.e., 
labour conflicts conducted on the workers' side by 
spontaneous and ephemeral 'strike committees' frowned upon 
by the recognized unions. At this point the story of the 
eternal dialectic of spontaneity and organization in labour 
relations may return to its beginning: the danger of a
relapse into more primitive forms of conduct is inherent in 
the rigidity of the social patterns of the labour dispute at 
the highest point of its development." (151)
150) "Intergroup Conflicts and Their Settlement" in Kahn- 
Freund 1978: 42.
151) Kahn-Freund 1978: 44-45.
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Thus Kahn-Freund is well aware that industrial 
relations remains a conflict system which can reverse into 
open conflict. However, the tendencies of joint decision­
making introduce a new quality to the relation of collective 
actors. The perception of industrial action as disruption 
of communication, even beyond the realm of industrial 
relations within the industrial relations system, leads to a 
new understanding of industrial action. Industrial
relations become responsive to societal needs which are 
mainly expressed in the form of dissatisfaction with 
collective violence.
Industrial relations maintain the character of a 
conflict system when the relations of unions and employers 
are dominated by what industrial relations research has 
coined the adversarial principle (152). Adverse industrial 
relations operate under the maxim "what is bad for my enemy 
is good for myself". As long as this attitude dominates the 
behaviour of actors the autonomisation of the industrial 
relations system is inhibited. The communication in the 
conflict system is restricted to negative communications 
with the "host" system. However, in reality industrial 
relations create themselves from communication structures 
which substitute for the dependency on negative links with 
the economic communications.
(b) Operational Closure and Cognitive Openness
Autopoietic industrial relations are operationally 
closed and cognitively open. The elements of the industrial 
relations system, i.e., its communications, are constituted 
in self-referentially closed operations. Because
autopoiesis or self-reproduction is guaranteed by closed
152) See Barbash 1979 and 1984.
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communication circuits, the industrial relations system can 
be open towards its societal environment.
The elements of an autopoietic industrial relations 
system are communications between collective actors. If the 
collective communications are defined as negotiations they 
are perceived as actions of the industrial relations system. 
Negotiations within an industrial relations system can be 
called "industrial relations acts", in analogy to "legal 
acts" which Teubner proposes as the self-constituted 
elements of an autopoietic legal system (153).
Industrial relations acts constitute the core of the 
industrial relations system as a social system. In 
particular, negotiations in collective bargaining are seen 
as such industrial relations acts. Luhmann's discussion of 
communication, action and the system is directly applicable 
to an industrial relations system. The industrial relations 
system defines behaviour of collective actors only as 
industrial action if it is linked to negotiations within the 
collective bargaining system. However, this link is 
entirely a product of the collective bargaining system. 
Thus collective bargaining is defined as industrial action 
within the industrial relations system only when it is 
recognized as industrial action in collective bargaining.
Furthermore, each negotiation can be seen as a form of 
action. The collective bargaining system observes and 
describes itself as a system of negotiations. Negotiations 
are the communications "produced" by previous communications 
relevant to the self-reproduction of the system. Reference 
of negotiations in collective bargaining to previous 
negotiations contains the self-referential process which 
guarantees the autopoiesis of the industrial relations 
system. Thus the realization as negotiation system is the 
mode of self-reference which constitutes the basis of its
153) Teubner 1989: 42.
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autopoiesis. On this basis of operational closure the 
industrial relations system can be open to establish 
intersystemic links.
Industrial relations research is used to discuss 
problems of operational closure and cognitive openness under 
the heading of the autonomy of industrial relations. The 
concept of autonomy of industrial relations, and in 
particular of collective bargaining, has a long history in 
the debates both of external regulation through state 
intervention and of self-regulation of the industrial 
relations system. However, autonomy is usually discussed 
with respect to the structure of the industrial relations 
system, and thus with respect to the capacity of its 
institutions to regulate the system's affairs. The system 
theoretic analysis relates the autonomy of the system to the 
self-reproductive processes and understands autonomy as a 
necessary condition to protect autopoiesis.
The radical view is that the industrial relations 
system creates the grievances and claims because it defines 
which conflict is treated as a "grievance" or "claim" in the 
industrial relations system through reflexive processes. 
This perspective does not deny that grievances or claims are 
defined by the individual grievant or claimant or by the 
union. It only assumes that grievances or claims when 
treated in the grievance machinery or in the collective 
bargaining system as products of previous communications 
inside the system, are influenced by the structure of the 
system which has a specific effect on the occurrence and 
definition of grievances as industrial relations acts.
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(c) The Code of the Industrial Relations System and its 
Operation
The core operations in the system of industrial 
relations are self-referential processes which constitute 
its autopoiesis. A major pre-condition for autopoiesis is 
the ability of the system to distinguish its elementary 
communications. The industrial relations system must select 
its elements from societal communications. This selection 
of communication is carried out by applying a code which is 
specific to the industrial relations system.
Thus industrial relations must possess a binary code in 
order to operate as an autopoietic function system. With a 
system specific code it becomes able to draw a distinction 
between those elements which it considers to belong to the 
system and those which belong to the environment. The 
binary code reflects the function of the industrial 
relations system. Only if the application of the code is 
guaranteed can the industrial relations system be called 
autonomous and autopoietic.
Luhmann calls the invention of codes the technically 
most efficient and consequential form of differentiation of 
function systems. The main function systems structure their 
communication with a binary code which claims universality 
with respect to the respective specific function and also 
claims the exclusion of third possibilities (154).
Luhmann has analyzed several binary codes of function 
systems. He defines the code for the scientific system to 
be the opposition of truth and untruth; the code of the 
economy is payment and non-payment; and the code of the 
legal system is law and non-law.
I propose to call the binary code of the industrial 
relations system negotiable or non-neaotiable between
154) Luhmann 1990a: 75-76.
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collective industrial actors. Like other binary codes the 
code of the industrial relations system entails a paradox 
insofar as the code itself cannot be justified by applying 
the code. The distinction between negotiable and not 
negotiable is itself not negotiable for the industrial 
relations system.
It is possible to demonstrate the idea of element and 
structure of autopoietic industrial relations in
reconstructing the recent definition of industrial relations 
offered by Walter Müller-Jentsch. This definition includes 
major features of a definition of industrial relations as an 
autopoietic social system:
"Arbeits- oder industrielle Beziehungen bezeichnen jene
eigentümliche Zwischensphäre im Verhältnis von Management 
und Belegschaft, von Arbeitgeberverbänden und Gewerk­
schaften, deren eigentlicher Gegenstand friedliche oder
konfliktorische Interaktionen zwischen Personen, Gruppen und 
Organisationen sind, sowie die aus solchen Interaktionen 
resultierenden Normen, Verträge und Institutionen." (155).
Müller-Jentsch emphasizes that interactions between 
persons, groups and organizations are the object of 
industrial relations from which norms, contracts and 
institutions result. In systems theory terms he identifies 
interactions as relations of communications from which the 
structure of the system derives. Interactions appear in 
this definition as abstractions which inhabited complex 
relations between management and employees, employers 
associations and unions or between persons, groups and 
organizations; and these relations can be conflictual or 
consensus oriented. However, the main radicalization of 
autopoietic systems theory in the study of industrial 
relations lies in the analysis of the self-reproductive 
process. Interactions and their derivative institutions 
form conditions and programs for operational closure and 
cognitive openness. Interaction in industrial relations is
155) Müller-Jentsch 1986: 17.
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communication which produces communication. Collective 
bargaining produces new collective bargaining, grievance 
processing produces new grievance processing.
The industrial relations system is a complex system 
which creates its structure by selecting among certain 
relations of its elements. The introduction of the 
criterion collectivity is such a selection. Collectivity is 
both an abstraction from individual relations and a way to 
reduce the complexity of relations of employees and 
employers to those communications in which collective 
representatives operate on behalf of the employees.
When industrial relations are conceived as social
systems which operate in a society consisting of several 
functionally differentiated social systems they have to 
manage both the internal and the external complexity. In 
fact industrial relations have to manage a higher internal 
complexity than most other function systems of society.
This is related to its specific form of organization, or, 
more precisely, the requirement of interaction between
organizations. The vast majority of function systems
including the religious, the political, the economic, the 
legal and the scientific systems, adopt organization as 
their form of achievement of function and production of 
performance. In his analysis of the economic system (156) 
and the scientific system (157), he emphasizes competition 
among organizations as a structural principle. Fulfillment 
of function needs openness, which is usually guaranteed by a 
plurality of organizations (competition among political 
parties, universities, corporations). Industrial relations 
are characterized by reflexive organization, i.e. 
organization of organization. However even among reflexive 
organizations competition is possible. In addition to union
156) Luhmann 1988a: 302-323.
157) Luhmann 1990c: 672-680.
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competition and competition among employer organizations a 
plurality of forms of collective bargaining is possible.
(d) Intersystemic Relations of the Industrial Relations
System in Society
The relation of the industrial relations system to 
other second order social systems is described by Luhmann as 
one of performance rather than function. In functionally 
differentiated societies social systems have to relate to
each other "horizontally" through performances; the function
describes the relation with society. A relation of
performance between two second order social systems is
established when the means used by one system to achieve a 
certain effect in another system are compatible with the 
structure of the other system (158).
Luhmann's distinction of function and performance 
enables one to criticize the inflationary use of the term 
function in industrial relations research. Walter Miiller- 
Jentsch (159), for example, defines several "functions" of 
collective bargaining which are in some cases better 
described as performances of the industrial relations 
system. His list of collective bargaining functions include 
protection of living standards, distribution of income and 
contribution to industrial democracy are not only benefits 
for employees but also performances of the collective 
bargaining system for the economic system. The creation of 
uniform conditions of production through standardization of 
wages and working time and through reinforcement of stable 
wage structures and working conditions are performances 
which benefit the whole group of employers. And the 
autonomy of collective bargaining benefits the state insofar
158) Luhmann 1981: 84.
159) Müller-Jentsch 1986: 158-202.
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as it relieves the political system from regulating working 
conditions; it increases rather than decreases the 
legitimation of the state and the government. Furthermore, 
what Walther Müller-Jentsch calls "societal effectiveness" 
(gesellschaftliche Effektivität) of collective bargaining 
describes, in fact, the function of collective bargaining 
and, indeed, of the whole industrial relations system, when 
he considers it to contain and canalize conflicts (160).
Several advanced industrial relations systems have 
developed their performance relations with the political and 
the legal system into intersystemic exchange relations. 
These exchange relations are described as tripartite 
corporatism. However, the intersystemic relations between 
the industrial relations system and its surrounding 
neighbour systems can only flourish when the industrial 
relations system is secure in its own autonomy and 
autopoiesis. Corporatist arrangements can only benefit the 
industrial relations system if it is strong enough to resist 
direct determination and can use corporatist arrangements 
for internal creation of structures. And the political and 
legal systems benefit only from participation in corporatist 
arrangements as long as the industrial relations system can 
offer performances which are useful for their internal 
communications. The political and the legal system will 
only maintain their support in the long run when the 
industrial relations system is strong enough so that the 
other systems can receive something in return for their 
contribution to the industrial relations system which lies 
in their participation in corporatist networks. Thus 
autonomisation and interdependence are not exclusive but co- 
evolutionary processes (161).
Although there are a number of discussions in Luhmann's 
work which are related to problems of an industrial
160) Müller-Jentsch 1986: 160.
161) See also Willke 1989: 90 and Rosewitz and Schimank
1988: 298-304.
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relations system, he has not directly applied his theory and 
analyses of social systems to a discussion of industrial 
relations as a social system. This might have theoretical 
reasons. But it might also be due to Luhmann's anti-marxist 
convictions. Luhmann resents that the "exhausted" Marxist 
theory of society dominates both a number of discourses 
within sociology and descriptions of our system of society 
(162). Luhmann's anti-marxism, however, should not prevent 
research from describing industrial relations as a social 
system. In fact, Luhmann's self-inflicted resistance to 
industrial relations leaves some space for his students to 
advance autopoietic systems theory and to apply it to one of 
the rare fields which have not been treated by an exhaustive 
study by Luhmann himself.
In particular Luhmann's many studies on the semantics 
of societal processes, i.e., self-descriptions of society 
and its function systems, are highly suggestive for 
industrial relations research as well. In an autopoietic 
view the processes of self-observation and self-description 
are constitutive of the self-reproduction of the industrial 
relations system. Empirical material on self-descriptions 
can be found in professional journals which contain the 
relevant information on collective bargaining agreements, 
strike statistics, so-called "legal" material and other 
background information for the negotiation process. These 
journals have been widely neglected in industrial relations 
research.
Industrial relations is fragile as an autonomous 
function system because the organization of collective 
bargaining depends on the future of interest representation. 
The autopoiesis of collective bargaining requires an 
organizational structure which protects it not only from 
interventions from other social systems like the political, 
the economic and the legal systems but also from
162) Luhmann 1988a: 168.
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fluctuations and changes in the unions and employer 
associations.
Trade unionism is in decline worldwide. There is a 
precarious link between the labour movement and the 
collective bargaining system. They are structurally coupled 
and interfere at several levels. The realization of the 
unions' dependence on collective bargaining might give them 
a chance to develop a strategy of survival. Interest 
organizations can legitimate themselves through 
participation in collective bargaining. Furthermore, they 
can internally structure themselves around collective 
bargaining. Nevertheless, the industrial relations system 
will have to achieve a greater independence from unions and 
their influence. It will have to emancipate itself as an 
autonomous system from the participating organizations.
79
CHAPTER II
LABOUR CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
SYSTEM
Labour conflict resolution is related in specific ways 
to the core of the industrial relations system, i.e., 
autonomous collective bargaining.
The function of labour conflict resolution in the 
industrial relations system is to secure the system of 
collective bargaining. Processes and procedures of labour 
conflict resolution provide the possibility to continue 
communications between the collective actors in case of a 
breakdown of negotiations in collective bargaining. In this 
sense the procedural system of labour conflict resolution 
can be characterized as an immune system of the collective 
bargaining system.
An external observer of the industrial relations system 
is able to detect a couple of other ’'functions” which are 
attached to labour conflict resolution. However, which 
"function” is emphasized depends on the system reference of 
the observer . An observer from the political system, for 
example, mentions the prevention and absorption of 
collective violence, and a legal observer highlights 
individual employment protection or the filtering of 
conflicts which have a propensity for litigation. From a 
systems theoretical perspective, it is important to 
distinguis between functions and performances of labour 
conflict resolution and to name these other "functions” 
rather performances or services for other social systems. 
The thesis of this chapter is that labour conflict 
resolution can service the legal, the political or the 
economic system only insofar as it is linked to the
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autopoietic system of industrial relations for which it 
functions as a system—specific immune system.
Chapter II proceeds by expounding the relationship 
between collective bargaining and labour conflict 
resolution. The history, functions, performances,
reflexions and autonomy of collective bargaining systems are 
discussed with respect to the four countries under 
comparison. Their arbitration systems are introduced as 
immune systems of the collective bargaining systems. 
Procedural aspects of negotiation and arbitration procedures 
and the role of litigation in industrial relations 
interactions are discussed. And in a final section, 
different forms of tripartite cooperation between unions, 
employers and the state are described as corporatist 
arrangements. These corporatist structures are purported by 
the institutions of labour conflict resolution. However, 
they also shape the modes of labour conflict resolution at 
the different levels of collective bargaining.
Collective Bargaining and Labour Conflict Resolution
In a systems theoretical account, collective bargaining 
is described as a system of recursive collective 
communications. These communications normally occur in 
autonomous negotiations between collective actors which are 
structured by procedures. Collective bargaining occurs in 
advanced industrial relations systems at three levels: (a)
negotiations between local unions, shop stewards or elected 
worker representatives and single employers at the company 
level; (b) negotiations between trade unions and employer 
associations at the sectorial level; and (c) negotiations of 
peak associations with state officials at the national or 
federal level.
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Thus collective bargaining appears in several forms, it 
can happen on different levels, and it has a number of 
societal functions. All four countries under comparison 
have seen phases in the historical development of industrial 
relations in which the struggle for autonomy of collective 
bargaining became a major concern. The history of 
collective bargaining structures reveals the importance of 
labour conflict resolution and the development of self- 
regulatory mechanisms to achieve internal autonomy in 
collective bargaining which guarantees external autonomy,
i.e., independence from other social systems based on their 
recognition of industrial relations as a social system. 
Thus, for the study of labour conflict resolution, the 
transformation of the collective bargaining systems from a 
concern with external autonomy to a concern with internal 
autonomy is particularly interesting.
The History of Collective Bargaining
The collective bargaining histories of the four 
national industrial relations systems under comparison are 
the context in which systems of collective labour conflict 
resolution developed. The history of industrial relations 
must be understood as an intertwined history of both the 
development of the industrial relations organizations and 
the autonomisation of the collective bargaining system.
Great Britain
Collective bargaining in the form of "shop-bargaining” 
and even district bargaining occurred in Britain even before 
the establishment of trade unions. However, as the Webbs 
showed, the system of collective bargaining only became
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viable once trade unions provided the machinery for its 
application. Trade unions brought "continuity and
elasticity" (l) to collective bargaining. British trade 
unions were only gradually legalized in the 19th century. 
Because of restrictive combination laws trade unions 
organized in the form of friendly societies, which provided 
only limited protection from regular, although 
unpredictable, prosecutions (2). The Combination Law Repeal 
Act of 1824 brought limited recognition of the freedom of 
association; however, only one year later Peele's
Combination Act of 1825 precluded the freedom to strike by 
penalizing undefined crimes of violence, threats,
intimidation, molestation and obstruction. Nevertheless, 
these combination laws of 1824-1825 had the effect that "the 
right of collective bargaining, involving the power to 
withhold labour from the market by concerted action, was for 
the first time expressly established" (3).
Collective bargaining as a system of negotiations 
between collective actors developed through self-regulation. 
Especially in the period from 1867 to 1875 "innumerable 
Boards of Conciliation and Arbitration were established, at 
which representatives of the masters met representatives of 
the Trade Unions on equal terms." (4) This development was 
supported by a change in law. The Councils of Conciliation 
Act of 1867 repealed the unsuccessful Arbitration Act of 
1824 which had introduced licensed Councils of Conciliation 
consisting of Justices of the Peace acting as arbitrators. 
The 1867 Act and the Arbitration (Masters and Servants) Act 
of 1872 supported the voluntary establishment of joint 
councils and the adoption of codes of work rules agreed upon 
between employers and workmen. In the aftermath of the Acts 
local negotiations and local joint committees were
1) Webb 1920b: 179.
2) Webb 1920a: 64-93. See also Thompson 1968: 543-569.
3) Webb 1920a: 108.
4) Webb 1920a: 337.
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established which led to a stabilization and to a "sturdy 
growth" of collective bargaining (5).
The legal situation improved for trade unions in the 
1870s, in particular with the Conspiracy and Protection of 
Property Act of 1875, which restricted crimes relating to 
picketing and other strike activities through codification. 
When unions began to organize unskilled workers after 1875 
(their so-called second formative period (6)) and when, 
after a number of major strikes, the employers began to
organize themselves and to recognize trade unions, a system
of sectorial and national collective bargaining could 
gradually develop in the 1890s (7) despite large-scale rank- 
and-file dissent within trade unions (8) . Without much 
support of the law (9), this system developed from 
negotiations of groups of craftsmen and employers to 
sectional and national bargaining between recognized "new 
model" unions and employer associations.
Around the turn of the century, collective bargaining 
in Great Britain received both extreme hostility from the 
judicial system and strong encouragement through state 
intervention. It was supported and endorsed by state
policies which shifted from mere recognition of the freedom 
of association, as the right of free men, to a view of
unions as positively contributing to social welfare through 
their participation in collective bargaining (10). In 1894 
the Royal Commission on Labour officially recognized in its 
final report collective bargaining and voluntary collective 
negotiations as the preferred methods for government
5) See Sharp 1950: 280-290.
6) On "new unionism" see Webb 1920a: 358-421, Clegg et al.
1977: 1-96 and Hinton 1982. See also Kahn-Freund 1977: 
69 on the impact of "new unionism" on labour law.
7) See Clegg 1979: 66 and Clegg et al. 1977: 471: "The
development of collective bargaining was the outstanding 
feature of this period" from 1899 to 1910.
8) See Gore 1982.
9) See Kahn-Freund 1983b, ch. 4.
10) See Clegg et al. 1977: 485.
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policies in the field of industrial relations. And the 
Conciliation Act of 1896 encouraged conciliation and 
voluntary arbitration in support of collective bargaining. 
This state policy of encouragement of collective bargaining 
through dispute settlement was continued with the Industrial 
Court Act of 1919, which established Courts of Inquiry and a 
machinery of voluntary arbitration through Industrial Courts 
(11), renamed Industrial Arbitration Board in 1971 and 
Central Arbitration Committee in 1975.
For three quarters of a century, until the 1970s, 
British state policies towards industrial relations were 
dominated by the concepts of voluntarism and collective 
laissez-faire of the collective parties and abstentionism 
with respect to state intervention. This British policy of 
"voluntarism" was initially directed against the Courts, 
which had adopted a hostile attitude towards the unions 
throughout the 19th century. Indeed, the exclusion of 
courts created the basis of voluntarism, as Lord Wedderburn 
has described the process with much insight.
"The reaction against legal attacks on unions by the 
nineteenth-century courts is a major reason why modern 
negotiating structures came to be built upon the autonomous 
arrangements of the parties (employers and unions) rather 
than upon legal devices and structures, such as bargaining 
units regulated by legislation" (12).
Within the industrial relations system, law was 
perceived as repressive and as a means for hostile courts to 
interfere in internal industrial relations affairs. 
Protective statutes were only enacted after disastrous court 
decisions. The 1875 Act, for example, which effectively 
decriminalized, the unions was a reaction to the outrageous 
attempt to criminalize unions in R. v. Bunn (13) j and the
11) On the development of voluntary arbitration see Turner- 
Samuels 1951: 261-282 and Sharp 1950: 290-305 and 347- 
368.
12) Wedderburn 1986: 272.
13) R. v. Bunn [1872] 12 Cox 316.
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Trades Disputes Act of 1906, which granted unions immunity 
from civil liability, was a reaction to the famous Taff Vale 
decision of the House of Lords, which had held unions liable 
in tort (delict) for the acts of their officials in the 
course of a strike (14).
However, after trade unions had achieved immunity 
through the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 (15) and after
official state policies had endorsed the policy objectives 
of voluntarism and abstentionism, trade unions gained 
enormously in social and political status (16). The state 
came to favour trade unionism and collective consultation 
even in the public sector. The Whitley Committee, 
established during WW I, recommended Joint Industrial 
Councils which "welded" organizations of workers into the 
system (17). The trend towards centralized bargaining 
continued between the wars. The coverage of collective 
bargaining increased even faster than trade union 
membership. By 1933 almost nine million British employees 
were covered by collective bargaining agreements (18).
The hostility of the legal system to industrial action 
and the collective organization of workers prevented the use 
of law for the creation of internal structures in the 
industrial relations and collective bargaining system. The 
Arbitration Acts of the 19th century, which introduced 
compulsory arbitration, were largely ineffective (19). 
Independent of the state, British industrial relations 
developed their own voluntary institutions of conflict 
resolution. The collective bargaining agreement was from 
the outset not only an alternative source of substantive
14) See Taff Vale Railway Co. v. Amalgamated Society of 
Railway Servants [1901] AC 426.
15) See only Clegg et al. 1977: 305-325 and 393-395 and 
Brown 1982.
16) Webb 1920a: 645.
17) Wedderburn 1986: 272.
18) Clegg 1985: 547-550.
19) See Sharp 1950: 273-289.
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regulation. It also established a machinery of dispute 
resolution through regulation of procedures. However, 
voluntaristic state policies both supported and
instrumentalized the self-regulatory capacities of the 
British industrial relations system.
It is the outstanding characteristic of British 
collective bargaining that the emphasis is on arbitration 
and conciliation procedures rather than upon substantive 
rules. Otto Kahn-Freund emphasised this point in
contrasting the British "dynamic" model with the German 
"static" model of collective bargaining (20).
"In the 'dynamic' system the emphasis is on the fixed and 
permanent constitution and procedure of the 'machinery' and 
not on the flexible and easily changeable substantive norms 
which it creates." (21)
British industrial relations developed a "non-statutory 
and non-governmental machinery" of voluntary conciliation 
and arbitration (22). In conjunction with collective 
bargaining permanent joint committees or joint councils were 
erected in a number of industries. British collective 
bargaining thus emerged from the institutions of labour 
conflict resolution.
The non-legal character of the British collective 
bargaining system is still a major characteristic of the
system. With the exception of the brief period of the 
Industrial Relations Act from 1971 to 1974 the collective 
agreement has • never been legally enforceable. The 
Industrial Relations Act of 1971 was rejected jointly by 
unions and employers, who refused to obey the law by
incorporating the TINALEA clause ("this is not a legally
20) Kahn-Freund 1978: 52-55 and 1983: 70-72.
21) Kahn-Freund 1978: 53.
22) See Turner-Samuels 1951: 1-126 on the "Non-statutory and
Non-governmental Machinery" and, in addition, Sharp 
1949: 1-269 on "Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration
in Selected Industries".
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enforceable agreement") in almost all collective bargaining 
agreements. Since the repeal of the Industrial Relations 
Act in 1974 the system of collective bargaining has kept its 
voluntary nature, despite the restrictions on industrial 
action and on union activities in general introduced by the 
Thatcher labour laws during the 1980s.
Thus Allan Flanders' description of the British system 
of collective bargaining, which he submitted as evidence to 
the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employer 
Associations, known as the Donovan Commission, is still 
accurate. During this official investigation of the system 
of British industrial relations, he outlined three 
principles of industrial relations which he considered to be 
the system's main characteristics:
According to Flanders a priority is accorded in British 
industrial relations (a) to collective bargaining over other 
methods of external job regulation; (b) to procedural over 
substantive rules for the regulation of collective 
bargaining; and (c) to voluntary over compulsory procedural 
rules for collective bargaining (23) .
Along with centralized bargaining there developed plant 
bargaining in Great Britain. Shop stewards established an 
independent system of job regulations. After the 1960s the 
number of shop stewards and the significance of plant 
bargaining increased considerably (24). They were diagnosed 
as the factors for an "inevitable growth of informality" in 
workplace industrial relations (25). Batstone reports for 
the 1980s a stabilisation of the shop steward organization. 
The range of plant bargaining increased; and, contrary to 
several predictions, a significant centralization of plant 
bargaining did not occur (26). In fact, Britain has
23) Flanders 1970: 94-99.
24) Clegg 1979, ch. 2, Degen 1976 and Batstone 1988, ch. 3.
25) Terry 1977.
26) Batstone 1988, ch. 3 and ch. 4.
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solidified its decentralized system of collective 
bargaining.
A new trend in British collective bargaining is the 
single union agreement which adds to decentralization. In 
some companies multi-union bargaining is replaced by 
recognition and procedure arrangements with a single union 
enjoying exclusive bargaining rights. Arbitration
procedures are replaced by joint advisory councils made up 
of management and elected employee representatives which 
recommend solutions for problems occurring in local union- 
management negotiations (27). The single union agreements 
do not aim at joint decision-making. The joint committee 
has only consultative rights and management retains the 
final responsibility. Keith Sisson predicts that the future 
of British personnel management will continue to show a 
considerable variety of practice. These include human 
resource management, which emphasizes bargaining with the 
individual employee, and consultation, which emphasizes 
constructive relations with the unions. Consultation, which 
incorporates unions into the organizational fabric of the 
company, is likely to become a necessity due to European 
company and competition law resulting from the Single 
European Market.
United States
In contrast to Britain the early development of 
collective bargaining structures was initially supported in 
the U.S. by courts expressing, according to Commons and 
Andrews, "common consent and favorable construction" (28). 
In 1842, in Commonwealth v. Hunt (29), the Supreme Court of
27) See the description of a single union agreement in Fox 
1987: 613.
28) Commons and Andrews 1916: 95.
29) Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Metcalf) 111 (1842).
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Massachusetts agreed to a strike which was carried out to 
establish a closed shop. Thus the right to strike which the 
employees gained in England through legislation in the 1870s 
was granted to them in the U.S. without legislation at a 
much earlier time.
However, this judicial policy could not be sustained 
due to a lack of legislative support. The lawmakers did not 
repeal the law of conspiracy. And the resurgence of the use 
of conspiracy law in the 1880s "became once more a serious 
menace to collective action by labor" (30). Concerted 
activities were treated as conspiracies which restrained 
trade. The emphasis shifted from criminal to civil 
liability. Civil courts issued injunctions against
concerted activities in support of unionization. The 
procedure was extremely one-sided in favour of the
employers. Restraining orders were "promptly secured on the 
basis of stylized affidavits, the truth of which often could 
not be challenged because they were presented to the judge 
ex parte, without notice to the employees" (31). In 
addition, the antitrust law (Sherman Act) proved to be a 
flexible instrument to outlaw unions. In the famous Danbury 
Hatters case in 1908 (32) antitrust law was used against a 
union boycott which was considered a restraint of trade, and 
the union was subjected to triple damages. Congress
subsequently diminished the unions' exposure to antitrust 
liability by passing the Clayton Act in 1914.
In 1916 Commons and Andrews still reach the conclusion 
that the law "seriously restricts labor in its collective 
action, while it does not interfere with the parallel 
weapons of the employers". They argue for equal conditions
for unions and employers. It is remarkable that they base
their arguments on a notion of what they call "true 
collective bargaining". Employers and unions should be
30) Commons and Andrews 1916: 91-112 (96).
31) Gorman 1976: 1-2.
32) Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S 274 (1908).
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allowed complete freedom to combine. "Restrictions in the 
law upon collective action upon either side are inconsistent 
with collective bargaining " (33).
Restrictions in law were not the only threat to
collective bargaining. New methods of "scientific
management", later known as Taylorism (34), developed an 
understanding of intra-plant-bargaining as "intimate 
cooperation of the management with the workmen, so that they 
together do the work in accordance with the scientific laws 
which have been developed" (35). The scope of collective 
bargaining was reduced to joint application of so-called 
scientific laws of management.
In the 1920s the advocates of unionization and 
collective bargaining were opposed by the majority of 
employers who combined to execute hostile industrial 
relations strategies. Even "Progressive" employers engaged 
in experiments in joint determination like employee 
representation, shop committees and shop councils rather
than in collective bargaining with the unions of the 
"American Federation of Labor" (AFL) (36).
The situation changed with the New Deal in the 1930s. 
After the Depression state policies were adopted to support 
collective bargaining. The New Deal Policy acknowledged as 
public policy the support of collective organizations and 
bargaining in order to manage escalating tensions in 
industrial relations. Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal 
labour policy both built on and expanded Herbert Hoover's 
policy of an "associative state" in which the welfare state 
provides the background for societal regulation by non-
33) Commons and Andrews 1916: 120.
27) See Taylor 1947 which comprises his main writings: "Shop 
Management" (1903) and "The Principles of Scientific 
Management" (1911).
35) Taylor 1947: 115.
36) Tomlins 1985: 93-100.
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governmental, assoclational networks located in the private 
sector (37).
In a first phase, with the National Recovery Act and 
the Labour Disputes Bill 1934, the New Deal state policies 
concentrated on the introduction of mechanisms of labour 
conflict resolution like conciliation, mediation and 
arbitration in order to facilitate voluntarist organization 
and bargaining.
"The solution lay in allowing individuals to organize and 
bargain collectively without interference, and in creating a 
tripartite administrative board which would ensure that 
interference did not take place and which would offer its 
services as a mediator and arbitrator in those disputes 
which still occurred." (38)
The National Labour Board (NLB) was created in 1933 as 
a tripartite administrative body at the federal level. Its 
main task was to prevent disputes to from developing into 
strikes by offering mediation. In addition the National 
Recovery Administration (NRA) implemented economic policies 
which also aimed at supporting the development of collective 
bargaining structures. However, this American version of 
corporatism supported by the NRA met strong opposition. The 
traditional crafts-oriented AFL, not at ease with organizing 
mass production workers, opposed the Labour Disputes Bill 
together with the employers. In particular the concept of 
collective bargaining pluralism which was purported by the 
NRA was rejected by the AFL and subsequently by the NLB, 
which favoured majority rule elections and exclusive 
representation (39). Indeed the NRA failed to achieve its 
general goal to "institutionalize a new cooperative 
relationship between business and labor based on collective 
bargaining. Instead, it had intensified class conflict." 
(40)
37) On Hoover's associative state see Tomlins 1985: 91-99.
38) Tomlins 1985: 119.
39) Brand 1988: 242-254.
40) Brand 1988: 257.
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Thus, in the second phase, the reform of industrial
relations at the governmental level shifted towards 
strengthening the collective bargaining system. The 
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 was introduced
explicitly to change the status of collective bargaining
agreements. These agreements were no longer seen as a
concern of the employees and the employers alone but as a 
concern and an expression of public interest as well. This 
meant a qualitative shift in public policy towards 
collective bargaining which intended to give unambiguous 
public support to independent unionism as a means of 
promoting collective bargaining. The policy differed from 
the several legislative attempts of the 1920s, which merely 
intended to stabilize existing relations between organized 
parties. It vindicated the tangible public interest in the 
stabilization of the wages, hours of work and working 
conditions of the labour force at large. Consequently, the 
new labour laws supported collective bargaining on a larger 
scale than companies and argued against company unionism. 
The new National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was designed 
to interfere directly in negotiations to secure appropriate 
collective bargaining structures.
The new act envisaged a different role for trade 
unions. They were encouraged to become dependent on the 
system of collective bargaining. Both unions and employers 
were asked to support the development of the collective 
bargaining system. This required a new self-understanding 
and practice from these organizations. In fact, the
instability of the collective bargaining system created 
uncertainty in the organizations which was directed against 
the state policies in support of the collective bargaining 
system.
The NLRB met opposition from employers, unions, 
politicians and academics who argued for voluntarism and 
against statutory state intervention. Against this
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opposition the NLRB failed to have an impact on the 
development of collective bargaining as a social system. 
The agency was widely perceived only to denounce "sins" of 
employers and to stamp them out. The powerful opposition 
alliance destroyed the old NLRB and this had a detrimental 
impact on collective bargaining in the U.S. (41).
The most severe impairment of the NLRB with respect to 
effective support of collective bargaining was the 
destruction of its Economic Research Division. The 
impotence of the NLRB to engage in labour policies and 
practices in support of collective bargaining was related to 
its inability to collect and use economic and industrial 
relations data in its everyday practice. Gross has 
drastically characterized the NLRB as an institution which 
by 1947 had been "transformed from an expert administrative 
agency which played a major role in formulation of labour 
policy into a conservative, insecure, politically sensitive 
agency preoccupied with its own survival and reduced to 
deciding essentially marginal legal issues" (42).
The post-war situation was largely dominated by 
processes restricting and de-radicalizing the NLRB and the 
Wagner Act (43) which in fact led to the "privatization of 
public policy" (44). Legislation stopped with the three 
major statutes: the Wagner Act of 1935 introducing state
support for autonomous collective bargaining, and the 
limitations of this Act by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and 
the Landrum-Griffiths Act of 1959 regulating and restricting 
union power.
There have been a number of attempts to explain the 
exceptional character of the devlopment of U.S. collective 
bargaining, labour law and industrial relations in general.
41) See Gross 1981.
42) Gross 1981: 267.
43) Klare 1978.
44) Selznick; Nonet and Vollmer 1969: 229-240.
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In Alan Hyde's "theory of labor legislation" the political 
passivity of American unions is held responsible for the 
inactivity of the U.S. policy-maker and the lack of 
legislation. Unlike in Europe the American political elite 
was not threatened by disruptive worker movements after WW
II and thus did not engage in symbolic political concessions 
to the labour movement.
Other analyses emphasize the broad pluralist consensus 
in industrial relations and labour law which developed after 
WW II. This consensus favoured a separate common law of 
industrial relations which develops formal cooperation in 
negotiations in unionized companies and in company grievance 
procedures, and which creates an alternative to state 
policies and judicial review. The development of sectorial 
or national collective bargaining was prevented, and large 
sectors of the American work force that were not unionized 
were kept outside the domain regulated by the industrial 
relations system.
Post-war American labour law developed into common law 
of collective bargaining, which is characterized by the 
following principles: exclusive representation of the
bargaining unit; majority rule; protection against unfair 
labour practises of the employer against union activities; 
no judicial review; and final and binding arbitration.
The paradigm of American labour law which is described 
as "industrial pluralism" is based on the premises of 
industrial equality at the workplace and neutral 
arbitration. Katherine Stone criticizes both premises as 
false descriptions of reality which is actually 
characterized by inequality at the workplace and important 
internal and external pressures on arbitration (45). She 
proposes an alternative concept of labour law which aims at 
a politicization of industrial relations issues and at a
45) Stone 1981.
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’'public" form of dispute resolution. Her institutional 
alternative could be read as a proposal for a labour 
judiciary in the U.S. (46).
Within the legal discourse the majority of American 
labour lawyers view the limited amount of regulations still 
rather as a virtue than an obstacle for the development of 
industrial relations. Nevertheless, some critical labour 
lawyers emphasize the weakness of American exceptionalism 
for the developments of unions, the collective bargaining 
system and the American industrial relations system in 
general (47). To overcome particularistic bargaining 
strategies they argue for an understanding of collective 
bargaining "as a system of industrial democracy and as a 
framework for employee self-determination" (48) . The goal 
is democratization of decision-making at the workplace. 
With respect to the reform of collective bargaining, this 
approach argues for restrictions on management rights; 
prerogatives or discretionary decisions should remain 
outside the ambit of collective bargaining. Thus, it 
radicalizes previous pluralist views.
Philip Selznick and his collaborators argued already in 
the 1960s that collective bargaining in fact undermines the 
doctrine of management prerogative. Although "creative 
arbitration" does not challenge "the locus of 
responsibility" within company structures, it inevitably 
restricts the exercise of management discretion and subjects 
the exercise of power to dialogue. In their empirically 
informed perspective, rooted in legal realism, a major 
effect of the operation of the collective bargaining system 
was that management has to justify its decisions and thus 
"give way to policy" (49). Collective bargaining introduces
46) Stone 1981: 1580.
47) See Rogers 1988 and Klare 1988a and 1988b.
48) Klare 1988a: 69-76 (74).
49) Selznick; Nonet and Vollmer 1969: 121-182.
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procedures which gradually undermine the basis for 
authoritarian power relations and management prerogatives.
At the end of the 1980s Klare argues for full 
recognition within labour law doctrine of the reality which 
Selznick et al. described more than twenty years ago. In 
Klare's account the principle of management prerogative 
should be abandoned within the context of collective 
bargaining and be replaced by the principle of industrial 
democracy and employee self-realization.
"There is no reason why collective bargaining and 
arbitration must assume an inherent managerial prerogative. 
Law easily could, and in my view should, substitute a 
different baseline assumption. The norm should be that 
employees enjoy an inherent or vested right to participation 
in workplace decision-making. A situation vesting management 
with exclusive decision-making authority should be the 
exception requiring special justification as a departure 
from the basic commitment to democracy in firm governance." 
(50)
Katherine Stone's analysis of the role of labour in the 
corporate structure supports this view. She argues that with 
the democratization of the corporate structure collective 
bargaining develops into participation (51). Although she 
does not seem to be aware of the parallels, her analysis of 
labor law reflects more general trends in the restructuring 
of American companies and the American economy. She 
describes within the regulatory processes of industrial 
relations a transformation which has been described in 
economic terms as the transformation from mass production to 
flexible specialization and as the emergence of a new 
economy of craft communities (52). Production patterns 
which pay attention to flexible specialization require new 
forms of work organization. Developments such as quality 
circles and other forms of decentralized, semi-autonomous 
production have an impact on corporate decision-making which
50) Klare 1988b: 51.
51) Stone 1988.
52) Piore and Sabel 1984.
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opens up new forms of worker participation and new 
directions for collective bargaining at the company level.
To summarize, the development of collective bargaining 
in the U.S. has been challenged by significant changes in 
labour markets and technology. However, American labour law 
is still centered around principles of voluntary regulation 
through collective bargaining and decentralization in the 
establishment of grievance arbitration. The rapid decline 
of unionism (53) is accompanied by new human resource 
management strategies. These alternatives to traditional 
collective bargaining in the form of consultation procedures 
and non-union company grievance procedures are structural 
innovations in the U.S. collective bargaining and industrial 
relations system. American labour law will have to take 
notice of these challenges which undermine traditional 
industrial relations and collective bargaining.
Germany
The development of collective bargaining in Germany 
started in the nineteenth century mainly in two industrial 
sectors, printing and construction. For a long period the 
development of collective bargaining showed a strong 
disparity among German industrial sectors. Whereas the 
major industries with mass production and large corporations 
remained opposed to collective bargaining with independent 
trade unions, it developed in sectors characterized by 
competition between small and medium-sized companies.
The printing industry was the first industry to adopt a 
national collective bargaining agreement in 1873. It was 
also the industry which developed the most elaborate 
structure of collective bargaining.
53) Freeman and Medoff 1984 and Kochan et al. 1986.
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The employer association (Buchdruckerverein) recognized the 
trade union (Buchdruckerverband) after a number of local 
strikes and short imprisonment of the union leader for 
'•defamation" because he had publicly announced his intention 
not to accept the employers' conditions (54). The 
collective agreement was the product of negotiations in a 
joint committee with an equal number of elected members from 
both sides. The agreement included detailed regulation of 
wages. However, the implementation of the national 
agreement was not successful in all regions. The trade 
union lost credibility among parts of its membership in the 
important district of Berlin and a significant drop in 
membership occurred. The revolutionary wing of the labour 
movement accused the printers' union of reformism. The 
local unions and some employers asked for revision of the 
collective agreement, which led to a new round of 
negotiations in 1876. The two major results of the new 
collective agreement were that union members were entitled 
to fixed wages which no employer of the printing industry 
was allowed to undercut. And the collective agreement 
included a detailed arbitration procedure (Schieds- und 
Schlichtunasordnuna) which formed an essential and 
characteristic part of the collective agreement (55). The 
collective bargaining system was almost destroyed in the 
1890s when the unions started strikes in order to widen the 
bargaining issues from wages to working time, which met 
almost unanimous employer resistance.
By the turn of the century the printing industry had not 
only adopted comprehensive regulations of wages, hours of 
work and overtime through collective agreements. Collective 
bargaining also included separate regulations on peace 
obligations, arbitration procedures and joint committees. 
It is significant from a system theory perspective on the 
German system of collective bargaining that the printing 
industry had a so-called "organization agreement" in which 
the collective bargaining partners mutually recognized each 
other. This agreement was in fact a closed shop agreement 
because the employers were only allowed to employ union 
members and union members were only allowed to work for 
employers who belonged to the association of printing 
employers. Trade unions and employer associations 
strengthened their organizations through collective 
bargaining.
The construction industry was the second most active 
industrial sector to develop a collective bargaining system. 
Collective bargaining was characterized by local agreements 
and only a few regional agreements The number of
collective bargaining agreements increased between 1890 and
54) Burkhardt 1974: 24-25.
55) See Burkhardt 1974: 29-32.
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1910 from 26 to 2437 (56). Although dominated by local
collective bargaining, there was a movement towards national 
agreements which led to a national agreement in 1910.
However, the large industries in mining, steel and 
textile remained hostile towards collective bargaining. The 
large corporations in these industries, which were engaged 
in developing mass-production before WW I, wanted to remain 
in control of restructuring their work organization. 
Whereas employers in printing and construction used 
collective bargaining to reduce competition among 
themselves, this was of minor concern for the cartellized 
large industries.
Trade unions were not very successful in organizing 
unskilled employees in these industries. Furthermore, they 
were against collective bargaining for ideological reasons. 
Lasalle's verdict against unions engaging in wage conflicts, 
which he thought only created false hopes that the working 
class would be able to raise its living situation above the 
level of subsistence, prevailed over Marxist ideas of the 
transformative potential of union involvement in collective 
bargaining in order to question the wage system as such 
(57) . The union position changed in 1899, when the General 
Convention of the German unions accepted collective 
bargaining as a means for unions to achieve recognition and 
an equal status with employer associations (58).
56) Ullmann 1977: 218-222.
57) See Hagemeier et al. 1984: 48.
58) "Tarifliche Vereinbarungen, welche die Lohn- und 
Arbeitsbedingungen für eine bestimmte Zeit regeln, sind 
als Beweis der Anerkennung der Gleichberechtigung der 
Arbeiter seitens der Unternehmer bei Festsetzung der 
Arbeitsbedingungen zu erachten und in den Berufen 
erstrebenswert, in welchen sowohl eine starke 
Organization der Unternehmer wie auch der Arbeiter 
vorhanden ist, welche eine Gewähr für Aufrechterhaltung 
und Durchführung des Vereinbarten bieten". See the 
documentation of the 1899 resolution in Blanke et al. 
1975, Vol. I, p. 128.
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Nevertheless by 1906 there existed more than 3.000 
collective bargaining agreements which rose to 13.000 
agreements in 1913 (59). And a new understanding of the
legal'status of collective bargaining agreements led to the 
development of a "scientific community" of labour lawyers in 
the academic world (60).
The situation changed during WW I. The War Ministry 
introduced a law in 1916 (Vaterländisches Hilfsdienstgesetz 
of 5 December 1916) which officially recognized the unions 
as representatives of the "national will" of German 
employees. Collective bargaining between the unions and the 
employer associations became the preferred method of 
regulation of industrial relations for the state and the 
judicial system (61). The 1916 law also introduced 
arbitration committees which consisted of an equal number of 
representatives of unions and employers.
Immediately after WW I a top agreement between the 
federations of the unions and employers' associations was 
reached (Stinnes-Legien-Abkommen creating the so-called 
Central Working Group, Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft). The 
agreement represented a corporatist arrangement at the 
national level. The employers favoured it as an instrument 
for developing an arbitration system independent of state 
regulation which could depoliticize the unions and reduce 
their role with respect to economic decision-making (62). 
The law on collective bargaining from 23 December 1918
(Verordnung über Tarifverträge.____ Arbeiter^---- unä
Angestelltenausschüsse______ UM______ Schlichtung_______von
Arbeitsstreitigkeiten) introduced legally binding collective
59) See Hagemeier et al. 1984: 49-50.
60) Dubischar 1990.
61) The Reichsgericht, in its decision of 20 January 1910,
only endorsed collective agreements as legally binding 
contracts in order to create a legal basis for tort 
claims against the unions. See RGZ 73, p. 99 and the 
interpretation in Hagemeier et al. 1984: 50-51. See
also Blanke et al. 1975, Vol. I, pp. 129-130.
62) See Berg 1975: 41-42.
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agreements, arbitration procedures and works councils. By 
1922 about 15 million employees were covered by collective 
agreements, compared with only two million employees in
1913 (63).
A significant development for German collective 
bargaining was the radicalization of shop floor industrial 
relations at the end of WW I and the beginning of the Weimar
Republic. The trade unions were largely unable to
incorporate the radical representatives of shop floor
unionism. The lack of reform of the traditional unions 
contributed to the development of an independent socialist 
works council movement. This movement created the 
background for the introduction of the so-called legislation 
on the company constitution (64). The Works Council Act 
fBetriebsrMteaesetz) of 1920 introduced worker
representation at the company or plant level initially as a 
second negotiation system in order Mto control production". 
The elected representatives were supposed to operate within 
the so-called company constitution, formally independent of 
the trade unions, which controlled industry-wide collective 
bargaining. After initial radicalization the works councils 
were depoliticized due to massive resentment from official 
trade unions. The tasks of works councils were reduced to 
representing employees and to participating in internal 
company affairs unrelated to decision-making on production 
(65) .
During the 1920s the influence of the state on 
collective bargaining increased. The law on arbitration of 
23 October 1923 (Verordnunq liber das Schlichtunqswesen) 
introduced official arbitration to "assist collective 
bargaining". However, the state could impose an arbitration 
award. This situation led to an arbitration system which
63) See Adamy and Steffen 1985: 216.
64) See von Oertzen 1963: 153-169.
65) See von Oertzen 1963: 195 and 247-270 on the arguments 
of the official unions against workers councils.
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was used by the state at the end of the 1920s and the 
beginning of the 1930s to implement authoritarian economic 
policies (66).
With the development of collective bargaining and state 
regulation of collective bargaining in the Weimar Republic, 
a collateral discussion led to the enactment of arbitration 
law. The state was able to impose arbitration awards on the 
collective parties in dispute. Thus, it was not the 
collective bargaining system through self-regulation but 
state legislation which forced arbitration and collective 
bargaining. This legislation has to be interpreted as part 
of the unsuccessful attempt to create a unified labour law 
(67). State arbitration was ultimately guided by the 
intention to fight strikes and not to create an autonomous 
collective bargaining system. The main instrument of state 
intervention became the declaration of extension of
arbitration awards which one or both parties had rejected 
(Verbindlicherklärunq).
The Nazis abolished collective bargaining and replaced 
it by wage orders issued and implemented by so-called labour 
trustees (Treuhänder der Arbeit) (68). After WW II
collective bargaining was given "autonomy" in the collective 
bargaining act of 9 April 1949 (Tarifvertraqsqesetz revised 
on 25 August 1969). The collective bargaining act defines 
the scope, the form and the parties of a collective
bargaining agreement. In addition, it contains regulations 
on the duty of the collective bargaining parties to register 
their agreement with the Federal Ministry of Labour. The 
most important regulation of this act concerns the extension 
of collective bargaining agreements which can be granted by 
either the Federal or a State Minister of Labour after
66) Berg 1975: 90.
67) Bohle 1990: 59-84.
68) See Körner 1937. See also Kranig 1983 and Mayer-Maly 
1989.
103
consultation with the committee comprised of union and 
employer representatives.
Collective bargaining stabilized its autonomy after WW
II by adopting its own arbitration system. German 
"interest" procedures, which structure negotiations on the 
renewal of a collective bargaining agreement, were 
distinguished and separately regulated as negotiation 
procedures and arbitration procedures. Special collective 
bargaining agreements established arbitration procedures 
which are applicable in case of conflict or stalemate of 
negotiations. These arbitration procedures were agreed upon 
by the peak organizations DGB and BDA in the early 1950s to 
avoid statutory legislation and external intervention by the 
state. In 1950 (Hattenheim) and 1954 (Margarethenhof) these 
organizations agreed on a "Mustervereinbarung für eine 
tarifliche Schlichtungsordnung" which all major collective 
bargaining associations (Tarifverbände) adopted
subsequently. Arbitration agreements have a different 
duration from collective agreements, which regulate wages 
and working conditions.
The law has recognized self-regulation of collective 
bargaining matters. It distinguishes between interest 
conflicts (Regelungsstre itigke iten) and rights conflicts 
(Rechtsstreitigkeiten). Only the second category can be 
handled in court.
Collective bargaining developed in Germany in a 
situation of relatively high legalization of industrial 
relations. Co-determination of company owners and employee 
representatives in mining and steel companies was already 
introduced by a statute at the beginning of the 1950s. The 
Co-determination Act (Mitbestimmungsqesetz) of 4 May 1976 
introduced co-determination schemes for supervisory boards 
of companies with more than 2000 employees. An equal number 
of shareholder representatives and elected employee 
representatives supervise management, i.e., the board of
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directors. However, there is no full parity between 
employees and owners, because middle management (Leitende 
Ahgest?llÇç) is granted a seat on the bench of the employee 
representatives. The unions therefore deny that the scheme 
constitutes full co-determination.
There were remarkable tendencies to establish 
collective bargaining at the macro-level of German politics. 
The German state experienced tripartite cooperations of the 
peak organizations and the government at national level. At 
the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s the so- 
called Concerted Action organized regular meetings to 
discuss issues of income politics. The macro-corporatist 
experiences of the German state were thus adopted to 
instrumentalize collective bargaining mechanisms in order to 
formulate and to implement economic policies (69). The 
unions refused in 1976 to continue to participate in this 
action after a legal attack of the employers on the Co­
determination Act of 1976 (70).
Complementary to macro-corporatist experiments, there 
has been a significant development in German collective 
bargaining towards decentralization of wage bargaining. 
Regional, industry-wide or national collective bargaining 
over wages establishes only the basis for more detailed 
regulation of wages at the company level (71). Real wages 
are no longer determined by national collective bargaining 
but rather by company agreements. To the extent, however, 
that industry collective bargaining has lost its influence 
on the development of real wages, it has gained influence 
regulating working conditions. A dominant issue of 
industry-wide negotiations in the 1980s were debates about 
reduction of hours of work, but also comprehensive programs 
to "humanize" the place of work. Wage bargaining at the 
supra—company level is nevertheless used by the
69) See von Beyme 1985: 116.
70) See also Weiss 1986: 31.
71) See only Buchner 1990 and DMubler 1990a: 154-172.
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participating organizations to demonstrate the success of 
policies. In 1989 there existed about 40.000 collective 
bargaining agreements in Germany (72). About 90 per cent of 
all employees are covered by collective bargaining 
agreements (73).
It is a remarkable sign of the success of the German 
collective bargaining system that it was never necessary to 
invoke the Law on Minimum Wages and Working Conditions 
because there was never a situation of insufficient 
regulation through autonomous collective bargaining. The 
German industrial relations system in general and the 
collective bargaining system in particular have been 
challenged during the recent processes following the 
unification of the two Germanies. The collective bargaining 
system plays an active role in the economic restructuring of 
the new East German states. The President of the Federation 
of German Employer Associations defended the system of 
autonomous collective bargaining in highlighting its 
performance during the restructuring processes of the East 
German economy. His characterization of the advantages of 
industry-wide collective bargaining can also inform about 
the actual practice of collective bargaining in Germany 
(74). His arguments can be summarized as follows:
1. Industry-wide collective bargaining and plant bargaining. 
The fact that individual employers and unions in the 
depressed industrial regions of East Germany negotiate lower 
wages at the shop floor or company level secures the system 
of collective bargaining in general. Fragmented collective 
bargaining would have negative impacts on the autonomy of 
collective bargaining. Permanent wage discussions at the 
company level would undermine social peace.
2. Collective bargaining and the restructuring of companies. 
Although wages which undercut the minimum level established
72) See Meier-Krenz 1989: 6.
73) See Kittner 1987: 1012.
74) Interview with Dr. Klaus Murmann, President of the 
Bundesverband der deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände. BDA, in 
die tageszeitung. 17.8.91, p. 5.
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by industry-wide collective bargaining could increase the 
survival rate of some companies, they would have a 
detrimental impact on the modernization of companies. 
Industry-wide wages force companies to modernize their 
capital basis and to change production patterns to become 
able to produce marketable goods.
3. Collective bargaining and wage regulations. Industry-wide 
autonomous collective bargaining is an integral part of the 
division of labour between the state, the companies and the 
system of collective bargaining in regulating wages and 
working conditions. Both the companies and the state have 
delegated the solution of distribution conflicts to the 
collective bargaining system and thus have relieved 
themselves of the need to decide on the distribution of 
economic surpluses. Companies would be overburdened with 
the task of settling wage conflicts. They would increase 
their risk of insolvency.
4. Collective bargaining and skilled workers. The results of 
industry-wide collective bargaining are stable and 
relatively high wages for a foreseeable period of time. 
Stable wages motivate qualified, skilled employees to stay 
in the Eastern regions where they are desperately needed in 
the restructuring process.
5. Macro-economic concerns and general social values in 
collective negotiations. In industry-wide negotiations 
which were conducted shortly after unification, solidarity 
given the strain on the economic development in general, 
concerns for social peace in the East and the prevention of 
massive migration from East to West played a prominent role 
in collective bargaining. Nevertheless, the instability of 
economic development was recognized in the recent collective 
bargaining agreements as well. Collective bargaining 
agreements have become more flexible through so-called 
revision clauses which were introduced to enable early 
negotiations before the agreed end of the term of the 
agreement.
In the future, German collective bargaining will have 
to deal with concession bargaining to manage the economic 
and social challenges of unification. There are discussions 
in the union movement to create a "solidarity fund" into 
which one per cent of the annual wage increases achieved 
through collective bargaining should be paid (75). In 
addition, collective bargaining will have to deal with 
increased decentralization. The system will have to strike 
a new balance in the division of tasks between meso- and
75) See Bispinck 1991: 124-129.
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micro-levels of bargaining. And in order to protect its 
autonomy it will have to find mechanisms to refrain from 
including topics which are beyond the scope of its 
regulatory capacities. The system can only perform economic 
and social policy goals when its autopoiesis is not 
threatened.
France
Collective bargaining in France is comparatively 
underdeveloped. Although unions were already decriminalized 
by the Law of 25 May 1864, when the felony of conspiracy was 
eliminated, and subsequently legalized by the Law of 21 
March 1884, collective bargaining did not develop as a 
system in the first half of the 20th century. Piore and 
Sabel argue that the non-cooperation of the French employers 
and unions was not only a result of managements' reprisals 
against union followers but, in fact, due to "the continuing 
influence of the Proudhomist tradition of craft mutualism, 
in which not the plant but the regional community of skilled 
workers was the locus of organization" (76). The local 
character of the French economy and, indeed, French 
industrial relations is an outstanding phenomenon which not 
only characterizes the institutions of labour market 
regulation (a further example are the Bourses du travail 
(77)) but also the development of French labour courts until 
the end of the 1970s.
•
The core issue of collective bargaining, wage 
regulation, was determined by state policies. After WW II 
the French state raised the minimum wage which was 
explicitly indexed to the cost of living after 1952. And 
the strategy of the government was to centralize the
76) Piore and Sabel 1984: 137.
77) SchSttler 1981.
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determination of wages through pattern-setting contracts in 
state-owned firms. Collective bargaining was reduced to 
implementation of these agreements in the non-governmental 
sector. The state developed a policy of extension of
collective bargaining agreements to other firms of the same 
industry which did not formally participate in collective 
bargaining.
The Law of 24 June 1936, based on the Matignon 
agreement, made collective agreements normal means of 
establishing conditions of employment. The Law of 11 
February 1950, modified by the Law of 13 July 1971, gave 
collective bargaining a new legal framework. However, only 
in the 1980s were there attempts to reform the collective 
bargaining system. The Auroux Law of 13 November 1982 
boosted collective bargaining by introducing the duty to
bargain on the part of the employer. The law prescribed 
that employers and unions have to meet at least once every 
year to negotiate over wages and working time. These 
negotiations have to be carried out at the company level and 
not at the plant level.
A particular concern in French labour law and, indeed, 
in French law in general is the so called ordre public. 
Collective bargaining agreements cannot regulate issues 
which are declared part of this public order. This 
principle is now incorporated in the Code du travail (L.
132-4). French labour courts, for example, cannot be
established by collective bargaining agreements (78).
French collective bargaining agreements can be either 
enlarged or extended (79). The Law of 11 February 1950 only 
permitted an extension if all involved unions had agreed to 
the procedure. Extension is granted by the Minister of 
Employment after consultation with the National Commission 
of Collective Negotiation. After an extension is granted,
78) See Despax and ofot 1987: 245-247.
79) See Despax 1989: 463-516.
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the normative provisions bind all employers and employees 
within the scope of the agreement or 'branch of activity' 
referred to by the parties. The extension might be
withdrawn. The Ministry of Labour reported that by the end 
of 1982 there were 1118 collective bargaining agreements 
registered of which about a third were extended (80). 
French labour law is remarkable insofar as it is largely 
codified. Since 1910 the Code du Travail has gradually been 
enlarged. It was reformed by the Law of 2 January 1973 and 
now contains 9 books. The law of collective bargaining
(Conventions et accord collectives de travail) is contained
in Title III of Book One L. 131-1 to L. 137-1, R. 132-1 to
R. 136-11).
The history of state regulation of conflict resolution 
in collective labour law shows more concern with suppressing 
strikes than enhancing collective bargaining. The Law of 1 
December 1936 imposed an obligatory arbitration procedure on 
the parties before they were allowed to strike or to lock 
out. The Law of 11 February 1950 kept the obligatory 
arbitration provisions only formally and abolished the 
requirement of an arbitration procedure before a strike can 
take place. The Law of 13 November 1982 modified the 
obligatory provisions and expressed a clear preference for 
negotiations.
French procedures for collective or interest conflicts 
are separately regulated by statute in Title II of Book Five 
of the Code du Travail (L. 521-1 to L. 26-1, R. 523-1 to R. 
525-18). Three main procedures are mentioned in French 
labour law: obligatory conciliation, mediation and
facultative arbitration (arbitrage). Conciliation is 
carried out by a tripartite commission located at the 
regional or national level. Mediation is carried out after 
conciliation has failed; the proposal of the mediator is 
not binding. Facultative arbitration is only binding if the
80) Despax and Rojot 1987: 275-276.
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parties have agreed upon it beforehand either in the 
collective bargaining agreement or in a separate agreement 
(81) .
Interest conflicts are referred to as "economic" 
conflicts. Similar to German law, the French law of 
collective labour conflict resolution distinguishes between 
interest and rights conflicts; only the latter category can 
be handled in court. The traditional ideological preference 
for state intervention over voluntary conflict resolution 
has been abolished by the Law of 13 November 1982 which 
explicitly endorses the idea of negotiations to deescalate 
tensions. State interventions in collective labour conflicts 
have always been rather ineffective (82). Finally, as in 
other countries, direct negotiations are also in France the 
prevalent mode of settlement of interest conflicts and not 
state intervention (83).
Functions, Performances and Reflexions of Collective 
Bargaining Systems
Sociologists are used to analyze industrial relations 
in the wider context of the study of society. In an 
autopoietic view of society functions of social systems are 
not fixed at the level of society but each system develops 
its own view of its functions within society. The view of 
society on the function of a social system can differ from 
the system's own view of its function. In this case 
adjustment processes must occur. For society the function 
of industrial relations is often the prevention of 
collective violence. Collective bargaining is supposed to
81) See Thillet and Bennechère 1990:, Rdnr. 30.60-19 to 23.
82) See the figures on declining use of collective
procedures in Blanc-Jouvan 1971: 59 and Table 2 and
Javillier 1981: 596-7 and 1990.
83) See Javillier 1990: 428.
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channel conflictual issues into negotiations between the 
collective parties. However, collective violence has a 
different meaning within the communicative processes of the 
industrial relations system. In fact, prevention of 
violence as such is not seen as the main function of the 
system. Rather violence is considered an integral part of 
industrial action and the threat to engage in violent 
actions is often seen as a necessary tool in negotiations.
The literature on industrial relations discusses a 
number of heterogeneous functions of collective bargaining. 
These include regulation of wages and working conditions, 
employment protection, distribution of gains from economic 
growth, participation in economic decision-making, reduction 
and control of company competition over working conditions 
and legitimation of social and economic state policies (84).
The classical literature, in particular the Webbs (85), 
discusses collective bargaining as the problem of trade 
unions and industrial democracy. In their view collective 
bargaining is intricately related to trade unions and is 
thus studied as a means to strengthen trade unions. 
Collective bargaining is one among other trade union 
functions. Although collective bargaining "extends over a 
much larger part of the industrial field than Trade 
Unionism" it is the trade unions alone which guarantee the 
application or extension of collective bargaining over the 
district or the nation (86). Their organizational or 
behaviouristic approach to collective bargaining as part of 
the development of trade unions has dominated the study of 
industrial relations.
In the industrial relations approaches collective 
bargaining is traditionally analyzed in behaviouristic terms
84) See only Flanders 1970: 155-276 and Chamberlain and Kuhn 
1983.
85) Webb 1920a and 1920b.
86) Webb 1920b: 178-9.
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as a problem of collective action. Its topics are the
development of trade unions, strike activities, and state 
interference and control of collective action (87). Indeed 
the origins of collective bargaining systems are intricately 
linked to the development of collective organizations of 
workers and their concerted activities. However, the 
behaviouristic approach becomes limited, if the
transformation of unions into bargaining agents is to be 
described. The focus of analysis has to shift to the 
collective bargaining system and its autonomy in order to 
understand the repercussions of this system on the 
organizations of workers.
There are several ways to classify the functions of 
collective bargaining systems. Functions can be
distinguished with respect to the participants in collective 
bargaining and with respect to external relations to 
society. However, in applying a systems theoretical 
understanding of function, the function expresses the 
special contribution of industrial relations and the
collective bargaining system to the society at large. Thus, 
insofar as relations of two systems like the industrial 
relations system and the economic system are concerned, this 
is best described as a relationship of performance and not 
of functions. Self-reference of the collective bargaining
system to its own communications should be distinguished 
both from its functions and its performances. Processes of 
self-reference can be called reflexions.
In applying this threefold distinction it becomes 
possible to see that the Oxford school of industrial 
relations has based its conception of industrial relations 
implicitly on notions of reflexion of the collective 
bargaining system. The theory of collective bargaining as
87) See for example Webb 1920a; Clegg et al. 1977; Clegg 
1985. This holds equally true for the history of labour 
law. See Kahn-Freund 1983, ch.3; Wedderburn 1986: 270-
309.
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the core of the theory of industrial relations was developed 
by Alan Flanders (88). He criticizes the Webbs for reducing 
the discussion of collective bargaining to traditional 
industrial relations research, in particular the economic 
aspects, thus overlooking the non-economic consequences of 
collective bargaining. Flanders states the following 
shortcomings of a purely economic view of collective 
bargaining which "tells us too little about the institution 
it claims to describe" (89):
"Because the Webbs treated collective bargaining as an 
economic process, ... they tended to overlook, as others 
have done who followed in their footsteps, all of its non­
economic aspects. This applies firstly to its overall social 
consequences and achievements and therefore to its 
evaluation; secondly, to the forces influencing the conduct 
of negotiations and consequently their outcome; and thirdly, 
to the range and type of industrial conflict which the 
institution may be called upon to resolve."
Flanders' three shortcomings of "the classical or 
traditional theory of the nature of collective bargaining" 
can be reconstructed in an autopoietic view as the three 
aspects of function ("overall social consequences"), 
reflexion ("forces influencing the conduct of negotiations") 
and performance ("conflict resolution"). Indeed Flanders 
develops an understanding of collective bargaining and 
industrial relations as an autonomous system.
For Flanders collective bargaining is characterized by 
its job-control function. Collective bargaining is
conceived as a source of law and rules which regulate jobs 
in a joint fashion. The function, of joint regulation of 
jobs indicates the essential character of the modern concept 
of collective bargaining (90).
88) Flanders was the leading representative of the 'Oxford 
School' of industrial relations which supported 
academically voluntarist labour policies against state 
intervention in collective 'laissez-faire' relations.
89) Flanders 1968: 223-224.
90) Flanders 1968: 213-226.
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Flanders' deserves credit for his rigorous insistence 
on the social origins of the collective bargaining system 
independent of unilateral regulation of trade unions. He 
arçues convincingly that collective bargaining "had its 
origins in alternative methods of job regulation" 
characterized by joint rather than unilateral regulation of 
jobs (91). Joint job control as the origin of collective 
bargaining has the potential to offer management an 
alternative to unilateral decision-making when it is 
integrated in the decision-making on economic issues in 
modern companies. Thus it is the reflexion on the core of 
the industrial relations system, i.e., collective 
communications, which enables the system to flourish and to 
become attractive for other systems.
Neil Chamberlain and James Kuhn (92) have distinguished 
three concepts of collective bargaining which also represent 
three stages in the development of a collective bargaining 
system: (a) the "marketing theory" viewing collective
bargaining as a means of contracting for the sale of labour; 
(b) the "governmental theory" viewing collective bargaining 
as a form of industrial government, and (c) the "managerial 
theory" viewing collective bargaining as a method of 
management (93). The historical development is accordingly 
characterized first by early negotiations fixing terms for 
the sale of labour; the agreements consist of no more than 
standard piecework price lists. The second stage introduces 
procedures for settling disputes. The third stage is 
characterized by negotiations and agreements over subjects 
that entered into internal decision-taking processes of a 
business enterprise.
The historical stage model can be reconstructed in a 
systems theoretical view which uses a differentiation
91) Flanders 1968: 223.
92) Chamberlain and Kuhn 1983.
93) See also the discussion of the three theories of 
collective bargaining in Flanders 1970: 230-236.
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concept. The first stage is characterized by the attempt of 
the industrial relations systems to differentiate itself 
from the economic system. In the second stage the 
industrial'relations system is governed by the state through 
direct interference in case of conflict; it has to achieve 
independence from the political system by developing its own 
structure through self-regulation resulting in joint 
procedures and institutions for conflict resolution. And 
the third stage indicates the possibilities of structural 
interference and the performance aspect of industrial 
relations with respect to other systems and in particular 
the economic system, once the industrial relations system is 
secured and no longer fundamentally threatened in its 
autopoiesis. In addition, it indicates the vitality and 
attractiveness of decision-making in collective bargaining 
for the reform of company decision-making in general. 
Indeed, industrial democracy based on strong autonomy of 
collective bargaining can be seen as a functional equivalent 
in management strategies of corporations.
In analyzing the relations of the industrial relations 
system to other social systems it is useful to distinguish 
the performances and reflexions of the industrial relations 
system. The collective bargaining system performs for the 
economic system a stabilization of wage conditions and 
reduces competition between companies. It creates the frame 
for long term planning and rational decision-making within 
companies with respect to financial and production matters. 
It affects the labour market composition, the mobility of 
the work force and career planning of skilled workers.
The collective bargaining system can fulfill its 
functions and achieve its performances for other systems 
mainly through reflexion on internal mechanisms which 
stabilize its autonomy. The industrial relations system 
reflects on its performances for other functional subsystems 
and the structural coupling to the economic and the
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political system. However, it becomes increasingly able to 
evaluate the dangers which arise from intersystemic 
relations. And the awareness of dangers is translated into 
developing control mechanisms which are compatible with the 
communication structure of the industrial"'relations system. 
Thus reflexion is guided by concerns for the self-reference 
and autopoiesis of the system. The introduction of 
adjustment procedures, i.e., ’’revision clauses", can be 
interpreted as a reflexion of the German collective 
bargaining system on its structural couplings to processes 
within the economic system. "Revision clauses" are attempts 
to flexibilize the structure of the system through further 
differentiation of procedures compatible with the 
communicative structure of collective negotiations.
Most collective bargaining laws stipulate that the 
collective agreement contain a peace obligation as part of 
the obligatory part of the collective bargaining agreement. 
The justification for the peace obligation was used to argue 
that the collective bargaining agreement has an "ordering 
function" within industrial relations; a peace obligation is 
therefore considered an intricate part of the very idea of 
obligatory collective bargaining agreements between the 
collective parties (94). From the societal point of view it 
is this mechanism of the peace obligation which fulfills 
society's functional ascription to the industrial relations 
system. This function relates to the management of 
collective violence in order to prevent the interruption of 
communications and interactions of other parts of society. 
It also raises the threshold for collective actors to engage 
in violent collective action unless it can also be justified 
as a concern for the society at large.
94) See Aubert 1981: 10-11 on the origins and early debates 
of the legal nature of the peace obligation.
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The Autonomy of Collective Bargaining
The autonomy of collective bargaining means that the 
cartel of collective bargaining parties is able to determine 
the content of collective agreements. The Autonomy of 
collective bargaining is thereby usually understood in 
organizational terms to mean the independence of collective 
bargaining from interference by the state as well as by 
groups of employees or single employers (95). In Germany 
the principle of the autonomy of wage negotiations 
(Tarifautonomie) is generally used to refer to collective 
bargaining. Indeed, this term, i.e., Tarifautonomie. has 
become a synonym to refer to the system of collective
bargaining (96).
It has been rightly observed that the different terms 
to refer to collective bargaining in the Anglo-American
world and the German-speaking world indicate different 
approaches. Whereas Anglo-American collective bargaining 
emphasizes the process character, the German concept 
emphasizes the independence from state regulation and its 
nature as a separate source of law. The Anglo-American
concept of collective bargaining is influenced by social 
science thinking, whereas the German concept of
Tarifautonomie has labour law origins (97).
From a political or legal perspective, i.e. from the 
perspective of the political or legal system, collective 
bargaining is seen as only relatively autonomous. The state 
remains in control of procedures and provides laws to 
regulate the procedural structures.
Marxist accounts of industrial relations have developed 
a concept of the autonomy of industrial relations which
95) See for example KUlp 1977: 1.
96) See for example Weitbrecht 1969.
97) See Müller-Jentsch 1983: 118.
118
delineates itself both from pluralist and from systems 
theoretical notions of autonomy. Richard Hyman, for 
example, insists that industrial relations are located only 
at "a level of social relations which partially follow their 
own (contradictory) laws of development" (98). Because of 
the dual emphasis of Marx on structuralist ("structural 
determinacy of capitalist production") and behaviouristic 
("working class struggle") facets, the analysis of the 
autonomy of industrial relations should not be exaggerated. 
However, Hyman confuses system references. His discussion 
of the relative autonomy of industrial relations refers to 
the state policy of abstentionism, which he interpretes as a 
different form of state involvement (99). His "political 
economy of industrial relations" argues from the perspective 
of the political system which certainly has granted 
industrial relations only relative autonomy.
From an autopoietic perspective which separates system 
references and thus is able to argue from within the 
industrial relations system, state regulations are only 
conditions for the internal creation of structures which 
guarantee self-reproduction of the industrial relations 
system. Autonomy is thus related to autopoiesis.
If we define the industrial relations system as 
autonomous because of its autopoietic nature, this has an 
impact on the definition of the role of collective 
bargaining agents. They become dependent on the circuit of 
decision-making. And this leads to intraorganisational 
repercussions. The theory of unions as agents of their 
members loses its validity. Unions are increasingly defined 
by their involvement in collective bargaining. They are no 
longer merely "pressure groups" or "bargaining agents" but 
interest representatives within negotiation systems. And 
the autonomy of these negotiations contributes to the split
98) Hyman 1989: 138.
99) Hyman 1989: 133.
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between member interests and the interests of the officials 
who take actively part in negotiations. The unions'real 
leaders are their bargaining experts.
Already in late 19 th century Britain, the Webbs 
analyzed a gradual transfer of duties from the "amateur 
negotiator" or "the non-commissioned officer" to the 
"salaried civil service" of the powerful collective 
bargaining participants (100). In the Webbs' account,
routinization and institutionalization of bargaining agents 
within the trade unions characterized the development of the 
trade unions and collective bargaining.
From a systems theoretical perspective the shift within 
the supporting organizations indicates the autonomisation of 
the system of collective bargaining. The system of 
collective bargaining becomes autonomous through negotiation 
experts who reinforce the collective communications 
underlying conditions and structures established by previous 
collective bargaining. In 19th century England the great 
staple industries of cotton, coal and iron, together with 
boot and shoe-making and the hosiery and lace traders 
developed elaborate organizations for collective bargaining. 
Bargaining agents became members of two organizations and 
had to combine their two roles which often contradicted each 
other.
The stabilization of collective bargaining occurs with 
the distinction of creating a new collective bargaining 
agreement and interpreting the terms of an existing 
collective bargaining agreement. The creation of a new 
collective bargaining agreement was open for compromise, 
conciliation and balancing of expediencies. The Webbs' 
ideal for interpreting a collective agreement was a 
"peripatetic calculating-machine, endowed with a high degree 
of technical knowledge, which could accurately register all
100) Webb 1920b: 182.
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the factors concerned, and unerringly print out the 
arithmetical result" (101). This ideal contrasts widely 
with reality in which grievance procedures and arbitration 
are hearer to a judicial model with interpretive discretion 
of general clauses than to routinized administration.
However, the most important strategy of autonomization 
from our systems theoretical perspective occurs with respect 
to collective communications. The bargaining parties 
develop an understanding that it is essential "to preserve 
the continuity of their relationship" (102). When
collective bargaining is conducted with reference to the 
term that can permanently be exacted, and not only with 
reference to temporary bargaining advantages, we discover 
processes of self-reference. When collective bargaining 
becomes self-referential, its autonomy reaches a new 
quality. In fact, the self-reference creates the basis for 
autopoiesis.
Alan Flanders has sensed the autopoiesis of industrial 
relations in his insistence on the to characterization of 
collective bargaining as a separate system of joint 
regulation independent of the economic system. Against the 
background of the most advanced "voluntarist" system of 
collective bargaining in Great Britain, he was able to 
understand the autonomy aspects of an advanced system of 
collective negotiations.
On the surface, an alternative to the British approach 
of separating autonomous function systems appears to be the 
German case of mutual interference of function systems. 
However, this interference must be understood as a sign of 
mutual recognition of autonomy. The German collective 
bargaining system has achieved a degree of autonomy which 
enables it to move beyond mere safe-guarding of the 
existence of independent bargaining. It has become so
101) Webb 1920b: 184.
102) Flanders 1968: 226-227.
121
strong that other functional subsystems, in particular the 
political and the economic system, can instrumentalize the 
industrial relations system in order to perform their own 
tasks. The threats to the existence of an independent 
collective bargaining system have been replaced by its 
instrumentalization and by a shared understanding of its 
advantageous impact on economic policies in general. In 
fact, the system is now more threatened by internal 
disagreement than by external repression (103).
industrial Relations and Procedures
Various mechanisms to achieve and to stabilize 
autonomous collective bargaining have been developed. The 
most important mechanism is the use of procedures. 
Proceduralization of collective bargaining usually starts 
historically with procedures which aim at the management of 
conflict in situations in which a new collective bargaining 
agreement has to be concluded or an existing collective 
bargaining agreement has to be renewed or interpreted. 
However, most industrial relations and labour law 
descriptions of collective bargaining concentrate on 
arbitration procedures.
A sociologist of law emphasizes the different system 
perspectives of the legal and the industrial relations 
system on procedural arrangements. Whereas the lawyer 
analyzes procedures as analogous and compatible with legal 
and judicial procedures, the industrial relationist is 
mainly interested in their protective function in securing
103) A good example for destructive internal disagreements 
was the conflict over the Co-determination Act 1976, 
which led to the seizure of national tripartite 
corporatism because of a dispute between the peak 
associations of labour and employers but not because of 
hostility on the part of the state.
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the autopoiesis of the industrial relation system. Thus 
control over the procedure, even in case of breakdown of the 
normal procedure, is vital to maintaining the autonomy of 
the system.
Three types of procedure have to be distinguished: 
negotiation procedures to reach collective agreements; 
arbitration procedures to settle conflicts between the 
collective actors; and grievance procedures to handle 
individual complaints at the company level.
Negotiation Procedures
Negotiation procedures are characterized by a double 
nature, being both internal structures of the industrial 
relations system and legal institutions governing industrial 
relations by reference to an external system, i.e., law. 
The meaning of negotiations or conflict resolution in 
industrial relations and in the legal system is completely 
different. The two systems perceive processes and 
structures (procedures) of negotiation and labour conflict 
resolution according to their own criteria. Attempts to 
regulate industrial procedures are thus judged using 
different codes. However, their elements can be linked 
structurally. In fact, they need a specific mechanism to 
cope with structural coupling. The preferred mechanism is 
the use of procedure and procedural norms both to link 
communicatively with other systems and to structure the 
industrial relations system.
In emphasizing procedures, the industrial relations 
literature has developed a number of insights into the self­
regulation of the system. Indeed, the industrial relations 
systems need procedures for their self-regulation. Without 
the possibility of procedure no negotiation would be
123
possible. Procedures are the condition of the industrial 
relations system to structure collective communications. 
Furthermore, through the use of procedures the system can 
establish a "memory" which enables the system to refer to 
previous events and their outcomes, i.e., previous 
collective bargaining and their results in the form of 
collective bargaining agreements.
British collective bargaining introduced at an early 
stage the distinction of negotiations between the collective 
parties to reach a collective bargaining agreement and the 
processes surrounding the interpretation of an agreement. 
The distinction was used to argue for a separate procedure 
replacing the "Joint Committees". Whereas the creation of 
new agreements or their reformulation was left with the 
joint committees, the application of the agreements was 
delegated to salaried professional experts, who proved to be 
more efficient. Already in the nineteenth century the 
system of collective bargaining developed into an 
organization with salaried experts who were able to 
"memorize" rules and procedures and shape them in daily 
interpretations (104).
Characteristic of the early phases of collective 
bargaining in England was that the procedure of collective 
bargaining developed after Boards of Conciliation and 
Arbitration had been institutionalized. Collective
bargaining caused unions to engage in argumentative 
communication showing an understanding for the other side. 
Collective bargaining institutions became institutions of
9
separate training of formalized negotiations and reduction 
of immediate confrontation. Unionists had to learn to argue 
in economic terms and capitalists had to recognize union 
leaders as bargaining partners. The role of a bargaining 
representative was created. For unions this meant that they
104) Webb 1920b: 182-206.
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became mediators between members and entrepreneurs and were 
thus transformed into bureaucracies (105).
A number of industrial relations experts have studied 
thé impact of collective bargaining on the functions of 
unions. Flanders emphasizes the impact on hierarchy and the 
increasing necessity for leadership within British trade 
unions (106). Weitbrecht stresses the mutual relations of 
collective bargaining and processes inside the participating 
organizations (107). The negotiation leaders are in a 
permanent role conflict, which derives from their double 
position within the collective bargaining system and the 
union or employers' association. These negotiation leaders 
have to become independent for structural reasons (108).
These studies can be read as descriptions of adjustment 
processes of trade unions to the autonomization of the 
collective bargaining system. Unions have to define their 
function within the system of collective negotiations. In 
fact, they have to become part of the structure of 
collective bargaining and have to defend its autonomy 
against interference from the political, the legal and even 
the economic system. The fate of unions becomes dependent on 
the success of collective bargaining.
If unions want to be recognized, they have to transform 
themselves from proletarian organizations which pursue 
goals solely determined by their members into organizations 
of interest representation which perform collective 
bargaining tasks. There is an interesting parallel between 
the political and the industrial relations system. Like 
political parties in representational democracies which are 
no longer controlled by their members but by functionaries 
representing the party within parliaments or governments,
105) See Müller-Jentsch 1983.
106) Flanders 1970: 238-240.
107) Weitbrecht 1974.
108) Weitbrecht 1969: 64-74.
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the industrial relations organizations are no longer 
controlled by their members but by functionaries acting 
within the representational collective bargaining system 
(109). ^
Collective bargaining theories have emphasized the
process character of negotiations. Both in economic and in 
industrial relations research the focus has shifted to the 
internal mechanisms of collective bargaining (110).
Collective bargaining has been conceptualized as a
power relation which is determined by strike threats (111). 
J.R. Hicks offers an economic theory of industrial disputes
(112). His starting point is collective negotiations and, 
although he acknowledges the logic of unions engaging in 
strikes "to keep their weapon burnished for future use"
(113), an industrial dispute is viewed mainly as the result 
of faulty negotiations. Thus formalization of joint 
meetings is for Hicks an obvious mechanism for avoiding 
industrial disputes.
Hicks' defence of employers against legally-minded 
arbitrators reveals the professional economic 
misunderstanding of industrial relations and collective
bargaining. Arbitrators and conciliators of industrial 
disputes are advised by Hicks to smooth over
misunderstandings, to make suggestions and to induce a frame 
of mind disposed to concession rather than to act as a judge 
thinking in terms of rights. For Hicks there is a danger in 
legally-minded arbitrators because they "cannot fail to be 
impressed toy Trade Union claims, couched in terms of rights, 
to a customary standard, or to fair wages. ... Legalism is a 
bias; the arbitrator's job is to find a settlement that the
109) See Mtiller-Jentsch 1983: 128.
110) See Kiilp 1977: 36-43.
111) Hicks 1963.
112) Hicks 1964:136-158.
113) Hicks 1964: 146.
126
disputants can with advantage accept, not to impose a 
solution that seems to him fair and just” (114).
From an economic point of view the strike is a cost
factor for both the employer and the union. The cost of a
strike is part of the negotiations over wages. In Hicks' 
economic view negotiations are only perceived as
interactions in which transactions of money claims are 
debated. At most, negotiations are seen as power relations 
in which union resistance matches employer concessions; 
These can then be put into supposedly sophisticated diagrams 
showing an "employer's concession curve" meeting a "union 
resistance curve". Thus Hicks analyzes strike threats as 
risk factors which form part of negotiations.
A number of approaches have transcended the simple 
neoclassical analysis of transaction costs and monopoly 
labour markets. The political dimension of collective 
bargaining has been emphasized and the prestige and
reputation aspects of associations were singled out as 
determining factors (115). In addition, game theory with two 
players has been used to analyze collective bargaining.
The literature on collective bargaining has emphasized 
a number of factors which influence collective negotiations. 
Rudolf Wolters discusses information theory in order to 
analyze collective bargaining negotiations as an interaction 
system. The form and amount of information structure 
negotiations. Risk factors and socio-psychological
processes of cognitive dissonance are mechanisms which start 
the search for information. The received information can 
influence the expectations of the participants. Thus the 
conscious release of information can be used as a strategy 
in negotiations (116).
114) Hicks 1964: 149-150.
115) Weitbrecht 1969; Himmelmann 1976; Wolters 1976.
116) Wolters 1976: 65-101.
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Gerhard Himmelmann characterizes the collective 
bargaining system as a mechanism to find a compromise which 
depends on mutual recognition of the parties throughout 
their negotiations. He distinguishes six phases of 
negotiations in his analysis of German industry-wide 
bargaining between employers' and employee organizations 
(117) :
1. Confrontation of issues
2. Consultation over details
3. Time of maturation
4. Cooperative search for solutions
5. Decision-making crisis
6. Conciliation, mediation or arbitration
Himmelmann's analysis includes in the sixth phase third 
party intervention. The next section on arbitration 
procedures concentrates on this form of communication. The 
involvement of a third party means a qualitative shift in 
the collective negotiations. In fact, it is a demonstration 
that negotiations have failed and a conflict of interest 
cannot be resolved between the parties.
Arbitration Procedures
The autonomy of collective bargaining depends 
internally to a large extent on the development of 
arbitration procedures. Once arbitration procedures are 
differentiated from negotiation procedures, the collective 
bargaining system ' has created * its own immune system. 
Communication between the collective bargaining parties can 
continue even in case of open disagreement. Arbitration 
procedures provide an opportunity to continue communication 
"in einer gegen Normalkommunikation versetzten Weise" (118).
117) Himmelmann 1976: 135-190.
118) Luhmann 1984: 509.
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An interesting insight into the limits of the autonomy 
of arbitration procedures was provided by Otto Kahn-Freund. 
In his account the state defines "vital interests of the 
community" which are threatened by strikes or lock-outs. If 
the self-regulated immune system of the collective 
bargaining system cannot handle these conflicts or adopts a 
view in which these conflicts form part of the conflictual 
negotiation strategies, the state usually intervenes with 
emergency procedures.
The general theory of third party intervention 
separates a number of variables in order to understand their 
relationship. Richard Abel, for example, distinguishes 
analytically conflicts (or disputes), third-party decision­
makers ("interveners") and a theory of the conflict 
resolution process ("theory of dispute processing") (119). 
Abel emphasizes several aspects in his theory of dispute 
processing: specialization, differentiation and
bureaucratization transform the conflict resolution process 
into a social institution.
This institution is centered around procedures. 
General dispute processing research distinguishes procedures 
according to the number of parties involved. Dyadic and 
triadic procedures (120) are separated from monadic conflict 
resolution like "avoidance" (121) and "self-help" (122).
The main dyadic form of procedure is negotiation. Two 
parties try to settle their conflict through bargaining. 
Negotiations are bargaining relationships which create the 
simplest form of conflict resolution (123).
119) Abel 1974.
120) See Spittler 1980a, Snyder 1983, and Nothdurft and 
Spranz-Fogasy 1986.
121) Felstiner 1974 and 1975.
122) On self-help through use of force which unilaterally 
dictates the solution of the conflict see Koch 1978: 85- 
115 and Spittler 1980b.
123) See Gottwald 1981: 38/39.
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The transition to triadic procedures is fluid. Michael 
Barkun (124) has invented the idea of the indirect, 
invisible third party or mediator in negotiations. For him 
elements of the invisible third party present in
negotiations are:
the creation of mutually shared expectations which
structure the proceedings;
the influence of commonly shared norms, e.g.
commercial customs or customary usage;
the binding force of precedent;
the wish or need to continue the established social
relationship.
Third party intervention can be separated into four 
types of procedure:
Conciliation: The conciliator acts as a mere go-
between; he is not allowed to present his own opinion about 
the case. He is a facilitator in communicating the 
proposals of each party.
Mediation: The mediator offers a solution after
consulting the parties but his solution has no binding 
effect on the parties; the mediator is not obliged to 
decide.
Arbitration: The arbitrator issues a binding award.
The binding effect of his award has been agreed upon by the 
parties before the arbitration takes place.
Adjudication: The adjudicator or judge treats the
conflict as a case which is decided according to statutory 
rules or precedent. The case is processed in a formalized 
judicial procedure; the adjudicator has to decide.
Triadic procedures are structured by the degree of 
third party intervention. Whereas the third party's control 
power is insignificant in conciliation, the adjudicator
124) Barkun 1968: 100-114.
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dominates the procedure through his official status. The 
stronger third party intervention is, the less influence the 
parties to the dispute have over the application of 
procedural arrangements, norms and rules.
Dispute processing research asks which factors 
determine the use of which procedure. Conflict theory (125) 
specifies the conflict as the substratum of the legal
proceeding and uses differences in types of conflict as 
determining factors. In the conflict itself the conditions 
are established by which reactions can be analyzed. Thus 
for conflict theory, the choice of the procedural
arrangement depends on the type of conflict.
Volkmar Gessner's study of the evolution and treatment 
of labour disputes and conflicts in Mexican private law 
attempts to investigate the correspondence between type of 
conflict and type of procedure. He has analyzed the filter 
effect of the multiplicity of conciliation institutions
which precede judicial procedures (126). Using a
classification deduced from systems theory, he divides
disputes into norm (i.e. value and program), role and 
personal conflicts. Personal conflicts are said to be 
complex whereas norm-related conflicts show low complexity. 
The three forms of conflict correspond with three types of 
third parties: counsellor (Rataeber). arbitrator and
adjudicator:
Personal conflict: counsellor
Role conflict: arbitrator
Norm conflict: adjudicator.
A different relationship between procedures and 
conflict types has been established by Aubert (127). He 
distinguishes between value-conflicts and interest-conflicts
125) See R8hl 1987 and 1979.
126) Gessner 1976: 101-138.
127) Aubert 1972.
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and relates them to settlement by judgement and settlement 
by arbitration respectively.
Arbitration procedures differ to some extent among 
national systems. In the U.S. interest arbitration in cases 
of renewal or establishing a new collective bargaining 
agreement sometimes includes policy considerations of 
national importance to the United States. Whether 
arbitrators with a national reputation will handle these 
conflicts depends on the level of collective bargaining 
(local, regional, or national). In cases of labour conflicts 
considered to be "national emergency" situations by the 
national government, the arbitration procedure loses most of 
its private character. It becomes compulsory and the state, 
i.e., the federal government on behalf of the President or 
the Attorney General, intervenes in industrial relations 
using these procedures.
In the U.S. the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service (FMCS) offers its assistance in "interest disputes". 
It has an independent "Office of Arbitration Services" which 
cooperates with the second major organization which provides 
arbitration personnel, i.e., the private American 
Arbitration Association (AAA). Both insitutions administer 
lists of arbitrators who are wiling to act as third parties. 
Arbitrators usually are members in the National Academy of 
Arbitrators. Being an arbitrator is still not considered to 
be an independent profession. The FMCS and AAA arbitrators 
are often publicly known figures who earn their reputations 
from service in other capacities. «
In contrast to the U.S. the state influence on 
arbitration is considerably higher in Germany. Arbitration 
procedures were introduced in Germany as a product not of 
self-regulation but rather of state regulation. In the 1890s 
so called Einiaunasamter. located in the industrial courts, 
performed more or less voluntaristic arbitration.
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In German labour law, conflicts of interest which occur 
during the establishment of a new collective bargaining 
agreement are called regulation disputes
(Reqelunasstreitigkeiten) as opposed to conflicts of rights. 
Regulation disputes remain by definition outside the 
jurisdiction of labour courts. In most branches the 
collective bargaining parties have concluded separate 
mediation or arbitration agreements (Schlichtunasabkommenl 
which provide for settlement procedures. These arbitration 
agreements differ in duration from the "normal” collective 
bargaining agreements in order to avoid interference with 
the general collective bargaining process. Arbitration 
procedures (Schlichtunqsverfahren) over regulation conflicts 
vary among different industries and unions. The mediation 
or arbitration committee is usually characterized by a 
similar tripartite composition with an equal number of 
members from unions and employer associations and a neutral 
chairman (128).
In interest conflict situations where no special 
arbitration agreements exist or the settlement procedure 
fails, the parties first have to call upon a mediator 
selected by the state Minister of Labour and then take the 
conflict before a state settlement board which is a standing 
tripartite committee. In some states of the Federal 
Republic there are forms of compulsory arbitration 
(Zwanqsschlichtunq) the constitutionality of which are 
unclear (129).
The arbitration court (Schiedsqericht) handles 
conflicts which arise out of disputes over the 
interpretation of existing collective bargaining agreements.
128) See Weiss, Simitis, and Rydzy 1984: 95/6.
129) Zöllner 1983, p. 392, argues for the constitutionality 
of compulsory arbitration if it is restricted to 
extraordinary circumstances of a public interest of 
considerable importance. Weiss, Simitis and Rydzy 1984: 
95/6, on the other hand, consider compulsory state 
settlement of industrial conflicts in general illegal.
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It also acts on special types of employment conflicts that 
involve sailors and artists. The collective bargaining 
partners have to establish the arbitration court through a 
separate arbitration agreement (Schiedsvertraa). The 
composition of the arbitration court is bipartite; neutral 
members are allowed but not obligatory (130). This form of 
collective dispute handling is rarely used in Germany (131).
According to the Company Constitution Act, both the 
works councils and management have the right to invoke an 
external arbitrator in case of conflict over the 
interpretation of their company agreement. The powers of 
the arbitration committee fEiniaunasstelle) are regulated in 
the Company Constitution Act. The external arbitrators are 
in most cases labour court judges.
Litigation of Labour Conflicts
It is quite characteristic of countries with active labour 
courts that these courts influence negotiation and 
arbitration processes in the industrial relations system 
through their decision-making . However, even in countries 
like the U.S. which have no separate labour court system the 
influence of the judiciary and the likelihood of litigation 
in labour and employment disputes is rapidly increasing.
a) Thematization of Labour Law in Interaction Systems
Litigation can be studied as an interaction event in 
the industrial relations system. The first step towards 
litigation in interactions is the thematization of law in a 
conflict situation.
130) Sec. 103 (1) of the Labour Court Act.
131) D&ubler 1986: 900 and KSnigbauer 1971.
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As in Luhmann's analysis of thematization in 
interaction systems (132), industrial relations interaction 
systems can thematize topics as industrial relations issues 
which indicate that the communication has to be understood 
as part of a wider system, i.e., the industrial relations 
system. Accordingly, if the interaction thematizes law, it 
refers to the societal function system known as the legal 
system.
The thematization of law in industrial relations 
communications is a common event in industrial relations 
systems. However, in countries with developed labour law 
systems and labour judiciaries the reference to law is a 
reference to an external power. This reference creates 
uncertainty and bears the risk of losing control over the 
negotiation topic. Thus law can be used strategically 
either to enable conflictual industrial relations 
communications to continue or to destroy and replace them 
with a legal mode of discourse.
Thus we can analytically distinguish in industrial 
relations communications between negotiations over a topic 
which is controversial between the parties and a situation 
of conflict. Only when the collective parties have reached 
a stage in their negotiations which requires external
assistance has the controversy become a conflict. The
resolution of this conflict can be attempted by introducing 
law into the communication, by using separate procedures 
which form part of the immune system of the industrial
relations system or by delegating the conflict to a judicial 
body. Successful thematization of law in conflictual
negotiations generalizes the conflict so that the 
interaction system can introduce devices which are provided 
by law for conflict resolution.
132) See Luhmann 1980.
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Thus, the mention and use of legal arguments lead only 
in rare circumstances to litigation. Litigation is usually 
an exceptional event in the process of labour conflict 
resolution. The most important function of litigation is 
therefore to create the shadow in which negotiations and 
other forms of conflict resolution can take place. The 
option to switch interactions to judicial resolution can be 
used as a threat in negotiations. Either one or both 
parties can always end "informal" communications and switch 
to a form of communication which is required to reach a 
decision by a court or other judicial body.
The threat of litigation also initiates the use of 
procedures provided by the immune system of the industrial 
relations system. The institutions of labour conflict 
resolution which are created within the industrial relations 
system for breakdowns of communications operate as 
alternatives to litigation. Conciliation, mediation and 
arbitration often use legal techniques. However, there are 
important "thematization thresholds" for law in these 
industrial relations procedures. If the use of law 
threatens the control of the non-judicial procedures over 
the settlement process, the immune system must abstain from 
legal measures. In such instances these procedures have to 
generate their own rules and procedural devices. In any 
case, the so-called alternative procedures of labour 
conflict resolution have to find ways to thematize law in 
order to regulate themselves.
b) Industrial Relations and Labour Courts
Litigation of labour conflicts is carried out in labour 
courts or other special branches of the judiciary. In 
advanced, differentiated judicial systems labour courts form
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a separate part of the judicial system on the same plane as 
other special or general courts.
Labour courts can achieve this position only if the 
judicial system in general has adopted internally the idea 
of differentiation as a mechanism for self-regulation. The 
judicial structures must have been reformed in a way which 
reflects internally the functional differentiation of 
society. In a certain sense, therefore, the existence of 
independent labour courts expresses an advanced stage of 
procedural differentiation in a judicial system.
As special judicial bodies, labour courts represent a 
form of self-regulation of the legal system which is guided 
by a particular view of industrial relations. The legal
system perceives the industrial relations system as a 
corporatist, tripartite-arrangement. Tripartite cooperation 
among the two major industrial interest groups and the state 
is used by the legal system as regulatory principle to 
organize and to differentiate a branch of the judiciary.
With the organization of the labour judiciary, the legal
system meets certain demands of the industrial relations 
system.
The internal organization of labour courts reflects the 
conditions of the industrial relations system. Unions and 
employer associations are usually allowed to represent their 
membership both collectively and individually in labour
courts. Informality is generally an important goal in 
labour courts. Labour court officials are obliged to reduce 
the formality of the legal language in order to assist 
unrepresented parties. It depends, however, on their 
qualifications and occupational socialization of these 
officials to what extent they are able to switch between 
formal legal and ordinary language in the court room in 
order to respond to the demands of the parties.
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Easy access to justice for individual employees and 
collective actors is also a concern of labour courts. Easy 
access for industrial relations parties is often put forward 
as a reason for the existence of labour courts during their 
establishment phase. Labour courts are thus designed to 
grant access to justice to financially disadvantaged 
employees, which is reflected in special provisions 
concerning costs and delays which are contained in the 
procedural codes of labour courts.
Elements of informalism are usually introduced in 
labour court procedures to foster settlements. Procedural 
formalism is only accepted to guarantee effective conflict 
resolution suited to the behavioural norms of industrial 
relations. Conciliation is favoured over adjudication. In 
addition, labour courts are supposed to pay some attention 
to the consequences of their decision-making for the 
industrial relations system. The organizational structure 
of labour courts is discussed in detail in Chapter IV.
Labour courts are characterized by structural 
relationships with the industrial relations system. In 
fact, labour courts rest on a whole infrastructure of 
procedures in companies and administrations. Their
effectiveness depends, to a considerable degree, on the 
preparation and the shaping of the conflict in company 
procedures, in administrative procedures, and in the legal 
offices of the interest organizations.
The system of interest representation at the company 
level creates both* advantages and constraints for labour 
courts. German labour courts, for example, provide special 
procedures for workplace industrial relations conflicts. 
Claims of works councils under the Company Constitution Act 
are treated in a special procedure (Beschluflverfahren). It 
has several procedural devices which reflect a facilitative 
approach designed to promote the self-regulation of works
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counsellors and management with respect to their -disputes at 
the company level.
.Judicial research is used to conceptualize the 
relationship of labour courts and company dispute procedures 
with a filter model. Company procedures are studied 
according to this model in their capacity to filter those 
conflicts which need special treatment in judicial bodies. 
The filter model is generally court-centered (133). 
Procedures are ranked higher or lower according to different 
degrees of formalization and legality. Filter models 
implicitly favour judicial conflict resolution over other 
forms of conflict resolution.
An evaluation of dispute processing which uses the 
filter perspective is particularly inappropriate for the 
study of labour conflict resolution. Labour conflict 
resolution is characterized by a multiplicity of procedures 
which are functional equivalents to finding solutions for 
industrial relations conflicts. This insight is supported 
by recent alternative dispute resolution research which 
urges judicial research to include the study of 
conciliation, mediation, and arbitration and to attach just 
as much importance to the positive contribution of so-called 
informal procedures as to formal court procedures. Judicial 
research needs legal pluralism, which is a concept that 
demonstrates that judicial and extra-judicial procedures are 
not hierarchically ordered but vertically arranged.
133) Blankenburg et al. 1980.
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Industrial Relations, Labour Conflict Resolution and
Corporatism
There is a special characteristic of labour conflict 
resolution which distinguishes it from other forms of 
conflict resolution. This special characteristic derives 
from its structural links with the industrial relations 
system in general. The institutional structure of
industrial relations communications is characterized by 
tripartite arrangements between the industrial interest 
groups and the state. These tripartite arrangements of 
collective actors have been described as corporatist 
arrangements.
Corporatism is conceived in the present study as a 
concept to analyze the cooperation of industrial interest 
groups and the state. Corporatist structures are
characteristic of a semi-autonomous stage in the development 
of industrial relations systems. In fact, corporatist 
structures characterize most industrial relations systems, 
although to different degrees and in different forms.
Whenever negotiations of collective interest groups 
include state participants, the industrial relations system 
develops tripartite structures of exchange. The structures 
shall be called liberal corporatism. Liberal corporatism 
creates the structural context for the institutions of 
labour conflict resolution in which they*are embedded.
Two versions of corporatism must be distinguished: 
authoritarian and liberal corporatism. The authoritarian 
version emphasizes the need of the state to rely on 
traditional societal organizations such as guilds. This 
concept of corporatism transcends industrial relations. It 
was adopted by Italian and German Fascist state theories 
that used it to legitimize the extension of state control
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through new societal organizations which were linked to the 
Fascist movement (134).
The concept of corporatism has been revitalized by 
political scientists in the 1970s (135). A new conception 
of liberal corporatism is used to analyze the welfare state. 
Liberal corporatism is in a certain sense a response to 
pluralist notions of steady change in intermediation 
processes; instead, cooperation of the industrial 
associations and the state is analyzed in terms of stable 
institutional network of organizational links.
Three forms of liberal corporatism can be 
distinguished: macro- meso- and micro-corporatism. Whereas 
macro-corporatism is located at national level and micro­
corporatism at the local or company level, meso-corporatism 
is characterized by tripartite structures which involve 
regional or sectorial professionals of both the state and 
interest associations (136). Labour courts and other 
official institutions of labour conflict resolution are 
usually located at this meso level.
Meso-corporatism
The corporatist concept argues that the state not only 
critically supervises negotiations between collective 
interest groups but also increasingly takes advantage of 
these systems of negotiations for both formulating and 
implementing policies. Empirical studies of corporatist 
policy-making in the various conflict areas are increasingly 
narrowing their focus from national to sectorial, regional
134) See only Bowen 1947.
135) Schmitter 1974; Winkler 1976; Panitch 1979 and 1980.
136) See the "three-level analysis" of corporatism in 
Wassenberg 1982; meso-corporatism in industrial policies 
is discussed in Cawson 1986, ch. 6. See also Teubner 
1983: 26/7.
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or local bargaining, including networks of the welfare state 
and associations on this level (137). They have uncovered 
an increasing number of independent, decentralized 
corporatist arrangements.
To a certain degree, this shift to meso-corporatist 
studies (138) is a response to compelling changes in current 
politics. The collapse of "social contract" policies on 
national levels in major Western countries in the 1980s has 
encouraged theorists of neo-corporatism to look at lower 
strata of the political process or even to talk about a 
post-corporatist state (139).
Analytically, the concept of corporatism is 
characterized by tripartism, the intermediation of state and 
group interests and the conciliation of conflicts (140). 
Meso-corporatism "involves political exchange between state 
agencies and specialized interest organizations" (141). We 
can add an element which Philippe Schmitter stresses in his 
well known definition: the intra-organisational aspects of
control in exchange for a representational monopoly of the 
association (142).
The study of intra-organisational ' structures of 
industrial associations (once accused of being the 'Achilles 
Heel' (143) of neo-corporatist studies) has concentrated on 
the internal status of members, the general development and 
composition of its membership and on the shop-floor 
influence of associations (144) . Little attention has been
137) Schmitter 1983 and 1984, Offe 1984 and Jessop 1990, ch.
4. See for Britain Cawson 1982 ("fragmented state") and 
Grant 1985.
138) See Cawson 1985 and 1986, ch. 6 and Williamson 1989: 
156-16?. See also Rogowski 1985.
139) As Lewis and Wiles 1984 suggest for the British case.
140) See von Beyme 1984: 224.
141) Cawson 1986: 118.
142) Schmitter 1979: 13.
143) Teubner 1979: 497.
144) See Streeck 1981; Heinze 1981 and from a legal point of 
view Teubner 1978.
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given to the service activities of associations (14 5). 
Research in this field is still dominated by the assumption 
of the differing organizational interests of leadership and 
of rank and file. It distinguishes between the political 
function of the association and its leadership and its 
service function towards its members (146).
Wolfgang Streeck argues that the important 
organizational consequences of neo-corporatist cooperation 
for associations are functional specification, 
professionalization, formalization and administrative 
rationalization (147). But for our purposes, we have to go 
beyond the intra-organisational analyses pursued by 
Schmitter and Streeck and switch our attention to the 
increased political activities of associations at the middle 
level of politics. We can follow studies on welfare 
corporatism which analyze corporatist relations within the 
context of social policy and its implementation; and it is 
the process of incorporation which becomes important in this 
respect (148).
Exchange processes with the political system do not 
only occur at the top level of politics. The servicing of 
members is not an apolitical intra-associational affair. 
Representatives of associations participate at the middle 
level of politics in administering the welfare state, 
usually as so-called lay members in administrative or 
judicial decision-making procedures. A constant political 
exchange occurs when representatives of the association act 
as officials in judicial or administrative procedures. 
These are indeed forms of stable network relations between
145) Research on legal advice provided by associations is 
discussed in Gawron and Rogowski 1982.
146) For a general account see Olson 1971; this concept has 
been used in the research design of the project on 
business interest organizations in Streeck and Schmitter 
1981.
147) Streeck 1982.
148) See Harrison 1984. See also Cawson 1982.
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associations and state agencies* They are organizational 
experiences of Teubner's role interference concept.
The political exchange at the middle level of politics 
creates continuous professional relationships between 
administrative institutions and associations which have been 
described as welfare corporatism (149). The interest in 
defending the meso-corporatist arrangements created by 
professional and bureaucratic representatives will affect 
its procedure. A depoliticization of issues is likely to 
occur as the main effect of the incorporation of interest 
groups.
It is constitutive for corporatist arrangements in 
social policy areas that associations or professional groups 
remain strong monopolies of interest representation "to 
defend themselves against bureaucratic incursions or market 
pressures" (150). Corporatist arrangements operate on the 
basis of interest intermediation. Professionals of
associations take an active part in the functioning of 
welfare agencies in order to maintain service functions for 
members; through participation in welfare corporatism, 
associations gain public status and can exercise influence 
in other social fields where direct associational control is 
lacking. In exchange, the integration and "licensing" of 
the behaviour of interest associations help the welfare 
state to absorb political criticism (151).
149) Cawson 1982 and 1986: 115-118. See also Williamson
1989, ch. 8.
150) Cawson 1986: 116.
151) Williamson 1989: 84-89.
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Macro-corporatism
Whereas meso-corporatism is defined as political 
exchange between state agencies and interest associations at 
a sectorial or regional level, macro-corporatism is defined 
as involvement by peak industrial associations in national 
policy-making. Leaders of associations offer internal 
control of members in exchange for political concessions on 
the behalf of their organization and the represented 
interests at the legislative level. At the level of the 
national state the German-speaking countries have 
experimented with a number of redistributive measures (152). 
Helmut willke has analyzed macro-corporatist arrangements as 
discourses of societal subsystems. They transform conflict 
between systems, which derives from their increasing 
autonomization, into cooperation. The state is perceived as 
the catalyst for this transformation of conflict into 
cooperation (153).
Uwe Schimank and Manfred Glagow have argued that the 
functional differentiation of society does not only lead to 
the macro-corporatist interdependency of functional 
subsystems but also to the self-regulation of function 
systems. In participating in corporatist arrangements, the 
associations transcend their interest orientation and adopt 
a functional view of society. This functional view enables 
them to limit and adjust their own self-regulation to the 
reproduction of society at large (154). However, this 
macro-perspective on neo-corporatism lacks to some extent 
the study of the actual operation of these arrangements. In 
systems theoretical terms, macro-corporatist arrangements 
are simply interaction systems.
152) von Beyme 1985: 116.
153) Willke 1989: 99-110.
154) Schimank and Glagow 1984: 13.
145
In fact, macro-corporatism is a somewhat misleading 
description of exchange relations between systems in high- 
powered interaction system. It suggests a stable exchange 
between .unions, employers and the state. However, the 
structure of the exchange system is rather unstable and 
difficult to organize due to its character as an interaction 
system at national level.
The German experience provides some insights into the 
limits of self-regulation of a macro-corporatist interaction 
system. The so-called Concerted Action negotiated about 
macro-political issues which included monetary stability and 
foreign-exchange relations. Compared with collective
bargaining at the meso- and micro-level, the interaction 
system of the national actors had to deal with immense new 
pressures. The traditional mechanisms failed to function.
"Die Tarifparteien als konflikt-orientierte ökonomische 
Akteure sehen sich in der Konzertierten Aktion als einem 
Verhandlungssystem Zwängen ausgesetzt, welche ihren 
traditionellen Rolen als einfache und einseitige 
Interessenvertreter widersprechen. Beide Parteien können 
nicht mehr einfach Gegner sein mit klar geschnittenen 
widersprüchlichen Strategien. Sie können nicht mehr 
schlicht externalisieren, aslo auf Dritte abwälzen. Sie 
können nicht mehr zugrunde legen, daß die traditionellen 
Formen der Konfliktregulierung - Verteilung des Zuwachs, 
Streik und Anpassung, Stabilisierung des
Beschäftigungsniveaus und Ausschließung der Nicht- 
Beschäftigten - zugleich auch optimale Lösungen für das 
Gesamtsystem entwickelter Gesellschaften ergeben." (155).
Indeed, the interaction system of the Concerted Action 
showed major structural weaknesses. From the point of view 
of conflict resolution it was crucial that this system was 
unable to establish procedures which prevented conflicts of 
opinion between the participants from influencing the 
tripartite negotiations. The national interaction system 
had not established arbitration mechanisms to immunize 
itself from conflictual interruptions of communication.
155) Willke 1989: 102-103. See also Willke 1983b.
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Indeed, the Concerted Action was weak with respect to its 
seIf-regulatory capacity. It resisted adopting procedural 
rules and a statute (Satzuna) and declared its decisions to 
be exempted from judicial review (156).
Macro-corporatism had an impact on the development of 
labour law in Europe mainly in the 1970s and in some 
countries also in the 1980s. Brian Bercusson has listed a 
number of macro-corporatist regulations which were enacted 
in major European countries during the 1970s J157). He 
describes the difficulties labour lawyers had understanding 
the macro-corporatist activities of industrial relations and 
describing them in traditional labour law terms. Because the 
agreements reached by the peak interest organizations and 
the state were rather gentlemen's agreements than 
enforceable contracts, the law was unable to deal with them 
in the usual way. Indeed, labour law was not capable of "di 
fronteggiare e selezionare la crescente complessità di 
domande" arising from neo-corporatist arrangements, as Luigi 
Mengoni has put it (158).
Micro-corporatism
There exists a certain ambiguity in the use of the 
concept of micro-corporatism. Not all authors consider 
micro-corporatist arrangements to be defined by tripartite 
structure. Thus Alan Cawson has warned "not to identify all 
examples of plant level bargaining as 'micro-corporatist'" 
(159). In his view, one can only speak of micro-corporatist 
arrangements when state agencies are centrally involved in 
decision-making processes at the company level. The 
examples he has in mind are direct negotiations of planning
156) See von Beyme 1977: 257 and Schmitter 1988 317.
157) Bercusson 1991: 16-20.
158) Mengoni 1988: 416.
159) Cawson 1985: 16.
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agreements between state agencies and single companies or 
the prescription of legally non-enforceable agreements as a 
precondition for subsidies assistance or support (160).
Peter Williamson criticises bilateral micro­
corporatism. "If 'micro-corporatism' has any relevance it 
must take a tripartite form." (161) However, if
associations of labour engage in interest intermediation at 
the level of the individual firm, Williamson sees scope for 
micro-corporatist arrangements.
Teubner argues similarly but is less concerned with 
tripartism being a major element in the definition of
corporatism. In his discussion of micro-corporatism at the 
company level, the state need not be present as a third 
party. His examples of micro-corporatisms are Scandinavian 
and German statutory co-determination, French voluntary
"cogestion", and Italian informal participatory rights of 
workers (162).
Teubner has analyzed a development of neo-corporatist 
experiments which he calls "involution" from macro- to 
micro-corporatism (163). Whereas macro-corporatist
arrangements decline, micro-corporatist arrangements at the 
company level are put forward as a promising alternative 
strategy of industrial flexibilization.
For Teubner, neo-corporatism as the "voluntary" 
symbiosis of capital, labour and state develops hierarchies 
of employers' associations, trade unions and state 
bureaucracies which can be used for policy formulation and 
policy implementation. Neo-coporatism gained a procedural 
flexibility which became more compatible with the structure 
of Western economic systems than its alternatives.
160) Cawson 1985: 16-18.
161) Williamson 1989: 165.
162) Teubner 1989: 165.
163) Teubner 1989: 165-166.
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Micro-corporatist arrangements offer flexibility 
through organization. A key feature of this flexibilization 
is the decentralization of the company organization. 
Corpdratist arrangements are advantageous for the
organization compared with its contractual arrangements for 
the following reasons: first, they foster lasting exchange 
relations of corporations; second, commitments within the
organization are less rigid in adapting to situational
changes than contractual relations; and third, the 
orientation of the actors towards the organizations' 
interests is more stable than under contractual arrangements 
(164) .
Neo-corporatist arrangements at the company level lead 
to "producer coalitions" of capital and labour. The
participants in corporatist arrangements treat each other as 
equals. These micro-corporatist arrangements mediate
between the different resources of capital, labour and state 
interests at the company level. The carriers of resources 
delegate their rights to the resource to the micro- 
corporatist arrangement. The arrangement becomes a 
corporate actor which is constituted as a producer 
coalition. The arrangement is guided by its own efficiency 
criterion. Thus involution of neo-corporatism in Teubner's 
view means a trend from coordination of national economic 
policies at a macro level to producer coalitions in 
corporations at a micro level.
It can be predicted that these producer coalitions can 
only develop into viable autopoietic systems if they adopt 
mechanisms of conflict resolution. Like macro-corporatist 
arrangements, these micro-corporatist interaction systems 
need to protect their autonomy from external and from 
internal threats. The tradition of the collective 
bargaining system is a source which can provide a number of 
examples of immune systems which enable self—regulation of
164) Teubner 1989: 167.
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conflict resolution by the system and from which micro- 
corporatist arrangements might learn.
4
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CHAPTER III
COMPANY DISPUTE PROCEDURES
Company dispute procedures handle both grievances of 
individual employees and conflicts of employee 
representatives with the management of the company. From a 
systems theoretical point of view these procedures are 
interaction systems which are linked both to the industrial 
relations system and to the organization system of the 
company. Their autonomy depends on their self-reproductive 
operations, which constitute their identity as interaction 
systems. The mechanisms to secure the autonomy of the 
interaction system have an influence on the degree to which 
they are accepted as independent interaction systems within 
the company.
A number of social systems interfere in company dispute 
procedures. The industrial relations system operates and 
understands industrial relations procedures both as formal 
and informal collective negotiations which instrumentalize 
the law for industrial relations purposes. The legal system 
reconstructs the formal aspects of procedures in legal terms 
in order to be able to refer to the company procedure for 
its own decision-making purposes. And the company
understands dispute procedures as part of the economic 
enterprise and thus relates to them in specific economic 
terms.
Dispute Procedures in Industrial Relations Research
We can distinguish two main types of systems of company 
dispute procedures: the constitutional type and the
collective bargaining type. In the German case the company
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dispute procedures form part of the company constitution. 
They are legally separated from collective bargaining 
between unions and employers. A different kind of "company 
constitution" with elected employee representatives exists 
in France.
In the Anglo-American world one can distinguish the 
case in which the industrial relations system has kept 
control over company dispute procedures and thus has 
designed them according to the collective bargaining model, 
from the case in which these procedures are dominated by 
personnel management strategies. In the latter case 
procedures sometimes are based on models of consultative 
"industrial democracy" at the company level; often, however, 
they are in fact instruments of human resource management 
strategies which intend to circumvent collective bargaining 
in order to deal directly with the employees on an 
individual basis.
In addition to the constitutional and the collective 
bargaining model, a third type of company dispute procedure 
can be distinguished which is the result of legal employment 
protection measures or of the implementation of official 
Codes of Practices. These procedures are designed simply to 
prevent management from to acting arbitrarily in dealing 
with employees. Before these types are described with 
respect to the four countries under comparison, there will 
be some general remarks on the relation of procedure and 
dispute and the approach of labour process research to 
company procedures. In addition, we’ shall discuss a 
classification scheme of types of company dispute procedures 
and their emphasis on certain elements and structures of 
company dispute procedures.
152
Grievances, Cl*iœ* aad Disputas
Industrial relations research often derives its
classification of company dispute procedures from analyzing 
the underlying conflicts. In the literature on company
dispute or grievance procedures we find the following 
distinction between grievances and claims:
"A grievance begins as an expression of dissatisfaction by 
an individual or group of employees whereas claims typically 
originate higher in the union hierarchy in the name of large 
groups or all union members in the plant or beyond." (1)
Grievances and claims are related to different types of 
conflict. Grievances are related to employment conflicts 
and claims are related to labour conflicts. Whereas 
grievances are handled in grievance procedures, claims fall 
outside these procedures and come within the arena of 
collective bargaining (2).
It is widely perceived that grievances are product of 
processes and thus not defined by a single event. Thomson 
and Murray (3) describe the phases of a typical grievance 
process as follows:
a triggering event manifests latent dissatisfaction; 
dissatisfaction is clarified and an opponent is 
identified;
the allegedly responsible person is confronted with the 
grievance (usually a foreman and a union 
representative);
"mutual probing" is exercised to clarify how the other 
side feels about the issue;
management has to make a first decision on handling or 
lumping the grievance;
1) Thomson and Murray 1976: 18.
2) This distinction between grievances and claims seems 
widely acclaimed in industrial relations research. See 
ILO 1965: 7-9; Lockwood 1955; Dahrendorf 1957: 71/72
3) Thomson and Murray 1976: 18-21.
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reaction phase: the grievant has to decide whether or 
not to follow procedures in case of an unsatisfactory 
management decision. Available reactions are
persuasion, positive or negative bargaining (offering 
of benefits or use of threats), punishing actions or 
problem solving to discover a mutually beneficial 
solution.
This conceptualization of the grievance process derives 
its persuasion from its descriptive character. However, it 
lacks to some extent analytical clarity. This can be 
achieved by adopting insights from general dispute- 
processing research. This research emphasizes that the 
origins and early transformation processes of disputes are 
important in order to understand the rate of occurrence, the 
distribution of disputes as well as the methods chosen to 
solve the dispute. Feistiner et al. (4) define a dispute as 
the result of failed interactions. A problem only becomes a 
dispute after it has gone through the three phases of 
"naming", "blaming", and "claiming". First, a problem must 
be perceived by at least one disputant. Secondly, the 
disputant must blame someone else as responsible for the 
problem. And thirdly, the disputant must claim redress from 
someone. Thus, a dispute occurs only after a monetary or 
other type of claim has been rejected.
Employment conflicts are special for two reasons. They 
occur in organizations, i.e., a firm, an enterprise or an 
office, and their resolution is shaped by the interests of 
collective actors. The transformation processes of
"naming", "blaming", and "claiming" of labour disputes are 
embedded in collective processes. Conflicts at work are 
related to institutionally prescribed roles of the workplace 
organization. Although the labour conflict might also be 
related to norms or to personal characteristics of the 
disputants, the institutional context and the collective 
interest groups involved almost always convert the labour
4) Felstiner et al. 1981.
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dispute into a role conflict (5) . Acting in roles is thus 
an important characteristic of social conflicts at work.
However, it is important to separate the definition 
processes of a conflict at the shop floor, in the personnel 
department or in the mind of the employee from the 
definition of the conflict by the interaction system of the 
grievance procedure. The role definition in the company at 
large and the types of conflict influence the interaction 
system only insofar as they are introduced and accepted 
according to the rules of the company dispute procedure. 
From a systems theoretical perspective the role distinction 
inside the company and the different sources and types of 
conflict form only the necessary context in which the 
interaction system operates.
There is some discussion in general dispute processing 
theory if disputes should be treated as an objective 
baseline outside procedures, against which procedures can be 
evaluated (6) . In a systems theoretical understanding, 
however, functions of grievance procedures are sought with 
respect to internal structures of dispute resolution rather 
than external factors. The procedures are analyzed as 
autonomous interaction systems which have a capacity to 
define what can be treated within their realm. A radical 
systems theory perspective takes the internal point of view 
of the interaction system. It assumes that it is the nature 
of the autopoietic process, the structure of the procedure 
and the rules developed within it which enable the system to 
define the dispute. Thus it is not the "nature" of the 
grievance which defines the procedure but it is the 
procedural system which selects conflictual communications 
of the company system to be treated inside the procedural
5) Falke and Gessner 1982: 303-4 distinguish role conflicts
from personal and norm conflicts. In particular, norm 
conflicts with low degrees of social interdependence are 
characterized by a high inclination for external 
interventions. See also Gessner 1976.
6) See Griffith 1983.
155
system. Thus the transformation of a "claim" into a
grievance depends to a large extent on the conditions of the 
institutional arrangements of procedures.
Industrial sociology studies often show that conflicts 
at work cover a variety of meaning. They may be about basic 
principles of work organization (class conflict); they can 
arise from tensions in a set of work relations (recurrent 
collective bargaining) or they can be related to single 
incidents (strikes or employment disputes) (7) . Conflicts 
at work are said to occur on three different levels. Overt 
and non-directed conflicts occur at the behavioural level, 
institutionalized conflicts at the institutional level, and 
implicit conflicts at the structural level (8).
However, analytical or structural definitions of a 
dispute differ between external observers and the 
participants in company dispute procedures. The empirical 
research usually adopts a pragmatic or interactionist 
approach to find out about the participants' views of the 
problem of defining a grievance. It studies industrial 
conflicts which are actually handled in labour dispute 
procedures as the participants do and finds out about these 
conflicts from the observable descriptions of conflicts in 
grievances or claims. The systems theoretical approach 
benefits from this empirical research insofar as it informs 
about the interaction system, i.e., its operations and its 
self-descriptions.
7) Edwards 1986: 5.
8) Edwards and Scullion 1982: 9-14.
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Tha Rasaarch on the "Labour Procass" and Labour
Conflicts
The research on the "labour process" claims to have 
adopted a comprehensive approach to the study of labour and 
employment conflicts at the workplace. This research is 
interested in control, resistance, and cooperation on the 
shopfloor (9) and views the labour process as a semi- 
autonomous process in which production patterns, managerial 
strategies and control mechanisms create, shape and prevent 
conflicts and cooperation at the workplace. The conditions 
of the labour process are used to explain rates of voluntary 
and involuntary labour turnover, absenteeism, sabotage, and 
other breaches of factory discipline ("pilfering and 
fiddling"). In particular, effort bargaining, i.e., 
conflicts over the amount of effort for a particular wage, 
is considered a prime example of both the relative autonomy 
of the labour process and managerial control (10).
Michael Burawoy emphasizes conflict prevention as a 
major result of the labour process. Workers normally 
consent to managerial control because of a "pragmatic role 
acceptance" (11) as the prevalent mode of behaviour among 
workers. The labour process is perceived by workers as a 
game, i.e. "a set of limited choices". The consequence of 
participation in the game is rule obedience and reduction of 
conflict. "Playing a game generates consent to its rules."
(12) Overt conflict becomes rather exceptional or
pathological in this game.
In criticizing Burawoy, P.K. Edwards insists that 
capitalist work organization is based on "structured
9) See only Burawoy 1979 and 1985; Edwards and Scullion 1982
and Edwards 1986.
10) Edwards and Scullion 1982.
11) Mann 1970.
12) Burawoy 1979: 93.
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antagonism" which involves both cooperation and conflict
(13). And it remains an open empirical question for Edwards 
as to what extent the labour process generates conflict or 
cooperation. However, Edwards can be criticized for his 
failure to develop definite empirical predictions as to the 
balance between conflict and cooperation.
Labour process research has been criticized for its 
reductionist neglect of aspects both of the employee 
autonomy and cultural embeddedness. Charles Sabel
emphasizes that conflict at work is often caused by 
subjective cultural factors, i.e. the worker's "concept of 
intolerable injustice" and his "determination to defend his 
everyday conception, which as a whole is comprised of 
illusions and truths inextricably mixed". An employee's 
militancy is thus a "sign as much of his world views as of 
his position in the production process" (14). These world 
views are caused by factors external to the labour process 
which thus undermine the autonomy of the labour process 
itself.
In a recent analysis of factors that influence the 
diffusion of grievance procedures Laura Edelman has 
emphasized that legitimacy rather than control was the 
imperative which drove this form of organizational 
governance. According to her study, grievance procedures 
were invented in the U.S. because "the civil rights movement 
of the 1960s created a normative environment in which 
legitimacy was conditioned upon fair governance" (15). Once 
this symbolic gesture to the normative and legal environment 
has led to the establishment of grievance procedures it can 
become a forum in which employee interests are given a voice 
in the company (16).
13) Edwards 1986.
14) Sabel 1982: 15.
15) Edelman 1989: 2-3.
16) Edelman 1989: 33.
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Labour process research considers dispute procedures as 
part of a system of control at the workplace. Conflicts are 
related as much to the 'struggle' between deliberate 
managerial strategy and workers' resistance as to the 
organization of work, which "is created by the day-to-day 
activities of both sides as they try to deal with particular 
sets of circumstances" (17). Labour process research helps 
to understand that formal workplace institutions like 
dispute procedures are based on these informal arrangements 
of work organization. "Adaptation and accommodation are as 
important as deliberate efforts to assert or resist 
'control'" (18). It has the advantage of integrating 
variables of power relations and production patterns in the 
analysis of workplace organization.
However, labour process research has so far not 
developed much interest in the relations of formal and 
informal dispute resolution. Surprisingly, formal dispute 
institutions have been largely neglected by this research. 
Although Burawoy acknowledges that "factory regimes" vary 
independently of the labour process, he underestimates the 
relative independence of formal workplace institutions (19). 
Historically, grievance procedures are as much a product of 
state intervention as they are linked to the labour process 
itself; in fact, they are dependent on both. "Production 
apparatuses" are most often a result of both state 
interventionism and formal processes of control of labour at 
the workplace. And they then develop as interaction systems 
according to their own autopoietic logic.
There are several debates on the sources and driving 
forces behind the introduction of grievance procedures. 
Traditionally, unions are perceived as the main source. 
Where unions are active on the shop floor they have an 
interest in acquiring recognition. Establishing joint
17) Edwards 1986: 77.
18) Edwards 1986: 77.
19) Burawoy 1985: 37-48.
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procedures is a good way for unions to become indispensable. 
These procedures are also means of integrating unions. 
Unions have to develop cooperative attitudes and reduce 
adversarial behaviour when they participate in decision­
making.
The activity of unions, even in a declining era, are 
said to have radiating effects with respect to work place 
institutions. For example, the introduction of grievance 
procedures in non-union firms is attributed to unionism. 
The adoption of grievance procedures in non-union companies 
was reported in nine out of ten cases to be the result of 
union pressure (20). Non-union grievance procedures are 
strategically used as instruments to prevent the work force 
from unionizing.
The arguments of labour process research can be 
summarized as follows. The system of formal decision-making 
over conflicts at work has its own 'relative autonomy'. It 
exercises not only disciplinary control over employees but 
also certain control over its input. Conflicts at work have 
to be defined as matters for the grievance procedure, and 
this transformation has to be mastered before a grievance 
can enter the grievance machinery. But labour process 
research stops asking questions at this stage. It does not 
engage in analyzing the operations of grievance procedures 
and it does not understand their autonomy.
Elements and Structures of Labour Dispute Procedures
A socio-legal account of labour dispute procedures, 
which adopts systems theory, is able to analyze the 
operations of company dispute procedures which constitute 
these procedures as interaction systems. It goes beyond the
20) Freeman and Medoff 1984: 154.
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traditional institutional approaches which are mainly 
concerned with structural aspects of the procedural systems.
Traditional approaches in the study of grievance 
procedures look at participants involved and only 
occasionally at the subject matters of disputes. On the 
European continent, and especially in French and German 
speaking countries, the distinction between individual and 
collective conflicts is not only used to separate the two 
major areas of labour law but also as a means to 
differentiate procedures. The resolution of individual 
labour disputes is generally attributed to judicial 
procedures while the settlement of collective labour 
disputes is largely attributed to voluntary ones.
There have always been discussions about the use of 
this distinction with respect to the separation of dispute 
fora (21). A majority of dispute procedures, even in 
countries which place strong emphasis on the distinction 
between collective/individual disputes, handle both types of 
conflicts. Company grievance procedures deal with
employment conflicts of individual workers as well as of a 
group of workers or a trade union. And labour courts are 
not only concerned with conflicts between two individuals, 
i.e. one employer and one employee, but also often with 
collective interests represented by unions and management; 
in addition, judicial procedures handle conflicts which 
often appear on the surface as individual conflicts, such as 
grievances of a trade union member with his or her 
organization, which in fact often relate to interests of 
many other members.
Another common approach to classifying procedures is to 
emphasize their bargaining context. Grievance procedures 
are thus located at different levels of the collective 
bargaining process. comparative research of the
21) Hanami and Blanpain 1986: 7 and 8.
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International Labour Office reports that a majority of 
Western countries distinguish three types of collective 
bargaining disputes (22):
1) Recognition Disputes: These conflicts are related to
the recognition of trade unions as bargaining parties 
and usually arise before collective bargaining actually 
begins.
2) Interest Disputes: These conflicts arise during the
establishment of a collective bargaining agreement.
3) Rights Disputes: These conflicts occur after the
establishment of collective bargaining agreements and
are related to their application and interpretation.
This classification of grievances in the context of 
collective bargaining relates procedures to different 
conflict levels and parties to the conflict. The 
distinction between recognition/interest/rights disputes 
assumes that each type of collective bargaining dispute 
requires a specific forum and type of dispute resolution. 
In general, recognition disputes are associated with 
administrative decision-making, interest disputes with 
arbitration and rights disputes with adjudication.
Although the literature generally still ascribes to 
this assumption, one also finds doubts about its 
appropriateness. Benjamin Aaron expresses his doubts in the 
following metaphorical language:
"... the line between disputes over rights and conflicts 
over interest is not always an impregnable wall; rather, it 
sometimes is more analogous to a semi-permeable membrane, 
through which disputes that are nominally of one type pass 
and are handled under procedures (sic, R.R.) usually 
reserved for disputes of the other type." (23)
The relation of types of labour conflicts to certain 
types of procedures begins to blur. Thus for a comparative 
socio-legal account it becomes insufficient to differentiate
22) Background Paper in ILO LMRS 56 (1977): 36/7
23) Aaron 1982: 260.
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grievance procedures only with respect to the nature of 
participants or with respect to the location of dispute 
settlement at collective bargaining levels. The nature of 
the dispute and the substantive rules involved are of equal 
importance.
There are some attempts to distinguish elements and 
structures of labour dispute procedures analytically. 
Anselm Strauss' (24) description of negotiations and 
Melville Dalton's study (25) of continuous working relations 
in industrial firms distinguish three sets of variables: 
institutional variables, content variables and process 
variables. This analytical distinction is a useful tool for 
the following description of company dispute procedures in 
four countries.
The institutional variables relate to the formal 
structure of and participants in grievance procedure. The 
degree of professionalization and experience of negotiators 
is an important variable. Experienced negotiators are 
engaged in repeated negotiations which create a web of 
commitment. These negotiators represent not only the 
grievant, who is often not required to be present during 
negotiations, but also themselves. They are concerned 
maintaining a "balance of favours" and accumulating mutual 
obligations.
The content variables relate to stakes. Formally, 
stakes in grievance procedures are defined (and confined) by 
law or by national collective bargaining agreements. 
Company agreements are only meant to implement law or 
national agreements. However, the standards established in 
statutes and national agreements can only broadly define 
issues and stakes. These standards have to leave specific 
contents and details to be arranged in company agreements. 
In addition to company agreements the relative autonomy of
24) Dalton 1959.
25) Strauss 1978: 122-141.
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the work place is enhanced by customs and practise. Custom 
and practise at the company level might, for example, allow 
a situation where grievance procedures are open to any 
grievance on the shop floor regardless of the definition of 
grievance in the company agreement. In another case, 
though, the definition of grievance might be even further 
restricted by the procedure than by what is stated in the 
agreement. According to Strauss, one possible hypothesis in
this context is that the more ambiguity exists about
legitimate boundaries for stakes, the more complex are the 
outcomes.
The process variables relate to the degree of
flexibility and control in negotiations. The process is
influenced by the threat and use of power or undesirable 
action as an option to one or both negotiators. The process 
of negotiation needs a certain degree of autonomy. It has 
to be free from direct intervention by outside forces, i.e., 
management and union leaders. Thus, covert negotiations 
occur hidden from persons who could endanger negotiations. 
Ways to bypass and mediate previous negotiations and to 
allow trade-offs constitute informal procedures.
A rather descriptive socio-legal approach to 
classifying procedures is taken by the ILO study on
Conciliation and Arbitration Procedures in Labour Disputes 
(26) . It looks at the type of dispute resolution and
thereby distinguishes four main types: (1) negotiation; (2)
mediation and conciliation; (3) arbitration; (4) 
adjudication. This ILO study presents *a careful and complex 
comparison of relevant forms of labour conflict procedures. 
It distinguishes the nature of procedures from the ways of 
establishing procedures, e.g., collective agreement, 
statutes, or other sources. The distinction in the nature 
of the procedure refers to voluntary or compulsory decision-
26) Cf. ILO 1980: 1 and 4-16; the study concentrates on
mediation, conciliation and arbitration procedures with 
only occasional references to adjudication.
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making and thus to "public policy concerning dispute
settlement"; if "emphasis is placed on the parties and on 
... compromise", procedures tend to be rather voluntary; if 
"greatest emphasis is placed on the avoidance of work
stoppages", the nature of the procedure tends to be 
compulsory (27).
With respect to a comparison of grievance procedures, a 
fifth form of labour dispute in addition to those in the ILO 
study might be added which relates to the administration of 
labour conflicts. This form of third party intervention, 
however, is not exclusively concerned with dispute 
resolution. It is related to factory inspection and the
surveillance of safety and health standards. These 
administrative grievance procedures, in which an agency 
resolves disputes in a court-like manner, can be
characterized as quasi-judicial state interventionism. The 
disputes which are handled in administrative grievance 
procedures are often created by the administrations 
themselves through active interference in company affairs.
Dispute procedures differ insofar as some are only 
designed for an ad hoc conflict resolution perspective 
whereas others engage in the maintenance of long-term 
relations. However, each procedure is an interaction system 
which must be able to identify itself if it wants to survive 
as a procedure. It must therefore primarily observe its 
need for self-reproduction, and only on this basis can it 
perform tasks for other systems. Thus the process of "task 
accumulation" in a procedure might be an expression of 
lacking "task allocation" between different types of 
procedure. But it certainly indicates the capacity of the 
system to handle a variety of conflicts due to its strongly 
secured autopoiesis.
27) Ibid: 16.
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Dispute procedures also have developed a remarkable 
capacity to instrumentalize different forms of third party 
intervention. Arbitration is the most used form of third 
party intervention at the company level. It has encountered 
a remarkable process of differentiation. Dean Pruitt gives 
a good overview of the different forms of arbitration:
"Arbitration can be either voluntary, in the sense of being 
requested by the two parties, or compulsory, in the sense of 
being imposed by law, contract, or outside pressures, 
whether voluntary or compulsory, the two parties usually 
have a hand in choosing the arbitrator except in the special 
case where arbitration is by a court. Three types of
arbitration can be distinguished: conventional, final offer, 
and med-arb (a combination of mediation and arbitration). 
In conventional arbitration, third parties have the leeway 
to make any award they wish. In final offer arbitration, 
third parties must choose one or the other party's final 
offer, having no right to improvise. There are two
varieties of this procedure: In the issue-by-issue variety, 
arbitrators can choose one party's offer on issue A and the 
other's offer on issue B. In the total package variety, 
they must choose one or the other party's entire set of 
offers. In med-arb, third parties first mediate and then, 
if that fails, render a binding award." (28)
From a systems theoretical point of view arbitration 
forms part of the structure of the interaction system. 
Third party involvement must be compatible with the internal 
settlement process of the procedure. It is thus important 
for the procedure to exercise control over the third party 
to avoid irrational interference. The third party must be 
bound into the rationality of self-regulation of the 
procedural interaction system.
*
Thus it can be stated as a rule that the imposition of 
arbitration models can only be successful if these models 
find response in internal processes of self-regulation in 
grievance procedures. Different types of arbitration must 
reflect the different concepts of self-regulation of 
procedures.
28) Pruitt 1981: 218.
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Four National Labour Disputa Procedure Systems
The jurisdiction and institutional structure of dispute 
or grievance procedures differ widely among industrial 
relations systems. In the following, the national labour 
dispute procedure systems of the U.S., Great Britain, France 
and Germany shall be analyzed and compared. Throughout the 
description, the terms "grievance procedure" and "dispute 
procedure" will be used synonymously. Although Hugh Clegg's 
suggestion to use the first for a description of collective 
conflict handling and the second for a description of 
individual dispute processing (29) seems an analytically 
sound proposal, it is not followed for two reasons: First,
the literature on industrial relations does not, in general, 
adhere to this distinction. And more importantly, the 
industrial relations practice does not distinguish clearly 
between collective and individual dispute treatment, as will 
be illustrated by some examples in the following overview of 
national labour dispute procedure systems.
Franca
The French labour dispute procedure system is a 
relatively new phenomenon.
French labour law provides three formal channels at the 
factory level through which management can be approached by 
the employees and the unions: délégués du personnel, comité 
d'entreprise, section syndicale.
29) Clegg 1979: 229, Fn. 1.
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The Personnel Delegates (Les délégués du personnel)
The institution of délégués was introduced by the Law 
of 24 June 1931 and the Law of 16 April 1946. The delegates 
are elected each year by ballot of the personnel. Elections 
can be held in all establishments with more than ten 
employees. There may be as many as four separate electoral 
colleges, namely blue collar workers, white collar workers, 
foremen, and cadres (30). The unions have the right to put 
forward the candidates for the first ballot and most 
delegates are active union members (31).
The main task of personnel delegates is to ensure the 
implementation of existing rules at the workplace. 
According to their jurisdiction the delegates have to bring 
to the attention of the employer all grievances among the 
personnel over the implementation of both the statutory 
regulations governing work and the clauses of collective 
agreements (32). The personnel delegates are the employee 
representatives who are especially empowered to present the 
grievances of the employees. The grievances presented by 
the personnel delegates in the meeting with the employer, 
conducted at least once a month, as well as the employer's 
answers, must be recorded in a special register by the 
Labour Inspector (33).
If there is a clear case of a breach of a legal or 
administrative regulation, personnel delegates can initiate 
proceedings of the Labour Inspector against the employer 
(34). Although personnel delegates are*only allowed to base 
their demands on existing legal rules, in practise they base
30) Rojot 1987: 77.
31) Reynaud 1975: 243: "Pour le plupart de salariés, le
délégué et le syndicat sont une seule et même chose, et, 
comme il est fréquent qu'en fait délégué et responsable 
syndical ne fassent qu'un, la confusion est normale et 
permanente."
32) L. 422-1, al. 1 Code du Travail.
33) Rojot 1987: 77.
34) See Dubois and Halpern 1988: 416.
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their demands also on customary conditions of the 
establishment. Meetings with the employer are also used as 
a sounding board for grievances that fall well outside the 
strict scope of their permitted activities (35). Grievances 
over pay and other working conditions are the main 
complaints which are handled by personnel delegates. 
However, disciplinary or dismissal issues of individual 
employees do not fall into the domain of responsibility of 
delegates.
The number of delegates depends on the size of the 
enterprise. At present, one delegate can be elected if 
there are more than 10 employees. The number of delegates 
rises with the number of employees. There are, for example, 
nine delegates if there are more than 500 employees, and an 
additional delegate for each 250 employees above 1,000 (36). 
Each delegate is entitled to devote 15 hours of paid working 
time per month to his or her duties as delegates. The 
delegates are allowed to display their information within 
the company (affichage); the employer, however, can veto the 
bill-posting.
The issues which delegates raise with management 
concern wage demands relating to individuals and small
groups, social facilities, work organization, and safety and
health conditions. On these issues management in general 
adopts the "strategy of arms' length bargaining" (37), 
accepting the demands of delegates in only a minority of
cases. However, since 1982 the position of the delegates 
has been strengthened by law. If no enterprise committee 
exists, the personnel delegates substitute for this
committee in all its functions.
35) Gallie 1978: 152.
36) See Javillier 1990: 314-315.
37) Batestone 1979: 11-12.
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The Enterprise Committee (Le Comité d'entreprise)
Like the personnel delegates the employee members of 
the enterprise committee are elected from lists of 
candidates provided by the unions. They serve two year 
terms. There have to be at least 50 employees in the 
enterprise to elect a minimum of three enterprise committee 
members. The maximum number of enterprise committee members 
is now fifteen in companies with more than 10,000 employees. 
The enterprise committee is composed of both employee and 
management representatives. The head of the company (the 
patron) is the president of the committee.
The enterprise committee is called a body of "triple 
représentation" because it is composed of employer 
representatives, elected employee representatives, and union 
representatives (38). It has legally guaranteed lee-way for 
self-regulation. L. 431-6, al. 2 allows the committee to 
adopt a "règlement intérieur" which also regulates the 
election of a secretary for the preparation and execution of 
its decisions (39).
The enterprise committee meets at least once a month. 
Each enterprise committee member is entitled to devote 20 
hours paid working time per month to his duties as 
enterprise committee member and he enjoys special protection 
against dismissal.
The first comité d'entreprise was established by the 
ordinance of 22 February 1945, and afterwards regulated by 
the Law of 16 Nay 1946. If an enterprise consists of more 
than one establishment a committee must be created for each 
different establishment having the same powers and 
operations exercised by the enterprise committee. When 
separate establishment committees exist, a separate 
enterprise committee must be constituted. Since the Law of
38) Lyon-Caen and Pélissier 1988: 819.
39) Javillier 1990: 347.
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23 December 1982 special powers are given to Committees on 
Safety, Health, and Working Conditions. The formal 
conditions (election etc.) are similar to the enterprise 
committee, with the exception that employee representatives 
are in a majority in these committees (40).
Unlike the délégués which handle grievances, the 
enterprise committee is designed to be a forum of 
cooperation rather than an adversary to management. The 
legally prescribed task of the enterprise committee is 
twofold. First, the committee must inform and consult with 
management over company affairs and the running of the 
enterprise. Second, enterprise committees administer the 
company's social welfare provisions for its personnel.
To fulfill the second task, the employer is obliged 
under French law to supply the committee with a grant over 
which this body has virtually total discretion. Although 
employers are only required to grant a certain legal 
minimum, empirical research found employers to be rather 
generous (41). However, consultation with the enterprise 
committee before decision-making was less favoured by French 
management. Because of an unclear legal definition of 
''consultation", with only marginal clarification by the Law 
of 18 June 1966, enterprise committees feel that management 
is constantly devaluing the concept of consultation, either 
by by-passing the committee completely or by starving it of 
the information it needs. Thus enterprise committees are 
barely informed and rarely consulted (42). Except for 
social matters this organ of collaboration is considered at 
best inefficient and is, unfortunately, not moving from 
consultation to negotiation (43). Insofar as enterprise 
committees can be said to "handle" claims, they are only
40) Despax and Rojot 1987: 203-209.
41) Gallie 1978: 154: "By all accounts the Committees were
fairly prosperous and they organised a wide range of
Xvit X©S •
42) Gallie 1978: 154-6. Also Delamotte 1962.
43) Reynaud 1975: 242.
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concerned with collective disputes. They are not directly 
involved in processing individual grievances.
Since the reform of dismissal law by the Law of 30 
December 1986 both the enterprise committee and the 
personnel delegates have gained responsibility for handling 
economically motivated dismissals of two or more employees. 
In these cases the employer has to inform the personnel 
delegates, if the company has more than 10 but less than 50 
employees. In larger companies he has to inform the 
enterprise committee. However, neither the delegates nor 
the committee have joint decision-making power. They only 
have a right to comment on the dismissals. The penalties 
for procedural negligence on the part of the employer are 
relatively mild (44). An individual employee can file a 
tort claim against the employer but he has to present 
evidence on his personal damages which result directly from 
the employer's neglect to consult the delegates or the 
enterprise committee.
The Union Section (La Section syndicale d'entreprise)
Since 27 December 1968, in the aftermath of the events 
of May 1968, unions have the right to their own delegates in 
the factory. There have to be at least 50 employees in the 
enterprise. The number of delegates ranges from one union 
delegate in companies with less than 1,000 employees to a 
maximum of four delegates in companies with more than 6,000 
employees. These delegates are not elected but designated 
by their respective unions. They are allowed to devote 15 
hours of paid working time to their duties as union 
delegates.
Unions and management differ in their interpretations 
of the intentions of the law on union sections. Whereas
44) Between FF 1300 and FF 2500. See Art. R. 362-1, al. 2 
Code du Travail. See Keller 1989: 38.
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management in general does not view these institutions as a 
major change in the system because of the unspecific wording 
of the statute, the unions often feel that the elected 
bodies now only play a secondary role while the unions take 
over discussions with management (45). However, management 
and unions agree that the new union rights should lead to 
more negotiation at the company level, perhaps by-passing 
older Central Company Committees (46). In 1973 only 40 per 
cent of the enterprises with more than 50 employees had 
union sections. Now 94 per cent of the enterprises with 
more than 1,000 employees do (47).
The law is rather vague and unspecified about the task 
of union sections in the enterprise. It only states 
"représentation des intérêts matériels et moraux de ses 
membres" (48). Thus it depends largely on the behaviour and 
relation of management and union sections what role the 
union section will play at the shop floor. There are three 
options: union sections may be "super-delegates" in
grievance handling, replace the enterprise committee in 
consultation and negotiation with management, or perform 
separate tasks from the delegates and the enterprise 
committee. Only the third option avoids competition with 
the other two bodies. The union sections are a potential 
for creating a system for work place industrial relations. 
They have been active in concluding company agreements on 
working conditions (49).
The representatives serving in an official capacity in 
one of the three bodies, enjoy special employment 
protection. This protection extends not only to the elected 
delegates and union delegates but also to candidates for 
election after their candidature is known, and even to
45) Gallie 1978: 156.
46) Gallie 1978: 162.
47) Reynaud 1975: 248.
48) Art. L. 412-6 Code du Travail.
49) See Javillier 1990: 451.
173
employees who have requested elections (50). Since the Law 
of 28 October 1982 these employees cannot be dismissed 
without consultation and advice of the comité d'entreprise 
and the authorization of the Labour Inspector. A later 
approval of the inspector is not allowed, so any dismissal 
is void without prior authorization. This protection lasts 
not only during the mandate of the elected representatives 
but for six months after its expiration.
For a long time the most distinct characteristic of 
labour dispute processing in France was the high degree of 
direct state intervention in shop floor disputes. This 
external third party intervention is carried out by a 
separate state agency, the Labour Inspector (inspecteur du 
travail) ._ He has the right of free access to all 
enterprises at any time, without warning and without 
employer interference.
Traditionally the Labour Inspector was responsible for 
supervision of health and safety standards. The dominant 
part of most inspectors' work is now labour relations. It 
has been reported that the French Labour Inspector spends 
only 15 to 25 percent of his working time on these matters 
(51) . The Law of 23 December 1982 significantly enhanced 
the rights of employees to involve Labour Inspectors in 
safety and health questions. Also in 1982 the Law on 
'Liberties of Workers Within Enterprises' empowered Labour 
Inspectors to direct employers to withdraw shop rules if 
these work rules deal with other than three subjects: health 
and safety, discipline, and employee rights in disciplinary 
proceedings.
The inspector's main role is to ensure compliance with 
labour laws at the work place. The Labour Inspector has in 
general four powers:
50) Despax and Rojot 1987: 166-168.
51) Campbell 1986: 50.
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control power over working conditions; 
decision-making power in certain dismissal cases, which 
was eliminated in 1986;
- negotiation and conciliation powers in collective 
labour conflicts; and
- advisory powers on social matters.
In 1982, the Labour Inspectorate of the whole of France 
reported that it 'controlled' 1,053,173 establishments with 
12,231,182 employees; Labour Inspectors visited 330,222 
establishments. 'Decisions' on dismissals for economic 
reasons were made in 86,531 cases, and on the dismissal of a 
worker representative in 6,751 cases. 'Negotiation' and 
'conciliation' of collective labour disputes occurred in 
4,867 conflicts. And 'advice' on social matters was given 
during 824,128 visits in 1982 (52).
During the 1980s the concepts and politics of external 
regulations of company affairs through state administration 
changed significantly. As a result of deregulation measures 
and of the implementation of European law, the influence of 
the Labour Inspector was significantly limited. In 
particular in dismissal law the powers of the Labour 
Inspector have been restricted and replaced by consultation 
rights of elected employee representatives. Until the 
middle of the 1980s the intervention powers of the Labour 
Inspectors created an advanced filter system in France for 
the processing of grievances and dismissals. It was 
designed to prevent dismissals through early participation 
of external decision-makers. The Labour Inspector had to 
approve dismissals for economic reasons and dismissals of 
specially protected employees. This procedure, however, was 
abolished by the Law of 30 December 1986.
Nevertheless, the Labour Inspector still plays a 
significant role in French industrial relations. He is an 
important advisor to employees and their representatives. 
Jacques Rojot describes his informal duties:
52) Liaisons sociales 1986a: 109.
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"The labor inspector may play an informal role in the 
resolution of shop floor disputes, even though he has no 
legal power to settle grievances or strikes per se. For 
example, if an employee inquires about a managerial action 
taken toward him, the labor inspector will typically 
instruct the employee as to his legal rights and actions. 
He may also simply telephone or write the employer to 
suggest a solution, a middle course, or a modification of 
the decision. The parties often call upon the labor 
inspector to informally mediate a strike, even though this 
role is not granted him by law. Obviously, much depends 
upon the nature of the relationship between the labor 
inspector, the employer, and the employees". (53)
The law concerning the Labour Inspector was never 
considered to be an integral part of French labour law. In 
fact, through decisions of the higher courts French labour 
law has adopted a view of strict separation of laws related 
to the actions of the administrative Labour Inspector from 
those related to the contract of employment. The employer 
might be penalized by the Labour Inspector, but this has 
only an indirect legal effect on the dismissal and the 
proceedings which end up in the labour court (54).
In summarizing the system of grievance procedure in 
France it has to be pointed out that compulsory grievance 
procedures do not exist. Personnel delegates may voice 
grievances to the employer. However, employees are not 
protected by these representatives. Although this can also 
be seen as a right to retain the ability to present 
grievances individually to the employer, it also means that 
there are no regulations on dismissals which provide for a 
participation of collective actors in * individual employment 
conflicts. Personnel delegates offer only an option to 
employees to channel the grievance without participation in 
the decision-making on the grievance.
53) Rojot 1987: 76.
54) Napier et al. 1982.
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The situation has changed, however, since the beginning 
of the 1970s when the labour lawyer Xavier Blanc-Jouvain 
characterized the French situation as follows:
•'In contrast to other countries, labour disputes in France 
are never settled within the enterprise. Internal
organizations representing workers have only limited powers; 
they may promote voluntary settlement of a grievance or act 
as a screening agency, but they have no decision-making 
powers and cannot really take part in the final settlement 
of a labor dispute. Such a settlement, in fact, always 
implies the intervention of an authority external to the 
enterprise - judge, state official, or private person. 
Labor unions, likewise, play a minor role in the settlement 
of labor disputes, at least at the company level. Union 
participation is more or less insignificant because of the 
principles that govern union activities in France - union 
pluralism and the rule that unions can represent members 
only - and because settlement procedures are usually 
prescribed by statutory law rather than by collective 
agreement." (55)
In a comparative study of the institutional system
governing workplace industrial relations in France and Great 
Britain, Duncan Gallie described in 1978 the consequences of 
the lack of formal company procedures in France. In his 
comparison of working conditions in four factories of a
multi-national oil company, of which two were located in 
France and two in Great Britain, he generally found that 
whereas "British workers were satisfied with the basic form 
of the institutionalized mechanisms of negotiation that had 
been established" the French workers, on the other hand,
"appeared to be fairly deeply alienated from the system of 
authority that prevailed in the enterprise. They felt that 
they were confronted by a highly centralized form of
management that remained sovereign over the entire field of 
decision-making. They regarded the institutions of
participation provided by the law as largely a façade, and 
they tended to reject the idea that the discussion that did 
take place between management and their representatives even
55) Blanc-Jouvain 1971: 13.
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amounted to consultation. The predominant feeling was one 
of powerlessness." (56)
However, there are remarkable trends in establishing a 
system of workplace industrial relations. The enterprise 
committee and the union section are institutions which now 
operate in the framework of a rudimentary company 
constitution. They are collective interaction systems which 
have developed into active institutions at the plant or 
company level. Within their organizational logic they serve 
collective interests rather than protect individual 
employees.
The system of dismissal protection divides employees on 
the shop floor into two categories: employee representatives 
attached to the collective interest bodies and other 
employees. Accordingly separate procedures exist and only 
the former enjoy effective dismissal protection. At least 
with respect to the category of 'protected employees', the 
general statement of Blanc-Jouvain and Gallie that France 
lacks an effective labour dispute resolution system at the 
shop floor must be modified. This group of employees has 
achieved an exceptionally strong form of preventive 
protection and cannot be called powerless.
United States
In principle the-U.S. approach towards labour dispute 
resolution on the shop floor (but only to a minor degree at 
the national level) is the direct opposite of the French 
state interventionist approach. Industrial relations 
policies in the U.S. have adopted a system of grievance 
procedures which privatize conflict resolution. These 
procedures at company level perform functions, in particular
56) Gallie 1978: 145.
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regarding dismissal protection, which are covered by public 
institutions in other countries (57). The U.S. grievance 
procedures are the product of decentralized collective 
bargaining. Thus the basis for rules and procedures at the 
shop floor is contractual and not constitutional.
Since the New Deal Wagner Act of 1935, and with the 
post-World War II laws on trade unions (58), the federal 
government has taken an active interest in labour conflict 
resolution through industrial relations self-regulation 
which is also supported at the state level (59) . This 
reliance on self-regulation has prevented the U.S. policy­
makers from adopting a comprehensive institutional system of 
labour dispute resolution by statute. Only in a few 
exceptional cases does the state offer assistance or 
intervene in industrial relations matters.
The preference for labour conflict resolution on a 
private basis is expressed by statute. Section 203 (d) of
the Labor Management Relations, or Taft-Hartley, Act (LMRA) 
of 1947 states:
"Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is 
hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement of 
grievance disputes arising over the application or 
interpretation of an existing collective bargaining 
agreement."
The "method agreed upon by the parties" is usually 
known as "grievance procedure" ending with arbitration. It 
is not a statute but a collective bargaining agreement that 
defines how the grievance procedure works and how a 
grievance is defined. The political system has successfully 
imstrumenta1i zed self—regulatory mechanisms for labour 
conflict resolution purposes. Over 95 percent of all
57) See Hanami and Monat 1985. Also Rogowski 1983.
58) Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and Landrum-Griffin Act of 
1959.
59) Goldman 1983.
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collective bargaining agreements in the private sector 
analyzed by the Department of Labor during the 1980s contain 
sections on a grievance procedure (60).
This system of industrial self-regulation through 
grievance procedures and private arbitration predates the 
labour legislation of the 1930s. It was mentioned in the 
Industrial Commission Report of 1902, and prior to World War 
II grievance procedures ending in binding arbitration were 
common in the clothing and coal mining industries (61) . 
Grievance arbitration became a common practice only after 
the introduction of legal regulation of labour. "Driving 
forces" in the constitution of the system have been: "New
Deal Legislation, the policies of the World War II War Labor 
Board and the views of the Board's administrators who 
thereafter moved on to private positions as leading 
scholars, mediators, and arbitrators." (62) In addition to 
the War Labor Board's arbitrators (63), the impact of 
Taylorism and similar methods of work organization are held 
responsible for the conscious decision of the American 
legislator for a pluralist and abstentionist industrial 
relations policy after World War II which favors private 
grievance arbitration over labour courts (64).
Grievances are related to both individual labour 
conflicts, e.g. dismissal, grouping or absenteeism of an 
individual worker, and to collective matters, i.e. rights of 
a group of workers or the shop steward's rights (65). The 
grievance procedure contains a strong "collective element",
60) Reported in Aaron 1985: 344.
61) Kochan 1980: 387; Fleming 1965.
62) Kochan, McKersie and Katz 1984, 3. See also Kuhn 1961, 
ch. 1.
63) See the interview with Paul Prasow on his training as an
arbitrator on the War Labor Board. As many of the
other oldtimer arbitrators he was a student of Professor
George Taylor who, when he became the Vice-Chairman of 
the War Labor Board in 1942, took his students to serve 
as arbitrators. Prasow and Peters 1983, ch. 17.
64) See Stone 1981.
65) See Elkouri and Elkouri 1973: 117-120.
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insofar as the formal procedure in many cases can only be 
initiated by union officials, i.e. by shop stewards after 
the approval of the union grievance committee. In these 
situations the employee has to transfer the conflict at an 
early stage to the collective parties. The individual 
"claim" is transformed substantively to become a grievance 
for the grievance procedure. After the transformation the 
union 'owns' the grievance. For the grievant much depends 
on not being "in bad favour with the exclusive bargaining 
representative" (66). American labour law paid special 
attention to this problem and developed in legal doctrine a 
so-called duty of fair representation (67).
Grievance procedures follow similar patterns of 
contacts between unions and management in a negotiation 
process. Grievance procedures which are laid down in a 
collective bargaining agreement typically consist of three 
to five steps of contacts, each on a higher level of the 
company hierarchy. An example (68) would be that:
(1) the employee contacts the supervisor or foreman and the
shop steward,
(2) the chief steward meets the division manager,
(3) the union's grievance chairman meets the Labor
Relations Director,
(4) the main grievance committee meets with the Company 
President, and
(5) grievance arbitration.
80 per cent of collective bargaining agreements contain 
special clauses for the processing of "discharge cases". In 
these cases the grievance procedure might be shortened, 
starting at the third step of the procedure after the union 
has been informed and has decided to file a written
66) Aaron 1985: 350.
67) See Vaca vs. Sipes 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
68) See St. Antoine 1984: 266. Freeman and Medoff 1984,
105/5 mention a four-step-procedure as average for 
grievance procedures in the United States.
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grievance because of "unjust discharge or suspension" (69). 
If an industrial relations department exists within the 
company, the steps before the grievance procedure reaches 
the industrial relations officer are thought to be largely 
irrelevant. The grievance is delegated to the industrial 
relations officer who, in fact, acts like a "petty 
arbitrator", hearing both union officials and personnel or 
other parts of management. The hearing before an external 
arbitrator becomes the appeal of the industrial relations 
officer's decision. Grievance procedures can vary in the 
time lapse allowed for written responses. "To improve 
promptness one agreement may require written answers to 
grievances within twenty four hours; another, within ten 
days." (70)
Arbitration hearings are held before a single impartial 
"ad hoc" arbitrator are by far the most common (71). In 
some industries tripartite arbitration boards exist which 
are composed of a neutral arbitrator and an equal number of 
representatives from labour and management. In the steel 
industry, the automobile industry, and the aircraft industry 
one occasionally finds permanent arbitrators; the term 
'permanent' can be misleading, however, because "the 
unquestioned right of either party to dismiss the arbitrator 
at any time, for any reason or no reason, is widely regarded 
by all participants as one of the great strengths and safety 
valves of the system." (72)
In ad hoc arbitration the parties choose an arbitrator 
each time a new case is submitted. The arbitrator is 
selected from lists supplied upon request by the regional 
offices of the official Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service (FMCS), created by the "Labor Management Relations
69) See the description and analysis of a discharge 
grievance procedure in Rogowski 1983b.
70) Kuhn 1961: 7 on the basis of 20 plants in 9 industries.
71) St. Antoine 1984: 268.
72) Aaron 1985: 346.
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Act" in 1947, or by the private American Arbitration 
Association (AAA). These lists usually contain an uneven 
number of three to seven names of arbitrators. The parties 
choose an arbitrator through negative selection by striking 
alternately names from these lists until the name of one 
arbitrator remains (73). Some states offer special 
arbitration services; the Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Commission (WERC), for example, offers the service of public 
arbitrators without charge. Arbitrators chosen from FMCS or 
AAA lists have to be paid by the parties, usually on an 
hourly basis.
Arbitration hearings take place on the premises of the 
plant or in a nearby "neutral” hotel suite. In conflicts 
with high stakes, i.e., where an amount of money is involved 
which both parties consider significant, lawyers usually act 
on behalf of each side, and union and management 
representatives become expert witnesses.
The overall characteristic of grievance arbitration 
lies in its private character. Located at the plant level, 
there is a certain amount of voluntary decision-making by 
the parties in choosing their arbitrator and in complying 
with awards and the rules of a private arbitrator. 
Arbitration awards are said to have effect on management 
because they set "rules for management interpretation and 
administration of the agreement" (74) . A few points can be 
made in assessing the U.S. system of shop floor rule-making 
through grievance handling. These remarks relate to the 
adversary nature of the procedure, the quasi-judicial nature 
of arbitration, costs, delay and the nature of grievance 
arbitration, grievance tactics and enforceability of awards, 
the profession of arbitrators, the rate of grievances, and 
non-union grievance procedures.
73) Goldman 1983: 321/2.
74) Phelps 1959: 11.
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The adversary nature of the procedure.
Company grievance procedures are normally a product of 
collective bargaining of unions and management. In fact, 
they are the institutionalized version of collective 
bargaining; thus they are in many ways also characterized by 
what has been called the adversarial principle of American 
industrial relations (75). Furthermore the general
adversarial nature of American industrial relations is 
reinforced when grievance arbitration adopts judicial 
measures. Because the leading principle in American court 
hearings is also adversariness, grievance procedures and 
grievance arbitration move away from joint regulation and 
decision-making when juridification increases. However, 
unions and management are said to have a congruent interest 
in maintaining the grievance arbitration system at the same 
time that they pursue adversarial power-price positions. In 
analyzing this "dialectic" J. Barbash has blamed the 
attitude of adversariness as an excuse for not openly taking 
over responsibility: " ... arbitration serves a scapegoat
%purpose which permits both sides to acquiesce in unpopular 
but necessary decisions by blaming the arbitrator." (76)
The quasi-judicial nature of arbitration.
The increasing similarity between the arbitral and the 
judicial procedure has been criticized as unnecessary 
juridification of arbitration. However, the 'shift from 
consensus arbitration to judicial arbitration' has been 
considered an inevitable result of unionization of mass 
production industries and the subsequent inclusion of 
increasingly more detailed and specific matters of working
75) Barbash 1984: 101 "The adversarial relationship has been 
normalised through due process methods like grievance 
arbitration." See also Kochan, Katz and McKersie 1986: 
84.
76) Ibid: 95.
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conditions in collective bargaining agreements (77). Since 
the end of WW II arbitration awards have been systematically 
collected and published, first by the 'Bureau of National 
Affairs' and later by the 'Commerce Clearing House'. From 
these publications a form of precedent and stare decisions 
have evolved which are comparable to their counterparts in 
the ordinary judiciary (78). In addition, judicial 
arbitration is characterized by the fact that the procedure 
of the arbitration hearing is increasingly governed by due 
process considerations.
The adversary and quasi-judicial structure of grievance 
arbitration requires skills on both sides to master the 
formalities. Knowledge of the procedural requirements, as 
well as the substantive rights under the collective 
agreement, are essential. In addition grievance
representatives must be familiar with previous arbitration 
awards. Thus professionalization and specialization on both 
sides is almost inevitable.
The involvement of professional lawyers fosters the 
trend towards quasi-judicial proceedings: "exhibits” are
presented, witnesses are cross-examined, and opening and 
closing statements on the case are made. The function of 
the arbitrator also becomes quasi-judicial. He conducts the 
hearing like an American judge, i.e. listening and 
supervising the procedure through granting objections, 
controlling the written record and taking oaths. 
Arbitrators rarely "lead" the case; this is left to the 
legal representatives or the parties themselves. The
participants adhere to the adversary principle which also 
governs normal judicial proceedings. There may be plant 
visits by the arbitrator, but arbitrators usually are not
77) Prasow and Peters 1983: 13-15.
78) The major selection of published arbitration awards are
Labor Arbitration Reports, published by the Bureau of
National Affairs, and the American Labor Arbitration
Awards, published by a private publishing house
(Prentice-Hall).
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informed about any details of the case before the hearing. 
"For this reason, ad hoc arbitrators almost never undertake 
to mediate a case." (79) The lawyers occasionally are 
permitted to send posthearing briefs to the arbitrators, "to 
clear some points of evidence". This seems an effective 
instrument to influence the award.
Costs, delays and the nature of grievance arbitration.
There is widespread concern about costs and delays in 
the grievance procedure and in arbitration. J. Zalusky 
reported that the average time required to process a case 
through arbitration in 1975 was 223 days (= 7 and 1/2
months) (80). St. Antoine reports in 1984 that "a normal 
case with a one-day hearing costs a union $ 2,200;
management will usually pay more" (81). Attempts to reduce 
costs and delays often aim at an increase in informalism. 
Programs for oral resolution of grievances have been 
developed; the introduction of time limits are designed to 
reduce delays at various steps of the procedure; and a 
procedure known as "expedited arbitration" aims at speeding 
up the process (82).
As a process of dispute handling, grievance arbitration 
is more than impartial adjudication. James Kuhn has argued 
that the procedures themselves, i.e., the meetings and 
hearings, may be as important to the employees as "impartial 
grievance judgments": "... these procedures both give the
workers an opportunity to express themselves and also 
require the directors of their work to hear and to consider 
their problems seriously." (83)
79) Aaron 1985: 346.
80) Zalusky 1976: 1.
81) St. Antoine 1984: 268.
82) Kochan 1980: 398.
83) Kuhn 1961: 23.
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Grievance tactics and enforceability of awards.
When industrial relations managers and special union 
grievance representatives control grievance handling, they 
often develop their own strategies and tactics. As a result 
of the control of grievance representatives over grievance 
handling, phenomena such as the "stock-piling" of grievances 
occur (84) . The logic behind this tactic is that union 
grievance representatives often assume that the overall 
success of grievances increase when uniohs appear strong. 
And their bargaining power is believed to be stronger when 
they can represent a group of grievances at the same time. 
This tactic can work to the detriment of the individual 
employee who is interested in fair representation and speedy 
conflict resolution of the single case. From an individual 
rights perspective, maintenance of long-term relations with 
management creates a barrier to the enforcement of the 
rights of individual employees. Thus, although the system 
depends on the support of the collective parties, a 
differentiation in the handling of individual and collective 
conflicts seems necessary.
A strength of this grievance arbitration is without 
doubt the easy enforceability of awards. A grievant found 
to have been unjustly dismissed is almost always reinstated 
with back pay and without loss of seniority rights, as 
empirical studies have shown (85). Based on this fact, 
Getman (86) favours American-style arbitration over labour 
courts because it enhances in general the acceptance of 
awards, and conflicts are more often finally solved. This 
view is not shared by all participants. Judge Hays has 
strongly favoured a reform in the direction of full-blown 
labour courts. His concerns lie with due process rights and 
visibility of the conflict in a public forum (87).
84) Kochan, Katz and McKersie 1986: 85.
85) Holly 1957 and Adams 1978.
86) Getman 1979: 920ff.
87) Hays 1966.
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The profession of arbitrators.
Most arbitrators lack formal industrial relations 
experience; they tend to be established academics in law or 
economics or practicing lawyers of repute (88). The 
recruitment of young arbitrators creates special problems, 
since the voluntary nature of the negative selection process 
of ad hoc arbitrators favours 'mainline arbitrators' (89) . 
This system offers no clear career pattern for newcomers. 
It erects several barriers to inexperienced arbitrators 
being selected by the normally reluctant parties. Thus most 
arbitrators remain so-called 'fringe arbitrators'. "It is 
estimated that 90 per cent of today's cases are being heard 
by 10 per cent of the available arbitrators." (90)
The arbitrators try to improve their status as a group. 
They have organized in a rather elitist association, the
National__Academy of__Arbitrators. Membership in this
organization is gained only through invitation. The academy 
has jointly promulgated with FMCS and AAA a "Code of 
Professional Responsibilities for Arbitrators of Labor- 
Management Disputes" (91).
The rate of grievances.
The kind of cases that may be handled in the American 
grievance procedure are in principle defined by the 
collective bargaining agreement. The agreement often 
contains a clause on the scope of acceptable grievances. 
However, the practise of grievance handling depends only 
indirectly on the written agreement. Often grievances are 
accepted in the procedure which are only vaguely related to 
the collective bargaining agreement (92).
88) Getman 1979: 930.
89) Prasow and Peters 1983: 352-361.
90) St. Antoine 1984: 269.
91) Goldman 1983: 325.
92) Elkouri and Elkouri 1973: 114-117.
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Industrial relations research offers some insight for 
an explanation of the rate of grievances, i.e. the number of 
claims "transformed" into grievances and the reasons for 
initiating grievances. This research indicates, for 
example, that a high rate of change in technology increases 
the rate of grievances (93). Other research emphasizes that 
collective bargaining which is related to "fractional" or 
informal bargaining with the supervisor to modify or ignore 
provisions of the agreement is continued in grievance 
procedures (94).
To what extent the use of grievance procedures has a 
negative effect on productivity is a standard topic in 
labour economics and industrial relations research. Some 
argue, on the basis of a relatively small number of case 
studies, that high grievance rates have a negative effect on 
productivity (95); other researchers insist that a zero rate 
of grievances also has negative effects and is less than 
optimal for productivity (96).
Non-union grievance procedures.
Grievance procedures are no longer characteristic only 
of unionized companies. Institutionalized conflict
resolution can also be found in so-called "alternative 
nonunion human resource management systems". Kochan et al. 
consider these systems to be leading "pattern setters" and 
more innovative than collectively bargained systems (97) . 
Indeed, new types of consultation are related to new forms 
of bargaining, among which so-called "concession" 
bargaining, in which unions agree to lower wages in order to 
save jobs becomes possible.
93) Kuhn 1961: 44/45. Peach and Livernash 1974 and
Slichter,
94) Kochan 1980: 391-394.
95) Freeman and Medoff 1984: 76-9; Katz, Kochan and Keefe 
1988: Ichniowski 1986.
96) Kleiner, Nickelsburg and Pilarski 1989.
97) Kochan, McKersie and Katz 1984, 6ff. and 1986: 93-108.
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Great Britain
Three basic three types of individual grievance 
processing exist in Britain which are related to different 
types of procedures: negotiation in dispute procedures at
the company level; conciliation efforts by a separate 
agency (ACAS); and adjudication by industrial tribunals. In 
this section company dispute procedures and ACAS 
conciliation are discussed; industrial tribunals are 
introduced in the chapter on labour courts.
Company dispute procedures
Company dispute procedures are both an old and a new 
phenomenon in British industrial relations. They are old 
because dispute procedures date back to the last century 
when collective bargaining was introduced. And they are new 
because many companies have introduced dispute procedures 
for the first time only in the 1970s and 1980s.
Britain has basically two forms of company dispute 
procedures. The first type is linked to shop steward 
activities and pay bargaining at the plant or company level. 
The second type is basically the requirement for employers 
to follow certain procedural steps in taking disciplinary or 
dismissal actions against employees.
The first type is related to the voluntarist tradition 
of joint regulations of job issues between unions and 
employers. Voluntarism resulted in a scattered picture and 
left several areas in British industrial relations 
unregulated. Indeed, workplace industrial relations were 
not generally covered by voluntary dispute procedures (98) . 
Medium-sized and small-sized companies were largely exempted 
from independent shop floor regulation. Even in larger
98) See Anderman 1971.
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companies the formal system of procedures, usually 
established at industry level, was counterbalanced by an 
informal system at the company level. Nevertheless, the 
tradition of consultation and collective communication in 
joint procedures or committees at the workplace and at 
higher levels has been continuously supported during the 
1970s and 1980s by statutory labour law. In 1984 joint 
consultative committees were established in 34 per cent of 
the manufacturing companies (99).
Hugh Clegg, a major advocate of the voluntarist system 
and a prominent member of the Donovan Commission, calls 
voluntary dispute procedures "a service which employers' 
associations provide for their members" (100). He argues 
from the fact that the "old" dispute procedures were related 
to British collective bargaining conducted at the regional 
or industry level. Industry collective agreements encounter 
special application or "interpretation" problems with 
respect to a particular plant or company. These
"interpretation conflicts" (101) were formerly handled in 
joint committees established by the collective agreement. 
Industrial relations research has described the limited role 
of this service of employers' associations to their members. 
Particular attention was given to a critical assessment of 
the engineering dispute procedure (102).
According to the Donovan Commission these joint 
procedures created the formal system which was undermined by 
the informal system of domestic disputes arising within 
factories. Domestic disputes often involved shop stewards 
who were and are called the "motor" of workplace industrial
99) Millward and Stevens 1984: 138.
100) Clegg 1979: 84.
101) Clegg distinguishes interpretation conflicts from 
"domestic conflicts" at plant level.
102) Clegg 1979: 89 mentions that "no other procedure in
Britain has come in for anything like the volume of 
criticism which was directed at the former engineering 
procedure". See for example the criticism of Hyman 
1972.
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relations in Britain (103). Shop stewards traditionally 
represent a certain work group unequivocally. They are 
organizationally and ideologically relatively independent of 
the official trade union movement and they develop 
relationships with lower level management, i.e. foremen and 
supervisors, and engage in wage-bargaining. However, shop 
stewards are no longer outside the formal system. A survey 
conducted in 1978 found that they Hare no longer divorced 
from formal negotiating arrangements in the way that the 
Donovan Commission had criticized. The formal arrangements 
have in the main been adapted to include them and the 
concomitant rise of single-employer bargaining has 
increasingly made stewards into the principal negotiators 
and guarantors of clear-cut factory agreements and 
procedures." (104).
A system of "piecework bargaining" (105) evolved at the*
plant level, and shop stewards have become procedurally
involved in grievance handling over the years. Terry, 
predicting an increase of informalism through the imposition 
of formal procedures at the plant level in the middle of the 
1970s (106), convincingly argues that the motor for joint
regulation of job issues was not so much willingness or
unwillingness on the side of the shop stewards but
managerial strategies of incorporation (107).
The Donovan report found the main "root of evil" in 
Britain in 1968 to be unofficial strikes at the plant level 
which resulted both from the non-binding legal character of 
collective bargaining agreements and from the "absence of 
speedy, clear and effective disputes procedures" (108), 
especially for dismissal and disciplinary issues. Thus the
103) Terry 1983.
104) Brown 1981: 79.
105) Brown 1973.
106) Terry 1977.
107) See Terry 1983: 85-91. See also McCarthy 1966: 27-29; 
Clegg 1979: 235.
108) Donovan Report 1968, par. 475, p. 127/8.
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report proposed to introduce such procedures with government 
support and placed high hopes in the recovery of British 
industrial relations through an introduction of procedures.
However, the type of procedure adopted by the Donovan 
Commission, and the employment policies following the 
Commission's proposals, differ significantly from joint 
procedures. The policy and the new legislation after 
Donovan were mainly concerned with protection of the 
employees from arbitrary employer decisions. A major 
instrument was the issuing of a Code of Practice in 1971 
urging employers to formalize procedures. The Code of 
Practise was revised and enlarged in 1977 by the government 
institution, "Advisory, Conciliation, and Arbitration 
Service" (ACAS), which was created among other reasons, to 
facilitate the implementation of procedures at the company 
level.
ACAS developed as an institution out of the activities 
performed by the Department of Employment. According to the 
recommendations of the Donovan Commission in 1968, the 
Department of Employment engaged and trained several 
officers in order to achieve conciliated settlements. ACAS 
officers are civil servants. They work in offices in 
Scotland, Wales, seven English regions, and in the London 
head office. "The staff of ACAS are part of the 'DE group'. 
Consequently their career progression is not simply within 
ACAS" (109). They might be transferred to the Manpower 
Services Commission or the DE itself.
ACAS is organizationally independent of the British 
labour judiciary. Along with its dispute resolution 
function ACAS performs several other functions which are 
aimed at improving industrial relations. ACAS offers third 
party intervention through advice on workplace industrial
109) Dickens 1987: 111.
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relations and conciliation, mediation or arbitration of 
collective conflicts.
In this respect ACAS has been quite successful. 
Industrial relations research discovered that over a period 
of twenty years procedures for disputes about dismissal or 
discipline grew in extent from less than 20 per cent to 90 
per cent of the manufacturing companies (110).
The 1984 survey by Mi 11 ward and Stevens shows that 90 
per cent of all establishments of the survey had reported 
the existence of dismissal and disciplinary procedures. In 
addition, 68 per cent reported procedures for dealing with 
collective disputes on pay and conditions and 86 per cent 
reported the existence of individual grievance procedures. 
Even private establishments with less than 50 employees 
reported in 1984 a rate of 82 per cent existence of a 
dismissal and dispute procedure (111).
These British grievance procedures are not so much a 
product of voluntary industrial relations but rather were 
established unilaterally by management after the issuing of 
the mentioned "Code of Practice" by the Department of 
Employment and by ACAS. "...there was a surprisingly high 
proportion of (union, R.R.) officials who reported little or 
no negotiation over the introduction of the procedures, with 
a third implying that impositions following either no or 
minimal consultation was the norm in their sector." (112)
The form and magnitude of dispute procedures vary with 
the size of the company. "In relatively small unionized 
plants, there may be nothing beyond occasional meetings 
between the manager and one or two stewards. At the other 
end of the scale, some large plants have negotiating bodies,
110) See Dickens et al. 1985: 235, Table 8.2. and Millward 
and Stevens 1986: 170, Table 7.1.
111) Millward and Stevens 1986: 170, Table 7.1 and 1972,
Table 7.2.
112) Evans et al. 1985: 96.
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dispute procedures, consultative committees, sub-committees, 
ad hoc committees, joint shop stewards' committees, and shop 
stewards negotiating committees which rival the arrangements 
of some major companies in their number and in their calls 
on manpower.” (113) The Code is not mandatory and thus does 
not replace dispute procedures established through 
collective agreements.
The ACAS "Code of Practise 1: Disciplinary practice and 
procedures in employment" (114) outlines the following steps 
of the procedure:
Formal oral warning in the case of minor offences, 
written warning in more serious cases setting out the 
nature of the offence and the likely consequences of 
further offences. In either case the individual should 
be advised that the warning constitutes the first 
formal stage of the procedure.
Final written warning which contains a statement on the 
likelihood of the disciplinary action or dismissal 
which, however, still allows time for improvement.
The individual who is going to be disciplined or 
dismissed is given the opportunity to state his or her 
case.
The individual is advised of his rights under the 
procedure, including the right to be accompanied by a 
representative.
Once the final step is taken, i.e. a disciplinary 
action or dismissal, the individual should have the 
right to appeal to a higher level of management or 
appeals body.
ACAS has been criticized for failing to outline a 
complete procedure and for using rather vague terms. The 
Code is allegedly tentative in nature (115). Indeed, there 
is no indication that the Code, which is especially designed 
as a guide for small and medium-sized establishments, will 
enhance joint decision-making with worker representatives.
113) Clegg 1979: 230. See also the data on dismissal
proceedings in five British plants in Marsh et al. 1981: 
140/1.
114) ACAS 1977; a proposed revision of the Code by ACAS was 
blocked by the government in 1987 because small 
employers found the revised Code "too formalistic”.
115) Wood, Hepple and Johnston 1987: 208.
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The Code is not an instrument for promoting industrial 
democracy.
Although employers are not obliged to adopt the ACAS 
procedure, there is pressure on them to implement and follow 
the procedure of the Code. Its impact is felt indirectly. 
A failure to implement and follow the rules of the Code of 
Practise is feared by employers because it can be used as 
evidence in matters upon which the employer has been called 
to account. This is most notable in dismissal cases which 
reach the stage of a hearing before the industrial tribunal. 
In the early 1970s the industrial tribunals, supported by 
the House of Lords (116), interpreted the reasonableness of 
a dismissal, i.e. the second legal test after looking into 
the reasons for the dismissal, by alluding to procedural 
fairness. A dismissal was automatically considered unfair 
if the employer did not follow the dispute procedure. This 
decision-making practise was criticized by small employers 
as formalistic. Subsequently the decision-making of the 
industrial tribunals was corrected and a standard was 
developed to forgive "procedural unfairness", i.e. not 
following the ACAS procedure, in cases in which the employee 
"on the balance of probabilities would have been dismissed 
anyway" (117). However, the ACAS procedure was reinforced 
by Polkev v. Davton (118) which overruled British Labour 
Pump (119).
Research on the "government of the work place" is 
divided. Strong words have been used to criticize an 
alleged British industrial disorder which is said to be 
caused by fractional bargaining leading to a cpnstant
116) Oevis & Sons Ltd. v. Atkins [1977] IRCR 314.
117) Wedderburn 1986: 240 commenting on the leading EAT case 
of British Labour Pump. See also Anderman 1986: 422-4; 
Dickens et al. 1985: 102/3 and Elias 1981.
118) Polkey v. Dayton Services Ltd [1988] AC 344, [1988] ICR
142.
119) British Labour Pump Ltd. v. Byrne [1979] ICR 347, 
[1979] IRLR 94
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breakdown in the pay system because strong union competition 
has "spiralled out of control in a war of all against all" 
(120).
The Conservative governments of the 1980s and the early 
1990s view employment protection and labour law measures in 
general rather as burdens on business. They are no longer 
seen as necessary devices for the attainment of industrial 
justice. The two Government White Papers "Lifting the 
Burden" (121) and "Building Business ... not Barriers" (122) 
and the Government sponsored Research Paper "Burdens on 
Business" (123) express this view. Procedures are evaluated 
according to "deregulatory" parameters if they "promote 
enterprise and job creation in growth areas such as small 
firms, self-employment and tourism". Although the era of 
proceduralism appears to be over, it seems nevertheless 
highly unlikely that the procedures introduced in the 1970s 
will be abolished again.
ACAS conciliation
If internal grievance procedures fail, the official 
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) can be 
invoked to handle cases of individual conciliation as well 
as collective conciliation, arbitration, mediation and 
investigation cases (124). It is appropriate to include 
information on these official conciliation attempts in our 
comparison of company grievance procedures not only because 
ACAS officers are supposed to contact the parties in 
dismissal and other individual cases "at the workplace".
It is also justified because ACAS is increasingly 
instrumentalized directly by the employers. In 1987 almost
120) Maitland 1983: 47.
121) Cmnd. 9571.
122) Cmnd. 9794.
123) HMSO 1985.
124) See Dickens 1987
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a third of all ACAS applications (32 per cent) for 
individual conciliation were referred to ACAS directly by 
employers who are about to dismiss one or more of their 
employees, but who wish to do so on agreed terms which will 
preclude any subsequent tribunal complaint (125). In these 
cases the industrial tribunals were not invoked. However, 
even in regular applications with the industrial tribunals 
the contact with ACAS officers forms a direct part of the 
dispute resolution process at the company level if the 
employee wishes to continue to work while the dismissal or 
disciplinary action is processed in the industrial tribunal 
system.
Individual conciliation creates the largest component 
of the ACAS caseload. In 1986 ACAS' individual conciliation 
officers assisted in 51,431 cases and in 1987 in 40,817
(126). In these cases ACAS officers act independently in 
their settlement attempts. Individual conciliation by an 
ACAS officer is automatically initiated by filing a
dismissal or other suit with the Central Office of the 
Industrial Tribunals (COIT). This London office will send 
copies of the application to both the regional industrial 
tribunal and the regional ACAS office. ACAS then has about 
six to ten weeks time to settle the case (127).
Within the regional ACAS office the case is assigned to
an individual conciliator who under normal circumstances 
immediately contacts the parties by phone and arranges 
visits if this seems appropriate. Conciliators mentioned in 
conversations with the author that they, are rather unhappy 
about increasing legal representation of the parties during 
conciliation. It prevents open discussions about the causes 
of the dispute and possible alternatives to a hearing or a 
money settlement in agreeable terms. Thus conciliators 
prefer to talk to the disputants personally.
125) ACAS 1988: 55 and Table 18.
126) ACAS 1987: 81.
127) Wood, Hepple, and Johnston 1987: 205.
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The parties are independently contacted by the 
conciliation officer. As a matter of convenience the
officer might start with contacting the defendant and ask 
him.about the possibility of a settlement. It is rare that
a party has absolutely clear ideas about possible
settlements. In his back and forth reporting of the 
proposals, the officer is sometimes clearly setting aside 
the role of the impartial conciliator. If the parties
insist he might inform them about published average 
compensation awards. The line between general information 
and settlement proposals however becomes rather thin in such 
moments.
The general attitude is that ACAS conciliation is a 
means of facilitating autonomous decision-making between the 
parties at dispute rather than as state intervention. ACAS 
considers itself as part of the ’helping business" (128) . 
ACAS can be characterized as an intermediate institution 
which organizationally reflects a compromise between self­
regulation in industrial relations and the policy goals of 
the welfare state to provide social protection.
ACAS has encountered 'misunderstandings' with respect 
to its role in individual conciliation:
" ... there has been evidence over the years that the ACAS 
role in individual conciliation is sometimes misunderstood. 
It is not the individual conciliator's responsibility to 
advance the interests of either party. He must be impartial 
in his^attempts to promote a voluntary settlement." (129)
The ACAS administration makes several attempts to fight 
these misunderstandings. It has produced a number of
128) The helping attitude of ACAS became apparent to me by 
phoning the Regional Office in Birmingham during my 
investigations. The telephone operator ("Aicass, may I 
help you") sounded like a nurse who tries to convince 
you that there is a way to relieve you of your problem 
without harm.
129) ACAS 1983: 37, para. 4.2..
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booklets to be distributed by the conciliation officer to 
the parties at conflict before conciliation starts; these 
booklets try to explain the impartiality and neutrality of 
conciliators in a non-technical language.
The contact of the parties by ACAS officers is 
perceived unavoidably as a form of state intervention and 
the activity of ACAS officers raises hopes for solutions in 
a muddled situation. However, the ACAS officer also has 
social responsibilities. The ACAS Annual Report stresses 
the responsibility of the ACAS officer to explain to the 
complainant that he <or she relinquishes the right to pursue 
a claim by industrial tribunal by signing an ACAS 
conciliated settlement (130).
Although the British system has already developed an 
impressive system of procedures, the demand for procedural 
differentiation continues. A discussion has recently 
started that arbitration "below" industrial tribunals should 
be installed to relieve the judicial bodies of cases which 
deserve less formalistic or legalistic treatment (131). So 
far this idea has not found much acclamation (132). Another 
discussion suggests that proposals be made to advance 
industrial tribunals into labour courts (133). It is 
predicted that the political resistance of the government
and the opposition of the legal and economic professions
will be too strong to allow further autonomisation of the
labour law through full-blown labour courts (134).
British industrial relations research emphasizes that 
the introduction of the industrial tribunal system has not 
replaced but stimulated reform of voluntary procedures 
(135). Official British labour dispute resolution
130) Ibid: 37/8, para. 4.4..
131) Dickens et al. 1985, ch. 9.
132) Justice 1988.
133) Wedderburn 1987: 26.
134) Hepple 1988: 19-21.
135) Dickens 1985: 232-252.
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mechanisms are designed to foster collective bargaining and 
voluntary grievance procedures. This interplay of judicial 
decision-making and industrial relations procedures in Great 
Britain can be called a reflexive social and industrial 
relations policy approach. The idea of reflexive social
policy emphasizes a retreat from state interventionism when
societal self-regulation is possible. Moreover if the state 
intervenes, it is rather with procedure than with
substantive policy prescriptions. Britain seems to have 
found over the years such a reflexive balance after some 
negative experience with procedurally unsatisfactory 
voluntarism on the one hand and repressive state
intervention during the period of the Industrial Relations 
Act on the other.
Germany
Germany represents the most advanced case of a company 
constitution independent of collective bargaining between 
unions and employer associations. The core idea of the 
company constitution is co-determination of company affairs 
between elected employee representatives and management. 
Labour grievance handling in Germany is tied to the 
structure of co-determination at the enterprise level. Co­
determination occurs on two levels in the enterprise, i.e. 
at the control level in the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) 
and at the shopfloor in form of participation of the works 
council (Betriebsrat) in certain areas of company decision­
making.
The function of the supervisory board is to control the 
board of directors, i.e. management. The employee 
representatives share almost a parity of seats with the 
owners (shareholders) of the company in this board. Co­
determination in supervisory boards was first introduced in
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Germany immediately after WWII in the coal and steel 
industry. The employers in these industries offered the 
unions half of the seats in the supervisory board and, in 
addition,^ the position of a "labour director" 
(Arbeitsdirektor) in the Board of Directors in order to 
avoid nationalization of their industries as demanded by the 
unions and the socialist movement at that time. In 1976 
this model was introduced in all German companies with more 
than two thousand employees in which elected representatives 
of the employees occupy almost half of the seats in the 
supervisory board (136).
Co-determination at the shopfloor is carried out by the 
works councils (Betriebsräte) which are statutorily 
protected under the Works Constitution Act 
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz). Works councils are elected by 
the employees of the enterprise for three years. There must 
be at least five employees in the enterprise or firm to 
elect one works councillor. This threshold exempts very 
small firms from co-determination. The number of works 
councillors reaches 5 in establishments with more than 20 
employees. The number of councillors increases with the 
size of the company, there being 31 councillors in 
enterprises with more than 7,000 employees. In enterprises 
employing more than 9,000, two additional works councillors 
can be elected for each 2,000 employees (137). In 
enterprises with more than 300 employees one member of the 
works council is released from other work for full-time 
works council activity. The number of those occupied full-♦
time in the works council rises to 11 in enterprises with 
more than 9,000 employees (138). In a group of companies 
the Works Constitution Act provides for a conglomerate works 
council-.
136) Mitbestimmungsgesetz of 1976.
137) Sec. 9 of the Works Constitution Act.
138) Sec. 36 of the Works Constitution Act.
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Since more than 80 per cent of the works council 
members in Germany are union members (139) unions actually 
control the works councils; however, works councils are not 
union bodies. Works councils represent not only union 
members but all employees of the enterprise. They lack the 
right to call a strike or other collective action.
Unions are represented at the enterprise level by 
bodies of so-called 'men and women of confidence' 
(Vertrauensleute). The function of these union sections is 
not defined by statute; it is left to the unions to define 
the tasks of their sections in the enterprises by internal 
union regulations (140). There is a special relationship 
between the union sections and the works council. Unions 
have the right "to activate, to advise and to control" the 
works council (141). This dual system of worker
representation is seen as beneficial for unions because it 
releases unions from the responsibility of having to fight 
for recognition (142) and from having to be fully alert and 
prepared to go on strike for the purpose of solving ad hoc 
conflicts over "small and smallest issues" (143). Research 
has found different types of relationships between works 
councils and union sections which influence the 
participation of works council and management (144).
Works councillors enjoy special employment protection. 
They can only be dismissed for serious reasons (wichtiaer 
Grund) and with the consent of the works council. If the 
works council refuses to agree to the dismissal of one of 
its members, the employer has to obtain the consent of the 
labour court before he can dismiss the works councillor 
(145). Former works councillors enjoy this special
139) Däubler 1985: 377.
140) Ibid: 529.
141) Ibid: 381-7.
142) Streeck 1979 and 1981.
143) Kittner and Breinlinger 1981: 63/4.
144) Kotthoff 1981.
145) Sec. 103 of the Works Constitution Act.
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dismissal protection for one year after the end of their 
term (146).
Participation of the works council is granted at three 
levels. First, works councils have full co-determination 
rights in social matters, including questions concerning 
enterprise work rules, working time arrangements, vacation 
plans, safety and health at the work place, the introduction 
and administration of social facilities and wage methods in 
the enterprise. Secondly, in economic questions the 
employer is only required to inform the works council. In 
case of a planned restructuring of the company which would 
have negative effects on the work force, management and the 
works council are required to enter a social plan which 
documents the settlement of interests (147).
And thirdly, works councils have participation rights 
in personnel matters. They have to be consulted or heard 
before any dismissal is carried out. But works councils do 
not have full co-determination rights in personnel matters. 
The Works Constitution Act provides for two possible 
reactions in cases of dismissal: the works council can
either oppose or remain silent (148). If the works council 
does not respond within a week after notification by 
management the consent of the works council is then 
stipulated by law.
Recent research shows that the works councils in a 
majority of dismissal cases do not adequately utilize their 
limited participation rights. They neither oppose nor
*
remain silent but actively support dismissals (149). This 
behaviour and attitude of works councils in dismissal 
situations can partly be explained by a flaw in the law. 
The opposition of the works council has no direct effect on
146) Sec. 15 of the Dismissal Protection Act.
147) Sec. Ill, 112, and 113 of the Works Constitution Act.
148) Sec. 102 of the Works Constitution Act.
149) Hôland 1985: 97-183, and especially Tab. 4 on p. 87.
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the dismissal decision; it cannot prevent management from 
pursuing the dismissal. The opposing statement of the works 
council must be attached to the written dismissal notice, 
which is handed to the dismissed employee, and may 
eventually influence the decision of the labour court in 
favour of the dismissed employee. The employee has to 
invoke the labour court in any case regardless of whether 
the works council has opposed or supported the dismissal. 
The joint search for alternative employment at the shop 
floor level in this co-determination structure is often not 
as rigorous as it might be. Occasionally it has been argued 
that settlement of a dismissal conflict at company level is 
given up too early in the German system because of a lack of 
formal procedures (150).
It would be possible to use the existing procedures and 
develop them into an effective system of employment 
protection at company level. In particular the procedure 
for resolving conflicts between the works council and 
management over the application and interpretation of 
company agreements could be used to handle individual 
grievances. The company constitution law provides for an 
arbitration committee (Einiounqsstelle) which is located at 
company level and forms part of the participatory decision­
making and collective bargaining at the plant level. It has 
a tripartite structure and the "neutral chairman" (151) of 
the arbitration committee is an active labour court judge. 
Judicial review of decisions of the arbitration committee is 
restricted to questions of the arbitral powers of the 
members of the committee (152).
However, the arbitration committee is so far 
deliberately not used to handle individual employment 
conflicts. It has to be said that, although the legal and 
actual co-determination rights of workers' representatives
150) See Simitis 1978.
151) Sec. 76 (2) of the Works Constitution Act.
152) Gaul 1980: 294; DSubler 1985: 426.
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in social, economic and personnel matters are impressive 
(153), German law does not provide effective procedures to 
guarantee the unequivocal and fair representation of the 
grievants and employees threatened with a dismissal. It is 
possible to analyze the ambivalent logic of collective 
action. The thesis put forward here is that there exists a 
structural reason for the works council to engage in trade­
offs which is related to the German co-determination system. 
Participation rights are exercised by employee 
representatives in order to obtain a conciliatory attitude 
on the part of management in economic and social matters, in 
return for a conciliatory attitude on the part of the works 
council in personnel matters. Works councils must be 
interested in maintaining a good relationship with 
management because they want to become involved in the 
important questions of economic decision-making. The works 
councils think they will benefit from inactivity in 
personnel matters in the long run by gaining an influence on 
decision-making on economic matters.
Moreover, the dismissal of individual employees for 
reasons of misconduct is often demanded by their colleagues. 
In these cases the dismissed employees are considered 
outsiders, belonging to the fringe of the work force in the 
enterprise, whereas their hostile colleagues form the core 
%of the work force. And this core creates the electorate for 
the works councillors. Furthermore their reluctant attitude 
towards dismissal processing rests on a belief that works 
councils are relieved from looking into dismissal issues 
because the dismissed can get adequate redress from the 
labour courts (154).
Disciplinary issues are dealt with separately from 
dismissal cases in Germany. The operation of company
153) On German co-determination see SScker 1981 and 
Runggaldier 1983.
154) On the efects of dismissal law on workplace industrial 
relations in general see Russig 1983 and Rosenbaum 1981.
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disciplinary procedures (Betriebsiustizl also forms part of 
the German co-determination system. Company penal codes 
(BuBordnung) can only be introduced with the consent of the 
works council. Although the statute on works councils does 
not mention the administration of the penal code at the 
company level as a co-determination issue, the Federal 
Labour Court has explicitly enlarged the co-determination 
rights of the works council to include works councils in 
sentencing employees for misconduct (155). It has outlined 
the structure and the conditions of a disciplinary procedure 
which is summarized by the leading labour law commentator 
Schaub (156) as follows:
an enterprise penal code must exist and be made public 
to the work force of the enterprise;
the norms and the penalties must be defined concretely; 
a procedure must be offered in which due process 
concerns prevail;
the accused should be given the opportunity of a 
hearing and legal representatives should be admitted.
In disciplinary actions works councils must consent 
even to a warning which might result in a penalty. Research 
indicates that only 29 per cent of the enterprises in West 
Germany have introduced penal codes (157). Even within 
these companies the joint procedures or committees are often 
circumvented by management. Works councils are also 
reluctant to participate in these procedures if 
participation only means legitimizing the employer's 
decision (158).
Since 1972 each employee is given the right to bring 
grievances to the attention of management or the works 
council. He or she must be heard and has the right to a 
fair procedure in which he or she can adequately express the 
points of concern from a subjective point of view. It is
155) BAG AP 1 to sec. 56 BetrVG Betriebsbuße.
156) Schaub 1987, 235 F II 1 b, p. 1565.
157) Kaiser and Metzger-Pregizer 1976.
158) Däubler 1986: 344.
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left to the discretion of the works council whether or not 
to represent the grievant. There is no obligation for the 
works council to take up a grievance.
Thus there is a lack of effective procedures in the 
German case which largely has to do with the peculiar
position of works councils. The current law does not
preclude more extensive formal procedures. The parties of a 
company agreement, i.e. the works council and management, 
have the option of installing a detailed grievance procedure 
voluntarily. The parties may create a’ joint grievance
committee. Considering the above-mentioned logic of 
collective action, it comes as no surprise that Manfred
Weiss reports that no such committee is known in Germany to 
date.
"Based on available evidence, there has not been a case of a 
grievance procedure under which an arbitration committee was 
asked to decide the grievance. Neither, to my knowledge, is 
there an agreement which regulates the details of the 
grievance procedure or establishes a grievance committee. 
No data are available on the number of cases in which the 
works council was involved. There is a strong indication 
that most grievances which do not end up in a law suit, are 
settled on the shop floor between personnel management and 
the individual worker without following any formal procedure 
whatsoever." (159)
The statement by Weiss most clearly expresses the 
weakness of the German dispute procedure system with respect 
to the handling of grievances on the shop floor. There is 
room for the individual employee to engage in informal and 
direct negotiations with management. However, formal 
handling of grievances at company level is in the hands of 
works councils which have to mediate dispute processing 
along with their other functions. Thus from an early stage 
in the grievance process the grievants have to turn to 
adjudication to challenge dismissals. The consequence is 
that little effort is made at the company level to 'heal'
159) Weiss 1987: 103.
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the employment relationship which is in crisis. Once the 
employee has left the company it is hard to search for a 
solution which would secure the job, such as finding an 
alternative occupation in the company.
Concluding Remarks on Company Dispute Procedures
Company grievance or dispute procedures can be defined 
as "a system of industrial jurisprudence” by which 
management and the unions can continue collective bargaining 
and "flexibly apply the general promises of an agreement to 
specific daily incidents in the shop." (160) Functionally, 
grievance procedures are designed to keep industrial peace 
and to avoid industrial action. However procedures are also 
a means of enhancing self-regulation and co-determination at 
the workplace.
The political regulation of grievance procedure systems 
is shaped by the three concerns of: voluntarism,
proceduralism, and positive rights. These concerns have 
clearly dominated the British development. Since the 1960s, 
British industrial relations have witnessed a general shift 
from voluntarism to negotiated proceduralism (161) or 
"bargained corporatism" (162). Until the 1960s a social
consensus existed that the role of the state should be 
minimal. The voluntary system of industrial relations 
rested on voluntary collective bargaining. Co-partnership 
or notions of worker control formed no part of the 
traditional consensus (163). In the aftermath of the 1968 
Donovan report and the failure of the 1971 Industrial 
Relations Act, proceduralism replaced the voluntarist
160) Kuhn 1961: 1.
161) Prigge 1987.
162) Crouch 1982b.
163) Hepple 1986: 43.
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consensus in the 1970s. It became the new consensus in 
labour law and in industrial relations.
In general, the regulations adopted in Britain in the 
1970s praised procedures as instruments for integrating 
voluntarism and state intervention. Industrial relations 
research triumphantly presented steadily increasing coverage 
of procedures in British companies. Employers accepted the 
ACAS Code of Practise. They calculated that these 
procedures could help in keeping industrial peace. Unions 
viewed procedures as a mean of achieving formal recognition 
when they were allowed to take part in their operation. 
Proceduralism at the company level was thus supported by a 
general belief in the "management of collective bargaining" 
(164).
During the 1980s the consensus among the industrial 
relations actors on proceduralism eroded to some extent in 
Britain. The Conservative government challenged procedures 
as an unnecessary burden on business. Labour lawyers, who 
evaluate proceduralism from a legal perspective (165), also 
view procedures no longer as goals in themselves, but rather 
as instruments of implementing and enforcing statutory or 
other rights. This approach is called the "positive rights" 
view; it relates the functioning of procedures to the 
content of decision-making in procedures. From this 
perspective procedures are criticized as being ineffective 
because they lack positive rights. Thus to improve the 
outcome of procedures it is necessary to create positive 
rights. *
The positive rights approach views progress in labour 
law as a process of facilitating voluntaristic societal 
self-regulation first by procedures and then by positive 
rights. Positive rights enlarge the labour law and in fact 
are the center of an autonomous labour law system.
164) Sisson 1987, ch. 5.
165) See only Hepple 1983.
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Grievance procedures therefore form part of the overall 
machinery of enforcing rights. Grievance procedures as part 
of the system of dispute resolution are recognized by ACAS 
and industrial tribunals. It is a functional division of 
labour between the different procedures which guarantees the 
enforcement of rights.
The elements of voluntarism, proceduralism, and 
positive rights can be found in particular constellation in 
the three other countries under comparison. The U.S. system 
has experience with voluntarism and proceduralism in an 
industrial pluralist framework but has not yet reached the 
stage of introducing positive rights through statutes which 
apply to all employees. Germany does not lack procedures 
and rights at the company level but removes dismissal cases 
at an early stage in the conflict resolution process as not 
being a further subject of the co-determined self-regulation 
of the workplace. Similarly there is an early reliance in 
France on external state intervention through administrators 
or the labour courts as a result of weak representative 
bodies and union competition at the company level.
The result of our comparative overview in political 
terms is that Germany and France need greater emphasis on 
self-regulation by procedure whereas the U.S. needs positive 
rights for the work force as a whole. In Britain there is a 
danger that the potential of proceduralism for joint 
regulation of the workplace will be undermined by market 
philosophies demanding more management prerogatives,* the 
industrial tribunals have unfortunately retreated from 
considerations of procedural fairness in judging the 
employer behaviour in the dismissal situation.
211
CHAPTER IV
LABOUR COURTS
A systems theoretical socio-legal understanding of 
labour courts requires a distinction of levels of analysis 
with respect to system references. At least four levels can 
be distinguished. There is the level of the political 
system, on which the historical processes surrounding the 
establishment of institutions for labour conflict 
resolution, and the enforcement of governmental industrial 
policies which regulate industrial relations through 
statutory intervention are analyzed. Then there is the 
judicial system, in which the relationship between labour 
courts and other parts of the judicial system is an 
important issue. With respect to the industrial relations 
system both the impact and the instrumentalization of labour 
courts can be analyzed. And, lastly, with respect to the 
systems of labour courts themselves internal factors related 
to the organization of labour courts have to be considered.
The distinction of system references, i.e., the 
political system, the industrial relations system, the legal 
system and the labour court system is especially important 
for comparative analysis. Comparative labour law rightly 
claims that a proper comparison of labour conflict 
resolution systems cannot be confined to organization 
aspects (1). However, a proper definition of the function of 
labour judiciaries can also not be confined to an analysis 
of the industrial relations context alone (2) . It has to 
integrate the studies of the external relations and of the 
internal structures and processes based on a collection of 
institutional data in a functional comparative analysis of
labour conflict institutions.
_________ i____________
1) See Blanpain 1985, referring to Schregle 1979.
2) As Schregle 1981: 27 seems to suggest.
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A systems theoretical perspective on judicial 
institutions places special emphasis on their degrees of 
autonomy. In this perspective the "function" of labour 
courts is not only defined by the industrial relations 
context, but rather a result of both societal definition and 
of self-definition processes of the judicial institutions 
themselves. Labour courts are located in the legal system. 
They have to be understood as legal institutions which 
reflect the self-regulation of the legal system in the area 
of labour law. Labour courts are an organizational response 
inside the legal system to the demands for regulation of 
industrial relations and employment relationships.
Labour Courts and the Judicial System
Labour courts form part of the judicial system in 
general. In fact they are the expression of certain trends 
in the development of national judicial systems. These 
processes can be described as internal differentiation. 
Modern litigation theory has been studying differentiation 
processes of the judicial system for some time. It has 
provided evidence on trends and developments in legal 
procedure.
In general such internal procedural differentiation of 
judicial systems follows after a certain external 
differentiation from the political system. Niklas Luhmann 
has described the development of the autonomy of the legal 
system as differentiation of the judicial system from the 
legislature which is accompanied by the creation of separate 
judicial procedures. In this process the legislation 
becomes responsible for the establishment of programs and 
the judiciary for the application of programs (3). 
Differentiation characterizes the further development of
3) See Luhmann 1981, ch. 2 and 1983: 234-242.
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judicial systems. It continues inside the judicial system 
as specialization and innovation in procedural forms. 
Procedural differentiation of the judicial system occurs 
thereby in two basic ways:
the creation of special courts and tribunals and new 
buffer institutions with quasi-judicial and informal 
procedures external to, but under the surveillance of, 
the judicial system;
new procedures and procedural innovations within 
judicial and administrative institutions (4).
Special Courts and Prehearing Proceedings
Procedural differentiation of the judicial system is 
evident in the development of Continental European civil law 
systems as well as in American and Anglo-Saxon common law 
systems. "Pre-trial" proceedings, ranging from formal court- 
annexed conciliation or arbitration proceedings to informal 
clarifying meetings with the presiding judge, such as plea 
bargaining or pre-hearing assessment, indicate similar 
trends of differentiation worldwide. These trends constitute 
a differentiation of procedures in the front-yards of the 
general courts and are sometimes called alternatives within 
the judiciary (5).
In addition differentiation is also present in the form 
of special courts or tribunals. These are composed of 
either new types of judiciaries like tribunals and small 
claims courts or attempts to revive traditional institutions 
such as the neighbourhood arbitrator (6).
4) See Blankenburg and Rogowski 1983: 134-140.
5) See Blankenburg, Gottwald, Strempel 1982 and Blankenburg,
Klausa, Rottleuthner; Rogowski 1980.
6) On the revival of the German Schiedsmann see Röhl 1987.
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Differentiation into special courts and pre-judicial 
proceedings can be seen as functionally equivalent responses 
to similar sets of new problems. The national or cultural 
differences in proceedings are due to the differences in 
legal principles or paradigms governing the different legal 
systems but not to different problems. Traditionally the 
principles which shape legal institutions and procedural 
codes are related to the emphasis that the legal system as a 
whole and its associated legal training place on the role of 
judge or lawyer (inquisitorial vs. adversarial model). 
Similarly there is a distinction between procedural goals as 
either a common search for truth or as a conflict between 
adversaries with opposing interests. Thus if one asks about 
functional equivalence of nationally different proceedings 
it should always be determined both in relation to the facts 
of the matter in dispute and the consequences of the 
decision.
Labour courts are specialized courts within the 
judicial system. Their very existence is a sign of internal 
differentiation of the judicial system. The fact that the 
legal system is capable to differentiate internally, is an 
expression of its autonomy. Internal differentiation of the 
legal system leads to a separation of areas of law and to 
separate judicial institutions in these areas organized by 
separate procedures and institutions.
Access to Justica and the Pursuit of Collective
Interest
Further differentiation is associated with recent 
reforms in judicial procedures. Two trends can be observed. 
Access to justice for the pursuit of collective or group 
interests on the one hand, and an awareness of the need to
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facilitate access for socially weak parties on the other 
hand.
There now exists a variety of collective legal actions 
which have been developed and recognized in several 
procedural laws. Kees Groenendijk neatly characterizes
these forms of collective interest representation as 
"representation of bundled interests" (7). Based on his 
overview five types of legal collective interest 
representation can be distinguished.
(a) Test cases (Musterklaae): A single litigator acts 
as forerunner for other cases with only an informal 
recognition of the relationship with other actual or 
potential litigators by the court (8).
(b) Amicus curiae: With consent of the court the
claiming party is supported by the expertise of a collective 
party, i.e. an institution or collective interest
organization.
(c) Collective action (Popularklage): A single party is 
allowed to sue in the public interest (9).
(d) Class action: A group of individuals with identical 
interests is allowed joint action in court as a "class".
(e) Legal action taken by an association 
fVerbandsklaqe): An organization or association is allowed 
to represent a collective interest in court.
These five forms of collective or group legal action 
locate the parties to the process along the dimension of the 
increasing scope of organizable interests. Using the 
parameter of degree of "collectivity" these forms can be 
grouped in a fourfold table:
7) Groenendijk 1982.
8) See Jost 1981.
9) Trubek 1979.
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Tab!« IV-l: Collectivity in Interest Representation
individual collective
litigant litigant
individual test case, class action
interest amicus curiae
collective collective action collective action
interest (public interest advocacy) of an association
From Judgement to Conciliation
A further trend in the development of judicial systems 
is the increased use of other forms of third party 
intervention than adjudication. This trend is particularly 
relevant for labour courts. With the discovery and 
introduction of alternative legal procedures a gradual shift 
occurs in emphasis placed on conciliation and the mediation 
of disputes. Mediation becomes an increasingly preferred 
alternative, in particular, to the judicial handling of 
petty conflicts (10).
Differentiation as a move from judgment to conciliation 
is reflected inside courthouses by variations in the forms 
of case disposal. Judges are more and more inclined to 
introduce a repertoire of different forms of disposal. A 
trend towards conciliation in hearings can be observed. At 
least in continental European courts, there is a growing 
understanding that a case should be settled rather than 
decided by a judge or panel of judges (11).
10) On the experiments in the United States with the 
settling of small claims and neighbourhood conflicts 
through special mediation bodies see Tomasic and Feeley 
1982. For Germany see Blankenburg et al. 1982 and Rohl 
1987b.
11) Gottwald et al. 1983.
217
Settlement through mediation in court can particularly 
be discovered in the hearings of German civil and labour 
courts. Mediation is a preferred method of disposing cases 
in Germany. Looking at settlement rates of mediation in 
German civil and labour courts statistically, this trend 
differs according to type of law and matter in dispute. 
However, this trend expresses no dramatic change of events 
in courtrooms in Germany. The figures relating to mediation 
over recent years make up a practically constant proportion 
of cases settled (12). This only suggests that mediation and 
settlement always have been utilized extensively in West 
German court and are not an entirely new phenomenon.
In the judicial handling of labour and employment 
conflicts the alternatives to adjudication are the preferred 
methods of conflict resolution worldwide.
Procedural informalisa
The study of litigation opens up towards these new 
procedural trends. The previous preoccupation of litigation 
research with questions relating to concerns of doctrinal 
civil procedure and with positivistic research on judicial 
behaviour has been replaced by an interest in 
experimentation with new forms and structures of legal 
procedures, and with alternatives to judicial procedures. 
In the United States the field is known as "alternative
4dispute resolution" or "ADR" research (13).
Bryant Garth has described the attempts to improve the 
judicial system as an increase in procedural informalism 
(14). He defines informal procedural standards as unwritten,
12) Rogowski 1982.
13) See only Murray, Rau and Sherman 1989. See also 
Goldberg, Green and Sander 1985 and Edwards 1986.
14) Garth 1982.
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communicative, flexible, ad hoc, particularistic, and 
'vague' rules (15). He associates the trend from formal 
towards informal types of legal procedure with several 
developments in Western legal systems:
(1) The judicial system experiments with so-called
informal procedures, such as court-annexed arbitration in
order to relieve the burden on the official courts.
(2) Mediation and other alternatives to formal
adjudication are increasingly preferred by parties to 
disputes, but also by the state, as a less costly form of
dispute resolution which also allows to speed up the
procedure.
(3) Increases in compensatory social laws for the
underprivileged lead to a reorientation and even a
restructuring of the legal profession. Administration of 
these new laws increasingly uses informal proceedings to 
improve the effectiveness of the statutes.
However, the movement towards informal procedures has 
recently decelerated for reasons other than the political 
anti-reform trend in the Western world. Alternative 
procedures appear to have a tendency to become formal after 
a consolidation phase. Thus it might be the case that the 
alternative forms of third party intervention are only 
initially characterized by informality and adopt with their 
organizational growth more formal procedures.
There are a number of critical assessments of 
informality. It is criticized as vulnerable to abuse by 
powerful groups and therefore does not serve the interests 
of oppressed groups who desire a public hearing and moral 
vindication in order to resist exploitation and domination. 
From this critical perspective, reenacting formal rules 
appears to guarantee more social protection than informal
15) Abel 1982, Vol. 2, p. 2.
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procedures ("formality as a shield") (16). Other approaches 
argue more radically. They regard the differentiation of 
procedures as introducing new forms of state intervention 
and a colonialisation of areas of social life which 
inappropriately removes conflicts from peoples7 life world 
(17) •
Other normative views of informal procedures argue on 
the contrary that improved access to justice means 
democratization of judicial institutions. Disadvantaged 
social groups are invited to seek their guaranteed rights 
through participation in the judicial system (18). 
Differentiation of proceedings is seen as a process of 
'social' and 'industrial democratization'.
Labour courts are directly affected by these trends. 
Indeed, they are to some extent frontrunners of informal 
proceduralism. Most of the recent judicial innovations are 
already common practice in French, German and British labour 
courts for some time. They can look back on a tradition of 
informalism, alternative third party intervention and 
representation and litigation of collective interests. They 
have found different organizational forms; the British 
Industrial Tribunal system, for example, has separated 
conciliation and adjudication organizationally, whereas the 
German and the French labour courts combine these two forms 
of conflict resolution. They are thus able to engage in 
settlement attempts throughout the whole procedure.
Labour courts have so far not been studied in 
litigation research as models for a reform of general 
courts. However, it does not seem unlikely that this might 
change in future reform discussions of the judiciary. The 
successful combination of forms of procedure and mechanisms
16) Abel 1982, Vol. 1, p. 297.
17) Christie 1977.
18) Cappelletti and Garth 1978.
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of conflict resolution can serve as a model for further 
internal differentiation of the judiciary.
Labour Courts and tha Judicial Hiararchy
French, German and British labour courts have a similar 
status within the judicial system. They are considered part 
of the judicial system but not of the ordinary judiciary. 
Unlike the Italian labour chambers, which are located within 
the ordinary judiciary (on the level of pretore) and only 
follow separate procedural law (19), and unlike the American 
system of private arbitration and semi-judicial procedures 
within administrative agencies (e.g. National Labor 
Relations Board), British, German, and French labour courts 
form an "equal, but separate" part of the judicial system. 
"Discrimination" against labour courts within the judicial 
system, for example, in financial or personnel matters, is 
rather hidden. And the labour courts themselves are seldom 
unhappy about their independent position. Nevertheless, 
requests of "officials" of the legal profession to integrate 
the independent labour courts into the ordinary justice 
systems are a common and constant event in all three 
countries under comparison. With an increase in legalism in 
labour courts, professionalization of judges and tight 
judicial control through appeal, internal developments even 
support external threats to the independence of labour court 
systems. Nowhere, however, do these threats seriously 
challenge the position of labour courts.
Probably the most obvious distinction in the formal 
organization of the three types of labour courts is in the 
composition of the bench. The French labour court adopted a 
bipartite bench in the middle of the last century,
19) See Treu 1984, and on the legislative history of the 
beginning 1970s see Cappelletti 1977: 287—331.
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consisting of an equal number of elected lay judges, which 
still operates without a professional judge. in contrast 
the German labour courts and British industrial tribunals, 
established in the 1920s and 1960s/1970s of this century, 
are equipped with a tripartite bench consisting of one 
professional judge and two lay judges nominated by unions 
and employer associations.
Labour courts also differ organizationally with respect 
to specialized sections which cover different industries or 
parts of the jurisdiction. In France, labour courts comprise 
five sections: trade, industry, agriculture, executives and 
other activities (20). In contrast, in Germany and Britain 
labour courts and industrial tribunals operate under the 
principle of general jurisdiction; cases are distributed to 
chambers or panels on purely formal grounds, e.g. the date 
of reception or the initial letters of the applicants' 
names. In Germany, only the labour court in West Berlin has 
specialized chambers (Fachkammernl for different industrial 
sectors (21).
The following Table IV-2 gives an overview of 
procedures and appeal instances on the various levels of the 
judicial dispute resolution process in the three countries.
20) See Pautrat and LeRoux-Cocheril 1984: 46.
21) See the research on the Berlin labour court by
Blankenburg et al. 1979: 64 ff. and Diekmann 1984a. Sec. 
17 (2) of the German Labour Court Act allows specialised 
panels if a "need" exists. Ramm 1971: 106 reported a
variety of specialised panels in different German States 
in the 1950s and 1960s.
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Table IV-2 Procedural Levels of the Judicial Dispute 
Resolution Process in Orest Britain, Germany and Trance
Procedural
Levels
Great Britain Germany France
Conciliation ACAS Labour Court:
Conciliation
Session
Labour Court:
Conciliation
Session
Adjudication Industrial
Tribunal
Labour Court:
Decision
Procedure
Labour Court
Judgement
Procedure
First Appeal Employment
Appeal
State Labour 
Court
Cour d'Appel 
(Chambre Social)
Second Appeal Court of 
Appeals/Court 
Session
Federal 
Labour Court
Cour de Cassa­
tion
Third appeal House of 
Lords
(Federal Consti­
tutional Court)
The formal organization of appeal differs significantly 
between the three countries. The two levels of appeal in 
Germany are organizationally independent from the ordinary 
judiciary, whereas in Britain the second and third appeal 
lie with the normal judiciary (Court of Appeal or Court of 
Session and the House of Lords). The first appeal, however, 
rests in Britain with a labour court, the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal (EAT), whereas in France the first appeal goes to 
the Civil Appeal Court of the ordinary judiciary.
In West Germany there are 14 so-called State Labour 
Courts as first levels of appeal. State Labour Courts, like 
the normal labour courts, have a tripartite bench with one 
professional judge and two lay judges. The bench of the 
German Federal Labour Court, the final level of appeal, 
consists of three professional judges and two lay judges. 
The Federal Labour Court is presently divided into seven 
divisions, known as the "Senat". each dealing with a
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distinct substantive areas of labour law (22). There also 
exists an Upper Division (GroSer Senat) which rules on 
principles in cases of controversy between divisions or in 
cases of divergence from previous decisions of the Federal 
Labour Court. The third "appeal" to the German Federal 
Constitutional Court is put in brackets in the Table IV-2 
because it is not considered to be a normal appeal, but 
rather considered a right of the citizen to be protected 
against unconstitutional acts of state organs, including 
courts. However, it is left to the discretion of the Federal 
Constitutional Court to accept an appeal on constitutional 
grounds against a court decision, e.g., a decision of the 
Federal Labour Court; and constitutional appeal does not 
prevent enforcement of the Labour Court decision. In 
general, the number of cases accepted to be heard by the 
Constitutional Court is comparable to the number of labour 
law cases heard in the House of Lords.
The bench of the British EAT consists of one 
professional judge who must have been a High Court judge, 
and two lay members. The EAT has been known until recently 
to take an activist view on the expansion of the scope of 
employment protection. Indeed, it has depended to some 
degree on the "style" of the President of this judicial body 
to determine in which direction the industrial tribunal 
system is moving in its still formative period (23) . The 
number of rules established by the EAT and the Court of 
Appeals has already been criticized as an important factor 
in increasing legalism in the industrial tribunals (24) . 
Compared to German State Labour Courts and French Civil 
Appeal Courts, however, the powers of the British appellate
22) See the distribution of jurisdiction according to the 
internal "caseload distribution plan" (Gesch&fts- 
verteilungsplan) of the Federal Labour Court, published 
for 1985 in Recht der Arbeit 1985, pp. 40/1.
23) The EAT policy on wide jurisdiction and the restrictive 
course of the Court of Appeals are discussed in Dickens 
1985: 67/8 and 210-215.
24) Hepple and O'Higgins 1981, para. 775.
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bodies are rather restricted. Only appeals on an error of 
law are allowed in the EAT; it has to accept the findings of 
fact recorded in the industrial tribunal hearing.
The organizational structure of labour courts and their 
independence from the other parts of the judicial system are 
achievements of historical processes. In the following the 
histories of the labour courts under comparison will be 
described separately for each court system. Afterwards the 
organization of the different labour courts will be analyzed 
in a sociological account of the labour court system.
Political Histories of Labour Courts
Labour courts are shaped by the different traditions of 
national industrial relations systems. In addition, national 
legal professions and civil services have played a role in 
the development of labour courts. The following historical 
remarks proceed by describing the results of political 
interaction of industrial and governmental actors in the 
development of labour law and labour courts for each 
country. Chronological order is maintained in the 
presentation insofar as it starts with France, where the 
first labour courts appeared, and then proceeds with the 
German and British courts. The development in the United 
States is included only with respect to rudimentary forms of 
judicial employment protection in administrative agencies.
Franc«: "Conseil d* prud'homines"
The oldest institutions of employment protection policy 
can be found in France. As early as the reign of Napoleon 
Bonaparte the first labour court (conseil de prud'hommes)
225
was established at the request of the chambre de commerce of 
Lyon in 1806. Its members at that time were exclusively 
employers. It took until 1848 to create a bipartite bench 
with an equal number of employer and employee members (25). 
The bipartite structure is still characteristic of the 
French labour courts today. In 1905, appeal to the civil 
courts was introduced alongside with the possibility of the 
juge de paix to intervene in cases of deadlock in the 
bipartite bench (26). In 1907 the jurisdictional basis was 
significantly enlarged to cover almost all types of workers; 
agricultural workers, however, had to wait until 1958 to be 
included.
Until 1979, each French labour court had to be created 
on special request by a separate government decree and 
conseils were therefore only created "sporadically whenever 
a particular need arose in a given area" (27) . The conseils 
had their seats in towns of some size and importance; the 
local governments had to bear the costs. The jurisdiction of 
conseils covered only a specified area around the town. This 
principle of specific territoriality meant that in 1973, for 
example, only 38 percent of the French population lived 
within areas covered by conseils (28). In the course of the 
major reform in 1979 (29), the principle of general
territoriality was adopted, which is now supposed to 
guarantee that all French workers, regardless of their place 
of work, have access to a conseil; and the financial burden 
was removed from the local authorities. By 1973, unfair 
dismissal legislation was introduced which enlarged the 
courts' jurisdiction. The reform of 1979 abolished the 
double jurisdiction of the labour court and the civil court 
to which formerly workers who were not covered by conseils
25) See on the early history of the French labour court 
David 1974.
26) See an evaluation of interventions in decision-making of 
the conseils in Jaubert and Sant 1985.
27) Blanc-Jouvain 1971: 16.
28) Rapport syndical 1974, S. 61.
29) Law of 18 January 1979.
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could present their claims; civil courts also had exclusive 
jurisdiction in certain labour law matters, since 1979 all 
individual employment matters rest with the conseils. But 
collective disputes which involve trade unions are in 
general still excluded from the jurisdiction of French 
labour courts.
Since the major court reform in 1979 conseils de 
prud'homines are divided into five sections within which four 
lay judges from each side serve on a panel. Conseillers are 
presently elected for five years with the possibility of 
renewal (30). All employees and employers in the labour 
court district, whose geographical limits are spelled out by 
the decree creating the labour court, have the right to 
participate in the election. In 1982, the Socialist 
government created an advisory body, the Conseil superieur 
de la prud'homie, which is located at national level and 
which has a tripartite structure composed of nine members 
each from unions and employer associations and five members 
designated by government; it is mainly supposed to discuss 
organizational matters of the French labour courts (31).
At several times the French unions have made proposals 
to extend jurisdiction to collective issues. The unions felt 
strong enough after the victory of the Socialist party in 
1981 to ask for direct appointments of their lay judges, but 
so far jurisdiction on collective interests as well as 
direct appointments have not been granted.
Conseils have been called institutions of class 
collaboration which have a function in "banalisation des 
pratiques conflictuelles" (32). The allegation is that 
smaller and medium sized employers still ideologically 
dominate the court and the bench, and that conflicts of the
30) See the Law of 6 May 1982.
31) See Badinter and Delebarre 1985 and Pautrat and LeRoux- 
Cocheril 1984: 390.
32) Cam 1981: 209.
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industrial sector cannot be adequately solved in a court 
which is dominated by values of the commercial sector. The 
old French employer ideal of a personally responsible 
"patron" does not answer the needs of functional management 
or company management by co-determination (33). It has to be 
seen if the new form of elections which makes it easier for 
employees and employers to participate in voting will change 
the personnel and ideology in the future. However, until now 
the local character of the courts and "judgment by "peers" 
(34) still characterizes the French labour courts.
Germany: "Arbeitsgericht"
French labour courts had some impact on the 
establishment of German institutions of labour conflict 
resolution in the 19th century, notably in the French- 
dominated provinces left of the Rhine. However, a general 
system of labour courts developed only at the end of the 
century when Bismarck's repressive policy against the 
Socialdemocratic Party was accompanied by the establishment 
of basic welfare measures. Before World War I, there had 
existed trade courts like the "Industrial Courts" 
(Gewerbeaerichte. established 1890) and the "Commercial 
Courts" fKaufmannsqerichte. established 1904) which had 
limited jurisdiction and did not cover agricultural workers. 
These trade courts had elected lay members from both the 
employers' side and the employees' 4side like the French 
labour courts, but in addition, one professional judge (35).
Labour courts (Arbeitsaerichte) were introduced in 1926 
after intensive political debates (36). The Labour Court Act 
1926 was part of social reform legislation of the Weimar
33) Cam 1981, chapitre 11.
34) See McPherson and Meyers 1966.
35) See Ramm 1971: 84-5 and Bender 1990.
36) See Michel 1982.
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Republic which aimed at democratic structures in companies 
and basic welfare protection for employees. The Weimar 
constitution of 1919 contained a programmatic statement: 
"Das ‘Reich schafft ein einheitliches Arbeitsrecht" (37). 
This policy statement led not only to the introduction of 
the Works Council Act in 1919 and the expansion of the 
social insurance system during the 1920s, but also to 
several proposals to create new labour courts. In 
particular the official proposal of 1923 to introduce labour 
courts as part of the civil justice system was opposed by 
the trade unions arguing for separate labour courts. They 
distrusted conservative judges in ordinary courts who 
similarly disapproved of the new courts (38) . The lay 
members however, from then on, were not elected but 
nominated from lists provided by unions and employer 
federations. The bench consisted of two lay members and one 
professional judge. The labour court was thus characterized 
by tripartism.
Labour courts were empowered to deal with all problems 
which could arise out of the employment relationship; access 
was guaranteed to all types of workers except civil 
servants. And labour courts had jurisdiction in collective 
labour law issues, e.g., participation rights of works 
councils on the shop floor level. Unions and works councils 
could enforce their statutory rights through these new 
labour courts. Conflicts of interest (Reqelunqs-
streitiakeiten) were deliberately kept outside labour
courts. These conflicts which occur during the period of
establishing new collective bargaining agreements remained 
subject to arbitration. First appeal was to the
Landesarbeitsgericht and second appeal to the
37) Art. 157 II Weimarer Reichsverfassung. See also Bohle 
1990.
38) On the early history of the labour courts in the Weimar 
Republic see Wunderlich 1946, Kahn-Freund 1981, Bohle 
1990.
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Reichsarbeitsgericht. However, both appeal courts were part 
of the civil justice system (39).
In the Third Reich, major changes in industrial 
relations were immediately carried out. A "German Labour 
Front" (Deutsche Arbeitsfront) replaced both trade unions 
and employer associations. Industrial relations on the 
company level were conceived of as hierarchically ordered 
with the employer as "leader" and his employees as 
"followers". Collective labour law of the Weimar Republic 
which was designed to support industrial democracy and 
participatory work relations were immediately abolished; the 
labour courts' jurisdiction over collective labour law was 
accordingly removed. However, labour courts kept their 
jurisdiction in individual matters; the special protection 
of certain groups of workers, like apprentices and pregnant 
women, was even enlarged. To a certain degree labour courts 
had to compete with newly established "Courts of Social 
Honour" (soziale Ehrenaerichte) which mainly controlled 
employer conduct (40). Labour court judges were closely 
controlled throughout the Third Reich. From the beginning in 
1933, judges who were politically active in leftist parties, 
like Otto Kahn-Freund (41), or had a Jewish heritage, were 
expelled from the labour courts. But the labour court system 
itself stayed in operation until the end of the war.
Labour courts were among the first institutions after 
the war to regain their pre-fascist jurisdiction through an 
order of the Allied Control Council (42). The labour courts 
steadily enlarged their jurisdiction* during the 1950s; in 
particular the Federal Labour Court increased its legal 
competences by its own decision-making, leading to the
39) On appeal in the Weimar labour courts see Weis 1988: 12- 
16.
40) See Spohn 1982: 204-5; and generally Wunderlich 1946.
41) See Ramm 1980: XXVI-XXVII.
42) The Allied Command Order Ho. 21 of 30 March 1946 which 
reinstated the Labour Court Act of 1926 is documented in 
Blanke et al. 1975, Vol. II: 162.
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allegation that German labour law ~  especially in 
collective matters where only few and scattered statutes
exist —  was turning to case law rather than resting on
"sound" statutory law (43). A new Labour Court Act
(Arbeitsqerichtsqesetz) was introduced in 1953, including 
articles on speediness, informality (i.e. barring lawyers), 
and reduced fees (44). Labour courts gained further
jurisdiction over collective issues by amendments to the 
Works Council Act (Betriebsverfassunqsqesetz 1972) and the 
enactment of the Co-Determination Act (Mitbestimmunqsqesetz 
1976). Since the Dismissal Protection Act
fKUndiqungsschutzqesetz 1951), which continued the tradition 
of a 1926 act protecting white-collar workers, only 
piecemeal reforms in the individual labour law area have 
occurred. The Labour Law Consolidation Act 
(Arbeitsrechtsbereiniqunqsgesetz 1969), amongst other 
statutes, led to the clearing up and slight extension of 
coverage and of notice periods in German employment 
protection law.
Recent discussions about a possible reduction of the 
scope of employment protection and minimum wages, initiated 
by employer associations and conservative politicians, thus 
far have not led to significant legislative changes or 
increases in the caseload of labour courts. However, there 
has been a further relaxation for small companies with 
respect to the application of dismissal protection law. 
Legislation to promote part-time work, job sharing and
43) DSubler 1985: 33 calls the far-reaching influence of
decision-making of the Federal Labour Court on the 
development of West German collective labour law. 
"Richterherrschaft" (judicial domination) which, he 
contends, reveals an aristocratic element in the 
function of the judiciary which does not fit a 
supposedly democratic society. Weiss and Daubler 1985: 6 
stated in a recent overview of development in German 
labour law "that the role of the courts in the evolution 
of labour law in Germany has become much more important 
than that of the legislator".
44) See sec. 9 to 12 of the Labour Court Act.
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The political reforms after Donovan were far less 
cautious than the Report suggested. Massive state 
interventions were first proposed by the Labour Government's 
White Paper" "In Place of Strife" (49) and then —  with a 
different impetus against the unions —  carried out by the 
Conservative Government in its Industrial Relations Act 
1971. This act introduced unfair dismissal legislation along 
with a tripartite "National Industrial Relations Court" with 
jurisdiction over collective issues. Repressive actions of 
this court against strikers clearly increased the already 
existing hostility of the British labour movement against 
courts, and it contributed to the final defeat of the 
Industrial Relations Act in 1974 (50). The unions refused to 
participate in implementing the act and, subsequently, asked 
their lay judges to withdraw from the tribunals. The 
experience with the Industrial Relations Act clearly 
revealed the social limits of law as a regulatory instrument 
in industrial relations (51).
After 1974, the era of so-called "social contract" 
policies of the Labour Government expanded statutory 
employment protection. The legalization of industrial 
relations continued despite an "abstentionist" attitude 
within the Labour Party (52). The "Trade Union and Labour 
Relations Act" 1974, which repealed the Industrial Relations 
Act 1971, retained the provisions on unfair dismissal 
protection almost unchanged. The Employment Protection Act 
1975 introduced obligatory conciliation, mediation and
49) In Place of Strife 1969, Cmnd. 3888.
50) See, e.g., Crouch 1982b: 75-79; Farmer 1974: 74-82. On 
the attitudes of the general courts towards industrial 
relations, see Wedderburn 1978 and Griffith 1981, ch.3.
51) See the title of Weekes et al. 1975. However, the
authors also acknowledge the commonly shared view on 
legislative intervention in the employment protection 
field: "The least controversial part of the IR Act
concerned unfair dismissal." (p.7).
52) See Lewis 1976: 15. A "trend towards the juridification 
of individual disputes" was acknowledged to continue in 
the beginning of the 1980ies. See Hepple 1983: 392.
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arbitration procedures for collective as well as individual 
labour conflicts, carried out by a separate government 
agency, the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
(ACAS). The Equal Pay Act 1970, the Sex Discrimination Act 
1975 and the Race Relation Act 1976 introduced equal 
employment opportunity ideas into British labour law. The 
Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act (EPCA) 1978, which 
now combines all unfair dismissal provisions, stabilised the 
legal foundation of the development of the industrial 
tribunal system. The various Conservative Employment Acts 
throughout the 1980s and the Trade Union Act 1984 seem not 
to have seriously challenged this development (53) ; few 
restrictions were put on the industrial tribunals, although 
the main emphasis of conservative reforms lies again with 
symbolic politics in collective labour relations and less 
with employment protection.
A convincing hypothesis on the origins of the 
industrial tribunals and ACAS has been proposed by Jon Clark 
and Lord Wedderburn which casts light on the relationship of 
the industrial actors to the new tribunals. In their view, 
official employment conflict resolution forms part of the 
welfare state and it is the welfare state itself, or rather 
the people employed by the welfare state, which show an 
interest in expanding its scope (54).
However, it has also been shown that unions in Britain 
adopt a differentiated view with respect to protective 
labour legislation. The unions mainly resist restrictive or 
repressive legislation. Unfair dismissal legislation and its 
administration by ACAS and the tribunals is somewhere 
between protection and restriction as the unions see it. 
Their attitude has therefore been labeled as "acquiescence 
rather than acceptance" (55). This is different from 
employer attitudes, which were always rather hostile towards
53) For the period prior to 1985 see Dickens et al. 1984.
54) Clark and Wedderburn 1983: 178.
55) Dickens et al. 1985: 254.
235
protective interventionism and led to significant pressure 
on the Conservative Government to change employment law 
provisions in the beginning of the 1980s.
Because neither unions nor employers have a
particularly strong feeling for the present system of 
employment protection and industrial tribunals, there is a 
possibility of further restrictions of the institutional 
system of employment protection in the future. So far, after 
the events of the Miners' strike (from March 1984 to
February 1985) when ordinary courts were invoked by 
employers and opposing factions of the miners (56) the
Conservative government in its Employment Act 1988 
introduced only further legal restrictions on closed shops 
and strengthened the position of union members by allowing 
them to sue their union leaders. We might be at the brink of 
a third wave in British industrial relations which were for 
long characterized by abstentionism, then adopted protective 
interventionist and proceduralist attitudes and now might 
turn towards a reemphasis of rights due to European social
law (57) . A new wave of social rights will probably
strengthen the position of ACAS and the industrial 
tribunals.
United States: Quasi-judicial Labour Agencies at
Federal and State Level
*
In contrast to the systems discussed so far, there 
exists no unitary judicial system of labour conflict 
resolution in the United States. Statutory measures for 
employment protection are still rare. The National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) which was established in 1935 by the
56) See the legal analyses of the miners' strike in the 
Industrial Law Journal 1985 (3).
57) See, for example, Hepple 1989.
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National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) as part of the New Deal 
welfare measures is still the only quasi-judicial labour law 
body. It provides special protection for union members and 
is the major agency of employment protection. In addition, 
federal and state agencies administer anti-discrimination 
law (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC) and 
safety and health standards (Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, OSHA). There are also federal and state 
services which provide assistance in solving labour 
conflicts through conciliators, mediators, and arbitrators.
After the demise of the Labor Disputes Bill President 
Roosevelt favoured a decentralized approach of a regulatory 
agency established by statute. The NLRB differed from its 
predecessor NLB significantly with respect to its collective 
bargaining function (see on the history of U.S. collective 
bargaining the relevant section in Chapter II) . It went 
beyond simply being a facilitative authority to become an 
agency committed "to professional lawyerly standards and 
procedural precision, and also, of course, with its own 
powers of enforcement" (58).
However, it fell short of being an industrial court 
which Andrew and Commons proposed to be introduced in the 
U.S.. These authors were inspired by the conseils de 
prud'homines and by German industrial and commercial courts 
but argued for a labour court model "modified and adapted to 
American conditions". They envisaged state and local 
advisory boards of employers and employees, which assisted 
state authorities in executing the California Wage Payment 
Law and the New York Industrial Commission Law, to transform 
into labour courts "through practice in cooperation between 
employees and employers" (59).
The NLRB was created to support industrial relations 
through facilitating the development of collective
58) Tomlins 1985: 133.
59) Commons and Andrews 1916: 86-90.
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bargaining between employers and trade unions. However, the 
traditional trade union AFL, unlike its left-wing rival CIO 
(60), remained cautious and skeptical towards this form of 
state intervention. Partly for anti-communist reasons and 
partly for traditional views of voluntarist collective 
bargaining the AFL promoted collective bargaining as a 
private affair outside the domain of the state.
Thus the policies of the NLRB were opposed in an 
alliance formed by conservative politicians and conservative 
union leaders. The split between the craft-oriented AFL and 
the more radical CIO had its effect on the internal 
operation of the NLRB. An anti-communist witch hunt was 
carried out in the late 1930s and the beginning 1940s by a 
Special Committee of the House of Representatives, chaired 
by Howard Smith (Smith Committee) set up to investigate 
communist attitudes and activities at the NLRB. Its 
hearings and reports led to the destruction of the original 
NLRB. The Smith Committee preceded the House Committees of 
Un-American Activities of the late 1940s and beginning 
1950s. This most hostile anti-communist committee was, as 
Gross comments, supported by irresponsible conservative AFL 
union leaders who acted in secrecy and deception of their 
members (61) . In fact these union leaders can be held 
responsible for the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, which 
organized labour later found abhorrent, and for the de­
legitimation and destruction of state labour policies.
These events surrounding the NLRB, and the experience 
with state sponsored arbitration during the existence of the 
War Labor Board in WW II, were responsible for the a 
conscious policy decision was taken in the late Forties and 
early Fifties to expand and foster the system of private 
grievance arbitration instead of establishing an official
60) See Bernstein 1950 and Lichtenstein 1982.
61) Gross 1981.
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system of labour courts (62). Arbitrators who had served on 
the War Labor Board became a stock of experts from which 
private arbitration could develop (63). A widely debated 
suggestion to transform the present system of arbitration 
into a special form of judiciary was made by Hays (64), but 
was not followed up. It was rejected by the vast majority 
of labour lawyers and arbitrators.
Since 1972 the government agency Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission can be mobilized in cases of 
discrimination in employment because of race, sex or age. 
But beyond these administrative agencies there exists no 
system of labour courts.
Judicial review of arbitration awards has been excluded 
except in cases of actions of the arbitrator which are not 
covered by the arbitration clause of the agreement; the 
final and binding character of arbitration awards was 
acknowledged by the Supreme Court in three decisions in 1960 
(65) . Moreover, the NLRB accepts the supremacy of decisions 
reached through private arbitration: whenever a case can be 
handled in private grievance procedures, the NLRB restrains 
itself from further action; it defers the case to the
62) For further references on the rather academic
discussions of introducing labour courts in the United 
States see Rogowski 1981: 120-122.
63) See only Fleming 1968: 1-30 on the history of the U.S. 
arbitration system and Getman 1979 on the War Labor 
Board.
64) Hays 1966. See also the critique in defense of the
arbitration system by Wallen 1967.
65) See the so-called "Steelworkers' Trilogy": 363 U.S. 564,
574, and 593 (1960). The primary exception from the
rule that arbitrators' awards should not be subjected to 
judicial review is a violation of an explicit, well-
defined public policy. This is the case in race
discrimination matters. See Alexander vs. Gardner- 
Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1973) and United Paperworkers Union 
vs. Misco, 484 U.S. 29 (1987). Public policy exemption 
have been widely discussed. See only Hamilton and 
Veglahn 1991: 366-370.
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dispute resolution institutions established by collective 
bargaining agreement (66).
The NLRB performs only two functions related to union 
activities. It controls elections of union representatives 
("representation cases") and it prevents "unfair labor 
practices" which include cases of "discharge" of an employee 
by the employer because of union activities and cases of 
misrepresentation of union members by their union officials. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has enlarged the interpretation of 
the NLRA beyond formal union activities to a protection of 
any effort among employees acting in concert to achieve 
better working conditions (67). In "unfair labor" dispute 
cases there is an independent investigation of the facts 
through an NLRB investigator, which may eventually be 
followed by prosecution and a hearing before an 
Administrative Law Judge within the NLRB. If necessary, a 
final decision is taken by the Board in Washington. Appeal 
lies then with the Court of Appeal and possibly the Supreme 
Court.
The two major American labour law statutes which 
amended the NLRA were designed to oppose unions rather than 
create a "floor of rights" for employees. The "Taft-Hartley 
Act" of 1947 aimed on the one hand at national strikes and 
introduced national "emergency procedures" which allow the 
President of the United States to intervene by imposing 
"cooling off" periods through an 80-day federal injunction
(68) . On the other hand, NLRB jurisdiction was enlarged by 
this act insofar as the adjudicatory review of union conduct 
in terms of "unfair labor practices" was made*possible. The 
"Landrum-Griffin Act" of 1959, the second major amendment to
66) Spielburg 112 NLRB 1080 (1955).
67) NLRB vs. City Disposal Systems, Inc. 465 U.S. 822 
(1984) .
68) Sec. 206-10 of the LMRA. During the last twenty days
before the injunction expires the NLRB must conduct a 
secret vote among the employees. See Gorman 1976: 368
and St. Antoine 1984: 263.
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the NLRA, aimed at democratic structures within unions by 
granting union members a "bill of rights" against union 
officials which can be enforced through the NLRB.
Beyond the protection provided by the NLRB the 
offspring of general Civil Rights legislation —  the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 —  provides some
employment protection through regulation of discrimination 
disputes. Litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, which prohibits discriminations in all terms, 
privileges and conditions of employment, must be started 
through filing a charge with the EEOC. However, this body 
can only stop the discriminatory practice through 
conciliation or through persuasion of the employer through 
holding of conferences. The individual, however, has to 
start civil action, and the EEOC can only support this claim 
but has no judicial function itself. There are a number of 
further employment protection legislations at the federal 
level which include the Federal Labor Standards Act. 
However, the United States is still one of the few countries 
in the world which did not adopt the ILO-Recommendation 119 
(1963), which suggests a statute on employer termination
(69). Government intervention is mainly designed to support 
private arbitration, i.e. through its Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service which provides lists (or panels) with 
names of arbitrators from which the parties can choose their 
umpire. The same service is also provided by the private 
American Arbitration Association (see Chapter III).
Labour Court Systems
The following sociological analysis of labour courts 
starts with conditions of access for the parties. Three sets
69) See Summers 1976 who proposes a separate statute in the
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of factors might be distinguished (70): (1) the structure of 
the mobilization process, (2) party and case variables and
(3) access factors related to the judicial organization. The 
comparison will proceed with several aspects of the judicial 
organization of labour courts related to procedures, 
legalism in hearings and implementation of court decisions. 
Empirically, these comparisons will rely on official 
judicial statistics as well as data of recent national 
socio-legal research projects on labour courts and on my own 
court observations and interviews.
Access Factors: Mobilisation Institutions, Parties and 
Cases
Access to labour courts is influenced by both the 
organization of the judiciaries and the conditions of the 
parties (71). The analysis starts with aspects of the party 
sphere: available mobilization institutions and party and
case variables.
Since labour conflicts occur in a collective and 
organized context, institutions of mobilization play an 
important role in the invoking of labour courts, especially 
for employee-applicants. Important mobilization institutions 
within industrial relations systems are works councils, 
trade unions and labour lawyers. In this context it is 
possible to reconsider the dispute resolution systems, 
analyzed in Chapter III, with respect to their mobilization 
capacity.
It has been discussed that elected bodies of employee 
representation within companies, like works councils, are
70) See the overview on access-to-law studies in Rogowski 
(1986). See also Blankenburg 1987a on caseload
developments.
71) See Blankenburg, Reifner; Gorges, Tiemann 1982.
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structurally characterized by conflicting functions of 
representation of an electorate and assistance of individual 
employees. Works councils, as elected bodies, perform 
primarily representative functions in company decision­
making procedures. Their relative inactivity in dismissal 
cases qualifies them as institutions with a rather low 
influence on mobilization of cases to courts. In this 
context it seems interesting to note that Polish works 
councils are said to have lost their participation rights in 
dismissal decisions in 1974 precisely because of a "conflict 
of representing the workers and protecting their rights. The 
representative function was seen as having priority ... "
(72) .
In France and especially in Germany it appears that 
works councils potentially could be active but actually 
underexploit their capacities to act in personnel matters. 
Rarely do these bodies formally contest a dismissal; the 
strength of the works councils lies in continuous relations 
with management and informal problem solving but only 
exceptionally in confrontation. Their mobilization capacity 
in any event lies inside the company; with respect to 
outside adjudication there is little support for dismissed 
workers coming from elected representative bodies inside the 
company (73). However, works councils also do not oppose or 
resent the labour courts. Works councils view labour courts 
largely as complementary institutions to internal decision­
making in personnel matters on the company level. For these 
bodies labour courts are seen as taking part in a decision­
making process which is characterized by division of labour 
rather than rivalry. Works councils in general seem to 
endorse the idea of outside judicial control of employer 
decisions because labour courts handle cases which are often
72) Hepple 1980: 488.
73) See for the German situation Hdland 1984: 86-169; and
generally on the functions of French works councils 
Carby- Hall 1977: 208-218.
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not related to concerns of the majority of the company 
employees.
This is different with respect to trade unions which 
act independently of company decision-making and can act 
freely on behalf of the employee. One reason for being a 
union member, which is becoming increasingly important also 
for the organization strategies of unions, is the offer of 
free legal advice in cases of conflict with the company; 
within the range of available union services, legal services 
play a prominent role (74). In all labour courts under 
comparison there is the possibility of legal representation 
by officials of unions or employer associations during the 
hearing. This enhances the capacity of association officials 
to act as mobilization agents in individual cases. Legal 
representation by collective interest group representatives, 
in fact, most clearly distinguishes labour courts from 
ordinary civil or criminal courts.
However, research has shown that in British industrial 
tribunals only about half of the union members in court 
actually use their union services for contesting a dismissal 
in court (75). The other half of union members employ their 
own lawyers or act alone. But union members are also 
generally underrepresented amongst the applicants compared 
to general figures of unionization (76). This can be 
explained by the greater opportunities of union members to 
resist dismissals in early stages of the conflict, i.e. by 
appeal to company grievance procedures which are a result of 
negotiations of unions and management; or it may reflect a 
capacity of unions to handle cases with management 
informally. Union members who fail in their case at this 
stage might no longer rely on the union and rather use a 
lawyer to contest the employer decision.
74) See Gawron and Rogowski 1982.
75) See Dickens et al. 1985: 46.
76) Dickens et al. 1985: 36 for Britain; and Falke at al.
1981: 639-646 for Germany.
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Underrepresentation of union members in labour courts 
or tribunals is generally an indication of the filter 
function of union legal advice; information on low success 
chances, given to the dismissed employee in interviews with 
the legal department of unions, discourage many applicants 
from further action (77). in Britain, the preventive 
function of information on low success chances has been 
instrumentalised by the industrial tribunals; in so-called 
"pre-hearing assessments", introduced in 1980, industrial 
tribunals can provisionally try without a full hearing 
certain cases in which the tribunal thinks that there is "no 
reasonable prospect of success" (78). The parties, however, 
are legally not prevented to continue from seeking a full 
hearing.
In all three countries an increasing tendency can be 
observed to use advocates or lawyers, sometimes specialized 
in labour law, as mobilization agents. Especially in 
Britain, it has been argued that this is a reason for
increases in legalism in the tribunal system. Although
labour law cases are in general not attractive to European 
lawyers when compared to corporate legal business, an 
expansion of the legal profession in the last years, which 
brought young and socially-minded lawyers to the bar, has 
increased the attraction of this field of law. European
lawyers who specialize in labour law often seem to like to 
work for both sides; this is different in the United States, 
where a rather clear distinction can be made between
management law firms and union law firms.
Besides the activity and availability of mobilization 
institutions, access to justice depends on the circumstances 
of the case and the abilities of the parties to file a 
claim. Applicants in labour courts are almost always
77) See on the "opportunities for the union to be selective 
in which cases to pursue" Dickens et al. 1985: 47/8.
78) Industrial Tribunals (Rules of Procedure) Regulation
1980, S.I. 1980 No. 884, Schedule 1, reg. 6 (2).
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employees rather than employers, which illustrates the fact 
that employment law in general is a protective device for 
workers and not a neutral law which applies equally to both 
sides of the employment contract. Even in West Germany, 
where the employer enjoys statutory rights which can be 
enforced through the labour courts against an employee or a 
works council, employer claims have decreased since the 
1960s; in 1981, less than four percent of all claims were 
filed by employers. However, if cross-petitioning or 
counterclaims are included, employer claims occur in about a 
third of all cases (79).
Most important with respect to parties is their 
knowledge of the right to apply to the labour court and the 
ability to file a claim or respond to it. Personal 
limitations can create insurmountable barriers to access to 
courts; for example, the problem which writing a letter 
poses for employees who are not well educated should not be 
underestimated. Britain has lowered these barriers by 
adopting a standardized application with prescribed text and 
questions (80); an equally easily understandable form is 
available to respondents (81).
Research on British industrial tribunals reports that 
applicants mention "friends and relatives, the media, and 
local job centers and unemployment benefit offices" (82) as 
their main source of information. This conforms rather well 
with general research on legal consciousness, the ranking of 
legal information sources, and first legal contacts in 
Western as well as Eastern countries (83).
79) Estermann 1984: 73.
80) See "Original Application to an Industrial Tribunal", 
also called IT-1 form.
81) See "Notice of Appearance by Respondent", also called 
IT-3 form.
82) Dickens et al. 1985:183.
83) See only Blankenburg 1980a who discusses empirical 
findings on first legal contacts and mobilisation of 
courts.
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An important characteristic of cases in labour courts 
is the fact that the underlying employment relationship 
usually has already been terminated when the claim is filed. 
It is left to the employee to change the status quo created 
by the unilateral termination of the employment relation by 
the employer. It has been argued that it is generally 
unfavourable to initiate the change of status quo through a 
court claim; for example, applicants have to state the facts 
of the case in a way which fits the criteria of a legal
claim used by the courts in reviewing the dismissal decision 
(84) . And the right choice of the form of claim can 
determine the outcome. In Germany for example, the employee 
is well advised to file a claim for reinstatement even if he 
or she is not convinced that it will be the best solution to 
return to the old job; under German law it pays in the end 
to file such a fictitious claim because of possible 
settlements in court during litigation; this demands
intelligent strategic behaviour on the side of the employee.
Cases also are characterized by the context from which 
they arise. In West Germany and in Great Britain the number 
of cases related to conflicts in small firms is 
proportionately high (85). This fact confirms findings on 
the distribution of company grievance procedures in Britain 
or works councils in West Germany (see Chapter II) . Both are 
found less frequently in small and medium-sized firms. 
Courtroom litigation for the employees of small firms seems, 
to a certain degree, the functional equivalent of what 
internal company grievance procedures are to employees of 
larger firms.
The number of cases which labour courts and tribunals
receive each year can reveal interesting developments in
access to these judiciaries. The following comparison of
84) See Röhl 1981.
85) See Blankenburg et al. 1979: 69-73 for Germany; and
Dickens et al. 1985: 87-90 for Britain.
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caseloads is restricted to the period from 1974 to 1984; the 
data is taken from national judicial statistics.
Tabl* iv-3: Caseload of Labour Courts in Franc«, west 
Germany and Graat Britain (Casaa Received)
Conseil de Arbeitsgericht Industrial 
Prud'hommes Tribunal
1975 79,648 301,625 32,734*
1976 76,680 288,388 43,066*
1977 77,668 296,376 41,995*
1978 83,385 327,271 43,319
1979 98,497 273,978 41,244
1980 114,366 302,602 41,424
1981 129,131 347,520 44,852
1982 143,954 386,789 43,660
1983 152,000** 365,363 39,959
1984 151,000 361,435 39,819
1985 150,902 367,725 n.a.
1986 144,033 365,895 39,404***
1987 142,991 360,813 34,233***
1988 145,522 356,960 29,317***
1989 n.a. 336,816 n.a.
1990 n.a. 325,969 
( + 100,296)
n.a.
* (excluding Scotland) ** (estimated) *** (since 1986
financial year: April to March; only outcome of cases)
Sources: Annuaire statistique de la justice 1983, Paris
1985, 75.; 1984, Paris 1986, 79; 1986, Paris 1987, 79;
1987, Paris 1989, 69; 1988, Paris 1990,57.
Statistisches Jahrbuch Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1976, 
311; 1979, 316; 1982, 330; and Bundesarbeitsblatt 
6/1983, 116; 6/1984,-136; 6/1985, 98.; 6/1986, 122; 
7/1987, 86; 7/8/1988, 196 and 7/8/1989, 99.
COIT Fact Sheets July 1982 and March 1985 (England and 
Wales) and February 1983 and April 1985 (Scotland). The 
Employment Gazette, May 1989, 258; April 1990, 214.j
The French labour courts increased their, caseload until 
the middle of the 1980s. Since 1982 the caseload has 
remained at a level between 140.000 and 150.000 cases. In
1983, the caseload of conseils had more than doubled 
compared to 1974. The reform in the beginning of 1979, which 
enlarged jurisdiction and increased the number of courts to 
meet the criteria of general territorial coverage, seems to
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be a main factor which has caused an increase in caseload of 
around 15 percent each year until 1983.
German labour courts experienced a total increase of 20 
percent between 1974 and 1984; and this increase was not 
steady. The caseload dropped from a peak of more than 
386.000 cases in 1982 to about 326.000 in 1990. However, 
the situation will change after the incorporation of the 
five new states. In contrast to both the French and the 
German courts, the caseload of British industrial tribunals 
decreased from 1976 to 1988 (except for 1981), apparently as 
a result of restrictions in eligibility for employment 
protection.
A comparison of the caseloads reveals that in 1983, 
German labour courts had more than twice as many cases as 
French labour courts and almost ten times more than the 
number of cases received in the British industrial 
tribunals. It should be mentioned, however, that about ten 
percent of the German are technical cases concerned with 
social insurance matters which usually need no hearing. And 
the British figures would increase by ten percent if the 
ACAS caseload of received cases would be used in the 
comparison instead of the figures issued by the Central 
Office of the Industrial Tribunals (COIT). The ACAS caseload 
consists now of more than thirty percent cases where no 
formal complaint was made to an industrial tribunal but ACAS 
assistance was sought under special sections of the EPCA 
1978 (86) .
It has been argued that court input and organization is 
linked to trends in industrial relations and labour markets. 
Declining union power, however, does not directly affect 
labour courts because institutionalised participation of 
unions and employer organizations is only in the long run 
dependent on the relative strengths of these associations;
86) See ACAS 1988: 56, Figure 5-1..
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their participation in labour conflict resolution is 
protected by the state, and their public status remains 
despite declining membership. By contrast, rates of 
unemployment have a direct impact on caseloads. A close 
correlation between unfair dismissal applications and 
unemployment rates, for example, has been found in Germany 
(87) .
The French labour courts are formally restricted to 
hear only individual labour law cases whereas West German 
labour courts, and to a minor degree also British industrial 
tribunals, are also involved in collective labour law 
issues. But this distinction is rather arbitrary and 
misleading for a proper comparative account. Napier reports 
that French labour courts have adopted a wide interpretation 
"by classifying disputes apparently collective as legally 
individual" (88) ; the jurisdiction of French labour courts 
is therefore wider than the jurisdiction of their British 
counterparts, according to his analysis.
Physical Factors: Location, Architecture, and Furniture
Access to courts is not only a function of statutory 
rights, mobilizing institutions or party and case 
characteristics, but also of physical factors related to 
court buildings. These physical factors can influence the 
attitudes and behaviour of the parties. There are three 
principal physical factors which are associated with court 
buildings: their location, their architecture and their
furniture.
87) See Blankenburg et. al 1979: 56 and Table 3 and Diekmann 
1984b.
88) Napier 1979: 271.
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In 1983, 282 French labour courts, 95 German labour
courts and 29 British hearing accommodations of industrial 
tribunals were officially reported.
Tabi« IV-4j Number of Labour Courts (First Instane«) in 
Frane«, Germany and Graat Britain in 1983
France Germany Great Britain
Number of 282 95* 
courts**
29
Cases per 539 3757 
court
1373
* only West Germany 
** permanent hearing accommodation 
Sources: Annuaire statistique de la 
1985, II- 59; Handbuch der Justiz 
England/Wales, March 1985, para. 3; 
1985, para. 4.
justice 1983, Paris 
1988: 256-267; COIT 
COIT Scotland, April
Combining the number of courts with the caseload 
figures presented in Table IV-3 shows that each French 
labour court handled on average 539 cases in 1983; in 
comparison, each German labour court had to handle 3,757 
cases and each British industrial tribunal 1,373 cases. 
Labour courts, of course, differ in size between big cities 
and small towns. This is especially true for France. About 
2 5 to 30 percent of the cases were handled by the Paris 
labour court alone while almost the vast majority of courts 
handle less than 500 cases per year (89). One might 
therefore draw the conclusion that German labour courts 
generally tend to be larger in organization than their 
British and French counterparts because they handle seven 
times, respectively three times, as many cases.
89) Moritz 1987: 156/7.
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The location of labour courts, tribunals or quasi­
judicial agencies in Great Britain, West Germany and the 
United States is similar in that these judiciaries are often 
not located in separate buildings but are part of larger 
buildings where non-judicial business is also carried out —  
either other governmental or even private business. 
Physically, labour courts appear therefore rather as a part 
of the structure of employment offices than as separate 
judicial control institutions.
A difference among the countries can be observed with 
respect to the area of the city where the labour court is 
located. In Britain, industrial tribunal buildings often are 
located in the financial and commercial center of the city. 
An example is Birmingham, where the industrial tribunal is 
mainly located in the "Phoenix House", built by an insurance 
company and still used by several private businesses. Most 
of the people working in this part of the city wear an 
almost uniform business dress consisting of a dark "three- 
piece" suit, dark shoes, tie, and sometimes bowler; their 
appearance marks them as clearly related to the financial or 
business world. An impact with respect to accessibility is 
immediately felt by any observer or participant. It can be 
expected that normally employers will accommodate more 
easily to this business atmosphere than their employees, 
although white collar workers who work regularly in this 
area will in some cases have an advantage over small 
employers from remote areas of the town.
The German court buildings visited usually were located 
in rather neutral areas; sometimes the area is dominated by 
other court buildings, and the parties then encounter 
similar problems with physical access to the labour court as 
they may have with visiting ordinary courthouses.
The architecture of labour court buildings is usually 
not designed to impress the parties; it rarely represents to 
the outside world an authoritative power of government as
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can be the case with criminal courts. Most of the labour 
court buildings and agencies visited in Germany, Britain and 
in the United States were rather similar with respect to 
their •architecture: plain office buildings which express a 
civil-service mentality. The welfare state rather than the 
repressive state is reflected in the architecture of these 
buildings.
The interior design matches the visitor's impression of 
the external architecture. The furniture in the courtrooms 
is usually plain and modern. The order of the tables and 
chairs is not dominantly hierarchical. Unlike the ordinary 
civil or criminal courts, the bench is not raised much above 
the parties and their representatives. There often are large 
windows which allow natural light to enter the courtroom. 
However, the view from these windows usually reminds one 
visually of the relation of court proceedings to the 
industrial society in which the cases occur, looking out 
over roofs or walls of other office buildings or factories.
Personnel Factors: Judges, Representatives, and Clerks
An important factor which characterizes organizations 
like the labour courts is their personnel. Three groups 
within the personnel of courts can be distinguished: (1)
Judges or chairmen and lay judges, (2) legal representatives 
and (3) clerks.
The overall numbers of professional and lay judges of 
labour courts in 1984 are compared in Table IV-5.
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Tabi« IV-5» Number of Labour Court Judg«s in Frano«, Garmany
and Gr«at Britain in 1984
France Germany Great Britain
Professional Judges 
or Chairmen
492* 227
Lay Judges 14,988 11,190** 2,286
Cases per Professional 
Judge or Chairman
726 175***
* only West Germany; including part-time judges and 
trainee judges in probationary period; the figure 
excluding those judges in probation is 415.
** figure for 1979
*** including part-time chairmen; the figure for full­
time chairmen only is 265.
Sources: Handbuch der Justiz 1988: 256-267 
1981: 493 COIT England/Wales, March 1985, 
Scotland, April 1985, para. 3. Pautrat and 
1984: 4.
; Falke et al.
para. 3 ; and 
leRoux-Cocheril
Recruitment patterns and legal socialization of 
professional judges differ significantly. Chairmen of 
industrial tribunals in Britain are barristers or 
solicitors. The law requires that they have "a standing of 
at least seven years" as an advocate, but often they are at 
a late stage in their career. They are appointed by the Lord 
Chancellor, as are judges generally in Great Britain. About 
a third of the 227 chairmen in 1984 were full-time chairmen; 
and two-thirds were part-time chairmen.
West German labour court judges pursue a career 
separate from their colleagues in ordinary civil courts. 
Until the beginning of the 1960s it was possible for 
industrial relations specialists, i.e. union or management 
representatives, to become labour court judges; today only 
candidates with the usual two law degrees are able to apply 
for these positions. A German law graduate usually makes an 
early choice as to whether he will strive for a labour court
254
judgeship. Nowadays there is severe competition for these 
judgeships and only the candidates with the best scores in 
their second law degree will be accepted for a judicial 
position. A labour court judge will usually stay with this 
post for the rest of his career; the career expectations are 
oriented towards appellate labour courts rather than towards 
the bar.
In 1988 there were 492 professional judges in West 
Germany (90). It is mainly due to traditional distrust by 
the unions of the legal profession that the nomination to 
the German labour court rests with the Minister or Senator 
of Labour (and not with the Minister of Justice). A 
nomination for a labour court judgeship has to clear a 
tripartite committee consisting of an equal number of 
members from the unions and the employer associations and of 
presidents of the labour courts (91). Candidates may improve 
their chances if they have special training in labour law or 
industrial relations. German labour court judges are said to 
be "somewhat more leftist" than their average colleagues in 
the ordinary courts, and their higher rate of membership in 
public service unions rather than in the Federation of 
German Judges is a good indication of this. However, when 
union membership of judges was taken as a variable in order 
to analyze outcomes, no significant correlation could be 
found; although union members on the bench had significantly 
different attitudes towards industrial relations, their 
actual decision-making showed no significant differences 
compared with their colleagues (92) .
In 1984 there were about twice as many professional 
judges in labour courts in West Germany as in Britain. The 
German labour court judges handled on average 726 cases in 
1988 (counting all judges, 860 if only fully qualified full
90) See Weiss et al. 1984: 101 for earlier and slightly
different figures on the number of judges.
91) Sec. 18 (1) of the West German Labour Court Act 1953.
92) Rottleuthner 1984b: 296.
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and part-time judges are considered) compared to only 175 
cases in Britain (in 1984). It should be noted that only a 
third of the British chairmen are full-time chairmen. If 
only these chairmen are taken for the calculation of the 
workload of professional members of the bench, and if one 
counts two part-timers for one full-time member, one arrives 
at about 265 cases per full-time chairman in 1984, which is 
still only approximately a third of the number of cases 
handled by their German colleagues (the proportion of part- 
time judges is much lower in Germany, 24 in 1988). German 
labour court judges are appointed for life tenure; their 
British colleagues are appointed for five years, but they 
are eligible for reappointment.
In France judges are not appointed by the Minister of 
Labour or Justice but are elected in local constituencies of 
the labour courts. Elections now take place every five 
years. The French trade unions and employer associations 
have a high influence on the lists from which the lay judges 
are elected. Conseillers are directly elected into one of 
the five industrial sections of the court by the employees 
and employers of these industries. These elections do not 
guarantee that local specialists will serve in the labour 
courts. Conseillers are not elected as special experts but 
as representatives of the unions or the employers' 
associations (93). In a recent sociological study of the new 
conseillers after the 1979 election, they were still 
characterized as "notables" who had attained professional 
stability and continuity in their occupations. And according 
to this study conseillers cannot be called young activists: 
more than three quarters of the employer conseillers and 
about two thirds of the employee conseillers are more than 
38 years old (94) . Cam reports that in the 1970s small 
entrepreneurs dominated the employer side of the bench (95).
93) Moritz 1987: 158.
94) Bonaff-Schmitt 1985: 35-8.
95) Cam 1981: 47.
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Recruitment of the two lay members of the bench in West 
Germany and Great Britain is rather similar. Lay judges are 
nominated by trade unions and employer associations, and in 
both countries the labour or employment ministries appoint 
them from lists provided by the associations without much 
intervention; the nominating associations cannot, however, 
exert influence on the lay judges after they have been 
selected (96). In Germany, associations are allowed to 
nominate any person for a lay judge position who is over 25 
years old and has not committed a serious crime (97) ; 
lawyers are permitted as lay judges. In Britain, more than a 
third of the union-nominated lay members are union 
officials, and almost all union-nominees hold active 
positions within unions. British employer-nominated lay 
members are dominated by executives who are personnel and 
industrial relations officers at the time of appointment.
German lay judges are nominated for four years, whereas 
they serve for three years in Britain. In both countries 
there is the possibility of renewal. There were about 1800 
lay members in 1989 covering England, Wales and Scotland. In 
a "Special Feature" on industrial tribunals in the official 
Employment Gazette the following information on British lay 
members was given:
"They are paid a fee of ^ 82 a day, plus travel and
subsistence, and are asked to be available to sit at 
tribunal hearings on about fifteen days a year. ... Of the 
1800 present members, about 22 per cent are women and 1.7 
per cent are from the ethnic minorities. ... New members are 
not normally appointed over the age of 60, but once 
appointed they may carry on until reaching 69. New members 
are also expected to be in current employment or to have 
retired recently. There is no lower age limit, but it is 
not considered that many people under the age of 40 will
96) A difference, however, can be observed with respect to 
the type of employer lay judge: it would be rather 
unusual to find former colonial officers serving as 
employer lay judges in the West German labour courts, 
but not so in British industrial tribunals.
97) Sec. 21 of the Labour Court Act 1953.
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have had sufficient work-based industrial relations 
experience." (98)
More than two-thirds of the British lay members are
over 56 years of age; it seems to be a job at the end of a 
career within the "business" of industrial relations (99).
About half of the lay judges in Germany are attached to 
panels for a certain period; the other half will be seated 
on panels which are newly constituted for each case (100). 
In Britain, the regional chairman of the industrial tribunal 
will select lay members for a particular hearing (101). A 
German study reported that lay judges in general and labour 
court lay judges in particular see their roles as being 
neutral decision-makers rather than as advocates of a 
particular side in an industrial controversy (102). 
Similarly, British lay members revealed an almost unanimous 
acceptance of the non-representative, impartial nature of 
their role in industrial tribunals (103).
A second group of professionals in court are the legal 
representatives. As Table IV-6 shows, trade union officials 
represent every fifth worker in British industrial tribunals 
and every fourth worker in German labour courts in unfair
dismissal cases. Representatives of employer associations 
are more likely to appear before the West German labour
courts than before British industrial tribunals (excluding
ACAS). Comparable data for the French labour courts was not 
available.
West German labour court procedures may appear more as 
an interaction among lawyers since only seven percent of 
employers and twenty five percent of the plaintiff-employees
98) Employment Gazette, May 1989, p. 256.
99) On the social status of British lay members see also 
Dickens et al. 1985: 57-58.
100) Falke et al. 1981: 874.
101) See Hepple and O'Higgins 1981: 365.
102) See Klausa 1972.
103) Dickens et al. 1984: 63.
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are not represented, while in the British industrial 
tribunals more than one third of both plaintiff-employees 
and employers still appear without any representation. On 
the other hand, company executives on the employers' side 
can be found in about one out of five cases in both systems.
A final remark concerns clerks who are present in 
hearings of the labour courts. In German courts, the clerk 
is a (usually female) secretary who has the duty to call 
witnesses waiting outside the hearing room, to arrange oath- 
taking, and to organize the seating. But the most important 
duty is the typing of judgment by default and particulars of 
settlement arrangements which are handed to the parties when 
the hearing has finished. In these cases it is not necessary 
for the parties to make further applications after the 
hearing. A written decision, however, which contains reasons 
for the decision will be produced after the hearing. In 
Britain, the (usually male) clerk at the hearing performs 
similar functions to his German counterpart except for 
witness calling; this is not necessary because witnesses are 
allowed to attend the hearing during the whole procedure. 
British clerks often appear rather distant and conservative; 
their reference group is inside the tribunals about which 
they can tell many a story.
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Table IV-«: Representation of Parties at Hearings in Unfair 
Dismissal Casas in Great Britain and Germany
British Industrial 
Tribunals
German Labour Courts 
(Conciliation Session)
Plaintiffs Respondents Plaintiffs Respondents
Self­
representation 45% 33% 25% 7%
Trade Union or 
Employers'
Association 
Representatives 22% 5% 29% 29%
Represented by 
Attorneys 23% 41% 42% 38%
Others (Associates, 
Friends, Managers 
Executives) 9% 21% 4% 26%
100% 100% 100% 100%
(n=596) (n=443) (n=1075) (n=1036)
Sources: Dickens et al. 
1981, Vol.II: 627, Tab.
1985: 45, 
IV/57 and
table 2.7 
647, Tab.
. Falke et al. 
IV/66.
Secretaries of the French conseils play an important 
role because they are considered an element of 
professionalism in an otherwise lay court. The secretary has 
the knowledge of the relevant law, and it is often left to 
him to draft the written judgment. It has been observed that 
"conseillers will decide the outcome and then leave it to 
their secretaries to produce reasons which reconcile the 
decision with the appropriate legal rules” (104). Because of 
the important role of the secretaries, it was suggested in 
the 1960s to view the French labour courts as a judiciary 
with in fact a tripartite rather than a bipartite bench
104) Napier 1979: 275.
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(105). However, after the major reform of the French labour 
courts in 1979 the secretaries decided to withdraw from 
participating in decision-making of the labour court. They 
followed a suggestion of their respective interest 
organization in order to achieve an equal status to the 
secretaries in the ordinary courts. The withdrawal of the 
secretaries is seen as a major setback for professionalism 
in the French labour courts (106).
Procedural Factors: Types of Procedure and Modes of 
Termination
Procedural arrangements differ formally between the 
countries. German procedural law distinguishes between 
procedures for individual matters (Urte ilsverfahren) and 
procedures for collective matters fBeschluflverfahren). The 
first form of procedure deals mainly with particular 
problems arising in relation to the contract of employment, 
and in addition with company pension problems, with disputes 
among employees, and also with disputes between collective 
bargaining parties. The second type of procedure is used 
mainly in works council matters, but a also matters 
concerning elections of employee representatives to the 
company boards and recognition of unions as bargaining 
agents (107). In the latter type of procedure the labour 
court technically does not decide the conflict but issues a 
"statement" on the case; accordingly, participants are not 
called parties but "persons involved" (Beteiliqte) (108). 
However, the legal distinctions blur when events, 
expectations and activities of the parties "involved" in the
105) McPherson and Meyers 1966: 40.
106) See Pautrat and LeRoux-Cocheril 1984: 100; Moritz 1987: 
161.
107) See sec. 2 and 2a and 46 to 98 of the Labour Court Act 
1953.
108) See Zöllner 1983: 502.
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two types of procedures are compared. The procedural 
distinction does not exist in French and British procedure, 
primarily because of the exclusion of collective labour law 
matters from their jurisdiction, although the British 
tribunals do handle a number of trade union conflicts (109).
Another important distinction with respect to 
procedures for handling individual labour conflicts applies 
both to French and German labour courts. All individual 
cases will first be tried in a conciliation session, and 
only after an unsuccessful conciliation attempt will the 
case proceed to a full hearing. In conciliation sessions 
only agreements between the parties can settle the case, and 
the court is empowered to decide the case. In France, 
conciliation usually is performed by two judges, one from 
the employer and one from the union side; in Germany, the 
conciliation session takes place before the professional 
judge without the lay members. In comparison, the full 
hearing will be conducted by at least four conseillers in 
France. The tripartite bench in Germany presides during the 
full hearing.
Interim relief procedures exist in all three countries. 
Whereas in Germany (einstweilige Verfügung) and in France 
(référé) urgent claims can get interim relief orders, in 
Britain the interim relief procedures can only be used if 
the dismissal was alleged on grounds of trade union 
membership or, since 1982, for non-membership of a trade 
union.
In Britain, the functional equivalent «to compulsory 
conciliation procedures of labour courts is individual 
conciliation performed by officers of the independent agency 
ACAS which has already been discussed in Chapter III. The 
overall rates of appeal differ significantly between the
109) Out of 32 jurisdictional matters of industrial 
tribunals, listed by Hepple and O'Higgins 1981: 362-4,
at least six are related to trade union activities.
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countries. In German unfair dismissal cases, an appeal rate 
of 38 percent of the labour court decisions has been 
reported (110); it should be noted, however, that only 14
percent of the cases get a decision (see Table IV-7). In 
British industrial tribunals, only 5 percent of the cases 
are appealed (ill), whereas in France an extraordinarily 
high figure of 55 percent of the appealable decisions is
mentioned in the research to go to appeal (112).
In looking at the mode of terminations of labour court 
cases one finds remarkable ratios of conciliated settlements 
and judgments between the three countries.
As can be seen from Table IV-7, the rate of
conciliation in French labour courts has been about six 
times lower than in German labour courts (113) and three 
times lower than in the British industrial tribunal system. 
The rate of adjudicated decisions is accordingly more than 
five times higher in French labour courts than in German
labour courts and more than two times higher than in British 
industrial tribunals. France also shows only half of the 
rate of withdrawals and summary judgments than British 
tribunals and German labour courts.
110) See Falke et al. 1981, Vol. II, 974.
111) Empoloyment Gazette 1982: 520 and (British) Judicial
Statistics 1981: 87, table G.4.
112) See Moritz 1987: 189-191.
113) The rate of conciliated settlements drops below 40 
percent in German labour courts if all terminated cases 
—  and not only terminated unfair dismissal cases —  are 
considered; see Rogowski 1982: 174, table 1.
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Tabl« IV-7ï Mod« of Termination in th« British Industrial 
Tribunal Systwa, th« 6«rman and th« Tr«noh Labour Courts
British Industrial German French
Tribunals and ACAS Labour Courts Labour Courts 
(1982)* (1978)* (1980)
Settlement through 
Conciliation 35%
Withdrawal and 
Summary Judgment 30%
Decisions and 
Hearings 35%
100%
n=33,109
Concilia- Judg- 
tion ment
60% 12% 3%
26% 9.5% 17%
14% 78.5% 80%
100% 100% 100%
n=97,164 n-103,884 n«49,172
* only unfair dismissal cases
Sources: Annuaire statistique de la justice 1983, Paris
1985, 75. The Employment Gazette, Oct. 1983, 449. Falke 
et al. 1981, Vol.II, 974.
In analysing conciliated settlements in France, Britain 
and Germany, one has to remember the institutional 
difference as to how settlements are achieved by third party 
intervention. In West German and French labour courts, 
conciliation is the mandatory first step of court procedure.
*Initial conciliation attempts in Great Britain are left to 
independent ACAS officers. ACAS conciliation is a pure go- 
between institution which is organizationally independent 
from the industrial tribunals. ACAS gets a copy of each 
application made with the industrial tribunals. ACAS 
individual conciliation performs the same function as 
conciliation sessions in German and French labour courts.
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ACAS conciliation officers are civil servants who often 
have had a career within the civil service. At the start of 
ACAS, in the middle of the Seventies, most of the 
conciliation officers were recruited from the staff of the 
Department of Employment. ACAS conciliation is particularly 
important for self-represented parties who have the 
opportunity to assess the merits of their cases through 
information about legal requirements and the formal steps in 
industrial tribunal proceedings. This information is 
provided through contacts with the conciliation officer 
initiated by the officer (114). According to an internal 
rule, if the ACAS conciliation fails to settle the case 
within six to ten weeks after the claim has been filed, a 
hearing before an industrial tribunal will be automatically 
arranged. In these hearings, the industrial tribunals are 
less prone to achieve settlements than the German labour 
court in hearings in front of the three judges. The 
procedure followed in the tribunals is a predominantly 
adjudication-oriented, adversary proceeding. In contrast, 
conciliation attempts continue in the full hearing before 
the German labour court, which can be explained by the fact 
that German procedural law has put both functions (that of 
conciliation or mediation and of adjudication) into the 
hands of the same professional judge, allowing him to use 
both functions directly or indirectly in both sessions. 
Although procedural provisions allow a similar behaviour, 
the French labour courts differ in practice significantly 
from the German courts; only three percent of the cases are 
conciliated in the judgment session. And there has been a 
long debate on the dramatic decline of conciliated 
settlements even in the conciliation session. Less than ten 
percent of the cases terminate nowadays at this stage (115).
114) See Dickens et al. 1985: 149-157 on organisation of
ACAS and information on the actual conciliation 
processes.
115) See Supiot 1985 and Pautrat and LeRoux-Cocheril 1984: 
XXX-XXXII.
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Procedural Principle« and Degrees of Legalism in Labour
Judiciaries
Legalism in labour courts is a topic which has evoked 
lively discussions in all countries under comparison, but 
especially in Britain (116). Under the broad heading of 
legalism several distinct issues have been discussed. On the 
one hand, the debate is linked to discussions of 
juridification of industrial relations insofar as the 
introduction of new legislation also broadens the 
jurisdictional basis and the possibilities of activist 
interventionism of labour courts. An empirically feasible 
concept of juridification, however, has to relate an 
increase in norms to indications of actual use of these
norms, i.e. mobilization of courts. If juridification is
made operational in this sense, the caseload development of 
labour courts becomes an interesting variable in determining 
the extent of legalism. As already discussed, French and 
German labour courts showed a significant increase in 
caseloads in the 1970s and in the early 1980s, with the 
German labour courts handling almost twice as many cases 
than French courts. Britain, on the other hand, showed
overall a declining caseload. In the beginning of the 
eighties they had only about one tenth of the caseload of 
German labour courts (see Table IV-3). In this perspective 
French and especially German labour courts might be called 
more legalistic, because more conflicts are solved by the 
judicial interventionism of these courts.
A similar result is obtained if legalism is related to 
legal representation. It has already been mentioned that 
about 40 percent of British and German respondents 
(employers) are represented by lawyers; but German
applicants (employees) use legal representation twice as
116) See for Britain: Munday 1981, and the "Special Feature" 
on legalism in the DE Gazette by Leslie 1985: 357-362.
266
often as British applicants (see Table IV-6). And French 
labour courts would be considered especially legalistic if 
the rate of appeals is taken as a measure for legalism; 
eve^y second appealable decision of French labour courts 
seems to be appealed in Civil Appeal Courts compared to only 
5 percent in Britain. However, it has been argued for 
Britain that the EAT and the Court of Appeals have a 
legalizing effect because their decisions are treated as 
precedents by industrial tribunals. Formalistic use of norms 
and inflexibility in procedure are results of decision­
making by higher bodies of the judiciary in Britain (117).
If legalism is measured by the types of interactions in 
labour court or tribunal hearings, a different result is 
reached. Industrial tribunals are "informal" only relative 
to the procedural rules and practices of ordinary British 
courts. From a sociological perspective the roles of 
participants in "adversarial" procedures show a high degree 
of formality when compared with the so-called 
"inquisitorial" procedures of Continental labour courts. 
Continental procedure requires both parties to formulate 
their arguments —  including the evidence that they are 
prepared to provide —  in the brief of the case; the German 
labour court judge, who will chair the proceedings, might 
even ask for additional information in preparation of the 
hearing. In this way, a file builds up based on an exchange 
of the arguments and evidence offered by both sides. Yet 
advocates for both sides may also contact each other by 
phone, or occasionally, may meet in the halls of the court 
building to attempt to settle the matter out of court. The 
court does not learn about such out-of-court negotiations 
unless the applicant withdraws from the case or one party 
defaults.
117) See Hepple and O'Higgins 1981: 364 and Dickens et al. 
1985: 77.
267
In German labour courts, the judge adopts an active 
role in settling cases which, to some degree, varies with 
the attitudes towards their judicial role. The Labour Court 
Act requires that the judge attempts to get the parties to 
settle by mutual consent at the initial hearing. In the 
Berlin labour court, for example, it could be observed that 
some of the more settlement-minded judges allowed, on the 
average, fifteen minutes for the initial conciliatory 
hearings. Some of the less settlement-minded judges allowed 
only five minutes. And also the judgment sessions are 
comparatively short in German labour courts; they usually 
last less than 30 minutes (118). In contrast, British 
industrial tribunal hearings last several hours, and it is 
not uncommon that they carry on for a whole day (119).
The settlement orientation of the German judges, which 
is generally high, in fact not only dominates the 
conciliatory session but also the judgment session. To a 
considerable extent it reduces legalism in the hearing. The 
judge's attempts to get the parties to reconcile continue 
through all of the formal proceedings and are sometimes 
aided by lay members of the bench. Parties are encouraged to 
settle at this later stage in order to avoid further costs 
and uncertainties involving witnesses and other types of 
evidence. Judges use several techniques of persuasion 
ranging from economic considerations, to hints about legal 
uncertainties or psychological pressures. In this sense, the 
judge is the most active actor in the courtroom and may 
repeatedly formulate possible terms for settlement. He does 
this based on his legal evaluation of the case as well as on 
the outcome most likely to occur. Settlement, therefore, is 
not achieved by the parties' anticipation of the costs of 
continuing the formal proceeding alone, but also by the
118) According to observations of a German research team, 95 
percent of conciliation sessions and 71 percent of 
judgment sessions last less than 30 minutes; see 
Rottleuthner 1984a: 32.
119) Dickens et al. 1985: 205, table 7.5.
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judge's explicit view of what the settlement options of the 
parties are in light of what the likely outcome of the case 
will be if it is pursued. In addition, the German judge has 
an interest in settling cases by agreement because it saves 
him writing a judgment. In France, there is less incentive 
for the bench to reach for settlement because the writing of 
decisions is widely left to the secretaries of the court, as 
already mentioned.
In conciliation processes in German labour courts two 
issues are often subject of debate: the amount of
compensation and the type of dismissal, i.e., termination 
with or without notice. The employer usually has a basic 
interest in settling the case quickly without a 
reinstatement order. The employee, on the other hand, if he 
or she is not desperate to return to the old job, has a 
basic interest in receiving the highest possible 
compensation. In addition, it is important for the employee 
to obtain the statement of a notified or "orderly" 
(ordentliche) dismissal which allows him or her to collect 
unemployment benefits without delay. Because at least three 
different legal aspects are involved - dismissal with or 
without notice, compensation, and unemployment benefits - 
the parties implicitly assume, and often directly ask, for 
assistance of the labour court judge in formulating terms of 
a settlement. The active role of the judge is reinforced in 
negotiations which, according to general procedural rules, 
should be under exclusive control of the parties (120).
120) Therefore> advocates of increased inquisition in 
British industrial tribunals, like Williams 1983: 161,
might be reminded that in inquisitorial proceedings most 
likely a considerable number of written documents will 
have to be exchanged before the hearing which might 
create even higher barriers for the unrepresented party. 
The German labour court procedure is to a great exent a 
procedure in writing and not primarily designed to 
produce new facts in a hearing as seems to be the main 
function of the adversarial procedure. The inquisitorial 
style is hardly the best way to discover something new 
about the case which has not been hinted at in the 
documents.
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There is some criticism of German labour courts' poor 
performance in safeguarding jobs, which has been provoked by 
low reinstatement figures and the common practice of 
settlement-in-court (121).
Adversary proceedings in British industrial tribunals 
are not designed to allow much "informal" behaviour of the 
chairmen or lay members on the bench who represent the 
employer's or trade union's position. Usually not having 
much more information than is contained in the standard 
application and respondent forms, the chairman of the 
tribunal and the lay members are prepared to hear arguments 
and review evidence to the extent presented by the parties 
or their representatives. In the industrial tribunals, the 
rules of evidence of civil or criminal procedure are not 
followed in full, but the procedure for cross-examination 
and the techniques that solicitors and barristers use in 
ordinary courts are employed in producing statements. Partly 
because non-lawyer representatives, e.g., trade union 
secretaries, lack alternative ways of proceeding and partly 
because their clients also expect an adversary style of 
processing, there is no real opposition to the introduction 
of established adversary techniques in the industrial 
tribunal hearings. Chairmen of industrial tribunals only 
occasionally adopt an active role by asking a few questions, 
but lay members on the bench rarely ever do so (122).
To an observer in the courtroom, the differences 
between interactions of an adversary and that of an 
"inquisitorial" procedure are remarkable. In a German 
courtroom, the judge asks most of the questions and usually 
does not sharply differentiate between statements of law and 
statements of fact. A formal presentation of evidence is
121) See the debates following the empirical findings of 
FaIke et al. 1981 on low reinstatement figures, some of 
which are documented in Ellermann-Witt et al. 1983.
122) On the influence of lay members in Tribunals see 
Dickens 1983b.
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avoided unless there are outright contradictions in the 
briefs, or unless some attorney insists on one, most likely 
with the idea of getting a higher fee. In chairing the 
proceeding, the German judge may shift from his role as 
mediator to that of adjudicator. He does not risk appeal as 
long as he proposes terms for a possible settlement, and in 
this sense, thus acts as a mediator. The inquisitorial 
discretion that he enjoys allows him to shift back and forth 
between mediation and adjudication, using the letter of the 
law to encourage parties to settle.
The degree of legalism in court is influenced by 
legalization of the conflict before it reaches the hearing. 
In Britain, cases which had little legal contact might be 
tried in preliminary hearings; the chairman invites the 
parties to meet for a so-called Pre-Hearing Assessment. In 
these hearings the chairman offers his opinions on the merit 
of the case and eventually issues a cost warning. Pre- 
Hearing Assessments were introduced with the argument that 
there were too many burdensome hearings of cases without 
merit. For some chairmen it seems a useful instrument to 
reduce their caseloads. The practice of holding Pre-Hearing 
Assessments therefore is not without controversy because the 
conciliatory agency ACAS views these hearings as intrusion 
in its domain (123).
French labour court hearings seem to range between 
German labour courts and British tribunals with respect to 
legalism in hearings. The atmosphere in French labour courts 
is influenced by the position and attire of the judges. The 
French labour court proceeding (conciliation procedure) has 
been described in the following way: "The parties and their 
lawyers (who were in full legal dress consisting of black
123) A debate on Pre-Hearing-Assessments, which also 
documents the ACAS point of view, has recently be 
published in the DE Gazette. The ACAS position has been 
presented by Wallace and Clifton 1985: 65-9.. The
response from the Department of Employment was given by 
Smith 1985: 182-8.
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robes and white ties) sat round the table with two 
conseillers, one employer, one employee (who incidentally 
each wear a medal on a red, white and blue ribbon when they 
are engaged on official duties), and the legal secretary.N 
(124). It seems possible to speculate that this attire 
contributes to a legalistic and formal proceeding and, 
subsequently, is an obstacle to amicable conciliation.
A final measure of legalism is related to the impact of 
appeal bodies on the labour courts. In Germany, the high 
valuation of conciliation in court serves as a barrier to 
legalization of procedures by appellate decision-making. 
This differs from British industrial tribunals. Because it 
is a practice in the EAT procedure that the notes of the 
tribunal chairman are made available to the parties, a 
reverse effect on the industrial tribunal proceedings 
probably results from this practice: If no new evidence is 
generally allowed in the EAT and if the notes of the 
tribunal chairman, which contain the evidence of the case, 
can become relevant in the appeal procedure, this fact most 
likely increases length and the detail of evidence 
procedures in the industrial tribunals. In addition, the 
fact that appellate rulings are treated as precedents by 
industrial tribunals increases formalism and restricts 
procedural flexibility in a legalistic fashion (125).
Implementation of Labour Court Decisions
*
In all three countries, implementation of court 
decisions is mainly left to the parties, especially the 
employer. There exist no special enforcement agencies 
attached to labour courts to guarantee compliance. However,
124) Van Noorden 1980: 110.
125) See on the treatment of appellate decisions as 
precedents and as means for increased legalism Hepple 
and O'Higgins 1981: 364 and Dickens et al. 1985: 77.
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there are procedural regulations in case of non-compliance 
which have to be mobilized by the aggrieved party separately 
in all three countries.
The following Table IV-8 gives an overview of success 
rates rand re-employment orders in Great Britain and West 
Germany. Similar data are not available for France as the 
law gives the employer a right to oppose a reinstatement 
order (réintégration) which is in about all cases raised. 
However reinstatement is enforceable against employer 
resistance in dismissals of employee representatives (126).
Table IV-8: Rates of Success and Re-Employment in German 
Labour Courts and British Industrial Tribunals in Unfair
Dismissal Casas
British Industrial 
Tribunal System 
1982
German 
Labour Courts 
1978*
Success of the Applicant
in the Decision 30.7% 46.4%
Out of all Applications:
Re instatement/Re-engagement
granted by Decision 1.7% (IT) 1.7%
including Reemployment
through Conciliation 3.1% (IT+ACAS) 9.0%
n*ll.509 n-97.164
* only unfair dismissal cases
Sources: The Employment Gazette, Oct. 1983, 
Falke et al. 1981, Vol.II, 974.
449.
The applicants' chances of success are lower in British 
tribunals than in German labour courts. An employee in
126) Moritz 1987: 154.
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Germany has a sixty percent chance of obtaining a lump sum 
settlement by going to court and settling the case in court 
(see Table IV-7) . In the 14 percent of cases which are 
decided in German labour courts there is an almost fifty 
percent chance for the employee to be successful; this 
compares to a 30 percent rate of success in British 
industrial tribunals (see Table IV-8).
There is little information on the extent to which 
employers comply with re-employment orders and settlement 
arrangements to the same effect. The British EPCA 1978 
provides that additional compensation will be awarded in 
case of non-compliance of the employer on request of the 
winning employee. If the reinstatement order is not 
implemented and the employer cannot show that it was 
impracticable to comply therewith, there will be an 
additional compensation award of between 13 and 26 weeks' 
pay (127). A 1981 study on the "aftermath" of re-employment 
orders of the tribunals, commissioned by the Department of 
Employment, showed that the legal intention is hardly 
matched by reality. Only five percent of tribunal decisions 
granted re-employment in the period between 1972 and 1977 
(128), and this did not change in the following years (129). 
In analyzing re-employment orders, the study found that 
union members in general were more often successful than 
non-members both in obtaining orders and actually getting 
re-employed for a certain period. Small employers were less 
likely to implement any order that was made. But the study 
also found that 80 percent of the successful applicants who 
finally got a re-employment order in fact returned to work; 
their average length of re-employment was over a year (130).
There is no similar study with a special focus on re­
employment orders either in Germany nor in France. However,
127) EPCA 1978 s. 71.
128) Williams and Lewis 1981: 6.
129) Dickens et al. 1985: 110/111.
130) Williams and Lewis 1981: 6-11.
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in Germany some information was obtained by research which 
asked parties about their attitudes towards labour court 
proceedings half a year after their hearing. Parties who had 
reached settlements in court showed a higher rate of 
satisfaction than parties who got a decision. Actual 
continuation of employment during the labour court 
proceeding or after the hearing was the case in 9 percent of 
the cases. An analysis of these cases shows that non­
dismissal issues and cases from bigger companies were 
overrepresented (131). In dismissal cases only 1.7 percent 
of all terminated cases in fact resulted in re-employment 
(132). Research on the U.S. reports that reinstatement 
orders of the NLRB are not particularly effective. 80 
percent of the cases in which reinstatement was ordered the 
employee left the company a short time afterwards (133) . 
This seems to some extent different with respect to 
reinstatement awards issued in arbitration. In these cases 
the employees actually continued employment and only rarely 
were dismissed a second time. "On the whole, the post­
reinstatement of the grievors did not prove arbitrators 
wrong in the judgments they made" (134).
Enforcement of orders for payment of money rests in 
Britain with the county courts. The industrial tribunals
themselves have no enforcement machinery. In case of non­
payment of the employer respondent the applicant has to 
initiate a separate procedure with the county court by 
filling in the special form (Form N 322), filing a copy of 
the decision of the industrial tribunal and presenting a 
sworn document (affidavit) which verifies the amount 
remaining due to the employee. The respondent's goods can 
be seized by the county court and sold by the counts court's
bailiff ("execution"). The respondent can also be forced to
declare bankruptcy. However, in case of redundancy
131) SchSnholz 1984: 475-507.
132) FaIke et al. 1981, Vol.II, p. 859.
133) Stephens and Chaney 1974: 25.
134) Adams 1978: 94.
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payments, unpaid wages, and the basic award of compensation 
for unfair dismissal there will be no need to apply to the 
county court for enforcement since the Secretary of State 
for Employment is empowered to pay these amounts out of the 
Redundancy Fund (135).
Comparative Conclusions
The establishment processes of labour courts reveal 
remarkable divergences among the courts. The oldest labour 
court, in France, was already established in the beginning 
of the last century. The employers took the initiative in 
installing the French labour courts. In contrast in Germany, 
trade unions and social-democratic governments were the 
decisive forces in establishing labour courts in the 1920s. 
In Great Britain, academic experts and the civil service 
pressed for independent tribunals in the 1960s and beginning 
of the 1970s, whereas the industrial interest groups and the 
political parties showed little interest in these 
institutions. And in the United States, the introduction of 
private arbitration instead of a system of labour courts 
after the WW II was the result of general policy 
considerations of both abstentionist (or pluralist) 
industrial relations policies and non-recognition of unions 
as political actors and participants in administrative or 
adjudicatory decision-making.
Not just short-term politics of either Socialist or 
Conservative governments are at work when institutions of 
judicial remedy in employment relations are introduced. The 
policies of abstentionism and interventionism in the British 
case, attributed to incomes policy on the interventionist 
side and traditional industrial relations politics on the
135) See Goodman 1990, paras. 1A-923 to 1A-924.
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abstentionist side (136), also apply in the employment 
protection policy field. Job protection policies oscillate 
between judicial interventionism by labour courts and 
utilization of self-regulatory mechanisms of the industrial 
relations system, i.e., voluntary procedures or informal 
negotiations. In general, labour courts are not designed to 
act as a substitute for collective bargaining, but rather to 
extend protection in fields where collective bargaining does 
not exist or where it shows deficiencies. Labour conflict 
institutions are a special form of state intervention which 
is often characterized by tripartite cooperation of unions, 
employer associations and the state. For interest 
associations it is possible to extend influence on 
regulation of employment relations even beyond collective 
bargaining through participation in these institutions; and 
the state gains industrial peace through corporatist 
structures.
The formal organization of labour courts differs 
significantly in the countries under comparison. Despite 
changes with respect to general territorial coverage and 
concentration of jurisdiction in 1979, a "judgment by peers'4 
is still an appropriate characterization of the French 
court; the bipartite court consists solely of elected lay 
judges. In West Germany and Great Britain, the tripartite 
bench consists of one professional judge and two lay judges 
nominated by unions and employer associations. The German 
judiciary has a historical lead of half a century over 
British industrial tribunals in providing judicial remedies 
for dismissal conflicts; the German labour courts were 
created in 1926 whereas the British industrial tribunals 
effectively began to work only after the defeat of the 
repressive Industrial Relations Act in 1974.
A comparison of the caseloads reveals that, in total, 
German labour courts handle three times as many cases as
136) Wedderburn 1984.
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French labour courts and almost ten times as many cases as 
the British industrial tribunals. This difference in 
caseloads cannot adequately be explained by differences in 
jurisdiction. French, British and German dismissal laws show 
some differences with respect to eligibility. British law is 
more restrictive with respect to obligatory periods of 
employment before becoming eligible for employment 
protection (two years) compared to West Germany (twenty-six 
weeks) and France (one year). Second, although West German 
labour courts have jurisdiction in collective labour law, 
these cases amount only to a relatively small caseload of 
under five percent of cases filed.
The explanation for differences in caseloads has, 
instead, to be attributed to the differences in mobilization 
processes, and, furthermore, to the nature of dispute 
handling at the shop level. It is the general assumption of 
the present study that a particular interaction between 
company procedures and judicial procedures characterizes 
systems of labour conflict resolution in general. Because 
dispute resolution is conceived of as a process which is 
divided into phases, the interrelation of procedures, 
located in these different phases, becomes an important task 
for research. It is the main aim of the present study to 
contribute to a proper understanding of interactions between 
pre-judicial and judicial procedures.
However, even on the level of judicial procedures there 
are major institutional differences between the countries 
under comparison. While conciliation in Britain is 
undertaken by means of a separate service (ACAS), the German 
and French labour courts are themselves responsible for 
attempting to get the parties to settle. The German 
procedure especially, after an initial conciliation hearing 
before a professional labour court judge, is characterized 
by a constant intermingling of conciliation attempts with 
formal litigation, even in the judgment session. This is
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enhanced by inquisitorial powers of the judges over the 
proceedings. Consequently, German labour court judges obtain 
a high rate of settlements: sixty per cent of all dismissal 
cases result in some form of settlement, compared to thirty- 
five percent in the ACAS. In these settlements, both sides 
satisfy some of their interests; the worker usually gets 
some monetary compensation, while the employer is protected 
against future claims and costs. French judges are 
surprisingly less prone to conciliate, although the 
procedural provisions would allow for a similar high rate of 
settlements as in the German case. The formality in hearings 
seems a major obstacle to conciliation in French labour 
courts.
The activity of judges as conciliators has to do with 
the procedural principles of adversarial and inquisitorial 
process. Hearings before the British industrial tribunals 
are comparatively formal even though some of the adversarial 
rituals are eased in comparison with British civil or 
criminal procedure. Legal representatives in industrial 
tribunals, who have major impact on the processes of the 
court, use adversary techniques of the ordinary courts; and 
the chairmen usually remain passive towards these attempts. 
It is not surprising therefore that British industrial 
tribunals have recently been criticized as legalistic. By 
contrast, the inquisitorial or investigative style of German 
labour court judges creates a rather informal atmosphere 
which has the purpose of finding agreement.
In addition, the relatively low success rates of 
applicants in British tribunal decisions have to be 
mentioned, which also discourage the bringing of cases to 
the industrial tribunals. Only about thirty percent of 
workers who have been dismissed are successful in 
adjudicated decisions in industrial tribunals, as compared 
to almost fifty percent in West German labour courts. 
Combined with the formality of industrial tribunal hearings,
279
such low success rates put strong pressure on British 
applicants to withdraw or settle their case already during 
conciliation.
Finally, low rates of actual re-employment 
characterizes all three labour court systems. This fact 
indicates that labour courts in general are not designed to 
offer employment protection in the sense of job retention 
for the unfairly dismissed. With respect to this result a 
"functional convergence" of the French, the British and the 
German labour courts can be observed.
A systems theoretical socio-legal understanding of 
labour courts requires a distinction of levels of analysis 
with respect to system references. At least four levels can 
be distinguished. There is the level of the political 
system, on which the historical processes surrounding the 
establishment of institutions for labour conflict 
resolution, and the enforcement of governmental industrial 
policies which regulate industrial relations through 
statutory intervention are analyzed. Then there is the 
judicial system, in which the relationship between labour 
courts and other parts of the judicial system is an 
important issue. With respect to the industrial relations 
system both the impact and the instrumentalization of labour 
courts can be analyzed. And, lastly, with respect to the 
systems of labour courts themselves internal factors related 
to the organization of labour courts have to be considered.
The distinction of system references, i.e., the 
political system, the industrial relations system, the legal 
system and the labour court system is especially important 
for comparative analysis. Comparative labour law rightly 
claims that a proper comparison of labour conflict 
resolution systems cannot be confined to organization 
aspects (137). However, a proper definition of the function
137) Cf. Blanpain 1985, referring to Schregle 1979.
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of labour judiciaries can also not be confined to an 
analysis of the industrial relations context alone (138). It 
has to integrate the studies of the external relations and 
of the internal structures and processes based on a 
collection of institutional data in a functional comparative 
analysis of labour conflict institutions.
The previous analysis concentrated on the 
organizational aspects of labour courts. They certainly 
have an impact on other systems. However, the analysis of 
this impact requires a study of the other systems and thus 
goes beyond the study of the labour court system. Labour 
courts need to be accepted both within the judicial system 
and within the other systems. But the acceptance by others 
depends to a considerable degree on the smooth operation and 
reduction of complexity within the labour courts themselves.
138) As Schregle 1981: 27 seems to suggest.
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CHAPTER V
LAV AMD LABOUR CONFLICT RESOLUTION
The final chapter focuses on self-regulation and 
reflexive labour law. It will be asked to what extent and 
how self-regulation can be the guiding principle of the 
legal regulation of labour and employment conflict 
resolution. Thus, the following remarks can be understood 
as a contribution to the establishment of a theory of 
reflexive labour law, which assumes that labour law is part 
of an autopoietic legal system.
Labour law, which regulates labour conflict resolution, 
distinguishes between substantive and procedural labour law. 
In the first section there will be a discussion of
substantive labour law. It is related first to problems of 
individual labour law or employment protection and second to 
problems of collective labour law or the law of industrial 
relations. Employment protection law is introduced in a 
comparison of the law of unfair dismissal in France, Great 
Britain and Germany and the respective regulatory attempts 
in the U.S.. This discussion is followed by remarks on the 
legal status of collective agreements and shop floor rules.
In the second section, procedural law aspects will be
discussed with respect to problems of decentralization of 
decision-making and self-regulation. A number of issues are 
raised pertaining to the legitimation of procedures, the
*
reintegration of industrial relations at the workplace and 
the role of procedures and corporatist structures in labour 
conflict resolution. This leads finally to a discussion on 
self-regulation and its study in a reflexive labour law
conception.
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comparative Dismissal Lav
-The meaning of law differs among the societal groups 
regulated by it. Whereas employees understand labour law as 
a set of rights which protect them, employers see in it 
restrictions on their decision-making, and labour courts 
view it as the source of substantive and procedural labour 
law which defines their jurisdiction, guides their 
operations and structures their organization. Academic 
labour lawyers are interested in legal doctrine and the 
consistency of the substantive law. From a systems 
theoretical point of view, these different opinions on the 
meaning of labour law express different system references 
and thus different constructions of reality which are used 
to define the meaning of labour law.
For an academic lawyer the fundamental distinction of 
labour law on the European continent, including the 
jurisdiction of labour courts, is the distinction between 
individual labour law and collective labour law. The law of 
unfair dismissal creates the main legal basis for labour 
conflict resolution in the area of individual employment 
protection. The vast majority of cases which the British, 
French, and German labour courts receive relate to the 
termination of employment.
In a reflexive labour law concept, the reality of 
labour law at the workplace as well as within the 
institutions which implement labour law is decisive for 
judging the substantive labour law. Furthermore, legal 
regulation is interpreted in the light of self-regulation of 
the regulated field. The distinctions between substantive 
and procedural as well as between individual and collective 
labour law are considered to reflect doctrinal problems 
rather than problems of industrial relations' self- 
regulation. Particularly with respect to unfair dismissal
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law, it is important to see the relationship between 
substantive dismissal law and both the procedural aspect 
related to the occurrence of dismissal conflicts and to the 
procedural aspects related to the implementation of a 
successful dismissal case. In fact, proceduralization of 
substantive dismissal law can be a yardstick for a 
comparison of dismissal law based on the reflexive law 
concept. Particularly interesting are processes of 
proceduralization within legal doctrine which express 
increasing recognition of both industrial relations self­
regulation and the limited role of labour law (1).
Regulatory Approaches to Unfair Dismissal
On the legislative level the 1963 ILO Recommendation 
119 concerning "Termination of Employment at the Initiative 
of the Employer" (2) has been an important source for 
legislation on unfair dismissal in the countries under 
comparison. It was a stimulating factor both for the 
introduction of new legislation on this topic in Britain in 
1971 and in France in 1973, and for the harmonization of the 
law in West Germany through the revisions of the dismissal 
protection statute in 1969. The respective statutes were 
the Law of 13 July 1973, amended by the Law of 30 December 
1986 in the French case, the Employment Protection Act (EPA) 
1975 and the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 
(EPCA) 1978, as amended, in the British case and the
*
Dismissal Protection Act 1951 (Ktindicmnqsschutzqesetz 
(KSchG)), as amended by the Arbeitsrechtsbereiniqunqsqesetz 
of 1969, in the German case.
1) The parameters for a comparison of unfair dismissal laws,
developed by Napier et al. 1982, especially chapter 7, 
are used as guidelines in the following comparison.
2) The text of ILO Recommendation 119 is documented in ILO
1975: 31-35.
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The basic ideas behind the ILO Recommendation relate to 
a twofold regulatory approach: Employer behaviour in case
of termination of an employee is regulated through the 
prescription of a procedure and through substantive reasons. 
The procedural approach requires the employer to give notice 
and to obey a certain notice period, unless there are 
grounds for a summary dismissal without notice. The 
substantive approach requires the employer to justify a 
dismissal with a legally defined reason or just cause. This 
twofold approach characterizes employment protection against 
unfair dismissal in Britain, France and Germany.
Nevertheless, the philosophies underlying the unfair 
dismissal regulations in these countries differ to some 
extent, as indicated by the basic terms that define the 
normative foundation of legal judgment concerning 
dismissals. While in Britain a dismissal is considered to 
be either fair or unfair, a German dismissal is reviewed in 
terms of whether or not it was ''socially warranted" (3) . In 
France, there has to be an "actual and serious cause" for 
the dismissal.
Each of these approaches is linked to a different
philosophy of industrial relations. The German idea that 
dismissals should be "socially warranted" implicitly refers 
to social standards that are established by the industrial 
partners and protected and supervised by the state. The
concept of a "socially warranted" dismissal suggests that
the reasons for dismissal must be accepted by a collectivity 
of actors in the social sphere. It implicitly refers to the 
consensus established in industrial relations, and thus 
includes the unions' and the employees' as well as the
employers' understanding of social justice.
The British "fair dismissal" concept, on the other 
hand, refers mainly to management standards of "fairness"
3) Sec. 1 (1) KSchG.
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(4); the employer's behaviour is supposed to be reviewed by 
the Industrial Tribunal against standards which are agreed 
upon by other employers. Fairness is therefore a concept 
which is defined with regard to class-biased norms of 
"gentlemanly behaviour" of a "reasonable employer" (5). The 
emphasis is on other employers' opinions and not on commonly 
shared values on which unions and the public at large agree 
as well.
In France, the rather technical-sounding principle of 
"actual and serious cause" leaves it largely to the lay 
judges of the conseils or the professional judges of the 
appellate courts to adopt a view towards dismissal. The 
French dismissal law, enacted in 1973, gave rise to 
discussions of the advantages of an objective or subjective 
concept of dismissal; the objective concept leans towards 
the German idea of looking into the social basis of the 
conflict, whereas the subjective concept leaves the 
employer's understanding of the factual situation untouched 
and assesses his conduct purely on normative grounds (6) . 
The principles adopted in the decision-making practice, 
however, seem to lean to a third position which leaves it to 
the judges to define the requirements of "actuality" and 
"seriousness" in a rather case-oriented manner (7).
These differences in the approach to unfair dismissal 
regulation are related to differences in the relationship 
between employment law and private law in the three 
countries. Only in France is the whole area of labour law 
codified in a general labour law statute (Code du Travail). 
French labour law nevertheless developed from the Code 
Civil, and legal techniques still exist to circumvent the 
unfair dismissal protection by directly applying rules of
4) Cf. Elias 1981.
5) Cf. Bercusson in Drake and Bercusson 1981: 33, Bowers and
Clarke 1981 and Collins 1982.
6) Javillier ^ in Napier et al. 1981, 81 ff..
7) Cf. Napier et al. 1983: 81/2.
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the Code Civil (8). In Britain and Germany, one finds an 
interplay of employment law and general private law which 
affects jurisdiction of the labour judiciaries differently. 
In the German system, sections on the "service contract" of 
the Civil Code are still considered as the basis of 
individual labour law; the employment statutes constitute an 
application of the general norms of the Civil Code. In the 
British system, employment statutes are considered as 
supplements to the common law, but not as replacements for 
it. Thus, the jurisdictional basis of the Industrial 
Tribunals is different from that of their German 
counterparts insofar as it rests solely on these newly 
established statutes (9) . The basic interpretation of the 
law on employment contracts as it has developed under common 
law is still left to the ordinary courts in Britain, whereas 
in West Germany and France the labour courts are granted 
jurisdiction in all legal matters concerning employment 
contracts (10).
There is a remarkable trend in U.S. labour law towards 
employment protection. The employment-at-will concept is 
gradually eroding. The doctrine of employment-at-will 
stipulates that employees without contracts of specific 
duration can be dismissed without notice and the contract of 
employment can be terminated for "a good reason, a bad
8) Napier et al. 1983: 73-5.
9) A list of 32 statutory jurisdictions of the Industrial
Tribunals can be found in Hepple and O'Higgins 1981: 
362-4, par. 774. The Lord Chancellor may by order confer 
jurisdiction on Industrial Tribunals to hear claims for 
breach of employment contract presently dealt with by 
the ordinary courts: EPCA 1978 s. 131. Until today no 
such order has been made; a reason for this lies in the 
interest of trade unions as well as employers to avoid 
cross-petitioning in Industrial Tribunals, since it is 
assumed that this would increase the length and legal 
complexity of dismissal cases.
10) Sec. 2 (1) (2) of the West German Labour Court Act 1953,
as amended, establishes exclusive jurisdiction of labour 
courts in "civil law disputes between employees and 
employers resulting from employment relations".
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reason, or no reason at all" (11). This doctrine was first 
challenged by federal legislation which introduced measures 
against dismissal or discharge for union-related or other 
concerted activities in the National Labor Relations Act of 
1935. Later, then employers were prohibited by federal law 
related to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 from engaging in 
discriminatory practices based on considerations of race, 
sex, age, disability or pregnancy.
In the last few years a number of state legislatures, 
and federal and state courts have developed legal 
restrictions on the employer-inspired termination of 
employment (12). There is a lively discussion on the 
erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine. The courts have 
increasingly used contract law doctrine to enforce various 
alleged express and implied terms of the employment 
contract. These doctrines include concepts such as work as 
consideration, promissory estoppel of the job offer, 
incorporation of employer manuals or handbooks into the 
employment contract, and an implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing (especially in California law).
Tort law has also been used to establish a concept of 
wrongful or retaliatory discharge which is considered a 
violation of public policy (13). Employers are prevented 
from dismissing employees who are absent from work because 
of their public duties (for example jury service), who 
report illegal practices of their company to public 
authorities ("whistleblowers"), or who refuse to participate 
in illegal activities of their employers. ,
There are also a number of state laws which protect 
employees. In some states, statutes prescribe "good causes" 
to justify discharges (for example, Arkansas. Montana,
11) See, for example, Epstein 1989.
12) See the overview of recent legal restrictions on the 
concept of employment-at-will in Jander and Lorenz 1990.
13) See Hoffman 1983.
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Puerto Rico, South Dakota). Five states have enacted 
legislation limiting the employer's right to terminate large 
numbers of employees. These are Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts, South Carolina and Wisconsin. The laws are 
commonly referred to as plant closing laws. They do not 
preclude mass dismissals but usually impose notice and/or 
severance pay requirements before an employer can terminate 
a large number of employees.
The doctrinal response of academic labour lawyers to 
the judicial and legislative erosion of the employment-at- 
will doctrine is somewhat dominated by rather 
unsophisticated and helpless defences of the doctrine on 
behalf of employers (14). They reflect feelings of unease 
among management that wrongful behaviour on their part can 
lead to costly litigation. The American courts have taken 
the initiative in regulating the employment relationship 
because general legislation as well as regulation by 
collective bargaining or other industrial relations 
instruments was unable to bring about comprehensive 
employment protection regulations.
Because the courts used their normal mechanisms of 
contract and tort law, employers have indeed reason to fear 
high damage awards. The reform of employment protection 
could be improved in the U.S. at two levels, if the 
regulators decided to consider successful examples from 
other countries. Following clear procedures can be a means 
to reduce uncertainty on the part of the employers as well 
as the employees. And it might be necessary to think about 
a reform of the judicial system. Labour and employment law 
problems need special judicial treatment in the U.S. as 
well. It is thus time for labour courts to be introduced 
in the U.S. (15).
14) See only Epstein 1984.
15) See also Summers 1976.
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Eligibility
Eligibility for judicial protection from unfair 
dismissal is restricted by dismissal legislation. Employers 
of small firms are, to a certain degree, exempted from 
judicial review of dismissal decisions. In Germany, only 
firms and administrations with at least six employees are 
covered by the employment protection jurisdiction of the
labour court (16). In France, the minimum number of 
employees is eleven. In Britain, access to the judicial 
review of dismissals from firms with less than twenty
employees was excluded in 1980 unless the employee had two 
years' service; British employees of these small firms may 
resort to ordinary courts under certain circumstances, but 
rarely seem to do so. In Germany and France, employees from 
very small firms sometimes are able to base their claims
before the labour courts on general provisions of the Civil
Code.
In all three countries, employees with fixed-term 
contracts are excluded (17). Public employees are eligible 
for protection in all three countries, but in contrast to 
Britain, West German civil servants are not; they must file 
their claims with administrative courts. Household
employees are ineligible for protection under the employment 
statutes in Britain, West Germany and France (18).
16) EPCA 1978 s. 64A (1) (b) and sec. 23 (1). KSchG. These
qualifications do not generally apply to British, German 
or French labour law; they are restricted to dismissal 
protection jurisdiction.
17) Javillier 1981, p. 304, para. 323; Napier et al. 1982: 
77; Zöllner 1983: 233; Hepple and O'Higgins 1981, para. 
526, 239.
18) Cf. for Britain Ewing 1982. And for West Germany cf. 
Zöllner 1983, p. 238. Occasionally there is opposition 
in the commentaries on German employment protection to 
the exemption of small employer dismissals from judicial 
review. See Trieschmann 1982 and Btinger and Moritz
1984.
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Jurisdiction is, indeed, further restricted with regard 
to the qualifying period of employment necessary before a 
case can be filed. German law requires an employee to have 
worked for at least twenty-six weeks (19); in Britain, the 
period was first raised from twenty-six weeks to fifty-two 
weeks by the Unfair Dismissal (Variation of Qualifying
Period) Order 1979 and was further raised to two years by 
the Unfair Dismissal (Variation of Qualifying Period) Order 
1985 for all employees employed after 1 June 1985 (20). In 
France, the minimum period of employment for making a claim 
is one year according to the "common law" concerning 
dismissal (21).
Notice periods for dismissals vary in all three 
countries according to status or length of employment. In
Britain, the employer has to notify the employee of the
dismissal one week in advance if there has been less than
two years' continuous employment; the statutory minimum 
period of notice increases by one week for each additional 
year beyond two years' employment; and if there has been 
continuous employment for twelve years or more, the period 
of notice is not less than twelve weeks (22). In Germany, a 
basic distinction is made between blue-collar and white- 
collar employees: the latter enjoy a statutory minimum
period of six weeks notice but they are allowed to reduce 
this period to four weeks by individual or collective 
agreement (23). Blue-collar workers are protected by a 
minimum period of two weeks, which increases to one month 
after five years' service and to two months after ten years' 
service, and finally to three months after twenty years' 
service (24). It is possible to lower statutory provisions 
by collective bargaining agreement, and the notice periods
19) Sec. 1 (1) KSchG.
20) S.I. 1979 No. 959 and S.I. Order 1985 No. 16.
21) Javillier 1981: 304.
22) EPCA 1978 s. 49 (1).
23) Sec. 622 (1) of the German Civil Code.
24) Sec. 622 (2) of the German Civil Code.
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do not apply to services below three months (25). In 
France, the law provides a formal procedure to be followed 
by the employer in case of dismissal rather than definite 
notice periods. First, the employee has to be invited to an 
interview by certified mail where he or she is informed 
about the possibility of dismissal. Afterwards the employee 
has to be notified about the dismissal, again by certified 
mail. And thirdly, the employer has to state the reasons 
for the dismissal in written form within ten days after the 
employee has requested it (26).
Despite the differences in notice periods, one can 
recognize a similarity with respect to termination or 
dismissal without notice in Britain and Germany. In
Britain, contract law principles are applied in judging
termination without notice or summary dismissal. The 
implied terms of the contract of employment provide the 
legal basis on which the employer termination without notice 
has to be judged, i.e., the reasons for such a form of 
dismissal must be related to "important" terms of the 
contract (27). In Germany, a termination without notice 
(außerordentliche Kündigung, extraordinary dismissal) is 
also based on general service contract law provisions of the 
Civil Code (28). The main aspect of this form of dismissal 
is that it is immediately effective. However, if
successfully contested in court, a summary dismissal can be 
dangerous for the German employer, because there is the
possibility of reinstatement orders coupled with severe 
compensation or back payments. In France, the above- 
mentioned notification procedure applies to all workers 
covered by the Law of 1973; the sanctions in case of 
employer non-compliance, however, seem to be widely disputed
25) Sec. 622 (3) and (4) of the German Civil Code.
26) Cf. the description of the procedure to be followed in
Javillier 1981: 304-9.
27) Hepple and O'Higgins 1981, para. 553 ff..
28) Sec. 622 (1) of the German Civil Code.
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among the courts (29). The time limit in which a claim can 
be presented to the labour court also varies among the 
countries. In Britain, a claim must be filed within three
months of the effective date of termination (30). In
Germany, the employee has to present the claim within three 
weeks after receipt of the dismissal (31). However, in case 
the claimant does not meet the period a special request can 
be made which has to be filed within six months (32) . It 
will normally be granted if the employee states a reason for 
the delay.
Reasons for Dismissal
There are few differences between the West German,
French and British systems with respect to reasons for 
dismissal. In all three legal systems, the major reasons
are related to the conduct or capability of the employee or
to redundancy situations arising from the company's bad 
economic performance or from changes in the company 
structure. These reasons cover all employer dismissals
which fall within the scope of statutory employment 
protection. The national employment protection statutes
thereby clearly follow the ILO Recommendation that 
"termination of employment should not take place unless 
there is a valid reason for such termination connected with 
the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the 
operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment 
or service" (33).
Dismissals because of redundancy or change in the 
company structure are covered by a separate act in Britain
29) Cf. Javillier 1981: 309-313.
30) Sec. 67 (1) EPCÄ 1978.
31) Sec. 4 KSchG.
32) Sec. 5 KSchG.
33) ILO 1975: 3.
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and separate procedures in France and Germany. The British 
Redundancy Payment Act (34) was adopted in 1965, six years 
before the unfair dismissal protection provisions were 
enacted as part of the Industrial Relations Act 1971. 
However, the redundancy provisions do not aim at dismissal 
protection but rather at fair payments in schemes of 
redundancy compensation (35). An employee can claim 
compensation if certain statutory requirements are 
fulfilled. Redundant jobs must be linked to "ceasement of 
requirement" and "work of a particular kind" (36). And the 
employee must be dismissed for reasons of redundancy; in 
redundancy cases a dismissal is defined in the same way as 
for unfair dismissal (37).
In France, the "dismissal for economic cause" is 
regulated by a special act adopted in 1975. It
distinguishes between economic dismissal of a - single 
employee and the collective dismissal of a group of workers. 
In cases of economically motivated dismissals, a prior 
authorization from the administration has to be granted. 
The French employer must in these cases first inform the 
works council, then hear the employee, and thirdly apply 
with the inspecteur for authorization of the dismissal. 
After successful application with the administration, the 
employer can notify the employee the dismissal; the worker 
then has the right to file a suit with the labour court
(38). The procedures for dismissal of ten employees or more 
are even more strict. The comité d'entreprise may ask for a 
"social plan"; it is compulsory for the employer to consult 
the works council and the authority and time limits given to 
the inspector are generous.
34) The Redundancy Payment Act 1965 is now consolidated in 
the EPCA 1978, Part VI.
35) Cf. the discussion in Davies and Freedland 1979: 394- 
424.
36) EPCA 1978 s. 81 (2) and Napier et al. 1981: 45-8.
37) Hepple and Fredman 1986: 165.
38) The procedure is described in Napier, Javillier and 
Verge 1982: 89 ff..
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In Great Britain collective redundancies must be 
discussed with the workers representatives. If the employer 
fails to consult them, this can lead to a protective award 
issued by the Industrial Tribunal on complaint of the trade 
union. The effect of the award is the suspension of the 
redundancy action and a right to wages of the employees made 
redundant. The employer also has to notify the Department 
of Employment of a prospective collective redundancy action
(39) .
In West Germany, so-called mass dismissals are 
regulated by separate provisions of the Employment 
Protection Act. In cases where changes in the structure of 
the firm lead to a dismissal of a considerable number of 
employees, remedies have to be negotiated in a social plan 
between management and the works council (40).
The ability of an employee to terminate the contract 
due to unacceptable behaviour of his/her employer, known as 
the concept of "constructive dismissal," seems to be further 
developed in Britain than in France or Germany (41).
39) Hepple and Fredman 1986: 167.
40) In Germany, local labour administrations have to be 
informed in cases of mass dismissal. See sec. 17 KSchG.
41) EPCA 1978 s. 55 (2) (c) . A short discussion of
"constructive dismissal" from a German point of view can 
be found in Döse- Digenopoulos 1982, 34/5. Only to a
certain degree is constructive dismissal also known in 
West German law. In sec. 626 (Kündigung aus wichtigem 
Grund) of the German Civil Code, there is a provision 
for dismissal without notice in cases of so-called "good 
cause". This paragraph —  in conjunction with sec. 628 
(compensation) of the Civil Code —  legally applies to 
both parties of the employment contract, but is widely 
used only by employers. An overview of the few Labour 
Court rulings on "good cause" in cases involving 
employee dismissals can be found in Schaub 1987: 622-4, 
para. 125 (VIII).
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Remedies
The major legal remedies granted in the unfair 
dismissal legislation of the three jurisdictions are 
reinstatement and compensation. All three systems place 
strong legal emphasis on re-employment whether at the same 
job as before (reinstatement) or at a new job with the same 
employer (re-engagement). However, unlike the United States 
where, according to an older study (42) , an arbitration 
award in favour of the discharged employee leads to 
reinstatement in about half of the cases, in all European 
countries re-employment orders are rather exceptional. This 
will be discussed later with respect to empirical studies 
and statistics on modes of termination in labour courts and 
implementation problems.
A right to retain employment during the judicial 
proceedings (WeiterbeschSftigungsanspruch) has been 
discussed almost from the beginning of statutory employment 
protection. In West Germany, a new situation has emerged 
since the decision of the "Upper Division" of the Federal 
Labour Court of 27 February 1985; the Federal Labour Court 
decided that at least during appeal proceedings a dismissed 
worker is legally entitled to be actually employed if he or 
she received a favourable decision in the first instance 
(43). In Britain, "interim relief", i.e. reinstatement 
during the legal proceedings, can be granted on special 
request in cases of so-called "inadmissible reasons" for 
dismissals which mainly are related to union activity (44). 
With respect to compensation, British law grants payments 
only in case of a positive decision of the Industrial
41) Holly 1957. Similar rates of actual re-employment have 
been reported in Quebec; cf. Napier et al 1983: 172.
43) Decision of the Federal Labour Court of 27 February 
1985: BAG Der Betrieb 1985: 55/6.
44) Cf. EPCA 1978 sec. 77-79 and Hepple and O'Higgins 1981: 
301/2.
296
Tribunal on unfair dismissal. French law, on the other 
hand, allows a modest sum to be paid even if there was an 
"actual and serious cause" for the dismissal. The French 
regulation is similar to the practice in Germany, in that in 
most cases the German employee will get some payments; but 
it is not so much the law which grants payments but the 
agreements between the parties reached in court which lead 
to compensation. And it is likely that the labour court 
decision may grant compensation instead of reinstatement.
In general, it is possible to conclude that there are 
slight differences with respect to the concepts of 
dismissal, whereas the statutory reasons or causes of 
dismissal are rather similar. In this context it seems 
useful to distinguish between ideological judicial 
approaches industrial relations and standards developed in 
judgments of particular situations. It is generally left to 
the judiciary to interpret, adjust, and shape the legal 
norms on dismissal. Basic principles like "fairness" or 
"socially warranted" grant sufficient discretion to the 
courts to allow them to establish their own policies in the 
creation of standards. It lies beyond the scope of the 
present analysis, however, to make a sufficient judgment 
about the extent of convergence which occurs between these 
judicial standards. There are certain indications which 
make such a convergence plausible (45).
A last remark can be made with respect to the 
"functional" approach to dismissal laws. A functional 
comparison of norms would be concerned with the protective 
function of dismissal law or the extent to which managerial
45) It should be possible to compare German judicial 
standards, documented for example in Schaub 1987, and 
British judicial standards on employment law, as they 
are documented in the annotations of Drake and Bercusson
1981. This comparison might reveal an interesting 
convergence on the level of judicial decision-making 
which occurs despite the undeniable differences of 
judicial attitudes within the British and German legal 
system.
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control is supported or recovered through these norms (46). 
In general, the functional questions are concerned with the 
impact of employment protection norms on economic processes. 
The present analysis does not go so far. It is, however, 
compatible with the functional approach, since it is also 
concerned with the application and outcome of substantive 
dismissal norms with respect to actual processes of labour 
conflict resolution. Included in the present analysis is a 
discussion of the status and relevance of remedies, i.e., an 
evaluation of compensation and reinstatement rates. The 
analysis of remedies granted by the judiciaries is one 
important element in the overall evaluation of dismissal 
laws which generally proceeds by contrasting aims of 
employment protection laws and actual performance of job 
protection under these laws.
The Legal Status of Collective Agreements and Shop Floor 
Regulations
From a private law perspective labour law is the law of 
the dependent employee. It is characterized by an 
individualistic approach which concentrates on the contract 
of employment. This individualistic approach has dominated 
traditional labour law (47) . However, from the beginning of 
the discussion of a separate field of labour law it has been 
argued that the civil law approach is inappropriate to the 
conceptualization labour law. This became especially 
apparent with respect to collective bargaining and 
collective bargaining agreements. The discussion of the 
legal nature of collective communications was a driving 
force for a legal conception of labour law separate from
46) Cf. Hepple 1980.
47) A good example for the external private law view of 
collective bargaining is BiedenXopf 1964.
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private law (48). Indeed, the legal status of the 
collective agreement created a number of problems for legal 
doctrine in most countries. In addition, shop floor 
regulations agreed upon by unions and management led to 
debates to transcend the private law approach in labour law.
Since Hugo Sinzheimer introduced his concept of a 
corporative labour norm contract (49), labour lawyers are 
used to distinguishing between an obligatory and a normative 
aspect of collective bargaining agreements. Otto Kahn-Freund 
(50) has developed on this basis his theoretical distinction 
of the collective bargaining agreement as a contract and as 
a code. Whereas the obligatory or contractual element binds 
the parties to the contract, the normative aspect of the 
collective bargaining agreement creates a code which governs 
the individual employment relationship. The collective 
bargaining agreement as code is incorporated into and forms 
part of the individual contract of employment, and the wage 
claim of the individual employee derives from this normative 
part of the collective bargaining agreement.
This basic distinction underlies the regulation of 
collective bargaining in Germany (Tarifvertraasaesetz of 
1949) and the French regulations on collective bargaining 
in the Code du Travail. Although similar in theory, the 
legal status of the British collective agreement differs in 
practice from the American and most European approaches. 
Bob Hepple describes the difference of the British 
collective bargaining agreement as a result of the 
voluntarist tradition:
"The British approach differs from that in the United States 
because the collective agreement does not provide all the
48) See the German debate on an independent legal field of 
labour law since Sinzheimer 1906 summarized in Däubler 
and Hege 1981 who argue for "eigenständige, vom BGB 
losgelöste Regeln" to regulate collective bargaining.
49) Sinzheimer 1907/08.
50) Kahn-Freund 1983b.
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terms, and from that in most European countries, because the 
collective agreement does not provide compulsory minimum 
terms." (51).
The collective bargaining agreement reflects the 
voluntary nature of British industrial relations. It is not 
considered a private law contract between the collective 
parties, and the extent to which the collective agreement is 
legally binding is debated from case to case (52). This is 
also a result of the fact that British labour law forms part 
of a common law system. Efforts to improve the legal status 
of collective agreements have not been very successful (53). 
On the contrary the Conservative Employment Act 1980, for 
example, which removed sanctions on employers in cases of 
violation of collectively agreed "terms and conditions" 
(repeal of Schedule 11 of the Labour "Employment Protection 
Act" of 1975), deliberately weakened the legal status and 
the regulatory power of collective bargaining (54).
Workers and employers have no right to enforce the 
collective agreement beyond its express or implied 
incorporation in the individual employment contracts. 
However, there is a strong individualist tradition within 
the common law and its understanding in British courts (55). 
They have protected the concept of the free labour contract 
and the freedom of individual parties to contract about all 
conditions of work despite the collective agreement against 
collective bargaining or statutory regulation (56). "The 
idea of positive legal regulation of the contract of 
employment by imperative norms is alien to the common law 
approach." (57) The individualist understanding of the 
contract of employment was responsible for the development
51) Hepple 1983: 402.
52) Doyle 1986: 114-117.
53) Kahn-Freund 1983, ch. 6.
54) Cf. Hepple and O'Higgins 1981, par. 55, p. 32.
55) Hepple and Fredman 1986: 39-41.
56) See Hepple and O'Higgins 1981: 126-131; Davis and
Freedland 1984, ch. 4.
57) Hepple 1983: 400.
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of labour law outside the frame of the contract of 
employment. This "atrophy” (58) is held responsible for the 
fact that legal issues concerning contracts of employment 
still fall under the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and 
not of the Industrial Tribunals in Britain.
Both British employers and unions have maintained their 
traditional opposition to law with respect to legal 
regulation of collective bargaining. Together they are 
largely responsible for the non-binding legal character of 
the collective agreement. They have always felt that a 
diverse, local and flexible character of collective 
bargaining is preferable to legal duties imposed on them by 
statute. It allows British employers to maintain a high 
degree of managerial prerogative in company decision-making 
(59) .
However, the policy of abstentionism, i.e., no state 
regulation or recognition of the collective bargaining 
agreement, was supported by the unions. They adhered to an 
ideology of voluntary regulation of industrial relations 
because they also feared repressive state intervention and 
the imposition of legal responsibilities on them. In the 
unions' view, legally binding collective agreements 
undermine their ability to engage in collective action at 
any time; unions need this freedom in order to be powerful 
enough to achieve joint job regulation in a state of truce 
at the company level.
The legal nature of shop floor rules provides another 
example of differences of approach in private law and in 
labour law which are linked to the collective character of 
communication in industrial relations. Shop floor rules 
were a major concern in British labour law. Since the 
Donovan report, employment policies have placed high 
emphasis on these rules. The legal approach was supposed to
58) Kahn-Freund 1977: 524.
59) Donovan Report 1968, paras. 127/8.
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reflect the voluntarist tradition. The solution was the so- 
called Code of Practice which was designed by a government 
agency (ACAS) as a model procedure to be implemented by 
companies.
From a reflexive labour law point of view, the Codes of 
Practice are a good example of the legal recognition of 
self-regulation. Their legal status is facilitative. 
Employers are forced by circumstances and conditions over 
which they have control to implement the code, but not by 
force of law. By not following the code employers can take 
the risk of losing in an Industrial Tribunal.
Shop floor rules have been discussed both in French 
and in German labour law in a manner rather typical of the 
analytical tradition of private law doctrine in these 
countries. The puzzling aspect of shop floor rules for 
these legal discussions is the source of law. In German 
legal literature shop floor rules are distinguished with 
respect to their source of origin. Shop floor rules are 
either regulated through collective agreement or through 
statute. A third type of rules exists which creates special 
problems, i.e. rules which originate from individual legal 
action but have collective legal effects. For these the 
following categories have been developed: unified regulation 
of employment contracts (arbeitsvertragliche
Einheitsregelung); company customs (Betriebsübung); and 
employer's general offer (Gesamtzusage) (60).
Franz-JUrgen Säcker has suggested calling shop floor 
rules "general rules of work conditions" . (Allgemeine 
Arbeitsbedingungen) for which a separate law should be 
created, analogous to the German law of general contract 
terms and conditions (Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen) which 
regulate the fine print in the contract (61). According to 
Säcker, shop floor rules create a special problem because
60) Zöllner 1983: 67/8.
61) Säcker 1972; Däubler 1986: 97-111.
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they are often unilaterally imposed by management on the 
individual contract of employment. He proposes that they 
receive special statutory recognition and be subject to 
review by the courts. They could be challenged on the 
grounds of unfair restrictions of the freedom both to enter 
and to carry out the employment contract. The German 
legislator has not yet picked up on this idea of general 
rules of work conditions, and statutory recognition of these 
rules remains scattered.
Procedure«/ Conflict Resolution and Company Decision-Making
Labour conflict resolution is carried out in 
procedures. The legal regulation of procedures is
traditionally confined to concerns of the legal system. 
Implicitly the procedural law of labour conflict resolution 
has always borrowed its rules from other procedural codes. 
From a reflexive labour law point of view, this can be 
understood as a self-limitation of labour law to the
regulatory concerns of the legal system. Instead the
contribution of procedures to self-regulation in other 
social systems should become a central concern for
procedural labour law.
Three aspects in the development of procedures can be 
emphasized which enhance self-regulation in other systems: 
decentralization of decision-making; the legitimation 
capacities of procedures; and self-regulation of the company 
by reintegration of industrial relations.
Decentralization of regulation of social conflicts is 
central to a reflexive law concept, and, in particular, to 
reflexive labour law. Teubner defines reflexive regulation 
in general by referring to "dezentrale Mechanismen der 
Selbststeuerung, in denen das staatliche Recht nur die
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Rahmenbedingungen reguliert" (62). Conflict regulation in 
organizations is for him a prime example of decentralized 
decision-making in an autopoietic legal system (63).
Traditionally, the judicial stage in conflict 
resolution is seen as the center beneath which other formal 
or informal procedures are grouped. The traditional 
approach views the division of labour between procedures 
from a vertical point of view. It locates procedures at 
different organizational levels and explicitly or implicitly 
assumes that hierarchical command and control structures 
characterize the relationship of procedures as a relation 
between levels of appeal. The higher (judicial) levels 
control the lower (judicial and extra-judicial) levels.
In accordance with the vertical view, the relation of 
extra-judicial and judicial procedures is regarded as a 
filter system. Negotiation, conciliation and mediation are 
types of procedures which are designed to sort out the petty 
problems which would only burden the courts. However, 
though judicial procedures (and some extra-judicial 
procedures) are internally hierarchically related, it seems 
nowadays questionable whether the vertical model should be 
extended to cover the relationship between extra-judicial 
and judicial procedures as well. The vertical view is 
coming under increasing challenge in this respect. Instead, 
a division of labour between judicial and extra-judicial 
procedures is emphasized (64), and the relation of these 
procedures is thus viewed as a horizontal arrangement.
Studies that arrange procedures horizontally draw on 
the legal pluralist analysis, which views traditional and 
informal procedures as extra-judicial rather than pre­
judicial (65). Instead of focusing on the filter function,
62) Teubner 1989: 85.
63) Ibid: 49.
64) Blankenburg and Rogowski 1983.
65) On legal pluralism and litigation theory see Griffiths 
1983.
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the division of labour in conflict resolution between 
procedures is seen as differentiation of procedures along 
functional lines (66).
The functional view is supported by conflict theories 
which are concerned with the adequacy of the procedure to 
resolving the conflict. It has been proposed to evaluate 
the adequacy of legal procedures with respect to their 
"proximity to the conflict" (Konfliktnahe). This concept 
asks whether procedures are 'close' to the social sub-system 
from which the conflict derives, whether the procedure is 
able to adequately distinguish the type of conflict and 
whether it acknowledges the steps in the juridification 
process of the conflict in which the parties themselves 
define the dispute (67). Compatible with the horizontal 
analytical approach, 'conflict-proximity' research assumes 
that extra-judicial procedures are generally better equipped 
for many conflicts currently handled by the courts. On this 
basis it predicts further decentralization of decision­
making to extra-judicial fora (68).
Horizontally arranged procedures are generally 
classified according to the degree of third party influence. 
Five ideal types of conflict resolution procedure have been 
distinguished in legal pluralist analyses.
(i) Negotiation: The parties to the conflict or their 
representatives negotiate face to face. Only the rules and 
expectations which bear on the negotiations are forms of 
invisible third parties.
(ii) Conciliation: A third party only facilitates a
settlement between the parties by serving as go-between.
66) See Holtwick-Mainzer 1985. On functional
differentiation of labour courts see Rottleuthner 1985.
67) Falke and Gessner 1982.
68) BUnger and Moritz 1983 propose differentiatian of 
procedures and decentralized decision-making in line 
with the concept of conflict proximity for the German 
labour court.
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(iii) Mediation: The third party involved submits a
proposal for resolution which is not, however, considered as 
having a binding effect.
(iv) Arbitration: The award of the arbitrator is
binding on the basis of a prior agreement between the 
parties to submit to arbitration. The parties might have 
discretion in choosing an ad hoc arbitrator.
(v) Adjudication: Once the conflict is submitted to
adjudication the parties lose control over the procedure. 
They are bound by the procedural rules in seeking conflict 
resolution.
Legal pluralist decision-making in decentralized 
procedures is in fact not a new phenomenon. In his article 
on "Special Courts, Special Law: Legal Pluralism in 19th
Century England" (69), Arthurs has traced early examples of 
decentralized decision-making in the English judicial 
system. His analysis of local courts in 18 th and 19 th 
century England criticizes the dominant views on the 
hierarchical organization of the legal system. He offers an 
alternative view:
"... local and special justice collided with the cherished 
assumptions of common lawyers about the inherent 
desirability of a unified, hierarchically organized, legal 
system. ... As the organizing principles in the design of a 
new system of conventional courts, unity and hierarchy may 
perhaps be at least defensible, if not inevitable. But as 
descriptions of the past they are misleading, and as 
prescriptions for the future allocation of caseload ... 
fatally inadequate." (70)
4
Furthermore, despite suppression of special courts, 
Arthurs argues, commercial arbitration, government 
inspectorates and commissions have always been used 
regardless of the dominant political and ideological views 
on the proper organization of the judicial system. "De
69) Arthurs 1984.
70) Arthurs: 403-4.
306
facto, not de jure, (legal) pluralism survived and indeed 
flourished." (71). Arthur's discovery of autonomous 
decentralized judicial decision-making is thus not just a 
historical reminiscence of the last century.
The material presented in the previous chapters reveals 
several examples of decentralized decision-making both 
within the judicial system and in extra-judicial procedures.
At the judicial level, courts and in particular labour 
courts in France and in Germany are characterized by 
procedural pressures to seek conciliation at every stage of 
the procedure. Only the parties can ultimately decide on 
this option of a conciliated or mediated settlement, though 
they often do so with the active encouragement of the judge 
(72) . This to some extent delegates decision-making to the 
parties themselves. A settlement reached in conciliation 
cannot be appealed, and therefore removes the dispute from 
the legal system at this stage. This courtroom conciliation 
is a rudimentary form of decentralized conflict resolution 
within the judiciary.
Luhmann's theory of procedure utilizes differentiation 
theory and the concept of an interaction system.
Decentralization of decision-making can take the form 
of formal delegation of decision-making to extra-judicial 
conflict resolution processes. Company level procedures are 
usually based on negotiation and arbitration. Outside the 
company, extra-judicial procedures involve conciliation, 
mediation and arbitration procedures (73). In looking at
71) Arthurs: 407.
72) Rogowski 1982.
73) Rottleuthner makes a useful analytical distinction of
three types of procedures which are located between 
company level and labour courts: collective extra­
company procedures (arbitration); administrative extra­
company procedures (safety and health agencies, chambers 
of commerce) and pre- judicial procedures (legal 
departments of interest associations, law offices). See 
Rottleuthner 1984c: 350.
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decentralization or delegation of decision-making to extra­
judicial procedures, some results of the comparative 
analyses on autonomous decision-making and procedural 
differentiation might be presented to indicate the extent of 
legal pluralism in labour conflict resolution in the various 
countries.
The U.S. grievance procedures with final and binding 
arbitration concentrate the settlement of disputes on an 
intra-company, on-the-spot and private level, free from both 
state intervention and judicial review. This grievance 
arbitration system is given a high degree of autonomy. 
Supported by the courts and by administrative agencies, the 
federal government has delegated most decision-making powers 
in employment conflicts to private arbitration. And the 
main actors, i.e. management, unions and arbitrators, 
actively engage in maintaining decentralized decision-making 
at local company level.
Freeman and Medoff have argued that the new non-union 
grievance procedure systems which some U.S. companies have 
introduced must still be understood as responses to union 
supported grievance arbitration systems (74). However, I 
would suggest that the relative success of grievance 
arbitration regulating shop floor affairs, rather than union 
pressure has inspired union-free companies to engage in 
joint employee-management cooperation in order to solve 
their conflicts .
The American company grievance procedure, which is set 
out in a collective agreement concluded between management 
and the local section of only one union that has won the 
elections at the company level and thus serves as exclusive 
bargaining representative, forms an elaborate decentralized 
system of labour conflict resolution. This system is 
characterized by both a high degree of formalization of the
74) Freeman and Medoff 1984: 154.
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procedure and sensivity towards collective interests. As 
the collective parties remain ultimately in control of 
regulation of their affairs it is a clear form of self­
regulation by joint decision-making.
From the perspective of individual employees, however, 
the formalized character of company grievance procedures 
with different steps to be followed may turn into a series 
of elaborate barriers. A major obstacle to the individual 
employee initiating conflict resolution on his ownbehalf 
might already be the decision of the shop steward to process 
the case in view of the collective control of the procedure 
(75) . These formalized procedures thus encourage informal 
settlements through a "deterrent effect" with respect to 
costs, delay and formal behaviour. Thus, the formal 
grievance procedure has to be viewed as background and 
instrument for reaching informal settlement (76), similar to 
the role of law and courts in creating the necessary 
background for out-of-court settlements.
American grievance arbitration is a good example of 
'juridification at a decentralized level'. American 
arbitrators increasingly use judicial standards to conduct 
arbitration hearings and in making awards. The leading 
textbook for American arbitrators concludes with an 
appraisal of the close relationship between 'rights 
arbitration' and the American formal legal system. It 
praises American arbitrators for "effectively utilizing 
established legalisms without paying slavish deference 
thereto." (77) Decentralized decision-making is reinforced 
by the control the parties exercise over the procedure 
including, significantly, the choice of the third party. 
The arbitrator has a relatively weak organizational status
75) See only Rogowski 1983b: 211.
76) On the extent and forms of informal norms, procedures 
and behaviour at the workplace see Dombois 1982 for 
Germany; Dezalay 1985 for France; and Terry 1977 for 
Britain.
77) Elkouri and Elkouri 1985: 852.
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compared with a judge. Only if negotiations fail do the 
parties appoint the arbitrator "ad hoc"; his weak 
organizational status is illustrated by the fact that he 
hears the case on the company premises, and that after he 
has given his arbitration decision he has virtually no 
further authority. Astonishingly, this weak organizational 
status, in general, causes no observable harm to the 
reputation of the arbitrators. American arbitrators receive 
their high social status from careers in other capacities.
Great Britain has successfully implemented dismissal 
procedures at the company level, which sometimes allow joint 
decision-making but "remain for the most part managerial 
procedures, devised and operated by management, without an 
independent appeal stage." (78). The official government 
agency ACAS facilitates settlements not reached in the 
dispute procedures through the active assistance of a 
neutral official who sees the parties on his own initiative. 
Usually, however, the employee has already filed a claim 
with the Industrial Tribunal at this stage.
Increasing decentralized decision-making activity in 
dispute procedures at the company level can be observed in 
Great Britain in the increase of (more or less) mutual 
agreements over dismissal. This trend underlies the growing 
number of non-IT-1 petitions filed directly with ACAS by 
employers who seek to ratify dismissal agreements 
independently reached by the parties. These petitions, once 
ratified, exclude the possibility of subsequent tribunal 
complaint. As a percentage of ACAS individual conciliation 
cases non-IT-1 petitions have increased from 2 percent in 
1976 to 32 percent in 1987 (79). Rather than limiting the
scope for decentralized decision-making, ACAS is being 
instrumentalized to make decentralized decisions binding. 
In addition, the thesis can be propounded that the rigid and
78) Dickens et al. 1985: 238.
79) ACAS 1988, Ch. 6.
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time-consuming judicial proceedings at the Industrial 
Tribunal level have a certain "deterrent effect" on both 
employer and employee which fosters their propensity to 
reach an amicable agreement.
Another example of decentralized decision-making, in 
West Germany, are negotiations between the works council and 
management and the arbitration committee (Einiaunasstelle). 
In case of disagreement over the enforcement or 
interpretation of dismissal of a group of workers, the works 
council or management can call for arbitration which 
eventually leads to a hearing before a tripartite bench. 
Arbitration committees at the company level increasingly 
handle conflicts which could go to the labour courts. It is 
said to be adopting increasingly judicial standards (80) . 
Thus, although arbitration committees are as independent as 
their American counterparts they show a similar tendency of 
legalism which derives not least from the participation of 
labour court judges as arbitrators.
The German arbitration committees have recently 
encountered some criticism about the high costs resulting 
from high fees for the arbitrator. Considering that most 
arbitrators are in fact labour court judges, it has recently 
been suggested that the Association of Labour Court Judges 
(Deutscher Arbeitsaerichtsverband) should design guidelines 
for arbitration fees (81). A more fundamental criticism, 
reminiscent of the relentless critiques of American Critical 
Legal Scholars of grievance arbitration, has been made by 
Erd.
He criticizes the fact that the participation of 
management in decision-making limits the enforcement of 
labour's rights in general. Hearings and negotiations in 
front of the arbitration panel are criticized for being 
private and not public. And the existence of judicial
80) ACAS 1985: 64 and 1988: 56.
81) Hartmann 1987.
311
review is excluded (82). DSubler rejects some of Erd's 
points and takes a more optimistic view with respect to the 
potential use of arbitration committees by collective and 
individual parties. He points out that the committee is 
free to decide on a public hearing and that the collective 
parties can agree in the company agreement that public 
access to the hearing is guaranteed at any time (83).
In general Germany is undergoing decentralization with 
respect to its collective bargaining system. Regional and 
industry-wide collective bargaining are declining to some 
extent and company agreements are on the rise (84) . 
Conflict resolution mechanisms at the company level will 
have to be reformed to take up the function of an immune 
system of the collective bargaining system at the company 
level.
West German disciplinary procedures (Betriebsiustiz) 
are also an example of the decentralization of decision­
making in large firms. Research on these disciplinary 
procedures found a multitude of work rules and formal 
procedures for dealing with deviant employee behaviour at 
the level of personnel management of large companies. 
However, it also reports that extensive customs and 
practices of discretionary justice guide disciplinary 
actions at the lower company levels of first-line 
supervisors (85). Thus most disciplinary conflicts are 
decentrally decided in informal procedures.
A comparison of the forms of procedure shows that the 
United States places a high emphasis on company negotiation 
systems and that procedurally, the U.S. has developed a
82) See Hanau 1983: 263. There are however many other
proposals how to regulate arbitration fees in west 
Germany.
83) Erd 1978: 84-86.
84) See only Buchner 1990: 17-18.
85) Kaiser and Metzger-Pregizer 1976: 102. Daubler 1985: 
425.
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highly decentralized system. Great Britain has a mixture of 
centralized and decentralized decision-making. And Germany 
maintains a highly centralized system focusing on judicial 
decision-making but is developing certain tendencies 
towards decentralized decision-making in arbitration 
committees and disciplinary procedures at the company level. 
And even France has recently started to foster decentralized 
decision- making by strengthening the position of personnel 
delegates and enterprise committees. They are becoming 
bargaining agents and consultative bodies in company 
decision-making and conflict resolution at the workplace.
There are signs that the labour law system realizes the 
needs of the industrial relations system for self­
regulation. Ulrich Goll (86) has analyzed a practical 
aspect of the proceduralization of arbitration as a result 
of judicial policies. According to his analysis of German 
law, both the legal doctrine and the judicial policy of the 
Federal Labour Court have created legal structures of 
conflict resolution and collective bargaining which favour 
procedural requirements over substantive conditions. In 
particular the concept of power parity (KampfParität) 
indicates a withdrawal of substantive welfare state
intervention in favour of procedural solutions which are not 
only acceptable to the negotiating parties but also 
compatible with major structures of the collective
bargaining system and principles of the welfare state 
representing the public interest. In addition "power
parity" is a legal concept which establishes a "sound" basis
for judicial review of industrial actions accompanying
collective bargaining. Inherent in the concept of power 
parity is the tendency to favour compromise over "all or 
nothing" decisions.
Decentralization in employment conflict resolution has 
an impact on labour courts. Decentralization of decision-
86) Goll 1980.
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making does not challenge judicial values. It does, however, 
develop into polycentral decision-making which replaces 
legal reasoning with other forms of reasoning adequate to 
the new centers of social bargaining. Judicial decision­
making is in some cases suspended when in decentralized, 
horizontally arranged fora a settlement is attempted. 
Nevertheless, judicial decision-making is also reinforced by 
decentralized decision-making. Labour courts are accepted in 
certain circumstances to act as third parties whose role is 
to provide specialized knowledge on legal questions. Thus 
the legal character of labour courts will become more 
important for institutions of decentralized decision-making 
than their conciliation function.
Self-Régulâtion and Legitimation by Procedure
The analysis of procedures has gradually changed its 
framework. It has moved from analyses of procedural norms to 
studies of the participants to analyses of legal procedures 
as complex social institutions. Modern research takes both a 
broader and a more precise viewpoint with regard to legal 
procedure as social institution. The context as well as the 
internal operations of procedures are studied.
With respect to differentiation theory, Luhmann argues 
rather formally for procedural differentiation of judicial 
and extra-judicial procedures. Judicial procedures should 
be restricted to rule application. Mediation, conciliation 
or arbitration should be excluded from judicial procedures. 
Luhmann has argued many times that judicial conflict 
resolution should refrain from broad considerations of 
factual conflict matters and that it should only be 
concerned with strictly legal questions (87). Arbitration 
or mediation in the courtroom is seen by him as a "perverse"
87) See only Luhmann 1974: 31 ff and 1986a: 28 ff.
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form of adjudication because it neglects basic dimensions of 
the judicial process. Settlement attempts in the courtroom 
are only viewed in this perspective as "episodes" and part- 
time suspensions of the real tasks of the judicial and legal 
system. Luhmann maintains that the judicial procedure 
remains the center of conflict resolution after the social 
conflict has been transformed into a legal conflict.
Luhmann analyzes procedures as interaction systems. He 
has contributed an important aspect of the self-regulatory 
mechanisms of procedures as interaction systems. This aspect 
relates to their capacity to legitimate both the procedure 
itself and the decisions reached in the procedure (88).
Luhmann analyzes procedures as systems of social 
interaction. Modern procedures are characterized by role 
division, external control through programs and a neutral 
third party. A modern procedure distinguishes between the 
roles of the participants. These roles are not defined by 
the social status of the participants but instead by the 
structure of the procedure. Modern procedures achieve 
autonomy by gaining control over the evidence. In autonomous 
procedures the assessment of the evidence is linked solely 
to the evidence presented during the procedure. However, 
modern procedures are externally controlled and guided by 
programs created separately from the procedure. Thus 
procedures for dispute resolution apply programs but do not 
create them. If decision-making in the procedure is handed 
over to a third party, this party is given a neutral role.
Luhmann's system theory of procedure banishes the 
question of the adequacy of the procedure for conflict 
resolution into the "environment" of the system 'procedure'. 
As with other systems, procedure is generally characterized 
by its ability to draw boundaries with the environment. 
Autonomy is won by the procedure in the processes of
88) Luhmann 1978a.
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distinguishing itself from the surrounding world. 
Conditions for relatively autonomous procedure are: a
certain time period for processing information; a general 
guarantee of procedure and freedom of decision-making; a 
distinction between normative and factual questions; and 
premises for the decision which are not predetermined.
Autonomous procedures develop networks between the 
professionals, which Luhmann calls contact systems. They 
have their own structures and rules. The so-called "Gesetz 
des Wiedersehens" or law of meeting again among 
professionals forces the decision, and even procedural
events, to relate to events in other procedures. The 
recognition of constellations of power and many other 
factors result in an increase in procedural complexity. 
Therefore contact systems have a tendency to settle the
dispute informally outside the procedure (89).
Luhmann sees the real benefit of procedure as the 
creation of "the readiness of the citizen ... to accept 
decisions independent of content and reasoning —  not
necessarily also as correct” (90). This process of 
legitimation by procedure relates to the way in which the 
roles, defined by the procedure, are assumed by the various 
parties. Role assumption implies the recognition of the
role of the other party, and thus results in a "constraint" 
(91) on the personality, which ultimately leads to the 
acceptance of the decisions.
The permissable conflict in the procedure is designated 
by Luhmann as a verbal dispute. It is crucial for the 
judicial procedure that there is no predetermined decision. 
The conflicting parties have to act in procedural roles, a
89) With respect to judicial procedures Luhmann, a former 
administrator and trained judge, considers informal or 
out of court settlements to be "dubious". See Luhmann 
1978a: 80.
90) Luhmann 1978a: 82.
91) Luhmann 1978a: 87.
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condition which places restrictions on their behaviour. 
Procedures require consistent presentation of information 
from the parties to create a valid basis for decision. 
Continuous party presentation leads to the development of a 
case history which constrains further procedural 
development. However, Luhmann recognizes limits to the 
learning capacity of the parties. He concedes that inner 
conviction or positive recognition by the parties of a 
success or defeat in the decision is a rather improbable 
result in conventional procedures. The real benefit of a 
procedure is, from a sociological view, the "absorption of 
protest" (92). Luhmann's systems theory asserts that the 
modern procedure has an overall legitimation benefit in that 
it serves the purpose of social learning. Successful 
learning has taken place when expectations have changed 
regardless of personal approval of outcomes.
Teubner has used Luhmann's concept of procedure in his 
analysis of the legal system. He argues that the legal 
system itself "learns" through its procedures. Teubner 
considers legal procedures the place of "ontogenetic 
learning" where the legal system experiences the real world 
through variation of norms and selection by decision. As 
procedures are limited in their ability to retain 
experiences in a "procedural history", the legal system 
provides legal doctrine which is the subject of 
communication in a "second circle":
"Das Rechtsverfahren ist sozusagen das Experimentierfeld des 
Rechts, in dem Normzumutungen als Variationsmechanismen und 
Rechtsentscheidungen als Selektionsmechanismen zusammen­
spielen. Über die Retention entscheidet erst der zweite 
Kommunikationskreislauf, (comma added, R.R.) in dem über die 
Tradierung der Rechtskultur verhandelt wird." (93)
Differentiation of legal procedures is thus for Teubner 
a result of legal self-regulation. Procedural improvements
92) Luhmann 1978a: 116.
93) Teubner 1989: 77.
317
attached to the judicial system are exclusively internal 
affairs of the judicial system, i.e., 'internal variation of 
access to justice conditions' (94). Nevertheless, it still 
remains a normal task for the legal system regulate other 
subsystems, for example through prescription of procedures. 
Teubner views procedural regulation as the major form to 
which legal regulation will increasingly retreat in the 
future.
Luhmann's system theory of legal procedure is 
preoccupied with legitimacy as procedural benefit. It 
neglects a whole range of socio-legal aspects and functions 
or performances of procedures. In particular, the
possibility of settlement by consensus during the procedure 
is largely neglected, because procedures are conceptually 
aligned toward decision-making. Luhmann's analysis
concentrates on legal procedures. However the effect of 
procedures on extra-judicial bargaining processes remains 
outside the picture. Social structural selectivities which 
relate to variations in both disputes and parties to the 
disputes are underrated in determining performances and 
systemic characteristics of procedure. The case history or 
the "history of the procedure" is analyzed solely from the 
perspective of decision-makers who control the procedure. 
It underrates dynamic aspects of courtroom interaction and 
strategic control by the parties and their representatives. 
In general, Luhmann's system theory of procedure neglects a 
study of the interrelated interactions in the courtroom 
working group.
♦
To reach a general theory of procedure, Luhmann's 
concept has to be transcended into a theory of legal 
procedure as social discourse. Social discourses are 
analyzed as communication systems. The maintenance of 
communication creates the basis for self-reproduction and
94) Teubner 1989: 101.
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autopoiesis. And it creates the basis for dispute 
resolution.
However, discourse theories have so far taken another 
line of argumentation. They criticize systems theory for 
denying the relationship of norms and procedures to moral 
questions of justice and the need for normative 
justification (95). The differentiation of truth and 
procedure, which systems theory views to be a result of 
procedural complexity, allows one to analyze only conditions 
of 'just' decision-making. For discourse theories, legal 
procedures remain ultimately instruments dependent on 
argumentation about moral issues and just and right 
behaviour to justify decision-making (96).
So far, legal procedure as discourse is a philosophical 
and not an empirical concept of procedure. The idea of 
discourse is derived from, and linked to, the idea of an 
"ideal speech situation". Habermas invented this concept as 
a way to solve normative conflicts. Disputants enter an 
imagined procedure in which the validity of a normative 
claim is challenged. The potential disputants are forced, 
in this discourse, to argue. Central to the "regulatory 
idea" of discourse is the belief that the best argument will 
eventually win and convince the opponents. The discourse as 
ideal speech situation is said to guide implicitly all 
argumentation over normative questions. Habermas goes even 
further to argue that ordinary language is dependent on 
there being the possibility of such a discourse. The 
possibility of entering a discourse in case of conflicting 
claims about the validity of the speech act serves as a 
normative guideline and metaconcept in each speech act (97).
The concept of procedure as discourse has been applied 
in a study of forensic communications. Hubert Rottleuthner
95) Alexy 1978: 164.
96) Günther 1988.
97) Habermas 1971.
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has analyzed interactions in political trials. He
interpreted events in these judicial procedures as 
"systematically distorted communication" (98). Judicial 
interactions are viewed as distorted by "asymmetrical"
structures in legal procedures and the "pathological" roles 
of the decision-makers. Rottleuthner overlooks the fact 
that judicial communication is to a large extent only a 
discourse among professionals and not meant to convince lay 
participants.
Rottleuthner's analysis is guided by a concept of
undistorted, "symmetrical" communication, from which 
interactions and structures of actual legal procedures are 
criticized. This normative concept conflates system
references by assuming an overarching model of "symmetric" 
communication. Habermas' discourse theory refers in this 
context to life world structures in which the systemic 
discourses are embedded (99). Their idea of legal procedure 
as discourse suggests including in the empirical study of 
procedures the normative intentions underlying strategic 
interactions which are guided by moral considerations of
justice and fairness. However, their normative concept of 
procedure as discourse has to be integrated into an analysis 
of communication processes which guarantee self-reproduction 
of the procedure.
*
98) Rottleuthner 1973: 158-167.
99) See Habermas 1981.
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Procaduraliaa and Reintegration of Workplace Industrial
Relations
Labour law and labour conflict resolution in 
decentralized bargaining systems are linked to the structure 
of the company or corporation. There are a number of new 
interpretations of the nature of corporations. James 
Coleman, the scholar known for his important studies on 
corporate actors, distinguishes relations of the corporation 
to natural persons and positions. Accordingly, the first 
set of relations is called "positional** rights and the 
second set "contractual" rights. However, Coleman's 
analysis is limited by his adherence to a strict rational 
choice approach in conceptualizing the modern corporation as 
a corporate "actor". Nevertheless, we can reconstruct his 
distinction of positional and contractual rights as 
indicating self-regulation and external legal regulation of 
the corporation. Coleman sees changes in the conception of 
the corporation which are related to different notions of 
the relation of external regulation and self-regulation.
"The modern corporation can increasingly be seen not as a 
machine with parts but as a system of action comparable to 
an unconstrained market, a system where organizational 
structure lies in defining expectations and obligations and 
not exercising authority, but in structuring reward systems 
and providing resources." (100)
Nevertheless, his analysis of the corporation as a 
system which defines expectations, structures and reward 
systems, and which provides resources, points in the right 
direction. The corporation is an organization which 
regulates itself, for example, by integrating self- 
regulatory mechanisms at the shop floor. The new 
corporation discovers the human factor as a collective 
resource. Workplace industrial relations are recognized in
100) Coleman 1990: 436.
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their productive capacity. Unions, employees, management 
and the state (labour inspector, labour administration, tax 
authority etc.) form producer coalitions.
Coleman discusses German co-determination as a model 
which parallels autonomous evolutionary development 
elsewhere. However, his description of German works' 
councils is woefully misinformed. His treatment of 
comparative industrial relations reveals a superficial use 
of empirical information on foreign countries throughout his 
book.
Wolfgang Streeck has analyzed changes in the work-place 
industrial relations system which result from a shift in 
status and contract relations of employees and employers and 
which suggest retreat to proceduralism in regulating 
industrial relations. Streeck (101) sees the challenge of
the Japanese style of production to Western pluralist and
corporatist economies in the functional reintegration of
industrial relations at the workplace. As the motivational 
factor becomes an economic factor once again, regulation of 
workplace industrial relations is increasingly seen as an 
important management task. Countries with traditionally low 
rates of unionization like the U.S. have witnessed a boom in 
so-called human resource management techniques (102) . One 
consequence of the reintegration of industrial relations 
matters into company strategies is the reemphasis on a
flexible individual employment contract. Employees become 
more directly "coupled" to the economic fate of the company.
Reintegration of industrial relations within the 
company poses new challenges to labour law. External 
regulation of company affairs (including workplace 
industrial relations) has to take into account a "shift from
101) Streeck 1991.
102) On the effect of human resource management systems and 
other non-union models on American industrial relations 
see only Kochan, McKersie and Katz 1986.
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'external' market coordination to 'informal' political 
processes" (103) in the company organization. Self­
regulation of workplace industrial relations is no longer 
carried out in an autonomous subsystem. Control of self­
regulation at the workplace increasingly means control of 
conscious decision-making in vital company affairs. In 
fact, with human resource management companies are 
attempting a new form of self-regulation which demands from 
labour law and from unions a new emphasis on representation 
of the employee as an individual.
If self-regulation of workplace industrial relations 
means their reintegration into the company culture, this 
demands new forms of external regulation through procedures. 
In traditional labour law terms, it demands procedures which 
do not replace custom and practice but are designed to 
control self-regulation "in circumstances where power 
conflicts are endemic" (104). Labour law would encounter 
regulatory failure if it intervened in reintegration 
processes with substantive demands. The new development of 
company industrial relations calls for a cautious retreat to 
proceduralism in this respect.
Unions have few choices but to engage in representation 
of the individual employee when workplace industrial 
relations are reintegrated into the core of the company, 
i.e., production. However, the traditional forms of 
collaboration between unions and management seem to some 
degree inadequate to this task. Regulation of new workplace 
industrial relations challenges labour law to offer 
additional procedural forms, thus demanding procedural 
differentiation at the workplace. In fact, retreat to 
proceduralism means an increased demand for new procedures. 
In these new procedures, which might be installed 
independently of co-determination bodies, individual
103) Teubner 1987a: 37.
104) Bercusson 1987: 77.
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employment conflicts could be handled unequivocally. 
Furthermore, these procedures would be designed only to 
create the shadow for negotiations. They become an instance 
of last resort for self-regulation and they are only invoked 
if negotiations fail.
In his comparison of American grievance procedures and 
German participation schemes, Herding showed that the two 
systems of grievance handling at the shop floor are far from 
balanced systems of self-regulation. In contrasting the two 
systems of grievance procedure and works council 
participation with the respective ideals of "job control" 
and "co-determination", he predicted as early as the 
beginning of the 1970s "heightened workers' aspirations for 
self-determination on the job, as well as active management 
reactions to maintain authority" (105). Unions will face 
demands for autonomy and discretion from individual workers, 
work groups, and plant or local bodies.
The 1980s have witnessed massive setbacks for the 
union-controlled systems, and serious debates about 
alternatives to unionization have begun. Kochan, Katz and 
McKersie have outlined likely alternatives to a collective 
bargaining system with union participation. They assess the 
non-union models which were introduced in several major 
companies as a conscious and largely successful effort by 
the employers to engage in human resource management.
"The new nonunion model consists of personnel systems that 
either match union wage and fringe benefit levels in labor 
markets where unions dominate or pay wages higher than 
competitive norms in rural or southern labor markets (but 
wages lower than the union rates found in the more highly 
unionized markets). At the workplace, the new personnel 
systems emphasize greater flexibility in job design and work 
organization, more extensive communications and 
participation in task-related decisions, and other 
behavioral science strategies designed to increase the
105) Gessner reports that Mexican labour courts also handle 
only very few cases that arise from continuing 
employment. Gessner 1976: 227.
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commitment, loyalty, and job satisfaction of employees. As 
a result, employees have fewer incentives to unionize.” 
(106)
The validity of the reintegration thesis as a universal 
trend applying to all companies, regardless of size, can be 
called into question. It seems somewhat doubtful that 
medium-sized or small firms have similar options for 
reintegration to those of multinational and large national 
companies, leaving aside the question of whether workplace 
industrial relations were ever differentiated. It makes an 
important difference if procedural regulation means control 
of self-regulation or control of unilateral decision-making 
by a small entrepreneur. Whereas early judicialization of 
employment conflicts in large companies might only disturb 
self-regulation, in small firms it often is the only option 
and can rapidly lead to overcoming the stalemate and the 
loss of communication in the personal reemployment 
relationship resulting from the disciplinary or dismissal 
action. The finding that employment conflicts of small 
firms are over-represented in German labour courts suggests 
a differentiation of judicial procedures for claims arising 
from small and from large companies (107). Regulation of 
conflict resolution at the judicial level might therefore 
lead to demands for procedural differentiation according to 
the degree of prior juridification of employment conflicts. 
Retreat to proceduralism at the judicial level thus can also 
mean new procedures.
106) Herding 1972: 350.
107) On the differentiation of claims from small firms and
large companies see Blankenburg, Schönholz and Rogowski 
1979: 69- 73. Procedural differentiation for the
different conflicts has been suggested by BUnger and 
Moritz 1983: 183.
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Corporat1st Arrangements in Orlavane* Procedures and
Arbitration
Grievance procedures for employment conflicts, which 
operate as negotiation systems between employer 
representatives and management at the plant level, can be 
conceptualized as micro-corporatist arrangements. Although 
the state usually does not directly participate in these 
procedures, they are state-sponsored fora. In various 
forms, the state compels management and unions to negotiate 
about shop-floor problems. The legal recognition itself is 
a form of state participation. Furthermore, these
negotiation systems are sometimes introduced on the 
initiative of state policies and their implementation and 
operation is monitored by state agencies. Thus the state 
takes part in various forms as a third party and it is 
justified to view these procedures as corporatist 
arrangements at a micro-level.
Comparative accounts of the involvement of governments 
in dispute resolution, at the plant level and in bargaining, 
describe tripartite cooperation with an active role for the 
state as a developing international trend in industrial 
relations (108). In particular the capacity of corporatist 
arrangements not only to solve but "to prevent open conflict 
or to limit it as far as possible" (109) is emphasized. 
Corporatist arrangements are thus an alternative to the 
'negative devices' of simply excluding certain industrial 
activities or repressively limiting the possibilities of 
industrial action (110).
108) See Bean 1985: 122-4; Bamber and Lansbury 1987:20.
109) Hanami and Blanpain 1984: 2/3.
110) On the preventive function of the German model of co­
determination for conflict resolution see Weiss, Simitis 
and Rydzy 1984: 87.
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In Germany and France, corporatism underlies regulatory 
schemes of the company constitution and statutory 
participation rights of worker representatives. In Great 
Britain and the United States, company procedures are 
enhanced either directly, through the issuing of Codes of 
Practices, or indirectly, through administrative control of 
the recognition of union bargaining representatives in 
collective bargaining at the company level.
Conciliation, mediation and arbitration in collective 
(or interest) labour conflicts, as distinct from grievance 
procedures, also operate independently of labour courts. 
The corporatist structures of these collective conflict 
resolution mechanisms depend on the scope of the conflicts. 
Whether collective bargaining or a strike is carried out on 
national, regional or local level will obviously influence 
the level of third-party intervention and the extent of 
cooperation between the industrial parties and the state.
France: "Administrative Corporatism"
It is the far-reaching, although recently limited, 
power of the external inspecteur du travail which lies at 
the center of 'administrative corporatism' in France. The 
inspecteur monitors cooperation and regulation at the 
workplace and, in case self-regulation is not successful, 
can always be called in to intervene in situations of 
stalemate. Moreover, he also has the right, derived from 
his original function as supervisor of health and safety 
matters, to enter the company at any time and intervene on 
his own discretion. The threat of interference may even 
have a preventive effect leading to reconsiderations on the 
part of the management.
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For a long time, the extensive powers of the labour 
inspector characterized French micro-corporatism as forced 
rather than voluntary tripartite cooperation. The
obligatory involvement of the administrative inspecteur du 
travail in employment conflicts offered the state a powerful 
means of intervention. This administrative approach to 
conflict resolution revealed a form of authoritative 
corporatism which has a tendency towards control rather than 
cooperation in labour relations.
The French industrial relations system has been 
strengthened in the work place with the enlargement of the 
conflict resolution functions of personnel delegates and 
enterprise committees in 1986. The powers of the inspector 
were reduced. It is now also true of French micro­
corporatism that the success of conflict-preventive control 
by corporatist structures rests on participatory rather than 
authoritarian attitudes. In a bureaucratic institution, 
much depends on the informal behaviour of the parties, 
including the collective parties. Whereas previously, 
French administrative corporatism relied on informal 
networks established between the inspector and the 
industrial relations actors and thus depended on mutual 
trust relationships, it now can evolve into more cooperative 
relations in which bargaining prevails over implementation 
of authoritative decisions.
As previously mentioned, interest conflicts are settled 
either in obligatory conciliation or in facultative 
arbitration and mediation procedures (111) which are also 
characteristic of French etatist corporatism. The limits of 
administrative corporatism are reflected in the declining 
use of these procedures (112). French corporatism is moving 
away from administrative corporatism.
111) See the figures on declining use in Blanc-Jouvan 1971: 
59, Table 2 and Javillier 1981, 596/7.
112) Stone 1981; Klare 1978; Getmann 1979.
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United states: "Passive corporatism”
Unlike the French preference for state intervention, 
negotiations in grievance procedures, eventually leading to 
private arbitration, are the preferred method of solving 
labour conflicts in American companies. Company dispute 
procedures create autonomous centers for decision-making and 
conflict resolution. The state remains apparently passive. 
However, there are elements or residual forms of corporatism 
in American labour policy and the state support given to
these private institutions which can be labelled passive 
corporatism.
The abstentionist national policy towards workplace 
industrial relations in the U.S. is expressed in the
limitations placed on judicial and administrative review of
arbitration awards as well as other tendencies of non­
intervention, for example the refusal of American policy­
makers to enact unfair discharge legislation. The Labour 
Management Relations Act of 1947 and the Steelworkers
Trilogy of the Supreme Court, as well as NLRB decisions on 
deferral and preemption, are concerted and conscious efforts 
to delegate decision-making to grievance arbitration (113). 
The judicial system offers support in enforcing arbitration 
awards without review of the merits of the case (114).
Although private, these arbitrations enjoy public 
attention. For example many awards are said to be published 
for reasons of "predictability" of decision-making so that 
previous arbitration awards can be used as precedents like 
decisions in ordinary courts (115). The final and binding 
character of arbitration awards has also raised concerns 
with due process at the arbitration hearings. Both these
113) See the section on the NLRB in Chapter II.
114) St. Antoine 1984: 269.
115) On the "precedent value of awards" see Elkouri and
Elkouri 1985: 414-436.
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tendencies make arbitration less informal and more judicial. 
This judicialization of grievance arbitration is partly a 
response to pressures which stem from the invisible third 
person present at the arbitration stage, i.e., the public 
and the state.
Grievance procedures and grievance arbitration are 
embedded in state policies which show residual corporatist 
aspects. The development of private grievance arbitration 
and the tripartite interactions of the labour 
administrations rest on networks of mutual exchange among 
the three collective parties. The origins of the present 
grievance procedures date back to a specific form of 
tripartite cooperation in the World War II War Labor Board 
which encouraged reluctant managers to accept collective 
bargaining in exchange for no-strike agreements and 
grievance procedures. The Board's administrators were 
trained as arbitrators by the state and thereafter moved on 
to private positions as leading scholars, mediators and 
arbitrators (116). It was the conscious decision of U.S. 
policy-makers after WW II to adopt a system of private 
justice at the workplace. This system can be legitimately 
called passive corporatism because the state, although 
remaining in the background, closely monitors private 
bargaining and grievance handling and offers support through 
NLRB, FMCS and various state labour agencies. It is only in 
strike situations which are considered national emergencies 
that the federal state becomes a visible actor in industrial 
relations and actively intervenes with federal injunctions. 
However, if the procedure ends without finding a^ resolution, 
the parties are left with the option of a resort to violent 
action which may in turn provoke the use of military force, 
e.g. the National Guard. Under the Railway Act the National 
Mediation Board suggests voluntary tripartite arbitration in 
case of railway strikes before an emergency procedure is
116) Kochan, McKersie and Katz 1986: 32.
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initiated. This arbitration, however, is also not binding 
(117).
Grievance arbitration panels are also sometimes
composed of a tripartite bench. Although most arbitration 
hearings are held before a single neutral "ad hoc"
arbitrator there are tripartite arbitration boards with a 
neutral arbitrator, and equal representatives from labour 
and management; in some industries (e.g. steel, automobile, 
and aircraft) there are permanent umpires (118).
Britain: "Bargained Corporatism"
It has often been suggested that the major effect of 
introducing a judiciary for labour conflicts in Britain has 
been its "collateral" impact on the establishment of 
grievance procedures at the company level (119). Government 
activities create the "shadow" in which dismissal procedures 
are established and in which they operate. These procedures
are not so much a product of voluntary industrial relations,
but rather have been established after the introduction of a 
state conciliation service and the issuing of a "Code of 
Practice" in industrial relations, first by the Department 
of Employment and then by ACAS.
Dismissal and disciplinary procedures show a micro- 
corporatist character only in a minority of cases. Most of 
these procedures only regulate management behaviour in the 
case of a dismissal decision or disciplinary action. 
However, these procedures become micro-corporatist when they 
open up to joint decision-making with shop stewards.
117) St. Antoine 1985: 263/4.
118) See Elkouri and Elkouri 1985 on permanent arbitrators.
119) See Hepple 1983a: 411; Daniel and Stilgoe 1978; Brown 
1981: 42-50.
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The general character of British corporatism applies to 
these institutions as well. Corporatism in grievance 
procedures is an example of British 'bargained corporatism', 
i.e., "a strategy which accepts major elements of the 
corporatist pattern but tries to insert important aspects of 
a liberal collective bargaining model among them" (120). 
Thus management has to be willing and shop stewards have to 
be strong enough to reach a collective agreement in which 
shop stewards are granted participation rights. The 
incidence of corporatist joint decision-making varies in 
Britain from company to company. Though there is evidence 
for a substantial increase in the proceduralization of 
dismissal, the weakness of shop floor bargaining strength is 
reflected in the insignificant extent of joint industrial 
relations procedures. In 1980 only three percent of 
establishments surveyed had a procedure which allowed appeal 
to a joint-body within the establishment (121).
Nevertheless, the British state (at least until 1979) 
continued to foster tripartism. The directing ACAS Council, 
for example, shows a tripartite composition (122). 
Furthermore, considering the facilitative, cooperative 
rather than repressive character of ACAS, for an ACAS 
officer, to take part in bargaining at company level in a 
discursive fashion can be considered a case of tripartite 
cooperation.
Germany: "Active corporatism"
*
Conciliation, mediation and arbitration institutions in 
Germany outside the labour courts show several forms of 
corporatism and tripartite structures. The arbitration
120) Crouch 1977: 262.
121) Daniel and Millward 1983 cited in Dickens et al 1985: 
237.
122) Hepple and O'Higgins 1981: 79/80; Dickens 1987: 40.
332
committee rEinicrunqsstelle), which is referred to in cases 
of disagreement between the works council and management, 
has a tripartite bench. There is a "neutral chairman" who 
is a labour court judge in 95 percent of the cases (123). 
Arbitration agreements for interest conflict resolution 
usually establish corporatist mediation bodies composed of 
an equal number of members from unions and employer 
associations and a neutral chairman.
An aspect of active corporatism can be found with 
respect to so-called social plans (Sozialplan). In cases 
where management wants restructuring of the company which 
significantly affects the work force, the employer is 
obliged under the Works Constitution Act to enter into a 
company agreement with the works council (124). If 
companies with more than twenty employees wish to dismiss 
more than five employees, they have to notify the local 
labour administration a month in advance (125). The labour 
administration usually actively tries to influence 
management and works council to conclude a social plan 
during this month. The law now provides for an expedited 
arbitration in case the collective parties cannot agree on a 
social plan (126). Empirical studies of arbitration 
committees emphasize the importance of legal regulation and 
the decrease in their autonomy with respect to labour courts 
and labour and other social administrations (127).
Active corporatism is particularly visible in state- 
owned companies. Streeck (128) gives an illuminating
123) Weiss 1987: 162.
124) Sec. Ill and 112 of the Works Constitution Act.
125) In companies with more than 500 employees, management
is only obliged to report mass dismissals of more than 
30 employees at a time to the local labour
administration. See sec. 17 of the Dismissal Protection 
Act.
126) Sec 112 a of the Works Constitution Act.
127) Hartmann 1987 referring to Knuth, Biittner and Schank 
1983 and Oechsler and Schônfeld 1985.
128) Streeck 1984a: 56-81.
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example of how the federal government forced the VW motor 
company (in which it was a major shareholder) to negotiate 
with their works council not only about planned redundancies 
but also about other major changes of company policy. The 
federal state in fact initiated a corporatist arrangement at 
VW by installing a managing director in 1975 who was willing 
to negotiate with the works council and IG Metall. In 
another example of corporatist crisis regulation in the 
German steel industry (ARBED Stahl), researchers report that 
unions were integrated at the leadership level into a 
corporatist block which pushed through the restructuring of 
the company with massive redundancies. In this at least 
part of the work force was excluded from decision-making 
(129).
Active corporatism is most visible in the German 
Codetermination Act of 1976 which grants participation to 
elected employee representatives at board level in companies 
with more than 2000 employees (130). In addition, at the 
national level there is some discussion whether so-called 
Concerted Action fKonzertierte Aktion), which aimed at 
restructuring and stabilizing the German economy through top 
level bargaining between the federal government, employer 
associations and the unions after 1967, led to a new type of 
labour law and industrial relations. Active corporatism in 
these forms, it is said, shows a tendency to legal pluralism 
rather than to dejuridification (131). The scope of 
"societal law" (rather than state law) is expanding and with 
it the extent to which law governs self-regulation (132).
129) Esser and Fach 1981; Heinze 1981; Vobruba 1983: 178
189.
130) Sec. 1 of the Codetermination Act of 1976.
131) Bonfl 1980; Ronge 1983.
132) Willke 1983b.
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Towards a Reflexive Law of Labour Conflict Resolution
The main aspect of reflexive labour law is the 
recognition of self-regulation, both of the labour law 
system and of other social systems. When labour law 
realizes its self-regulation in relation to other forms of 
self-regulation, it becomes able to realize the limits of 
regulation. However, realizing the limits of regulation 
enables labour law on the other hand to determine the 
effective scope of regulation.
A reflexive labour law concept assumes that regulation 
of the industrial relations system by the legal system is 
limited by their respective search for autonomy and their 
needs for self-reproduction (133). In Teubner's concept the 
legal system communicates with another system through mutual 
observation, affiliation by interference and communication 
about organization (134). The legal system intervenes 
according to its own idea of a proper industrial relations 
system, and the industrial relations system reacts towards 
the legal system according to its own perception of the 
legal system. Both systems are exclusively guided by their 
internal models of the external world. Thus, successful 
regulation through interference of the systems depends 
largely on mutual internal realization of the needs of the 
regulating and the regulated system.
We might ask to what extent there are signs of mutual 
recognition of self-regulation in the four systems under 
comparison. We can briefly reconsider our material with 
respect to the seIf-régulatory capacities of both the labour 
court and the workplace industrial relations systems, and to 
examples of mutual recognition of self-regulation.
13 3) Luhmann 1986b.
134) Teubner 1989: 96-122.
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Teubner distinguishes between the conflict-resolution 
function of the legal system and regulation of other systems 
by the legal system. The autopoietic legal system 
encounters few problems in solving societal conflicts 
because it can remain in its boundaries of self-regulation 
in applying its devices (norms, procedures and legal 
doctrine) to process the conflict. Problems arise mainly 
with demands on the legal system to regulate other social 
systems (135).
The line between conflict resolution and regulation as 
two distinct functions of procedure is not always easy to 
draw. Indeed, whether conflict resolution also means 
regulation, depends on the scope of the conflict, the 
characteristics of disputants involved and the issues of the 
conflict.
However, in most labour law systems the distinction 
between conflict resolution and regulation of industrial 
relations matters plays an important role. In conflict 
resolution, furthermore, disputes arising from individual 
employment contracts have to be distinguished from 
collective labour conflicts related to disagreements in 
collective bargaining. Individual employment conflicts are 
generally considered social problems which require legal 
treatment in a legal or judicial procedure. Collective or 
interest disputes are in most countries explicitly exempted 
from judicial treatment and left to be solved and regulated 
by the industrial relations system.
The distinction between individual employment conflicts 
and collective labour conflicts is expressed in the 
distinction of institutions of labour conflict resolution. 
Arbitration procedures for collective conflicts form part of 
the immune system of the industrial relations system. 
Labour courts, on the other hand, are judicial bodies for
135) Teubner 1989: 88-89.
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employment disputes which belong to the institutional 
structure of the legal system.
Labour courts as autopoietic systems have to achieve 
som‘e degree of autonomy. Hubert Rottleuthner has analyzed 
the external differentiation of the German labour court 
system. He concludes that the German labour court system is 
autonomous "gegenüber dem sozio-ökonomischen und dem sozio- 
kulturellen Umfeld, nicht aber gegenüber dem politischen, 
rechtsetzenden System. Hier gelingt seine
Ausdifferenzierung in dem Maße, indem die Gerichte keine 
(probably a printing error; the meaning of the sentence 
suggests "eine", R.R.) eigenständige Rechtsfortbildung 
betreiben" (136).
Rottleuthner rightly emphasizes the judicial function 
of labour courts. Once labour courts are established as 
part of the judicial system, their autonomy depends on 
successful self-regulation of the area of law for which they 
are responsible. This means that the labour courts have to 
be active in forming the labour law. For this purpose they 
can benefit from regulations achieved in the industrial 
relations system.
Labour courts thus recognize self-regulation of the 
industrial relations system in a variety of ways. However, 
they do so for their own purposes of extending legal 
autonomy in their fielde of law. There are several examples 
of how labour courts try to instrumentalize industrial 
relations procedures for their purposes.
In their formative period in the 1970s, British 
Industrial Tribunals went beyond mere recognition of 
industrial self-regulation and actively endorsed and 
directly controlled the employer's use or non-use of dispute 
procedures; they developed a reasonableness test linking the
136) Rottleuthner 1984: 355.
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judgement of dismissals to procedural fairness (137). The 
Court of Appeal reversed this line of decision-making, 
thereby arguing that such a direct linkage would lead to 
formalistic results (138). In fact, the courts stopped the 
instrumentalization of company procedures for purposes of 
judicial decision-making and this can be seen as enhancing 
the autonomy of industrial relations decision-making.
German labour courts also engage in active recognition 
of other forms of regulation. In the conciliation phase and 
during conciliation attempts at the hearing, the labour 
courts often propose a solution which suits the regulation 
of the unemployment agency to secure the dismissed employees 
an immediate payment of unemployment benefits, and to adopt 
the agency's view as terms of the settlement. However, 
labour courts encourage the reference to an absent third 
party in their own interest. The judges can more easily 
convince the parties to agree to a settlement when there is 
an option of calling in a third party. And settlements 
relieve the court of the obligation to formulate a decision.
The aim of reflexive labour law is twofold: a self-
critical assessment of legal developments relating to 
doctrinal issues and operations of labour courts; and a 
description of self-regulation in industrial relations. 
Reflexive law in general claims to enlighten the legal 
discourse with socio-legal information in order to assess 
critically legal perspectives on reality. In accordance, 
reflexive labour law discusses the legal construction of 
industrial relations reality. For this purpose it obtains
information from industrial relations and * socio-legal
137) Earl v. Slater and Wheeler (Airlyne) Ltd. [1972] ICR 
508.
138) See especially British Labour Pump Co. Ltd. v. Byrne 
[1979] ICR 347. The negative effect of this decision on 
dismissal procedures at company level was acknowledged 
by the House of Lords in the decision Polkey v. Dayton 
Services Ltd. [1988] ICR 142, which reversed British 
Labour Pump.
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research on regulatory and self-regulatory processes in 
industrial relations. Some information gathered in Chapters 
II and III can be assessed with respect to these self- 
regulatory processes.
American-style grievance arbitration provides many 
examples of the consequences of autonomous self-regulation 
by collective actors at the workplace. Issues handled by 
these negotiation systems have to become collectivized. 
This system maintains its autonomy through control over the 
input. The major legal and organizational obstacles to 
handling individual employment conflicts in grievance 
procedures are related to the representation of individual 
interests.
In his critical assessment of U.S. grievance procedures 
and grievance arbitration, Herding reports that procedural 
rights were found to be largely ineffective and eroding: "In 
the grievance and arbitration procedure, waves of 
'efficient', low-level, relatively speedy settlements with 
substantial success in arbitration are succeeded by those of 
obstinate day-to-day bargaining including strife for 
expanding contractual rights, which result in long delays, 
high-level settlements, and little success in the 
unambiguously non-expansive step of arbitration. ... the 
grievance machinery ... turns into a conflict-evading rather 
than conflict-settling strategy" (139).
The U.S. labour law system has imposed a duty of fair 
representation on union representatives in grievance 
procedures. However, the collective character of the 
grievance process unavoidably leads union representatives to 
adopt a view that they "own" the individual grievances. 
Much of the criticism of grievance handling in U.S. 
grievance procedures relates to this intertwinement of the 
enforcement of collective issues and of individual rights,
139) Herding 1972: 212-213.
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which are both granted in the collective bargaining
agreement. The tension between individual rights and
collective interests thus constitutes the structure of the 
U.S. grievance procedure.
In Germany this tension is solved by large-scale 
abstentionism of works councils from unequivocal 
representation of dismissed employees. This self-restraint 
of representative bodies in fact means delegation of 
dismissal matters to the labour courts, which are seen as 
the appropriate bodies for handling of these cases. 
Although labour courts have many jurisdictions over
employment conflicts, in fact, in the vast majority of 
cases, they only handle conflicts after the employee has
involuntarily or voluntarily left the job. 91 percent out 
of the already high number of almost 400,000 claims brought 
each year to the German labour courts derive from broken 
employment relationships (140). Thus Falke concludes 
convincingly: "Die Funktion des Gerichts ist vorwiegend, den 
Abbruch von Sozialbeziehungen zu regeln, nicht aber, deren 
Aufrechterhaltung zu erreichen." (141).
Disputes in continuous employment are thus most often 
handled either in informal negotiations at the company level 
or resolved by one or another form of self-help, i.e., 
deviant behaviour or avoidance. The real dangers attached 
to the delegation strategy of works councils in these 
matters lie with those cases in which employees in fact want 
to continue employment despite the breach in the social 
relationship. Thus far they get very little support indeed
*from either their elected representatives or the labour 
courts (142).
140) Reported by Kohte 1981: 49. See also Diekmann 1984:
83.
141) Falke 1984b: 132.
142) Höland 1985, Linne 1984.
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Although the German approach can hardly be criticized 
for lacking institutionalization of seIf-regulatory 
mechanisms, it nevertheless encounters problems of 
representation of individual employees similar to those in 
France. Works councils largely underexploit their potential 
power in employment protection compared to a relatively
greater engagement of American local union representatives 
in grievance procedures. Since works councils are
integrated into company management by means of their co­
determination rights, individual complaints are largely 
delegated to the external judicial forum of the labour 
court.
Self-regulation of individual employment conflicts that 
delegated protection of individuals, now carried out by
judiciaries, to the workplace industrial relations system 
would require procedures different from most of the present 
integrated collective negotiation systems. Collective 
parties in all four countries engage in trade-offs, creating
a web of commitment and trust relations, which, in West
Germany for example, have the effect that works councils 
exchange leniency in personnel matters for participation in 
economic decision-making, which they consider more 
important. Unequivocal representation of individual
interests is hardly possible under these conditions. It 
would therefore require special grievance committees for 
joint decisions of these conflicts if continued employment 
in the company is desired either in the same job or in 
another capacity.
The French system of grievance procedures demonstrates 
a particular weakness with respect to self-régulâtion. 
Self-regulation at the shop floor traditionally had to rely 
on outside intervention to regulate matters of workplace 
industrial relations. The institutional boundaries and 
jurisdictions between the three main representative bodies 
at the shop floor (personnel delegates, enterprise
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committees and union sections) led to competition and 
factionalism which decreased the efficiency of employee 
representation against management (143). However, this has 
been changing since the reforms of the 1980's.
Nevertheless, the French system still lacks strong 
self-regulation. In a comparison with American grievance 
procedures, Renaud mentions that the vagueness of the French 
procedural standards puts the delegates in a position to 
oppose management on principle (144). In his view, the 
American grievance procedure allows for more detailed 
treatment of individual cases and is thus more flexible and 
pragmatic. Both the formal principle of seniority, which is 
easy to implement, and the nature of American grievance 
procedure as an institutionalized form of collective 
bargaining (continuous bargaining) is interpreted as 
superior to the French system. In this account French 
workplace industrial relations would improve through 
institutional stabilization of negotiations at the 
enterprise level. Due to the "loi Aroux" of 1982 and other 
legislation in the 1980s which supported collective 
bargaining in workplace industrial relations (145), French 
industrial relations are now experimenting with forms of 
self-regulation (146). The recent reforms adopted the 
strategy of strengthening self-regulation and employment 
conflict resolution at the company level in France through 
the reduction of competition among the representative bodies 
in French companies and restriction of the powers of the 
labour inspector. However, the role of union sections is 
still not entirely clear. They could, for example, adopt a 
new role in handling discharge cases at the'company level 
and in negotiating over company agreements with management 
(social plan). This body seems well suited to performing
143) See also Nagels and Sorge 1977: 99; Weiss 1973: 275f..
144) Reynaud 1975: 245-7.
145) On intentions of the labour law proposals of the 
Mitterand era see Javillier 1981.
146) Goetschy and Rojot 1987.
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the role of an independent and unyielding representative 
which, in so doing, also promotes industrial self­
regulation.
British industrial relations are said to have largely 
recognized the new labour law system and the Industrial 
Tribunal system. As an indicator for this, industrial 
relations research usually points to the adoption of formal 
dismissal procedures. However, these procedures are not 
joint decision-making procedures, as already mentioned on 
various occasions. Union involvement in dispute procedures 
occurs only in negotiations over the introduction of these 
procedures and in representation of members who are about to 
be disciplined or dismissed. Participation in determining 
the issue and applying sanctions is the rare exception 
(147). Nevertheless, the still low number of complaints 
with the Industrial Tribunals (only one tenth of the 
caseload of German labour courts) suggests that several 
conflicts which in France or Germany go to the labour court 
are settled in one way or another at the company level.
A comparison of the degree of self-regulation in the 
industrial relations systems can be summarized as follows. 
The French system is still characterized by a low capacity 
for self-regulation, although this is rapidly changing. The 
American system, in contrast, which favours private company 
grievance procedures with final and binding arbitration, 
formally shows the highest degree of autonomy in self­
regulation of dismissals at the plant level. However, with 
the decline of unionism these negotiation systems at the 
plant level are severely threatened. The British system can 
be characterized as a dual approach; it fosters voluntary 
grievance procedures through official conciliation but it 
also threatens employers with Industrial Tribunals, which 
judge managerial behaviour in dismissal situations based on 
fairness standards agreed upon by their peers. The German
147) Dickens et al. 1985: 237.
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system relies from an early stage in the dispute resolution 
process on judicial procedures and favours adjudication over 
other forms of dispute resolution; self-regulation of labour 
conflicts at the company level distinguishes strictly 
between employment conflicts related to broken employment 
relationships and continuing employment relationships (148).
The reflexive law perspective can contribute to the 
debate on the transfer of industrial relations rules between 
national industrial relations and labour law systems. 
Comparative industrial relations research has from its 
beginning struggled with the demands of international and 
national policy-makers for ways to design industrial 
relations policies and to legitimize international transfer 
of these policies. The International Labour Organization in 
Geneva is the major body to promote the harmonization and 
universalization of industrial relations regulations by 
enforcing minimum standards of industrial relations conduct 
and employment protection. Dunlop's comparative approach, 
for example, implicitly fosters the idea of the 
modernization of industrial relations rules and institutions 
according to universal patterns. However, he is also a good 
example of the opposition which the ILO has encountered, 
especially from U.S. industrial relations research. Dunlop 
remains astonishingly skeptical about the international 
transfer of rules and procedures (149).
Otto Kahn-Freund, the eminent comparative labour 
lawyer, was more optimistic with respect to the 
transplantation of industrial relation rules. Kahn-Freund 
distinguished between individual and collective labour 
relations rules and procedures, strongly warning against 
transplanting collective bargaining institutions and rules. 
Since these are closely linked to the structure and 
organization of political and social power within their own
148) Kochan, Katz and McKersie 1984, cited in Kerr and 
Staudohar 1986: 395/6.
149) Dunlop 1958: 27.
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environment, they cannot be expected to function adequately 
when wrenched out of their original context and implanted 
elsewhere. However, labour relation rules and procedures 
relating to individual workers, he thought, could be 
transplanted relatively straightforwardly. According to 
Kahn-Freund, comparative research on procedures relating to 
individual workers is less likely to be misused in political 
debates when reforms of industrial relations systems are 
intended (150).
In a systems theoretical view, Kahn-Freund has simply 
separated the industrial relations context from the legal 
context and its rules. From the industrial relations
systems point of view, the legal protection of individual 
employees remains relatively external to the industrial 
relations system as a system based on recursive collective 
communications. It is an affair more or less confined to 
the legal system and thus is easier to "harmonize” among
nations than the rules directly related to vital processes 
of collective communications. Thus Kahn-Freund's statement 
can be read as the statement of a comparative lawyer who 
sees little resistance in national legal systems to the 
harmonization of labour law norms because of the relatively 
marginal nature of labour law within national legal orders.
Industrial relations researchers are rarely able to
influence political processes directly; Kahn-Freund was a 
notable exception in this respect because of his outstanding 
personal reputation as a legal scholar which was recognized 
even outside the legal academia in British politics and 
industrial relations (151). The political process in 
general uses or misuses industrial relations research,
uncontrolled by researchers, as Kahn-Freund clearly saw
150) Kahn-Freund 1974. Bean 1985: 5.
151) See Clegg 1983 on Kahn-Freund's influence on British 
industrial relations policies and Wedderburn 1983 on 
Kahn-Freund's impact on British labour law.
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(152). Comparative industrial relations have to distinguish 
between their political purposes and the academic 
intentions, and thus have to define themselves clearly as an 
academic discipline of comparative industrial relations 
research in order to survive. Roy Bean sees this clearly 
when he insists that the overriding purpose of comparative 
industrial relations research is primarily academic and not 
its relevance for any practical policy implications (153). 
His approach is superior to competing approaches in 
industrial relations that naively think that it is possible 
mechanistically "to graft industrial relations practices 
derived from one country to another" (154).
We can now return to the topic of self-regulation for 
some final observations. Legally, the idea of self­
regulation rests on two pillars: collective bargaining and 
the settlement of conflicts in self-created procedures which 
solve the conflict finally and bindingly. Interest 
conflicts are, in all countries under comparison, self- 
regulated in this sense. With respect to employment 
conflicts the concept of self-regulation has been adopted 
most clearly in the U.S.. In Germany only a few conflicts 
are handled exclusively at the company level, e.g., the 
resolution of so-called regulation conflicts over the 
interpretation of company agreements.
There is an important interplay between formal and 
informal negotiations. Formal rules and procedures are used 
as bargaining counters to secure informal negotiations 
(155). In fact, the more dispute or grievance procedure 
systems develop into routine procedures ' of conflict 
resolution and into private judiciaries, the more there is a 
need for informal negotiations to preserve non-conflictual 
communication between management and employee
152) Kahn-Freund 1974.
153) Bean 1985: 7 and the concluding statement on p. 229.
154) Bamber and Lansbury 1987: 11.
155) Gouldner 1954; McCarthy 1966.
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representatives. Routinized dispute procedures have to 
differentiate into mechanisms for conflict resolution and 
into institutions for joint decision-making.
Mutual recognition of self-regulation in labour 
conflict resolution matters has taken several forms. Labour 
courts largely acknowledge solutions reached at the company 
level. Increasingly solutions are best brought about by 
procedural rather than substantive legal devices. 
Industrial relations systems have to accept the role of 
labour courts in labour conflict resolution in so far as 
attempts to reestablish broken employment relationships are 
concerned. For the unequivocal representation of conflicts 
in continuous employment, separate, procedurally 
differentiated grievance committees are better equipped to 
handle these individual grievances than the established 
bodies of co-determination or collective bargaining which 
are dominated by collective concerns.
Decentralized decision-making, the retreat to 
proceduralism and mutual recognition of self-regulation in 
the legal and the industrial relations system are three 
tendencies which all enhance self-regulation through 
negotiations. The realization of this fact constitutes the 
core assumption of a conception of reflexive labour law. 
There is a peculiar relationship between self-regulation and 
third party intervention. Although autonomous self- 
regulation does not preclude third party intervention, it 
ultimately aims at direct negotiations between the parties 
at dispute. Conciliation, mediation, arbitration and 
adjudication provide the shadow in which negotiations in 
grievance procedures and in collective bargaining can take 
place. "Yet the availability of third-party services is a 
mixed blessing because it frequently encourages reliance on 
these services, making bargainers less likely to resolve 
their controversies on their own" (156). One disadvantage
156) Pruitt 1981: 220.
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of arbitration is that the parties may come to rely on the 
third party to do their thinking. And the parties are less 
likely to adhere to a decision by a third party over the 
long run than to a solution endorsed by the parties 
themselves. Negotiation remains the preferred method of 
self-regulation, because the parties themselves are best 
qualified to assess and uphold the needs of the disputants.
The analytical distinction between conflict resolution 
in the legal and in the industrial relations system enables 
us to understand their relationship as intersystemic 
cooperation. It follows from the assumption of autonomous 
social systems with self-regulatory capacities that external 
regulation of labour conflict resolution through political 
intervention can only improve a situation if the political 
intentions are translated into processes of self-regulation 
of either the legal or the industrial relations system.
In realizing self-regulation of the industrial 
relations system, reflexive labour law can advance beyond a 
conflict-centered perspective on the procedures of labour 
conflict resolution. These procedures are characterized by 
intervention power towards collective bargaining and thus 
inherently promote the idea of industrial democracy. 
Procedures of labour conflict resolution operate in the 
industrial relations system and contribute in securing the 
autonomy of the system, either through self-reference or as 
an immune system. They can memorize negotiations results as 
results of conflict resolution.
However, the realization of other functions than 
conflict resolution which are attached to the procedures and 
operations in the industrial relations system is a main 
achievement of the conception of reflexive labour law. 
Reflexive labour law describes realistically the 
contribution of the law of labour conflict resolution to 
self-regulation of the industrial relations system. It 
emphasizes the limits of law and the limited role of labour
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courts in this respect. However, the reflexive labour law 
conception can contribute to the establishment of a new view 
of procedures of labour conflict resolution by 
reconstructing processes of self-regulation in the 
industrial relations system and the legal system. These 
procedures of joint decision-making may well contain the 
potential to become the essential elements of a modern 
concept of the corporation which is conceived as a network 
of micro-corporatist arrangements and collective negotiation 
systems.
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